2014 QCCQ 8967, 2014 QCCQ 8967

Unofficial English Translation Bérubé c. Québec (Ville de) 2014 QCCQ 8967 COURT OF QUEBEC “Small Claims Division” CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF QUEBEC LOCALITY OF QUEBEC “Civil Division” No.: 200-32-057918-129 DATE: September 17, 2014 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE JUDGE DANIEL LAVOIE, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ ANDRÉ BÉRUBÉ ...., Quebec, Quebec ... Plaintiff v.

VILLE DE QUÉBEC 2 des Jardins Quebec, Quebec G1R 4S9 Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Mr. Bérubé ("Bérubé") faults the Ville de Québec ("the City") for violating his right to protest freely in the evening of May 28, 2012.

He impleads the City's police department and claims $7,000. [ 2 ] In his motion before the Court, he alleges the following: [ translation ] Unlawful arrest and detention for more than three hours; Unnecessary and unlawful handcuffing; Sharp pains during the removal of the handcuffs, which took five minutes; Wrist injuries (due to handcuffing) Psychological stress for two weeks after the arrest; Being clubbed on four occasions; Multiple inconveniences (forced removal); Inhumane treatment. [ 3 ] The City counters by arguing that the protest in which the plaintiff took part had been declared illegal by its police department.

The methods used by the police officers were necessary to enable the service of the statements of offence. [ 4 ] The dispute raises three questions: 1. Were Bérubé's constitutional rights violated? 2. Did Bérubé suffer bodily injury caused by the actions of the police officers? 3. If so, what is the appropriate remedy? background and facts [ 5 ] This action takes place against the backdrop of the student protest movement in the spring of 2012. The protests were held in

objection to the tuition hikes the government had in store at the time. This movement gave rise to the phenomenon known as the " Carrés rouges " ("red squares") or what some called the " Printemps érable " ("maple spring"). [ 6 ] Bérubé’s action against the City seeks a monetary remedy for the damage he claims to have suffered. It need not be determined, therefore, whether Bérubé, along with the other protesters that night, committed the offence of unlawfully occupying the public roadway in violation of

section 500.1 of the Highway Safety Code . [1] The evidence reveals that Bérubé received a statement of offence under this provision, but the parties have not provided us with any information regarding the progress of this penal proceeding. But whatever the case may be, as we note further on in this judgment, the unlawfulness of the protest does not in itself compromise the merits of a civil action. [ 7 ] Bérubé sues the City directly.

This means that the target of the action is the City's police department, not the City in its capacity as the employer of certain police officers being faulted for their individual actions. Thus, although the plaintiff's motion alleges excessive use of force by the police as a result of the clubbing and handcuffing he claims to have suffered, he does not point the finger at any police officer in particular.

It is the City's civil liability that is directly at issue because, according to Bérubé, it must answer for the actions of its police department when it opts for crowd control measures that are unjustified, disproportionate, and in violation of civil liberties. [ 8 ] The factual evidence adduced before us is from diverse sources. [ 9 ] First, there is a video recording prepared by the defendant's police department showing portions of the protest in the Lower Town and primarily in the Upper Town of Quebec City in the evening of May 28, 2012 (D-4).

As for the plaintiff, he has compiled audiovisual evidence showing the location of the protest in the Upper Town. The disc filed before the Court (P-3) also contains recordings of the hearings of two cases before the Montreal Municipal Court on offences under

section 500.1 of the Highway Safety Code . [ 10 ] The City has provided the written reports of eleven officers on duty that evening, including those of Lieutenant Francis Pétrin and Officer Jean-Michel Côté-Lemieux (D-1). [ 11 ] Aside from the plaintiff, Lieutenant Pétrin, and Officer Côté-Lemieux, the Court heard the testimony of one other protestor, Annie-Pierre Bélanger, and that of student leader Léo Bureau-Blouin.

A person in charge at the City's claims department also testified. [ 12 ] This lengthy evidence can be summarized as follows: [ 13 ] The social context of the protest in which Bérubé took part that evening has been described in great detail. The route taken by the protesters was the same as that followed on previous evenings in the Upper Town of Quebec City; in other words, the protesters met in front of the National Assembly building and marched along the nearby streets in the Parliament Hill area.

The police reports note the route taken by the protesters and specify that they occupied the roadway on Honoré-Mercier Street southbound, Grande-Allée westbound, des Parlementaires northbound (which becomes Joly-de-Lotbinière and Louis-Alexandre Taschereau) and René-Lévesque westbound. And according to Bérubé, on May 28, 2012, the protest route had even been described on social media, including Facebook. Bérubé adds that the police officers had access to this information and that some of them had questioned the protesters on this subject before the march began.

