2019 BCPC 141, 2019 BCPC 141
Opinion
Citation: S. 810 Application to Issue Process on a Private Information, T. Anthony 2019 BCPC 141 Date: 20190523 File No: 252227-1 Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Criminal Court) IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION TO ISSUE PROCESS ON A PRIVATE INFORMATION ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE D. ST. PIERRE IN CAMERA Counsel for the Crown: B. Wolfe Appearing on his own behalf: T. Anthony Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C. Date of Hearing: May 14, 2019 Date of Judgment: May 23, 2019 [ 1 ] THE COURT: This is a request by Mr.
Anthony to swear an information under s. 810 of the Code , and he has advanced this request to swear the information on his own by virtue of the
section itself, s. 810. [ 2 ] This is under s. 810: An information may be laid before a justice, and in this case the definition under the Code of “justice” includes a Provincial Court Judge. An information may be laid before a justice by or on behalf of any person who fears on reasonable
grounds that another person, in this case, will cause personal injury to him. That is essentially what Mr. Anthony is here for. He is theperson who is laying the information before the justice, the Provincial Court Judge in this case. Subsection (2) of that
section indicatesthat a justice who hears an information under subsection (1) “shall cause the parties to appear” before him or before a
summaryconviction court having jurisdiction in the same territorial division. [3] So he has advanced this thing on his own. It is not normally done. Normally speaking, the Attorney General of the Provinceand the investigative agencies assist informants who are doing this. However, a private person can do this. It is set out in the sectionitself and it stands in contrast with public prosecutions of any kind where informations for criminal offences or other offences are laid bya police officer or public officer or the Attorney General or the Attorney General's agent, as specified within s. 507. [4] We had some discussion in this proceeding about the applicability of 507.1 which is the
section which facilitates the privateprosecution of offences.
Section 507.1(9) indicates that the procedure sections, subsections (1) through (8) do not apply in respect of aninformation laid under s. 810 or 810.1. It is curious because they only refer to those two peace bond sections when there are several otherones, but in any event, the one we are dealing with is under
Section 810. [5] Under
Section 810, again, it is the duty of the justice to receive the information and to “cause the parties to appear” beforethem if that is the case.
Section 810 of the Criminal Code provides that a court may order a recognizance if it is satisfied that acomplainant has current reasonable grounds to fear that a defendant will cause personal injury to them. The
section contains proceduresand legal requirements in order to cause the parties to appear before it, give notice to a defendant of the nature of the case and allow adefendant to have a hearing. At a hearing, reliable hearsay and character evidence may be admissible, along with other forms of evidencethat is not normally admissible in a criminal case.
While it is part of the Criminal Code, s. 810 does not create a criminal offence, andthere is no conviction or sentence resulting from a successful application of that section. [6] My task in my mind at this moment is to determine, having heard sworn evidence from Mr. Timothy setting out the basis ofwhy he fears Mr. Wilson, whether to swear the information and then determine where to go from there. [7] The evidence from Mr. Anthony is that he was working in a phone centre essentially. He and the respondent here, Dan Wilson,were working in a big telephone room. They had known each other from before through the Dr.
Peter Centre where they both attend toreceive support services for persons with HIV status. He did not really have a relationship with Wilson other than to work with him in thisroom. Initially he says Wilson was bullying towards him. Initially, he screamed at him from time to time using violent language andcalling him names. Management said, you know, just sort of stay away from each other.
They were told not to confront each other or talkto each other. [8] He says there was one day though, January 18, 2018, wherein he describes how he went to the washroom down the hall and hewas standing in the doorway coming back to get into the work space and Mr. Wilson was there, essentially, in the doorway. Mr. Anthonysays he went to try to pass him through the doorway and successfully did that, but he could tell Mr. Wilson was being aggressive forsome reason. As Mr. Anthony was walking away from him he says that Mr. Wilson, essentially, hit him in the face and knocking himdown and for a split second. Mr.
Anthony believes he was rendered unconscious at that point. He says he hit his head on the ground afterMr. Wilson hit him in the head with his hand. He says he could tell it was Mr. Wilson because he was partially turned but that Wilsonwas the only person who was standing behind him and who had the opportunity to do what he did at that time. [9] Mr. Anthony says he came to immediately, and called 9-1-1, told them about what had happened. It was approximately about10:30 a.m. They asked him if he was all right. He said, yes. He turned down a request for an ambulance and the police showed up about20 minutes later.
