2017 QCCQ 3284, 2017 QCCQ 3284

Importations Sweet Value inc. c. 9095 6350 Québec inc. 2017 QCCQ 3284 COURT OF QUEBEC (Civil Division) CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL No: 500-22-074478-028 DATE: March 30, 2017 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE ENRICO FORLINI J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ IMPORTATIONS SWEET VALUE INC.

Plaintiff v. 9095 6350 QUÉBEC INC. and CONSTANTINOS STASINOPOULOS and THEODORE STASINOPOULOS Defendants ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] In August 2002, Importations Sweet Value Inc. (Sweet Value) commenced a lawsuit against the defendants in which it claims $49,264.87 solidarily. More than 14 years later, the trial in this matter has still not been heard. [ 2 ] The defendants Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095 6350 Québec Inc. (9095) [1] bring an application pursuant to

section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) in which they ask the Court to dismiss Sweet Value’s lawsuit. [2] 9095 and Constantinos Stasinopoulos argue that Sweet Value’s lawsuit constitutes an abuse of proceedings given the unreasonable and inexcusable delays incurred since the introduction of the proceedings. They further argue that in 2017 alone, Sweet Value committed three serious misconducts towards the Court. Finally they argue that on its merits, Sweet Value’s claim is ill-founded and farfetched in that it has not filed the proper documentary evidence to support its claim in damages. Questions in Issue [ 3 ] Is Sweet Value’s lawsuit abusive within the meaning of

section 51 C.C.P. ? If so, is dismissal of the lawsuit warranted? Context [ 4 ] Sweet Value filed its lawsuit on August 2, 2002. In its application, it alleges that it carries on business as an importer of fruits. It claims it entered into an agreement with 9095 whereby Sweet Value was to act as an intermediary for 9095 in the importation and purchase of fruits and vegetables. Under this agreement, Sweet Value imports and purchases produce from various suppliers, 9095 takes delivery and ownership of the produce and reimburses Sweet Value the amount it has paid for the fruits and vegetables.

Sweet Value alleges that 9095 breached the agreement in that it has not reimbursed it for shipments of fruits and vegetables which it ordered and paid for the benefit of 9095. [ 5 ] Sweet Value’s lawsuit is also directed against Constantinos Stasinopoulos and Theodore Stasinopoulos, who are respectively the director and shareholder of 9095. Sweet Value seeks to pierce the corporate veil pursuant to

section 317 of the Civil Code of Québec to hold Constantinos and Theodore Stasinopoulos personally liable for the amounts owned by 9095 to Sweet Value. [3] [ 6 ] 9095, Constantinos and Theodore Stasinopoulos filed their respective statements of defense in July 2003. Various applications where filed by the parties over the course of the life of the lawsuit, but, as will be addressed further below, the file was left dormant and inactive for considerable stretches of time. In fact, the plumitif [4] reveals that since August 2002, the file was inactive for approximately 9 years and 10 months. The Law:

section 51 C.C.P. and Dismissal for Want of Prosecution [ 7 ] The Application to Dismiss is based on s. 51 C.C.P. , which reads as follows:

51. Les tribunaux peuvent à tout moment, sur demande et même d’office, déclarer qu’une demande en justice ou un autre acte de procédure est abusif. L’abus peut résulter, sans égard à l’intention, d’une demande en justice ou d’un autre acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire, ou d’un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent. Il peut aussi résulter de l’utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, entre autres si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d’expression d’autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. 52. Si une

partie établit

sommairement que la demande en justice ou l’acte de procédure peut constituer un abus, il revient à la

partie qui l’introduit de démontrer que son geste n’est pas exercé de manière excessive ou déraisonnable et se justifie en droit. La demande est présentée et contestée oralement, et le tribunal en décide sur le vu des actes de procédure et des pièces au dossier et, le cas échéant, de la transcription des interrogatoires préalables à l’instruction. Aucune autre preuve n’est présentée, à moins que le tribunal ne l’estime nécessaire.