Consequently, Bérubé asserts that the route followed by the protesters was neither unpredictable nor unknown to the police department. [ 14 ] Before the Court, Lieutenant Pétrin cited the following figures: ▪ 300 protesters gathered in front of the National Assembly that evening; ▪ 150 took

part in the street march; ▪ ultimately, approximately 80 of them ended up in front of the National Bank building on the corner of René-Lévesque and Turnbull, the location where Bérubé and the other protesters were placed in detention. [ 15 ] According to Bérubé, this was the thirtieth demonstration in Quebec City, the first one having taken place on April 27, 2012. Around 8:55 p.m., the group of protesters in front of the National Assembly voted by a show of hands on whether they would submit the planned route to the police officers.

The vast majority of the group voted against doing so, contrary to previous evenings, when participants had generally agreed to submit the route to the police. It should be noted that the context had changed with the May 18 enactment of Law 12 (Bill 78). [2] There was now a greater tendency on the part of protesters to refuse to collaborate with the police. Bérubé adds that the defendant's police department had published information online that this recent statute would not apply within the territory of the City, but that the police force would prioritize the application of

section 500.1 of the Highway Safety Code instead. It should be noted that, since 2001, this provision has required that access to public roadways remain unobstructed, bringing an end to the use of roadblocks by protesters. [ 16 ] The enactment of Law 12 a few days before the protest on May 28, 2012, strongly influenced Bérubé to refrain from clearly identifying himself as an organizer from that point on, given the heavy penalties associated with such a role under the new statute.

He testifies that at that point he became [ translation ] "like a semi-organizer". [ 17 ] In the evening of May 28, Lieutenant Pétrin was commander of the Crowd Control Unit (C.C.U.) of the City's police department. Before 2008, this specialized unit of the City's police force was known as the riot squad. There are 140 police officers in the C.C.U. Its operational deployment varies with every protest. Lieutenant Pétrin testifies that in 2012, there were 305 street protests in Quebec City and that 216 of these protests were over the tuition issue.

Seventeen of the tuition hike protests led to arrests and police interventions of all kinds, under either the Criminal Code or the Code of Penal Procedure for offences such as those set out in the Highway Safety Code , which is at issue here. He adds that before the enactment of Law 12 on May 18, there were no multiple arrests, as he calls them – that is to say, mass arrests. He explains that this is because the protesters in Quebec City always submitted their route in advance. Things changed after the enactment of Law 12, however.

The attitude of the protesters was much less cooperative, and those who were known to be organizers were much more hesitant to act. He explains that this is why the group voted every night on whether they would disclose their route to the police. Lieutenant Pétrin adds that he himself had even asked for and obtained the route that would

be taken from a group of protesters in front of the National Assembly. [ 18 ] May 28, 2012, was the third time the group of protesters were subjected to mass detention involving kettling, handcuffing behind the back with tie wraps, filming, and removal by bus.

The police presence deployed near the National Bank building at the corner of René-Lévesque and Turnbull Streets, the location where Bérubé was detained with the other protesters, was significant: several vehicles, about one hundred officers (according to Bérubé) or fifty officers (according to Pétrin), and the special C.C.U. [ 19 ] But let us return to the stages of the route followed by the protesters. [ 20 ] When he arrived in front of the National Assembly on May 28, 2012, Bérubé knew that negotiations between student leaders and government representatives were taking place in the National Bank building near Parliament Hill.

After voting against disclosing the route to the police force, the protesters began their march around 9:05 p.m. [ 21 ] They all agreed that the protest would remain celebratory and non-violent. Bérubé described them as a "peace and love" group, or in other words, pacifists. The City acknowledges that everything unfolded calmly and peacefully. The police reports filed under D-1 do not refer to any altercations or wrongdoings against persons or property.

Remarkably, a look at the document filed under D-4 reveals that, midway along their short route, as the protesters walked on the final part of René-Lévesque Street westbound, there was even a police vehicle preceding the crowd. [ 22 ] It is also apparent upon viewing the defendant's document that there were no vehicles on the roadway other than those of the police department. [ 23 ] Thus, the protester's march began. By the time they reached Grande-Allée, the group had already gotten smaller by 5% to 10% (according to Bérubé) or by 50% (according to Pétrin).

Only a few minutes after the march began, while the group was on Grande-Allée, tension mounted when they came up against about a dozen officers from the C.C.U. According to Bérubé, half of the unit began tapping their shields, while the other half charged the crowd. He adds that at that moment, things were [ translation ] “chaotic”. He explains that he had to flee the area as quickly as possible and as a result found himself in front of the Armory and face-to-face with helmeted police officers.

He dodged two blows from a club, but claims that he was nevertheless struck four times on the left side of his body, his thigh, and his knee. He was able to run behind the Parliament building and finally meet up with the rest of the protesters, who had continued along the route. [ 24 ] This part of Bérubé's testimony, which concerns the aspect of his claim relating to injuries, is not consistent with the testimony of the protester Bélanger, who states that she did not see police officers using clubs on the protesters....

As for Lieutenant Pétrin, he denies that the police officers had to charge the crowd or that they received an order to do so, because in his view the dynamic was not confrontational. [ 25 ] Despite this episode related by Bérubé, at the very beginning of the march, the protesters took the streets heading toward the National Bank building, where the meeting between student and government leaders was taking place. The police department seemed to have a very good idea of where the protesters were headed, since they came upon police officers blocking access to the building upon their arrival.