They talked to both parties and essentially, according to Mr. Anthony, did not do much other than advise the parties totake it easy and if he touches you next time -- this is to Mr. Anthony -- then we will get involved. [10] So, Mr. Anthony indicated that he fears this gentleman because of his history of violent verbal confrontations with Mr. Anthonyand this unprovoked assault that took place on January 18. The reason why he is having troubles, because he otherwise would not runinto this fellow, is because they both attend at the Dr. Peter Centre, and Mr.
Anthony says that has been his place for support for quite aperiod of time and he is now afraid to go there and run into this man who has been so aggressive towards him, to the point of beingphysical. So that is essentially what he says. [11] There are clearly grounds for a basis for Mr. Anthony to have a fear. There is a basis on the evidence that was given for theinformation to be sworn. The issue is, what do you do now, with respect to the process? [12] I make the following comments in that regard.
There has been no firm agreement among different courts over the years as tohow to deal with process, arrest and release of individuals who are the subject of a request for a recognizance under these peace bondsections and that is unfortunate. [13] Apparently, it is going to be resolved very quickly. There is a case on reserve in the Supreme Court of Canada, I will get to in aminute, but there is also a recent case called Nowazek, N-o-w-a-z-e-k, 2018 YJ No. 69 from the Yukon Court of Appeal. Justice Fitchwrote the decision, and of course he sits on our Court of Appeal as well.
They agree that at least as it relates to what they were dealingwith there (Section 810.1 of the Code) that either a warrant or a summons could issue. Under 810.2 the language with respect to causingthe parties to appear is permissive. If a respondent is summonsed or asked to appear by way of summons the court in Nowazek says thatthe s. 515 provisions do not apply in that case.
And so, they basically say, in my view, that (at paragraph 88) a judge cannot apply thejudicial interim release provisions in s. 515 to a defendant who appears in response to a summons in 810.1 proceedings, which is whatthey were dealing with.
Section 515 is triggered when an accused is "taken before a justice." A summonsed defendant is neither incustody nor "taken before a justice." By contrast the defendants in the other cases that were referred to (i.e. Allen, Wakelin, Budreo, andCachine), all dealing with peace bond processes, were actually arrested and once taken before a justice, s. 515 governed their releasepending the hearing of the Crown's application for a recognizance.
For that reason those cases were factually distinguishable from theone that the Yukon Court of Appeal were dealing with. [14] Just to fill it out, illustrative of the disagreement between the appellate courts is the case that is on reserve by the Supreme Courtof Canada from the Newfoundland Court of Appeal called Penunsi, P-e-n-u-n-s-i, 2018 NLCA 4 , 2018 NJ No. 13. There it was
a question of whether the judge had the power to issue an arrest warrant for an information sworn under 810.2 of the Code, and the answer to that question would determine whether the bail provisions in s. 515 applied to the peace bond informations or not. The question was specifically raised for 810.2 informations but the court found it necessary to analyze the language in relation to other peace bonds.
They said at paragraph 27, notably s. 507.1(9), which is the one I just referred to earlier, enacted in 2002, specifically excludes the application of s. 507.1 to informations laid under s. 810 and 810.1 of the peace bond provisions. Parliament, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal said, has therefore expressly provided that a judge does not have the power to arrest the defendant on a s. 810 or 810.1 peace bond information.
There is no reference to s. 810.2 in s. 507.1. [ 15 ] For what it is worth, the reasoning in Penunsi I found intuitively attractive, but I find, however, that I am bound to follow Justice Fitch's conclusions made on any issue in relation to that because the Yukon Court of Appeal is made up of justices of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, and justices for the Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories and Nunavut. [ 16 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has heard the Crown appeal in that case and as of today's date the matter is, I understand, on reserve.