La demande faite au tribunal de se prononcer sur le caractère abusif d’un acte de procédure qui a pour effet de limiter la liberté d’expression d’autrui dans le contexte d’un débat public est, en première instance, traitée en priorité. 51. The courts may, at any time, on an application and even on their own initiative, declare that a judicial application or a pleading is abusive. Regardless of intent, the abuse of procedure may consist in a judicial application or pleading that is clearly unfounded, frivolous or intended to delay or in conduct that is vexatious or quarrelsome.

It may also consist in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or that causes prejudice to another person, or attempts to defeat the ends of justice, particularly if it operates to restrict another person’s freedom of expression in public debate. 52. If a party summarily establishes that a judicial application or pleading may constitute an abuse of procedure, the onus is on the initiator of the application or pleading to show that it is not excessive or unreasonable and is justified in law.

The application is presented and defended orally, and decided by the court on the face of the pleadings and exhibits in the record and the transcripts of any pre-trial examinations. No other evidence is presented, unless the court considers it necessary.

An application for a court ruling on the abusive nature of a pleading that operates to restrict another person’s freedom of expression in public debate must, in first instance, be dealt with as a matter of priority. [ 8 ] The general principles applicable on an application to dismiss on the grounds that a judicial application or a pleadings is abusive are succinctly summarized by Justice Chatelain in 8187819 Canada Inc . v. Dumoulin : [34] Les principes applicables à une demande en rejet fondée sur l’

article 51 C.p.c. au motif que le recours est manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire sont bien connus :

a) en présence d’un recours qui ne présente pas de chance de succès, le Tribunal peut déclarer le recours abusif et rejeter le recours préliminairement;

b) lorsqu’un abus est

sommairement établi, il y a renversement du fardeau de la preuve et il appartient à la

partie qui a introduit l’acte de procédure attaqué de démontrer prima facie qu’elle n’agit pas de façon excessive ou déraisonnable et que sa procédure se justifie en droit;

c) le Tribunal doit faire montre de prudence et ne rejeter une action que si un examen méticuleux du dossier le mène à conclure que le recours est manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire;

d) dans le cadre de son examen, le Tribunal peut utiliser l’ensemble du dossier incluant les procédures, les pièces et les interrogatoires;

e) le Tribunal n’a pas à apprécier le degré de difficulté qu’aura le demandeur à prouver ses allégations;

f) le Tribunal peut conclure à l’abus sans égard à l'intention d'abuser et il n'est pas requis de démontrer la malveillance ou la mauvaise foi de l’auteur de l’abus;

g) un acte de procédure intenté de façon téméraire peut constituer un abus;

h) avant de rejeter préliminairement un recours, le cas doit être clair; et

i) si la situation est claire, le Tribunal doit statuer sans reporter inutilement l’analyse de la problématique à une étape judiciaire ultérieure. [5] [ 9 ]

Section 51 C.C.P. must also be interpreted and applied keeping in mind that the mission of the courts includes ensuring proper case management (assurer la saine gestion des instances) as stated in

section 9 C.C.P. and as reminded by the Minister of Justice when the new Code of Civil Procedure was adopted [6] : Le pouvoir de sanctionner les abus s'inscrit dans la mission des tribunaux d'assurer une saine gestion des instances et il constitue une application du principe de proportionnalité. Les actes doivent, quant à leur coût et au temps exigé pour les traiter, être proportionnés à leur nature et à leur finalité.

Il ressort de la jurisprudence que les tribunaux sont très prudents dans l'exercice de ce pouvoir afin de ne pas brimer l'exercice des droits et de préserver notamment celui à une défense pleine et entière, mais il est aussi nécessaire, dans l'intérêt même de la justice, de réprimer ou de limiter les abus de la procédure.

L'article est une application en matière de procédure civile des principes posés par les articles 6 et 7 du Code civil , lesquels permettent de considérer que si l'abus peut résulter d'une intention de nuire, donc répréhensible, il peut aussi résulter de l'exercice déraisonnable ou excessif d'un droit qui rompt l'équilibre des droits entre les parties ou qui détourne le droit, ou ici la procédure, de sa fin sociale intrinsèque, l'administration de la justice telle que la disposition préliminaire du Code de procédure civile la circonscrit. [ 10 ] The courts of this province have interpreted and applied s. 51 C.C.P. [7] in the context of applications to dismiss for want of prosecution or for inordinate delay on a number of occasions. [ 11 ] In 2008, in Karkouti v.