Some of them went north along Turnbull Street. Most of them, however, turned around in front of the National Bank building and protested freely for around thirty minutes, until they were completely kettled by police officers. [ 26 ] In the meantime, the student leaders exited the building and appeared on its front steps. File No. 1924 in D-4 indicates that it was approximately 10 p.m. at the time. [ 27 ] Student leader Léo Bureau-Blouin was accompanied by lawyers. He met with Lieutenant Pétrin, who was in charge of operations.

This crucial moment, which took place during this thirty-minute period, is related by both Bureau-Blouin and Lieutenant Pétrin. [ 28 ] Bureau-Blouin states that he learned that the protesters were about to be arrested in front of the building he was exiting. In his discussion with Pétrin, he pointed out that the protest was peaceful and that there was a significant media presence. As a result of this conversation with the defendant's officer, Bureau-Blouin himself went to speak with the protesters, while Pétrin contacted his superiors. [ 29 ] Thus, it fell to Bureau-Blouin to address the protesters.

He emphasized that there would soon be a breakthrough with the government. He did this, he says, so that he could better reason with the group he was talking to. [ 30 ] Bérubé, for his part, testifies that Bureau-Blouin announced that all of the protesters that night would be released. Bérubé adds that the police let it be known that they would all be able to leave the area without hindrance. [ 31 ] Nevertheless, the conversation between Lieutenant Pétrin and his superiors in the chain of command did not have a positive outcome.

Pétrin testifies that he waited for the response from his superiors for about five minutes before being told that the protesters would not be released. Examined by the Court about the reasons for this refusal, Lieutenant Pétrin answers that he does not know why his superiors rejected the offer presented by student leader Bureau-Blouin. [ 32 ] Bureau-Blouin then realized that the arrests of the protesters had begun.

He was disappointed to learn of the refusal by the police department superiors. [ 33 ] When Bérubé speaks about this period, he speaks of a promise being broken... [ 34 ] The protesters, well contained by the police officers, remained calm. They obeyed orders. [ 35 ] Bérubé appears in file No. 1926 of exhibit D-4 as the fiftieth of the eighty-four detained protesters. For his part, he affirms that he was detained for three and half hours and wearing handcuffs behind his back for two and a half of those hours.

The D-1 police reports record that the detention lasted three hours, half in front of the National Bank building and the other half for the duration of the

conveyance by bus and at the destination before all of the protesters were fully released. [ 36 ] Bérubé describes the protesters arrested with him as disheartened by events. He tried to reassure them. He points out that his detention prevented him and eighty-three others from accessing a bathroom. He even remembers seeing one female protester urinate in her clothes. They had no drinking water. And at no time was he or any of the others able to communicate with anyone outside the locations they were detained. [ 37 ] The witness Bélanger, another protester, was also detained.

At the time, she was a student group coordinator. She reports seeing a curious bystander in front of the National Bank building be corralled by the police and included among the protesters. She describes the forced lineup before a police camera, with no knowledge of the reason for detention, as a chain gang.

According to her, the police officers deceptively justified the handcuffing by claiming that there were only two of them for each group of about thirty detained protesters on the buses. [ 38 ] Léo Bureau-Blouin adds that he was ordered to leave the area of the protest in front of the National Bank building a few moments after the arrests of the protesters began, under threat of being placed in detention himself. [ 39 ] A look at the defendant's document D-4 reveals the following: ▪ File No. 1925: a first charter bus from the public transit system was used; thirty-one individuals were detained inside it with their hands cuffed behind their backs; they were filmed while identifying themselves as they climbed inside; these included young men and women and one older man; ▪ File Nos. 1925 and 1926: second bus: a group of thirty-one individuals, including two older men; ▪ File No. 1927: third bus: twenty-two young adults.

In total, eighty-four individuals, including Bérubé, got on the buses with their hands cuffed behind their backs after having been filmed and identified. [ 40 ] A look at the defendant's document also reveals that the handcuffing with tie wraps was carried out peacefully and with no resistance (file No. 1925). Two police officers have made contradictory comments regarding how easy it was to handcuff the protesters. One found them easy to place on their wrists, while another states exactly the contrary.

Two young women complained that they felt pain as they were being handcuffed (files No. 1925 and 1926). [ 41 ] The City and its police representatives argue that public safety justified their actions that night. [ 42 ] In his testimony, Lieutenant Pétrin recognizes that ideally, there could have been more officers so as to intrude less on the rights of the protesters. He also wrote something to this effect in his report: [ translation ] The powers to intervene are those set out in the code of penal procedure.

In an ideal world, for every person stopped, there would have been one person who proceeded with their identification and issued a statement of offence if necessary, thereby limiting the period during which the person who was stopped was not free to move, as would be the case for a driver stopped for running a red light, for example. The number of individuals stopped in the circumstances required implementing a structure to take charge of and identify protesters that was adapted to the situation.