So we will get an answer with respect to at least that issue, the issue of whether s. 515 applies to 810.2 peace bond proceedings. They may, hopefully, give us some help on some of these other issues. [ 17 ] The differences in language between 810(2), and then 810.1(2), and 810.2(2), for that matter, is important in my mind. As Justice Fitch noted in Nowazek at paragraph 82 when he was explaining why he preferred not to follow the Penunsi analysis he says: …First, a provincial court judge who receives an information under 810.1(1) exercises a discretion in determining whether to issue process.
This discretion is reflected in the permissive language of 810.1(2). Second, as held in Budreo , where process does issue, the circumstances in which it will be “necessary in the public interest” to issue an arrest warrant will be limited to cases in which proceeding in this fashion is necessary to preserve the integrity of the 810.1 proceedings.
This will only be so when a case has been made out by the informant that the defendant will not otherwise attend court or that the defendant poses an imminent risk to the safety of children. [ 18 ] That is paragraph 82 of Nowazek , the recent case from the Yukon Court of Appeal. [ 19 ] I should point out here that there is what appears to be a material difference between all of the peace bond sections and the first section, which is the 810 simpliciter, subsection (2), in that permissive language is found in all of the other peace bond sections in that section.
All of those other sections say the judge “may” cause the parties to appear, “may cause.” Section 810(2), the wording is the judge “shall cause” the parties to appear. I also note that the language in s. 507.1 contemplates a hearing to determine process in criminal prosecutions. These hearing procedures specifically exclude peace bond applications like the one here. Why these two sections, 810 and 810.1 were exempted, in particular, is not entirely clear to me, but whatever the case, the sections are silent on the mechanics to which the parties are to be compelled to appear.
That gap, says the court in Nowazek, at paragraph 84, is filled by s. 795 which imports
Part XVI including 507(4) and 515 into at least the
section 810.1 proceeding. [ 20 ] So it seems to me that once a judicial officer has made the appropriate inquiries of an informant and endorsed the information as having been sworn on reasonable grounds, the judge “shall cause” the parties to appear before the court. Then the merits of the informant's fear can be adjudicated and the issue as to whether a respondent should be required to enter into a recognizance is made. That appears to me to be the gist of s. 810 especially when it is proceeded by an individual on their own.
The judge shall cause the parties to appear where, as in this case, he finds that the information should be sworn. [ 21 ] What happens next under subsection (2) is the judge shall cause the parties to appear before him, before a
summary conviction court. That, according to Nowazek, can either be a warrant or a summons. It seems to me that in this particular case a summons is sufficient to bring Mr. Dan Wilson before the court on an information before the court, 252227-1, which I am going to sign here. [ 22 ] Now, Mr. Wolfe, you had indicated, and I am not sure whether the Crown still maintains this, that the Crown has jurisdiction in this case to intervene. Does the Crown still take that position? [ 23 ] MR.
WOLFE: Yes. [ 24 ] THE COURT: Okay, and if you were to intervene, you are also saying, commensurately, that the Crown would intervene and you say the Crown has the right at this point to stay the proceedings under s. 579 of the Criminal Code ; is that right? [ 25 ] MR. WOLFE: Forgive me. [ 26 ] THE COURT: Mm-hmm. [ 27 ] MR. WOLFE: The basis of your question is? [ 28 ] THE COURT: Well, I have submissions to make if that is your position. I am just trying to find out what your position is. I have -- [ 29 ] MR. WOLFE: We would take conduct of it and -- [ 30 ] THE COURT: I have a ruling. [ 31 ] MR.
WOLFE: -- exercise our discretion accordingly. [ 32 ] THE COURT: Okay. What is the date today, Madam Registrar? [ 33 ] THE CLERK: May 23rd, Your Honour. [ 34 ] THE COURT: May 23rd. Okay. All right. If you will pass this down to Mr. Anthony. Mr. Anthony, your signature is required on the information and I will put an X where your signature is to be.
[35] Yes. So, Mr. Wolfe maintains that the Crown has jurisdiction in this case to intervene and then stay the proceedings of the s.810 information. Do you have that? [36] MR. WOLFE: Actually, what I said, Your Honour, was we would take conduct and exercise our discretion accordingly. [37] THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Wolfe maintains that the Crown has jurisdiction in this case to intervene and exercisetheir discretion accordingly with respect to this 810 information that has been sworn by a judge now. Mr.