Société Al-Qantara , the Superior Court dismissed a lawsuit where the underlying facts took place between 1994 and 1998 and the lawsuit had been filed in 1998 [8] . [ 12 ] The lawsuit progressed somewhat between 1998 and 2000, albeit at a slow pace. The file was more or less dormant between 2000 and 2002 over a roughly 19 month period. The plaintiff was pushed to re-activate his file between January and March 2002 when the defendant filed a motion in peremption of suit. [ 13 ] Between September 2002 and June 2008, the plaintiff failed to prosecute his action.

The defendant brought its application to dismiss in June 2008. The plaintiff in Karkouti offered no proof to explain the 6 year period of inactivity [9] . [ 14 ] Justice Roy noted that the onus is on the plaintiff to prosecute its file [10] . She added that the defendant has the burden of proving that the delays are excessive, unjustified and causes him/her to suffer prejudice [11] . [ 15 ] The passage of time made it difficult for the defendant’s witnesses to recall what had happened many years before [12] . In her view, the delay gives rise to a presumption of prejudice to the defendant [13] .

Ultimately, Justice Roy held that the inordinate, excessive and unexplained delay caused prejudice to the defendant and deprived it of its right to a full and fair defense [14] . [ 16 ] The rule that inordinate delay compromises a defendant’s right to a fair trial because of the risk that its witnesses can no longer recollect what happened many years prior was reiterated in Pliska Investments Inc. v. Montréal (Ville de) [15] . [ 17 ] In Pliska , there had been a 17 year period of inactivity between the filing of the City’s statement of defense and the examination of its representative.

The court dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of

section 54.1 old C.C.P. While the plaintiff did testify at the hearing of the motion to dismiss to try to justify the delays in prosecuting the lawsuit, her explanations failed to convince the court [16] . The court held that the inordinate and inexcusable delay made it such that the lawsuit was excessive and unreasonable and thus dismissal was warranted. [ 18 ] Simon v. Gabriel [17] is another illustration of the dismissal of an action for inordinate and inexcusable delays. The lawsuit was based on facts which took place during the Oka crisis in 1994 and was filed in the same year.

It appears from the ruling that the certificate of readiness had been issued by the court in 2005, yet neither the plaintiff nor its lawyer took any steps to

prosecute the file over a 7 year period (2005 to 2012). [ 19 ] In October 2011, the defendant brought a motion to dismiss based on

section 54.1 old C.C.P. which was heard and granted in June 2012.

Justice Marcotte writes: [8] CONSIDÉRANT que par ailleurs pour justifier son inaction depuis mars 2007, l'avocat des Demandeurs soutient qu'il a omis par inadvertance de déposer au dossier de la Cour en mars 2007, la réinscription et la nouvelle déclaration pour mise au rôle d'au​dience qu'il avait préparées et qu'il a laissées par mégarde au dossier avant de classer le dossier par erreur parmi les dossiers fermés; [9] CONSIDÉRANT que malgré ces explications, l'avocat des Demandeurs s'est déclaré incapable de déposer à l'audience les procédures qu'il soutient avoir préparées en 2007, puisqu'elles ne figurent apparemment plus à son dossier; … [18] CONSIDÉRANT qu'au-delà des 18 années passées depuis l'introduction des procédures, les délais dans le dossier depuis l'émission du certificat d'état de cause en 2005 sont injustifiables et susceptibles de causer un dérapage judiciaire important ; [19] CONSIDÉRANT que le droit des Défendeurs à une défense pleine et entière est susceptible d'en être largement affecté, puisque la preuve dans ce dossier reposera sur des témoignages et que les 18 années écoulées depuis l'introduction des procédures sont susceptibles d'empêcher la tenue d'un procès équitable ; [20] CONSIDÉRANT que depuis les évènements de 1994, les principaux témoins en défense ont, soit pris leur retraite ou ne seront pas susceptibles de se rappeler avec force et détail des évènements, lorsque le dossier sera susceptible d'être entendu au fond; [21] CONSIDÉRANT que le défaut de faire progresser le dossier des Demandeurs est imputable à plusieurs omissions de leur avocat depuis 2006, soit le défaut d'as​surer le suivi de la conférence préparatoire entre 2005 et 2007, le défaut de produire les procédures de réinscription et de déclaration de dossier complétées en 2007 et le fait d'avoir classé le dossier parmi les dossiers fermés et de n'avoir assumé aucun suivi jusqu'à la Requête du Procureur général en 2011; [22] CONSIDÉRANT que le Tribunal est en présence d'erreurs répé​tées de l'avocat des Demandeurs qui peuvent être qualifiées d'insouciance et de manque généralisé de célérité, voire de négligence grossière et dont les conséquences entraînent une injustice pour la