To do so, 2 ( sic ) RTC vehicles were requested to use as shuttles between the location they were stopped and the location they were released. We could not identify the individuals present and release them right away, since they would have progressively increased the size of the surrounding crowd and compromised our safety. Emphasis added.

Exhibit D-1, incident report of May 28, 2012, at 5 of 13. [ 43 ] The witness explains that restraining Bérubé and the other protesters ensured that the officers avoided the risk of anyone using a concealed blunt instrument since, as he states, no search was performed. [ 44 ] Moreover, he asserts that handcuffing them allowed them to secure the groups in each of the buses, since there were only two police officers also riding in the vehicles. [ 45 ] He states that the groups of students were loaded onto three buses which were then driven simultaneously to three separate locations far from the protest to avoid obstruction by other protesters near the National Bank building.

The idea of having the three buses converge at the central Parc Victoria station had to be abandoned because other protesters were observed at that precise location. The destination for each of the three buses was determined on the basis of the proximity of certain services, including the availability of public transit. [ 46 ] Officer Côté-Lemieux testifies that, when the protesters on the bus on which he had ridden were released, there was a bit of a crush of people. The officer states that the protesters complained about being hot or cold or having to go to the bathroom once they

arrived at the Fleur-de-Lys destination, where Bérubé and his group were. In short, they were shouting their discontent. He affirms, however, that the situation quickly calmed down and that the detained protesters collaborated. [ 47 ] At the end of the demonstration on May 28, 2012, which concluded early in the night of May 29, many of the protesters were given statements of offence, while others were told that they would receive theirs in the mail. Analysis question 1 : were bérubé's constitutional rights violated? [ 48 ] As noted above, this case concerns civil liability.

The dispute therefore requires a determination of whether Bérubé is entitled to a remedy of damages because his fundamental rights were not respected by the City and its police department in the circumstances, regardless of whether he committed the penal offence set out in

section 500.1 of the Highway Safety Code . [ 49 ] The relevant legislative provisions invoked in his motion are from the Charter of human rights and freedoms , [3] the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , [4] the

Preamble to the Civil Code of Québec , and the Police Act . [5] [ 50 ]

Section 1 of the Quebec Charter provides that every human being has the right to personal inviolability.

Section 3 proclaims that every person is the possessor of the fundamental freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly. [ 51 ]

Section 2 of the Canadian Charter provides that everyone has the fundamental freedom of opinion, expression and peaceful assembly. It adds in

section 7 that everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. In

section 9, it provides that everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. [ 52 ] The Civil Code of Québec , which came into force in 1994, also weighs in on the subject of these fundamental constitutional rights and freedoms. Its preliminary provision states that it exists in harmony with the Quebec Charter .

Article 10 of the C.C.Q. provides that every person is inviolable and entitled to the integrity of his or her person. [ 53 ] As for the Police Act , it too is concerned with rights and freedoms, and in the second paragraph of

section 48 it reminds police officers that they must safeguard these interests while pursuing their mission. The mission of police forces and of each police force member is to maintain peace, order and public security, to prevent and repress crime and, according to their respective jurisdiction as set out in sections 50 and 289.6, offences under the law and municipal by-laws, and to apprehend offenders.

In pursuing their mission, police forces and police force members shall ensure the safety of persons and property, safeguard rights and freedoms , respect and remain attentive to the needs of victims, and cooperate with the community in a manner consistent with cultural pluralism. Police forces shall target an adequate representation, among their members, of the communities they serve. [6] Emphasis added. [ 54 ] In addition to

article 1457 of the Civil Code of Québec , which is applicable in any situation involving conduct likely to incur civil liability, both the Quebec and Canadian charters provide their own remedial mechanisms. [ 55 ] Thus,

section 49 of the Quebec Charter provides that unlawful interference with a right or freedom recognized therein entitles the victim to obtain "compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom". Subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter allows anyone to "apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances". [ 56 ] The words "appropriate and just in the circumstances" modulate the provision, or at least give courts the power to calibrate the remedy to each case. This caveat is a kind of echo of

section 1 of the Canadian Charter , which provides that the rights and freedoms it sets out may be subject only to such "reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". [ 57 ] The Quebec Charter is not silent on this subject either. Since its amendment in 1982, it has provided that "fundamental freedoms and rights are exercised with a proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec”. [7] [ 58 ] The same idea is reiterated in the second paragraph of

article 10 of the Civil Code of Québec , which provides that, " Except in cases provided for by law , no one may interfere with his person without his ... enlightened consent" (emphasis added). [ 59 ] Even the second paragraph of

section 48 of the Police Act incorporates this type of modulation in the name of the "safety of persons and property". [ 60 ] This bundle of fundamental rights and freedoms, tempered as it is to better serve public order and safety, gives rise to the issue of the true nature of a civil action.

The difficulty is all the more pronounced since, under Quebec law, civil liability is traditionally based on three inseparable elements: fault, injury and a causal connection between the two. [ 61 ] In other words, what is the interface between the rights and freedoms regime with the traditional civil liability regime? [ 62 ] In an eloquent commentary entitled La protection des droits fondamentaux et la responsabilité civile , [8] Justice Louis LeBel shares his perspective.