Wolfe argued on the lastoccasion that s. 4 of the Crown Counsel Act operates to allow him to intervene in the ‘private prosecution’ and to stay the proceedings iftheir discretion was so exercised under s. 579 of the Criminal Code of Canada. [38] With respect to that argument, I disagree, Mr. Wolfe. Now, typically s. 810 is used to protect an identified victim. It is used toprotect a person who has been identified, a person already harmed, from further harm, where evidence points to the likelihood of dangerto the victim from continuing contact with another person.
The courts have consistently held that s. 810 is a preventative measure; that itdoes not create an offence or mete out a criminal punishment, and Budreo says as much from the Ontario Court of Appeal, (ON CA), 2000 OJ No. 72. [39] There are certain safeguards contained in s. 507.1 when an individual attempts to carry forth a prosecution of “offences.” Thosesubsections are found in one through eight of that 507.1. Those safeguards do not apply to s. 810 applications by a private individual.Justice Fitch in Nowazek says at paragraph 83.
The enactment of s. 507.1(9) does nothing, in my view, to detract from the authoritativeness of Allen, Wakelin, and Budreo. It appearsthat s. 507.1(9) simply exempts proceedings under ss. 810 and 810.1 from the additional safeguards for private prosecutions in s. 507.1,even where the s. 810 or 810.1 information is laid by a member of the public. [40] He refers to Trotter J., as he then was, reaching the same result in a case called Konjarski, 2015 ONSC 3999. Where atparagraph six Trotter says: Proceedings under s. 810 are different from the more elaborate procedure under s. 507.1.
Section 507.1 provides for a pre-enquetehearing before process may issue.
However, this procedure does not apply to proceedings under s. 810. [41] And so, Justice Fitch goes on to say [as read in]: In my view, the enactment of s. 507.1(9) did not change the law in relation to compelling a defendant's appearance in proceedings under810.1. [42] This extract here deals with the issuance of process but the court is clear that 507.1(1) through (8) do not apply to thisapplication. [43] The Crown Counsel Act, under s. 4 of the Crown Counsel Act indicates where Crown counsel has jurisdiction, the AttorneyGeneral may designate as Crown counsel any individual or class of individual who is lawfully entitled to practice law in B.C.
Andsubsection (2) of that 4 says: Each Crown Counsel is authorized to represent the Crown before all courts in relation to the prosecution of offences. [44] Subsection (3)(
a) says that the Crown is authorized to do things like approve for prosecution any offence or offences that he orshe considers appropriate, and subsection (
c) of three says the Crown counsel is authorized to supervise prosecution of “offences” thatare being initiated or conducted by individuals who are not Crown counsel, and if the interests of justice require, to intervene and toconduct those prosecutions. [45] It is true that a private prosecutor does not have a legal right or a liberty to continue a prosecution in the face of a Crownintervention. The Attorney General has an agent, the Crown attorney, represent the sovereign in the prosecution of crimes.
When the roleof the private prosecutor comes into conflict with that -- of the Crown prosecutor, the role of the latter, the Crown prosecutor isparamount, where in his opinion the interests of justice require that he intervene to take over a private prosecution. That comes fromHamilton v. B.C. Attorney General, 1986 BCJ No. 756 from Justice McKenzie. But this is a different process, and again, courts haveconsistently have held that s. 810 is a preventative measure, that it does not create an offence or mete out a criminal punishment.
And s.579 reads that: The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose may, at any time after the proceedings in relation to an accused ordefendant are commenced and before judgment, direct the clerk or other proper officer of the court to make an entry on the record thatthe proceedings are stayed by his direction, and such entry shall be made forthwith thereafter, whereupon the proceedings shall be stayedaccordingly and any recognizance relating to the proceedings is vacated. [46] The Criminal Code provides no definition of the term "proceedings" as it is used in 579(1) or elsewhere in the Criminal Code;however, it is clear that the proceedings must be in relation to an accused or a defendant.
That is not the case here. I repeat my opinion onthis matter. Once a judicial officer has made the appropriate inquiries of an informant, endorsed the information as having been sworn onreasonable grounds, the judge is required -- mandated under s.810, to cause the parties to appear before the court. Then the merits of theinformant's fear can be adjudicated and the issue as to whether a respondent should be required to enter a recognizance made. [47] There appears, by my reading, to be no jurisdiction for the Crown to simply intervene in a private informant's laying of a s. 810information.