partie adverse que ce Tribunal, agissant avec circons​pection, ne peut cautionner; (underlining added) [ 20 ] The Québec Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of Justice Marcotte’s decision [18] . Firstly, the Court notes that the inordinate delay in prosecuting the lawsuit demonstrates that the plaintiffs showed a gross lack of interest in pursuing their claim. [ 21 ] The Court adds that the defendant’s failure to bring a motion in peremption of suit is not a bar to a motion under 54.1 old C.C.P. for dismissal for want of prosecution [19] .

Finally, the court concludes that the reasoning in paragraphs 8, 9, and 18 to 22 of the Superior Court’s decision (cited above) “is sound and Appellants fail to demonstrate, in the judgement a quo , any error that would justify the intervention of the Court.” [20] [ 22 ] Finally, in Couture v. Québec (Procureur général) , the Superior Court held that because the plaintiffs failed to prosecute their claim over an 8 year period (2003 to 2012), the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was excessive and unreasonable and therefore abusive for the purposes of

section 54.1 old C.C.P. [21] The lawsuit was dismissed. Application of the Law to the Facts of the Present Case [ 23 ] In March 2017, 9095 and Constantinos Stasinopoulos bring an Application to Dismiss based on

section 51 C.C.P. and argue:

a) The 14 ½ delay since the filing of the lawsuit is unreasonable and excessive and constitutes an abuse;

b) Sweet Value’s recent conduct is abusive;

c) The merits of Sweet Value’s claim is unfounded because we are on the eve of the trial and it has no evidence to prove its damages;

d) The delay gives rise to a presumption of prejudice. In fact, they have suffered prejudice in that the lawsuit is based on facts that happened at least 15 years ago, one witness has died, another witness cannot be found, Mr. Constantinos Stasinopoulos is now 75 years old and his memory has faded;

e) The Defendants have made at the very least a prima facie case of abuse. The Plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of abuse (

section 52 C.C.P. ) because it presented no evidence at the hearing of the Application to Dismiss. [ 24 ] Sweet Value’s lawsuit was commenced in August 2002. Almost 15 years later, the trial has still not been held, although the trial is scheduled to start May 5, 2017. [ 25 ] It is useful to present a chronology of the lawsuit since 2002. [ 26 ] Concurrently with the filing of its lawsuit in August 2012, Sweet value obtains the court’s authorization to seize before judgement property belonging to the defendants [22] . On August 12, 2002, the seizures before judgment are quashed [23] .

Between August and October 2002, there is a flurry of activity in the file surrounding the proceedings in seizure before judgement, including proceedings before the Québec Court of Appeal which come to an end in April 2003. [ 27 ] On July 29, 2013, the Defendants obtain the court’s authorization to seize before judgement property belonging to the plaintiff [24] . [ 28 ] On July 30, 2003, the defendants file their statements of defense [25] . [ 29 ] On September 30 and October 1, 2003, the court hears a motion to quash the defendants’ seizures before judgment.

On January 6, 2004, Judge Locas quashes the seizures practiced by the defendants [26] . [ 30 ] A bill of costs is filed by the defendants on April 5, 2005 [27] . [ 31 ] Between April 6, 2004 and May 20, 2008, there is no activity whatsoever in the judicial file. Sweet Value does not explain at the hearing of the Application to Dismiss why the file was dormant for 4 years plus one month. [ 32 ] On May 20, 2008, Sweet Value files it inscription for proof and hearing. On July 8, 2008, it receives a notice of incomplete file [28] .