[ 63 ] Written by Justice LeBel in 2004, the

article traces the history of the issue, drawing a distinction between the pre- and post- Charter eras. According to him, the enactment of the Quebec Charter led to a profound change from the traditional situation based on the three elements of civil fault: [ translation ] 24 This new constitutional environment created by the enactment of the charters profoundly modified the situation of the law of traditional civil liability. From that point on, this C.C.Q. -based right represented nothing more than one of the elements in a complex, multi-levelled normative order.

Constitutional rules now govern many situations where the law of civil liability once offered the only effective remedy.

The relationships between these potentially concurrent norms in the protection of fundamental rights must therefore be considered. [9] [ 64 ] Justice LeBel discusses the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions concerning the coordination and convergence of fundamental rights regimes and delictual liability under the Civil Code of Québec : [ translation ] 30 In Quebec law, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has not accepted the principle of the autonomy of liability regimes, which could have led to the development of two parallel but fundamentally different systems.

In a series of judgments rendered since 1996, the Court has so far favoured a method of coordination and convergence of the law of fundamental freedoms and the delictual liability regime under the C.C.Q .

This case law seems to have developed because of the unity of the Quebec civil liability regime based on the notion of civil fault, which the Court has found to be able to accommodate the evolution of the standards of social behaviour enshrined by the enactment of the Quebec Charter . [10] [ 65 ] In his view, in Quebec there is a single system of civil liability arising from the application of both constitutional provisions and those of the Civil Code of Québec : [ translation ] 39 Since those judgments, the Supreme Court case law has remained faithful to this method of coordinating the law of civil liberties and the law of delictual liability to avoid creating two separate civil liability systems when the Quebec Charter is at issue. ... 40 Reliance on the concept of civil fault in this context always presents some challenges, however, despite the inherent flexibility of the notion. ...

It is important to recall the sometimes subtle nuances between the different concepts, one flowing from public law and concerned with the infringement of protected rights, and the other, that of fault, arising from the general law of delictual liability. Not every infringement of a guaranteed right is necessarily a fault. A violation does not, in itself, trigger the application of

section 49 of the Quebec Charter . Unlawfulness does not arise from the mere act of infringement. 41 Sometimes it is observed only after applying the principles of balancing and justification inherent in

section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter . ... [11] [ 66 ] Thus, Justice LeBel adopts an approach merging the notions of fault and the violation of a constitutional right. In his view, the existence of an imbalance is what demonstrates the unlawfulness of the infringement and justifies a remedy: [ translation ] 41 … Only a demonstration of an imbalance or a lack of justification in the exercise of these rights will establish the unlawfulness of an infringement.

Such a finding will make it possible to draw a parallel between the infringement of a protected right and the violation of the standard of conduct of a reasonable person, or in other words, civil fault . This method of balancing concurrent or contradictory rights requires a closer analysis of the technicalities of the current public law of fundamental freedoms as they have evolved through the application of

section 1 of the Canadian Charter . It requires the judge and the parties to adopt a broader vision of the nature of the interests at play when considering a legal situation involving the coordination of public law with the general law of civil liability to protect fundamental rights. [12] Emphasis added. ward (2010) [13] [ 67 ] In what can be seen as a logical extension of Justice LeBel’s commentary in 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a unanimous judgment on the issue in 2010, in a case in which the Attorney General of Quebec and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police intervened. In that case, the Chief Justice, writing for the Court, considered

section 24 of the Canadian Charter in the historical context of civil liability cases where fundamental rights and freedoms were at issue. [ 68 ] The case involved the unlawful detention and strip search of an individual after he found himself near the Prime Minister of Canada in a public place in Vancouver in 2002. Ward sued the city, seeking an appropriate remedy under

section 24 of the Canadian Charter for being overpowered by the police officers. [ 69 ] After noting that judicial authority on the issue was sparse, the Chief Justice summarizes the judgment of the Court as follows: 4 I conclude that damages may be awarded for Charter breach under s. 24(1) where appropriate and just. The first step in the inquiry is to establish that a Charter right has been breached. The second step is to show why damages are a just and appropriate remedy, having regard to whether they would fulfill one or more of the related functions of compensation, vindication of the right, and/or deterrence of

future breaches. At the third step, the state has the opportunity to demonstrate, if it can, that countervailing factors defeat the functional considerations that support a damage award and render damages inappropriate or unjust. The final step is to assess the quantum of the damages. [14] [ 70 ] Thus, it is a four-step process wherein the second and third steps cause a certain disruption to the classic civil liability regime in Quebec law. At the second step, damages are a just and appropriate remedy if they seek to compensate or protect the fundamental right at issue.

