2023 QCCQ 9381, 2023 QCCQ 9381

R. c. Marshall 2023 QCCQ 9381 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU TOWN OF GATINEAU «Criminal Division» No: 550-01-118935-206 550-01-118934-209 DATE: November 27 th , 2023 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE ROSEMARIE MILLAR, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ THE KING Prosecutor, Respondent v.

VARNEY MARSHALL Accused, Applicant ______________________________________________________________________ DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTIONS 7, 11b) and 24 OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ______________________________________________________________________ CONTEXT [ 1 ] Are the procedures done by the police officers to execute the arrest warrants issued against the Applicant reasonable in view of the circumstances? [ 2 ] The Applicant argues that his right to be tried in a reasonable time has been infringed. [ 3 ] The only issue is the period between the issuance of arrest warrants against the Applicant and their execution 19 months and 14 days later. [ 4 ] This delay, being over the presumptive ceiling of 18 months is presumed unreasonable. [ 5 ] According to the Applicant, no due diligence was done to execute the warrants and accordingly, a stay of proceedings should be ordered. [ 6 ] According to the Respondent, the delay must be treated as a discrete event, evidence showing that the police officers made some reasonable attempts to locate the Applicant and therefore the delay should be deducted from the total delay.

FACTS [ 7 ] The Applicant faces the following charge in the file hearing number 550-01-118934-209: On or about July 3, 2020, in Gatineau, in committing an assault on Eric Lavigne, did cause bodily arm to the said person, committing thereby the offence punishable by

summary conviction provided by

section 267

b) of the Criminel code. [ 8 ] The Applicant faces the following charge in the file hearing number 550-01-118935-206: On or about September 7, 2020, in Gatineau, did attempt to commit a breaking and entering, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by

section 463

b) of the Criminal code , in relation to section 348

(1) a) d) of the Criminal code . [ 9 ] On October 6 th , 2020, two warrants were issued for the above-mentioned files because the Applicant could not be located. [ 10 ] On May 20, 2022, the Applicant was identified by a police officer and a promise to appear was given to him after the execution of the warrant.

[ 11 ] The evidence shows the following: - On July 8, 2020, officer Maxime Gravel received a call concerning an assault on July 3, 2020, at 700 St-Joseph bld against Eric Lavigne. - Officer Gravel met Mr. Lavigne who explained he was assaulted by a black man. - Officer Gravel met the building administrator, Mrs.

Zogo, who viewed the cameras and identified an old tenant named Varney McGill who was residing at apt 1001 at 700 St-Joseph bld. - Officer Gravel searched at the SPVG’s Versadex and found nothing under that name. - Officer Gravel then searched for the address 700 St-Joseph bld apt 1001, and saw that an incident was recorded on May 17, 2019 for that address with the name Varnay McGill Marshall. - Officer Gravel transferred the file to the investigations section. - On July 17, 2020, SD Athina Kloutis was assigned to the file, and she made some verifications about Varnay McGill Marshall. - SD Kloutis made a verification at the SPVG’s Versadex and saw that there is only one incident related to 700 St-Joseph bld apt 1001 in 2019. - On that incident, Marshall showed identification papers from Alberta.

He phoned later to inform the police that it will be difficult to reach him by phone and gave also an email address. - She verifies with the CRPQ ( Centre de renseignements policiers du Québec ) and noted that the Applicant had no driver’s licence in Quebec nor in Ontario.

She learned that he was under an arrest warrant from Alberta. - Learning that he had also a criminal file in Newfoundland, she called an officer there to obtain a picture of the Applicant. - She communicated again with madame Zogo who confirmed that the Applicant was not a tenant for a few months in July 2020. - She called the telephone number given by the Applicant; it was not functioning as the email address. - SD Kloutis learned form Mr. Lavigne that the Applicant was seen in the building on September 7, 2020, and she told Mr.

Lavigne to call her if he sees the Applicant again. - Finally, without knowing where to locate the Applicant, she asked for the emission of warrants. - The warrants were recorded in the SPVG’s Versadex and in the CRPQ. - On October 20, 2020, SPVG’s liaison division send a letter to the Applicant at his old address on 700 St-Joseph bld in the goal he had made a change of address and to have the letter redirected. [ 12 ] The Respondent pleads that the presumption of unreasonable delay is rebutted because of the steps or attempts made by the police officers to locate the Applicant. [ 13 ] According to the Respondent, the delay incurred due to the execution of the arrest warrants must be treated as a "discrete event" with the Jordan framework under exceptional circumstance and therefore should be deducted from the total delay. [ 14 ] The Applicant disagrees.

He pleads that the officers should have done more steps to locate himself: verification at the SAAQ , at the Régie du Logement and at Revenu Quebec for instance. LAW [ 15 ] On July 8, 2016, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in the Jordan [1] Case and ended the delays framework of analysis established in Morin [2] for the application of

section 11

b) of the Charter . [ 16 ] The Supreme Court in Jordan set out a new framework to assess whether delay is unreasonable. [ 17 ] What is this new framework of analysis? [ 18 ] Ceilings are established beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable: 18 months for cases going to trial in Provincial Court and 30 months for cases going to trial in Superior Court or cases going to trial in provincial Court after preliminary inquiry. [ 19 ] If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus Defence delay) exceeds the delay, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. [ 20 ] The Crown can rebut this presumption by establishing the presence of exceptional circumstances.