It does nothing to remedy this. [ 33 ] On February 17, 2009, it receives a second notice of incomplete file [29] .

Once again, it fails to remedy this. [ 34 ] On June 20, 2011, the court convenes the parties to a provisional roll call scheduled for August 30, 2011. [ 35 ] Between the inscription for proof and hearing filed by Sweet value in May 2008 and the notice to attend a provisional roll call on August 30, 2011, 39 months pass yet Sweet Value does nothing to remedy the two notices of incomplete file. [ 36 ] On August 30, 2011, the case is postponed to the next provisional roll call scheduled for October 25, 2011.

On this day, the trial is scheduled for June 6, 2012 [30] . [ 37 ] The trial is postponed notably because on June 1, 2012, Constantinos Stasinopoulos files a motion to declare Sweet Value’s lawyer (Me Marc Galletta) unable to act. [31] [ 38 ] The motion to declare Sweet Value’s lawyer unable to act is heard on December 13, 2013 before Judge Aznar.

On February 7, 2013 Judge Aznar grants the motion and declares Sweet Value’s lawyer unable to act. [ 39 ] In the intervening period, on September 14, 2012 Constantinos Stasinopoulos files a Motion to Dismiss based on old section 165(4) C.C.P. on the grounds that Sweet Value does not have standing to sue because it was struck from the Registraire des entreprises du Québec in June 2006.

The excerpt from the Registraire des entreprises du Québec filed in support of the motion shows that Sweet Value filed its annual declaration for 2003 in January 2004, did not file its annual declaration for the year 2004, received a notice of default in June 2005 and was struck on June 16, 2006 [32] . [ 40 ] It appears that following the filing of the Motion to Dismiss of September 14, 2012, Sweet Value remedied its default and filed its annual declaration for the years 2004 to 2012 and was thus re-immatriculated [33] .

Hence the Motion to Dismiss of September 14, 2012 was ultimately dismissed by the court on November 5, 2013. [ 41 ] On April 23, 2013, the law firm Martino Peluzzo files an appearance for Sweet value further to the judgment of February 7, 2013 declaring its former counsel unable to act. [ 42 ] On October 15, 2013, Sweet value files an inscription for proof and hearing and a declaration under old

section 274.1 C.C.P . [ 43 ] On July 5, 2016, the parties are convened to a provisional roll call scheduled for September 29, 2016 to fix a trial date. On that date, the trial is scheduled for February 22, 2017. Sweet Value does not explain at the hearing of the Application to Dismiss why the file was dormant for 32 months between November 2013 and July 2016.

[ 44 ] On February 13, 2017, the Court writes to the lawyers for the parties to enquire as to whether they are ready to proceed at the trial scheduled for February 22, 2017. [ 45 ] On February 14, 2017, the lawyer for Sweet Value informs the Court that “ le dossier est complet et nous sommes prêt à procéder. ” [ 46 ] On February 21, on the eve of the trial, Sweet Value’s lawyer informs the Court by letter that she will ask for a postponement of the trial since plaintiff’s sole representative, Mr.

Gadi Fogelman, cannot attend the trial because his spouse is scheduled to give birth at any moment. [ 47 ] On the day scheduled for the trial, Sweet Value asks the court to postpone the trial; the defendants contest this request arguing that it is made at the last minute, that it contradicts Sweet Value’s position taken on February 14 and that there is no evidence in the form of a sworn statement from Mr. Fogelman proving that his spouse is due to give birth imminently. [ 48 ] On February 22, 2017, the Court hears evidence and oral arguments on Sweet Value’s request for a postponement.

The Court grants the adjournment but decides that the request was abusive within the meaning of

section 51 C.C.P. [34] The Court further holds that it will remain seized of the matter and schedules a case-management conference for February 28, 2017. [ 49 ] The defendants’ Application to Dismiss was filed on March 13 and heard on March 16, 2017. [ 50 ] This chronology of the proceedings from August 2002 to September 2016 as described above reveals that over the course of this 14 year period, there was a period of 118 months or 9 years and 10 months of inactivity. [ 51 ] This 118 month period of inactivity is inordinate and unreasonable.