At the third step, where a fundamental right has been infringed, the onus is on the public authorities to demonstrate countervailing factors based on, for example, public order or security. [ 71 ] The Supreme Court notes that every case is unique and that consequently the facts must prevail: 19 ... What is appropriate and just will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

Prior cases may offer guidance on what is appropriate and just in a particular situation. [15] [ 72 ] Therefore, to answer the first question in this case, we will consider the first, second and third steps of the analytical framework set out in Ward in some detail. As for the fourth step in that judgment, it will be considered under the third question here. [ 73 ] Referring to the uniqueness of the

section 24 remedy, the Chief Justice distinguishes it from a traditional action in private law, describing it more as an action in public law brought directly against a public authority: 22 ... an action for public law damages “is not a private law action in the nature of a tort claim for which the state is vicariously liable but [a distinct] public law action directly against the state for which the state is primarily liable”. ... The nature of the remedy is to require the state (or society writ large) to compensate an individual for breaches of the individual’s constitutional rights.

An action for public law damages — including constitutional damages — lies against the state and not against individual actors. ... [16] [ 74 ] Under this constitutional remedy, compensation of the victim is the primary objective, although the protection of the fundamental right at issue must be taken into consideration: 47 As discussed earlier, damages may be awarded to compensate the claimant for his loss, to vindicate the right or to deter future violations of the right.

These objects, the presence and force of which vary from case to case, determine not only whether damages are appropriate, but also the amount of damages awarded. Generally, compensation will be the most important object, and vindication and deterrence will play supporting roles. ... [17] [ 75 ] This leading case has been the subject of relevant commentary in Quebec. [18] [ 76 ] The author Brunelle sees it as establishing a new, distinct and autonomous remedy not based on fault and requiring the demonstration that a Charter right has been breached. Because it is not a subsidiary or residual remedy, however,

section 24 does not permit granting double compensation, that is to say, compensation in addition to what could be awarded on the basis of the traditional civil liability regime. [ 77 ] The author Grammond, for his part, sees Ward as an invitation to broaden the scope of

section 49 of the Quebec Charter primarily when an award of punitive damages is at issue. The case law [ 78 ] Bérubé and the City have submitted precedents dealing with civil liability in circumstances involving detention and public protest. [ 79 ] We have accepted three, two of which were decided before Ward in 2010. 1 st khoury [19] [ 80 ] This Court found that the arrests by the defendant police officers, employees of the City of Montreal, were unlawful and that the use of handcuffs was not necessary because the plaintiff did not represent a threat.

Interpreting articles 74 and 75 of the Code of Penal Procedure , [20] Dortelus J. concluded as follows: [ translation ] [66] Taking all of the evidence into account, the Court finds that, in the circumstances, the arrest was not necessary to prevent the continuation of the offence; moreover, even if an intervention was necessary, given the nature of the offence and the fact that Mr. Khoury cooperated upon arrest, it is clear that it was not the only reasonable method available to the police officers to prevent the resumption or continuation of the alleged offence of screaming audibly outside.

Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Khoury's arrest was unlawful. [67] As for the use of handcuffs, it was not justified given the nature of the offence, the circumstances of the arrest, and the conduct of Mr. Khoury, who did not present a threat to either himself or the officers. [21] 2 nd syndicat des cols bleus regroupés de montréal (scfp, local 301) v . coll [22] [ 81 ] The Court of Appeal overturned a trial judgment that had allowed a class action against the Union following a demonstration in downtown Montreal that was in violation of a decision of the essential services council.

The Court of Appeal declared that a noisy protest that does not itself obstruct traffic is not a fault: [ translation ]

[70] I therefore find it difficult to imagine characterizing a demonstration, an exercise of the fundamental right of freedom of expression that was carried out [ translation ] “in an orderly fashion, with no excess of any kind and that … allowed the traffic to circulate in the above-described area” as illegal and unlawful, when the points of access were [ translation ] “not blocked by the demonstrators”. [71] In concluding as I do, I in no way state that a demonstration must be unreasonable or unlawful or deliberately seek to harm the public or third parties to be characterized as excessive and therefore wrongful, if its direct, calculated, or inevitable purpose is to cause damage to others.

Such a demonstration would, alone, engage liability, even if the strike during which it took place were perfectly legal. That could have been the case here if the objective of the demonstrators was not merely to make noise to draw the attention of municipal authorities to their complaints and disturb activities of city hall but also deliberately to obstruct traffic within the targeted area as completely as possible. ... ... [83] As already noted, this (the demonstration) constitutes a form of expression protected by s. 3 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms and s. 2(

b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . For this constitutional guarantee to no longer apply, the demonstration would have to be accompanied by actions that were in themselves undue or unlawful. ... ... [85] To find otherwise would mean that any demonstration that caused a slowdown in traffic because of its size could give rise to a class action against the people who organized it, whatever its legal character, the orderliness in which it took place, and the absence of any violence or excess.

It is a matter of judicial notice that, in a city like Montreal, there are numerous causes for demonstrations, that they take place frequently, that they often cause a temporary paralysis in certain main traffic arteries, and that police intervene in order to divert traffic. This result is, of course, not desirable. [23] 3 rd kavanaght [24] [ 82 ] In 2011 and 2013, the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal ruled on incidents that took place in 1996 in Montreal and involved the arrest of seventy-eight protesters occupying a public square in violation of a municipal by-law.