The matter must proceed to a hearing on the merits. That is the purpose of the preventative nature of this process. So therewill be a summons issued to Mr. Dan Wilson who is the respondent in this matter. [48] Yes. Mr. Wolfe, do you have any comments to make on that?
[ 49 ] MR. WOLFE: I don't accept your ruling. [ 50 ] THE COURT: Yes. No, I understood that from your submissions that, that would be the case. But I just do not see anywhere in the Code or other legislation, like the Crown Counsel Act , and I have looked at it carefully, where there is any jurisdiction for the Crown to intervene in the manner that you have indicated that you wish to. [ 51 ] MR. WOLFE: So what we're left then is Mr. Anthony will be conducting his own 810 as you see. [ 52 ] THE COURT: That is what 810 contemplates that an information may be laid by a person who fears. That is what it contemplates.
There has to be a reason why it was excluded from all of the other procedural safeguards with respect to prosecuting “offences”, other offences. There has to be a reason for it and, I confess, I do not know why the legislature backed it in the way they did, but the language of the
section is fairly clear that a person could come before the court and have the parties, if appropriate, be caused to appear in front of the court. I think it is there for a reason, I guess, because it is not a criminal offence, it is not a criminal proceeding, it is a preventative measure to keep the peace. [ 53 ] MR. WOLFE: I certainly know what my branch policy is. [ 54 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 55 ] MR. WOLFE: And I am guided by that. [ 56 ] THE COURT: Yes, and is the policy the same with respect to s. 810 proceedings? [ 57 ] MR.
WOLFE: I see no difference between the Code offence and an 810 about Crown stepping in and taking conduct. [ 58 ] THE COURT: Yes. Well, I mean there is obviously a difference between “offences” in this procedure, otherwise the legislation would be different but there is clearly a difference. It is interesting that it is not as clear as you would like it to be, but I am assuming that is why the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave and is going to comment on some of these issues very shortly. [ 59 ] MR. WOLFE: So let's be -- I need to be abundantly clear about what you found. [ 60 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 61 ] MR.
WOLFE: It's a live information. [ 62 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 63 ] MR. WOLFE: You're going to issue a summons. [ 64 ] THE COURT: Right. [ 65 ] MR. WOLFE: And Mr. Anthony is left to his own devices at this point; is that correct? [ 66 ] THE COURT: That is the case, yes. [ 67 ] MR. WOLFE: So the implication, of course you said then, if I understand you is even if Crown wanted to intervene and conduct it, it couldn't. [ 68 ] THE COURT: Even of the Crown wanted to intervene? [ 69 ] MR.
WOLFE: And conduct it, it could not as you've stated. [ 70 ] THE COURT: In this case the jurisdiction, not to intervene particularly, to intervene and apply the s. 579, the combination of both of those, I do not think can be done. I have not ruled about whether the Crown is incapable of assisting Mr. Anthony in advancing this information. [ 71 ] MR. WOLFE: I didn't say assist. I said take over essentially, let's be clear, please. I'm looking -- just so I understand the depth of your decision. [ 72 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 73 ] MR.
WOLFE: If we -- if the Crown intervened, took conduct of it you're saying we can't do that, we're barred. [ 74 ] THE COURT: No, I think my ruling is very limited to the application of -- [ 75 ] MR. WOLFE: 579. [ 76 ] THE COURT: -- 579. [ 77 ] MR. WOLFE: Then I'm confused. You'll have to explain that a little better for me, I think. If you're saying -- have you answered or unanswered the issue about whether Crown could actually take conduct of the application? If you say that we can't I see that as consistent with you saying Crown can't even direct a stay of proceedings.
If you say we can, I'd like -- I'm just looking for what your view is on that. [ 78 ] THE COURT: Well, the application of the Crown Counsel Act and 579 indicate to me that the Crown cannot simply “stay the
proceedings.” The Crown is obviously capable of advancing a s. 810 information by themselves, just as a police officer can swear the information, the Crown counsel, the agent of the Crown counsel, all of those individuals clearly have jurisdiction. [ 79 ] But what s. 579 contemplates is that the Crown has the jurisdiction and may enter a stay of proceedings in relation to proceedings in relation to an accused or a defendant and that is just not this case. I am not ruling on whether the Crown can conduct the hearing or to advance the matter on behalf of Mr. Anthony.