This is clearly a case of the old maxim that “Justice delayed is justice denied.” [35] [ 52 ] The 118 month delay gives rise to a presumption of prejudice to the defendants. [ 53 ] Not only is there a presumption of prejudice resulting from the delay, the defendants 9095 and Constantinos Stasinopoulos have established through the evidence made at the hearing of the Application to Dismiss that the delay has in fact caused them serious prejudice [36] . The underlying facts of the lawsuit occurred at least 15 years ago, one witness has died, another witness cannot be found, Mr.

Constantinos Stasinopoulos is now 75 years old and his memory has faded. [ 54 ] Sweet Value provided no evidence to explain or justify the delays in this lawsuit. The hearing of the Application to Dismiss was preceded by a case management conference on February 28, 2017 before the undersigned to, inter alia , address all issues related to the defendants’ Application to Dismiss.

Sweet Value’s lawyer informed the Court that it intended to cross-examine Constantinos Stasinopoulos at the hearing of the Application to Dismiss and accordingly, the Court ordered his presence for the hearing. [ 55 ] On March 16, 2017, the parties appear before the Court to argue the Application to Dismiss. Mr. Constantinos Stasinopoulos is present, expecting to be examined by Sweet Value’s lawyer. Sweet Value informs the Court that it no longer wished to cross examine Mr. Stasinopoulos. Sweet Value elects not to present any evidence to explain or justify the delays in this lawsuit.

This is further illustration of its disinterestedness towards this lawsuit. [ 56 ] Sweet Value’s lawyer argued that his firm only appeared in the file in April 2013 and as such, they should not be held responsible for the delays that preceded their arrival in the file. This argument is not valid. When a new firm appears in a file, it takes it as is. [ 57 ] In certain circumstances, what at first might appear to be an inexcusable delay might reveal itself not to be the case. For example, in Carrefour de la croisée inc. v.

Bouclair inc. [37] , although the court file had been inactive for 7 years, the plaintiffs adduced evidence at the hearing of the motion to dismiss based on old

section 54.1 C.C.P. to explain that considerable work was done during that time period to advance the file [38] . In proffering this evidence, the plaintiffs convinced the court that the delay was justified and was not unreasonable.

The court concluded that this was not a case of abuse. [ 58 ] In the present case, other than to argue that its lawyers could not be held liable for the delays incurred prior to their appearance in the file in April 2013, Sweet Value made no attempt to explain or justify the delays between 2002 and 2013. [ 59 ] The Court is convinced that because of Sweet Value’s inordinate and inexcusable delay in prosecuting its claim, the defendants’ right to a full and fair defense is jeopardized.

Given the passage of time, a fair trial is simply not possible. [ 60 ] Based on the excessive and unreasonable delays described above, and considering the serious prejudice these delays have caused to the defendants, the Court believes that Sweet Value’s lawsuit is abusive within the meaning of

section 51 C.C.P. [ 61 ] In accordance with

section 52 C.C.P. , once the defendants establish that Sweet Value’s lawsuit may constitute an abuse [39] , the onus shifts to Sweet Value to show that its lawsuit is not excessive or unreasonable. In other words, it has the burden of adducing evidence to show that the defendants have not suffered prejudice because of the delays in prosecuting the lawsuit [40] . [ 62 ] Sweet Value presented no evidence to show that the defendants suffered no prejudice because of the passage of time.

It made no effort to prove that the witness which the defendants claim can no longer be found is available; it presented no evidence to show that documentary evidence might compensate for the fact that some or all of the witness can no longer recollect events that occurred 15 years ago. [ 63 ] In conclusion, the defendants have established that the inordinate delays incurred since the filing of this lawsuit in 2002 are excessive and unreasonable. They have further established that these delays have caused them serious prejudice such that a fair trial is not possible.