As in the second case listed above, it was also a class action against the city of Montreal: [ translation ] [26] There were approximately 80 of them. It was 5:15 a.m. [27] The police officers intervened again, but this time they kettled the protesters to prevent them from fleeing. They ordered them to sit on the ground and began arresting them. [28] This resulted in the arrest of seventy-eight individuals. Once everyone was identified, they were all handcuffed and led to the patrol wagon, which then carried them, about fifteen at a time, to a police station.

Once there, the handcuffs were removed and they were booked and placed in a common cell. [29] All of the individuals arrested were subsequently released between late morning and 5 p.m. that day.

They were issued a statement of offence for [ translation ] "being in a park after closing". [25] [ 83 ] The Superior Court judge, addressing the justification for the arrest and detention of the protesters, outlined the procedure for issuing a statement of offence or arresting a person informed of the alleged offence without a warrant for violating a provincial statute as set out in articles 72 to 75 of the Code of Penal Procedure . Referring to a close analysis of these provisions by the Municipal Court of Montreal, he concluded: [ translation ] [128] In

summary, the power of arrest is not absolute. It is exercised in exigent circumstances that require immediate intervention to put an end to a violation, after all other reasonable means have been exhausted. The person must be released as soon as the detention no longer appears necessary to prevent the immediate continuation or resumption of the offence. [26] [ 84 ] After finding that the arrest by the police officers was justified, he nevertheless came to the opposite conclusion concerning the handcuffing and detention at the police station: [ translation ] [136] That is not the case with what followed, however.

The application of handcuffs and the detention at the police station were in no way justified. [137] In fact, with only one exception, the individuals arrested did not resist. They sat calmly on the ground in a circle and obeyed the police officers' instructions.

They also agreed to identify themselves when asked. [138] What, then, prevented the police from issuing statements of offence and releasing these individuals immediately? ... [140] Ultimately, it would have been possible for only those individuals who failed to identify themselves adequately, if any, to be taken to the police station. [141] The police officers provide little explanation for why they decided to detain all these individuals. It should be noted that in this

case, the detention includes the handcuffing, the transportation of the individuals to the police station in the patrol wagon, the booking process, and their captivity for a few hours. [142] The incident report is silent on this subject.

Sergeant Robert Richard, who was directing the police operation, testified that he wanted to [ translation ] "free the park" before nearby offices and businesses opened. [143] The other explanation is from police officer Jean Bergeron, who stated that detention is the usual procedure at demonstrations and that in this case the protesters had also lit a fire. [144] These reasons do not hold water. [145] By deciding to take 51 adults to the Bonsecours Station and 27 minors to Station 33, the police officers were required to apply measures generally associated with detention, in particular the application of handcuffs, transportation to the police station, and the booking process.

This was pointless and unjustifiable in the circumstances. [146] The City's liability is therefore incurred by the fault of its police officers. [27] [ 85 ] Referring to the moral damages he awarded, the judge emphasized the humiliation inherent in any detention. [ translation ] [159] By its very nature, any detention is a humiliating act for the person deprived of his or her freedom.

This is all the more true when the detention is unjustified, as it also violates the detainee's dignity and self-esteem. [28] [ 86 ] The Court of Appeal intervened on these conclusions only with regard to the award of punitive damages. It found that they were not justified. 4 th bérubé v. québec (city) [29] [ 87 ] That judgment, which was rendered while the Court was in deliberations and of which we have taken judicial notice, concerns the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and took Ward into consideration.

We will return to this point in Question 3. [ 88 ] To answer Question 1 regarding Bérubé's constitutional rights, we will take the same approach as the Superior Court judge in Kavanaght and consider whether the intervention of the city's police department was subject to any legal restrictions on the night of the protests of May 28, 2012. the legal restrictions on the work of a police officer [ 89 ] Articles 72 , 74 , 75 and 144 of the Code of Penal Procedure must be taken into account. They set out the legislative restrictions on police officers in the case of non-indictable offences. [ 90 ]

Article 144 establishes the rule that all penal proceedings are instituted by way of a statement of offence. Articles 72, 74 and 75 limit the actions of the police primarily with respect to arrests without a warrant. 72. A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed an offence may require the person to give him his name and address , if he does not know them, so that a statement of offence may be prepared.

A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has not given him his real name and address may require further information from the person to confirm their accuracy. ... 74. A peace officer may arrest without a warrant a person informed of the offence alleged against him who, despite the peace officer's demand, fails or refuses to give him his name and address or further information to confirm their accuracy. The person so arrested must be released from custody by the person detaining him once he gives his name and address or once their accuracy is confirmed. 75.

A peace officer who finds a person committing an offence may arrest him without a warrant if that is the only reasonable means available to him to put an end to the commission of the offence. The person so arrested must be released from custody by the person detaining him once the latter person has reasonable grounds to believe that detention is no longer necessary to prevent, for the time being, the repetition or continuation of the offence. [30] Emphasis added. [ 91 ] Arrest without a warrant is therefore an exception because a police officer's task is to issue a statement of offence.