If not, the delay is unreasonable. [ 21 ] According to the Supreme Court, the presence of exceptional circumstances is the only vases upon which the Crown can discharge its burden to justify a delay exceeding the ceiling. [ 22 ] Exceptional circumstances are reasonably, unforeseen, or reasonably unavoidable and the Crown cannot remedy the delays.

[ 23 ] These exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particular complex cases.

ANALYSIS [ 24 ] First, it is important to note that the Applicant, being unaware of the issuance of warrants against him, is not responsible for the delay to execute the warrant. [ 25 ] Here, the SPVG did some attempts to locate the Applicant without success. [ 26 ] Unfortunately, the police officers had a name, no address, a phone number non-functional, an email address non-functional, knew the existence of a warrant issued in Alberta and that, in 2019, he presented identification papers from Alberta. [ 27 ] The procedures done to locate the Applicant were there sufficient to be qualified as diligent? [ 28 ] Were the police officers forced to communicate with the Tribunal du logement’s decisions to verify if the Applicant was a party in one of their public decision or to communicate with Revenu Quebec to verify is the Applicant filed his income tax and had an address? [ 29 ] According to the Applicant, the police officers should have applied

section 41.2 of the «

Loi sur l’accès aux documents des organismes publics et sur la protection des renseignements personnels », which reads: 41.2.

Un organisme public peut communiquer un renseignement visé par une restriction au droit d’accès prévue aux articles 23, 24, 28, 28.1 ou 29 dans les cas suivants: 1° à son procureur si le renseignement est nécessaire aux fins d’une poursuite pour infraction à une loi que l’organisme est chargé d’appliquer, ou au Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales si le renseignement est nécessaire aux fins d’une poursuite pour infraction à une loi applicable au Québec; 2° à son procureur ou au procureur général lorsqu’il agit comme procureur de l’organisme, si le renseignement est nécessaire aux fins d’une procédure judiciaire autre qu’une procédure visée dans le paragraphe 1°; 3° à une personne ou à un organisme qui, en vertu de la loi, est chargé de prévenir, détecter ou réprimer le crime ou les infractions aux lois, si le renseignement est nécessaire aux fins d’une poursuite pour infraction à une loi applicable au Québec; 4° à toute personne ou tout organisme si cette communication est nécessaire à l’application d’une loi au Québec, que cette communication soit ou non prévue expressément par la loi; 5° à un organisme public, dans le cas d’un renseignement visé à l’article 23 ou 24, si cette communication est nécessaire dans le cadre de la prestation d’un service à rendre au tiers concerné; 6° à toute personne ou tout organisme si cette communication est nécessaire à l’exercice d’un mandat ou à l’exécution d’un contrat de service ou d’entreprise confié par l’organisme public à cette personne ou à cet organisme.

Dans le cas visé au paragraphe 6°, l’organisme public doit: 1° confier le mandat ou le contrat par écrit; 2° indiquer, dans le mandat ou le contrat, les dispositions de la présente loi qui s’appliquent au renseignement communiqué au mandataire ou à l’exécutant du contrat ainsi que les mesures qu’il doit prendre pour que ce renseignement ne soit utilisé que dans l’exercice de son mandat ou l’exécution de son contrat et pour qu’il ne le conserve pas après son expiration. Le deuxième alinéa ne s’applique pas lorsque le mandataire ou l’exécutant du contrat est un membre d’un ordre professionnel.

De même, le paragraphe 2° du deuxième alinéa ne s’applique pas lorsque le mandataire ou l’exécutant du contrat est un autre organisme public. En outre, un corps de police peut communiquer un renseignement visé par une restriction au droit d’accès prévue aux articles 23, 24, 28, 28.1 ou 29 à un autre corps de police. Toutefois, l’application du présent

article ne doit avoir pour effet de révéler une source confidentielle d’information ni le secret industriel d’un tiers. [ 30 ] The Tribunal is satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, the police officers acted with reasonable diligence trying to locate the Applicant. [ 31 ] While they could have done more, the standard is not perfection as it was decided in the Case Rea [3] . [ 32 ] The Tribunal adds that there is no evidence that had the police officers taken additional steps they would have been more successful to locate the Applicant. [ 33 ] In the decision Diagne [4] , the attempt made by the police officers to locate the Accused consisted only to verify « un avis de guet » at the border’s services Agency. [ 34 ] In the decision Gauthier [5] , the evidence revealed that the police officer knew the accused’s address.

Moreover, no search was done to locate the accused were not serious and obviously no sufficient. [ 35 ] These decisions can be distinguished with the present case.

[ 36 ]

Section 41.2 of the «

Loi sur l’accès aux documents des organismes publics et sur la protection des renseignements personnels » has to be read in relation with sections 23, 24, 28, 28.1 and 29. [ 37 ] The situations described at these sections don’t authorise the public organisms to give personal information as an address to the police officers. [ 38 ] There is no obligation for the police officers to obtain a judicial authorisation of communication for the disclosure of a personal address at Revenu Quebec and there is certainly no guarantee that this judicial authorisation would I have been obtained. [ 39 ] The attempts made to obtain the localisation of the Applicant are reasonable and can be qualified as a discrete event and deducted from the total delay.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DIMISSES the Motion. __________________________________ ROSEMARIE MILLAR, J.C.Q. Me Caroline Buteau Counsel for the Respondent Mrs. Catherine Gravel Counsel for the Applicant Date of hearing: November 1 st , 2023