Sweet Value has not offered evidence to justify or explain the lengthy delays nor any evidence to show that its conduct of the lawsuit since 2002 was not excessive or unreasonable or failed to cause prejudice to the defendants. The Court therefore concludes that Sweet Value’s lawsuit is abusive. [ 64 ] That said, the Court is mindful that dismissal is the ultimate sanction in cases of abusive proceedings and that it must be prudent before imposing this remedy [41] .

Section 53 C.C.P. affords the Court with alternative remedies where it has been shown that there has been abuse of procedure. For example, the Court may impose conditions on any further steps, such as ordering plaintiff to pay security [42] . [ 65 ] Would such alternative remedies be appropriate in the present case? The Court does not believe so. Where the defendant establishes that the delay in prosecuting a lawsuit has caused it prejudice, and where plaintiff has failed to refute the proof of prejudice, ordering the plaintiff to furnish security or imposing one of the other remedies set out in

section 53 C.C.P. cannot alleviate this prejudice. Dismissal is the only remedy in the circumstances of the present case.

Is Sweet Value’s Claim Abusive in that it is Clearly Unfounded Since it has No Evidence to Prove its Damages? [ 66 ] Sweet Value alleges in its lawsuit that in 2002, it entered into an agreement with 9095 whereby it imports and purchases produce from various suppliers, 9095 takes delivery and ownership of the produce and undertakes to reimburse Sweet Value for these goods. [ 67 ] For example, Sweet Value alleges in its declaration that it purchased produce from Inversiones Soto Sandra c.a. for $10,000 for the benefit of 9095, but that the latter has not reimbursed this amount.

Similarly, Sweet Value alleges that it purchased a shipment of limes from Itacitrus comercio de frutas ltda for $23,230 which 9095 took possession of yet has failed to reimburse to Sweet Value. Moreover, Sweet Value also alleges that it purchased from Delorme international a shipment of produce for $23,230.50 which 9095 took possession of but has still not reimbursed.

In total, Sweet Value claims it purchased $49,264.87 in produce which 9095 has yet to reimburse. [ 68 ] Sweet Value files in support of its lawsuit the invoices issued by Inversiones Soto Sandra c.a., (P-5), Itacitrus comercio de frutas ltda (P-6), and Delorme international (P-7) (collectively, the Invoices). [ 69 ] The defendants argue that Sweet Value’s lawsuit is clearly unfounded and frivolous because it has declared itself ready to proceed to trial, yet it has not filed any documentary evidence to prove that it actually paid the invoices and therefore there is not proof that it suffered damages. [ 70 ] Sweet Value has known since September 2002 that it required proof of the payment of the Invoices.

On August 20, 2002, it filed an Inscription for default to appear against the defendants. On September 25, 2002, the Special Clerk (Me Huguette Daoust) sent Sweet Value’s lawyer a notice of incomplete file in which she wrote: “ fournir la prevue qu’ils [les factures] ont été payés par la demanderesse. ” This was not remedied in 2002 nor has it been more than 14 years later. [ 71 ] On June 7, 2013, defendant Theodore Stasinopoulos files a motion to dismiss based on then

section 54.1 of old C.C.P. in which he argues that Sweet Value’s lawsuit has no chance of success because it has failed to file the proof of payment of the Invoices notwithstanding numerous requests (see paragraphs 6 to 8 of the motion; # 93 on the plumitif). In November 2013, this motion is continued sine die . [ 72 ] On February 28, 2017, the Court holds a case management conference presided by the undersigned judge pursuant to

section 153 C.C.P. in which it makes the following order: ORDONNE à Me Kadri [Sweet Value’s lawyer] de communiquer aux avocats des défendeurs au plus tard le 13 mars 2017 les preuves de paiement de tous les montants réclamé dans la Déclaration datée du 1 août 2002, en précisant que l’ordonnance vise la communication des documents aux avocats des défendeurs, sous réserve de leur droit de soulever la tardivité de la production de ces documents au procès, le cas échéant. [ 73 ] On March 13, 2017, Me Kadri writes to the Court further to the above-cited case management order: La présente fait suite à la conférence de gestion tenue le 28 février dernier.