I just do not think that the application of those two sections allow the Crown to simply, before a hearing on the merits, stay the proceedings. [ 80 ] MR. WOLFE: Well -- but I'm looking for clarification on that point, and not generally speaking. I mean Mr. Anthony's 810 application is now a live application. [ 81 ] THE COURT: It is a live application. [ 82 ] MR. WOLFE: And having listened to you carefully I'm seeking clarification regarding what you say the state of the law is regarding whether a Crown can actually take conduct of Mr.
Anthony's application. [ 83 ] THE COURT: I do not need to say any more than I have already said. I thought I was very clear. It is true that a private prosecutor does not have any legal right or liberty to continue a prosecution in the face of Crown intervention, if they want to take it over for whatever discretionary purposes they want to take it over. This is not one of those things. So if the Crown wants to recommence the proceeding on behalf of Mr. Anthony, well, then they can do that, but right now it is Mr.
Anthony who is here on his own before the court under s. 810 as he is entitled to do, and he is entitled to avail himself of the procedure that is set out there. That is all I am going to say about it. [ 84 ] MR. WOLFE: Okay. I am really not clear, but if you have nothing more to say, thank you. [ 85 ] THE COURT: That is about as clear as I can be. All right. So Mr. Anthony, you are going to have to provide information with respect to Mr. Wilson.
You know his name is Dan Wilson? [ 86 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Daniel Wilson. [ 87 ] THE COURT: Daniel? [ 88 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Daniel Wilson. [ 89 ] THE COURT: There will be a summons for Daniel, D-a-n-i-e-l, Wilson. [ 90 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: I believe so, yes, sir. [ 91 ] THE COURT: Do you know where he resides? [ 92 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: A friend of mine told me that he is now at 1112 Nelson. It's on the corner of Nelson and Thurlow, northwest corner, the huge, tall building. He just got -- he just moved into there. I guess evicted -- sorry, I shouldn't say evicted.
But that's where he's at recently. [ 93 ] THE COURT: 1112 Nelson? [ 94 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: I could check, just one second. [ 95 ] THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. [ 96 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Sorry about that. This is just from a friend of mine and he says that Dan told me [indiscernible]. [ 97 ] THE COURT: Do you think you have his address in there? [ 98 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Yes, I do. I should have -- it's in a separate file. I thought I had everything. [ 99 ] THE COURT: Daniel. You are confident that the respondent's name here is Daniel, Mr.
Anthony? [ 100 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: I'm pretty sure that's what his -- his full name is. I did have the police report here also, that should tell us, I think. [Indiscernible]. Oh, here it is. Okay. They have in the police report when I was first attacked by him the first time. Oh, yes. I don't understand that but when I -- when I got the police report I asked for it through the police and for some reason they did not give me any of his -- any of his information that he set forth at that time when I got attacked. For some reason they did not put his name in here anywhere. I'm surprised. I never even noticed that.
I'm pretty sure it's Daniel Wilson. [ 101 ] THE COURT: Well, leave it the way you have written it here, Dan Wilson. You can provide information with respect to where he may receive a summons, okay. [ 102 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Oh, yes. [ 103 ] THE COURT: Mr. Anthony, it is up to you. It is your matter. You have to provide information as to where Mr. Wilson can receive a summons. [ 104 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: I don't have his apartment number. It would just be at the -- at that building. [ 105 ] THE COURT: And do you know when he is at the Dr. Peter Centre?
[ 106 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Pardon? [ 107 ] THE COURT: Do you know when he is at the Dr. Peter Centre? [ 108 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Usually lunchtime most of the time and rarely breakfast. Lunchtime starts -- lunch starts at 1:30 till 2:15. [ 109 ] THE COURT: 1:30 to 2:15 at Dr. Peter? [ 110 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Yes, sir. [ 111 ] THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. [ 112 ] TIMOTHY ANTHONY: Thank you, sir. (REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)
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