Notre client a contacté les fournisseurs avec lesquels il a transigé. Force est de constater que la majorité d’entre eux n’ont plus les preuves de paiements reçus . Par ailleurs, nous nous empressons de vous communiquer une correspondance de l’entreprise ItaCitrus confirmant qu’il n’y a aucune balance due et également en liasse un échange de courriels de l’entreprise Agence en douance limitée confirmant également qu’il n’y a aucun solde au dossier. ( underlining added )

[ 74 ] Me Kadri attaches to her letter a notice of communication of additional exhibits along with exhibits P-17 and P-18. P-17 is a document on ItaCitrus letterhead which states: “We Itacitrus a Brazilian company exporter of fresh fruits can certify that Sweet Value Imports Inc., a company based out of Montreal, Quebec, Canada has no debt with our company and all balances are paid.” [ 75 ] P-18 is a series of emails from Affiliated Customs Brokers Limited in which the latter writes: “As the last transaction was done back in 2002, we cannot provide a statement.

However, the account has been inactive for 15 years, your account balance is therefore 0$.” [ 76 ] Despite the February 28, 2017 case-management order, Sweet Value has provided no proof of payment of the invoices from Inversiones Soto Sandra c.a., (P-5) and Delorme international (P-7), which are the basis for an important portion of the damages it alleges to have suffered. [ 77 ] Counsel for the defendants inform the Court that they will object to exhibits P-17 and P-18 as constituting evidence that Sweet Value paid invoices P-5 and P-6. [ 78 ] Sweet Value was warned in September 2002 that it had to file proof of the payment of its invoices; defense counsel have requested the proof of payments numerous times since 2002; Sweet Value faced a motion to dismiss in 2013 in which the principal argument was that it failed to communicate to the defendants the proof of the payment of the invoices; the Court issued a case- management order compelling it to communicate the proofs of payment of the invoices.

Notwithstanding this, we are at the eve of the trial and Sweet Value has filed little or no documents evidencing the proof of payment of the invoices.

It will have significant challenges at the trial to prove that it paid the Invoices and that it suffered damages. [ 79 ] The Court need not decide for the purposes of this application whether the proof of payment of its invoices (or lack thereof) is in of itself sufficient to establish that Sweet Value’s lawsuit is unfounded or frivolous since the inordinate and inexcusable delay argument alone is sufficient grounds to convince the court that Sweet Value’s lawsuit is abusive and warrants its dismissal. [ 80 ] That said, the episode surrounding the proof of payment of the invoices is illustrative of Sweet Value’s attitude and conduct since it filed its lawsuit: it has shown lack of diligence and gross disinterestedness in prosecuting the lawsuit.

It also supports the defendants’ argument that they have suffered serious prejudice because of the inordinate and inexcusable delays. [ 81 ] Considering the Court’s conclusion reached on the inordinate an inexcusable delay argument, it is not necessary for the Court to address the other argument raised by defendants Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095 in their Application to Dismiss.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 82 ] GRANTS defendants’ Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095-6350 Québec Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss; [ 83 ] DECLARES that Importations Sweet value Inc.’s lawsuit is abusive; [ 84 ] DISMISSES Importations Sweet value Inc.’s lawsuit; [ 85 ] RESERVES, pursuant to

section 54 paragraph 2 C.C.P. , Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095-6350 Québec Inc.’s right to claim damages from Importations Sweet Value Inc., and if they elect to do so, ORDERS Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095-6350 Québec Inc., to notify their written claim in damages, including all exhibits in support of this claim, to Importations Sweet value Inc. within 15 days of the present judgment and, FIXES the hearing to determine the amount of the damages before the undersigned judge on May 5, 2017; [ 86 ] WITH COSTS. __________________________________ ENRICO FORLINI J.C.Q.

Me Willy Arnold Ndongo Nguele Martino, Perluzzo Lawyer for Importations Sweet Value Inc. Me Jean El Masri El Masri Avocat Inc. Lawyer for Constantinos Stasinopoulos and 9095-6350 Québec inc. Me Jean-David Fortier Jean-David Fortier, avocat Lawyer for Theodore Stasinopoulos Date of hearing: March 16, 2017