An arrest may take place only if it is necessary for the identification of the person observed committing a wrongdoing or for the purpose of stopping the commission of the offence.

Author and criminal law scholar Gilles Létourneau refers to the statement of offence procedure as the [ translation ] "the one and only procedure initiating a penal prosecution". [31] He adds: [ translation ] In reality, it can be expected that the statement of offence will be as effective as these techniques because the service of the statement marking the beginning of the prosecution ( art. 156 C.P.P .) may take place at the time of the commission and statement of the offence

(arts. 157 and 158 C.P.P.).[32] [92] In reference to the constitutional validity of the statement of offence procedure, Létourneau notes: [translation] The only real infringement of a citizen's rights that remains – and it is inevitable and minimal – is that resulting from being stopped to begiven the statement of offence. It is inevitable because it is often necessary to stop the offender to obtain his or her contact informationfor the purpose of serving the statement of offence.

It is minimal since the statement of offence is the penal procedure that probably bestreconciles the public interest in the effective prosecution of violations of provincial laws and regulations and the defendant's interest inhaving his or her procedural and fundamental rights be infringed as little as possible in the service of this purpose.[33] [93] Thus, it is clear that the procedure for serving statement of offences does not involve methods that impinge on fundamentalrights and freedoms. [94] As this Court has pointed out, the identification required for the preparation of statements of offence does not require thatphotographs be taken: [translation] 30 The individuals were therefore not obligated to reveal their identity.

That said, once they had done so, as soon as they were forced tostay in one place so that that their photo could be taken, they were unlawfully and arbitrarily detained, and it may be objectively inferredthat they were subjected to significant physical and psychological constraint. 31 It was absolutely unnecessary to take photographs to prepare a statement of offence, and in doing so, the police officers greatlyexceeded the powers set out in the Code of Penal Procedure.

No witness for the prosecution has shed any light in their testimony on thereasons for taking the photographs.[34] [95] As for arrests for non-indictable offences, they must correspond to the behaviour of the offender, not the nature of the offence: [translation] Arrests are not linked to the nature or seriousness of the offence, but to the behaviour of the offender after being stopped when theoffence is observed.

Measures provide for the release of the offender as soon as the issue of identification is resolved by the peace officer(article 74 C.P.P.) or by a judge before whom the offender must be brought within 24 hours (articles 89 and 92 C.P.P.).[35] [96] While the detention of protesters may be justified under articles 74 and 75, it must also be allowed by the circumstances, forexample, to prevent [translation] “damage to cars, graffiti, or a traffic standstill”.[36] Author Gilles Létourneau, in his comments on the2008 Superior Court judgment rendered by Boilard J. describes it as an incident that disrupted public order and justified the momentarydetention of protesters to stop the commission of the offence and identify the offenders.[37] This implies that the detention of protestersrequires a situation of some urgency and is consequently a last resort, or in other words, in the absence of any other reasonablemethods.[38] [97] Moreover, the power to issue a statement of offence is discretionary. [translation] A police officer enjoys a discretionary power to decide not to take the legal route and therefore not to issue a statement of offence.

Thispower is not absolute, but it is not limited by the discretionary power of Crown counsel. In the accomplishment of their respective duties,the police officer and the prosecutor have a discretion that must be exercised independently of any outside influence. The police officer's power is not absolute, in that its exercise must be subjectively justifiable, or in other words, it must be exercisedhonestly and transparently, and on the basis of valid and reasonable grounds. But a subjective belief is not sufficient to justify theexercise of discretionary power.

It also requires justification on the basis of objective elements, including – and this is an important factor– the material circumstances that prevailed when the power was exercised. R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5 , [2007] 1 S.C.R.190.[39] [98] Finally, we note that under

article 145 of the Code of Penal Procedure, a statement of offence may be in electronic form: 145. The form, including the electronically-generated form, of a statement of offence shall be prescribed by regulation.[40] the direct liability of the city [99] The constitutional aspect of Bérubé's action does not concern individual acts or the specific acts of one or certain police officers.The claim he asks the Court to recognize is for compensation because the defendant's police department and its administration wereinvolved and, he alleges, their decision had a direct effect on him on the evening of the protest.

In his view, liability for his detentionarises because the police authorities were fully aware of the effects that their decision would have on his rights and freedoms. [100] From this perspective, this is not a master-servant relationship. It is the city itself, through one of the most important services itprovides to the population, who must answer for his action.

This is because the police department and its commander legally representand constitute the defendant City. [101] The evidence reveals that the final decision to detain Bérubé and the other demonstrators was made at the highest level of thechain of command of the defendant's police force, with the result that, given the comparable protests that had taken place in precedingdays, the issuing of the statements of offence under the Code of Penal Procedure required that a group of citizens including the plaintiff

be deprived of their constitutional rights for a few hours. [ 102 ] From a legal standpoint, this concerns the liability of the state. The liability of the City is incurred directly, insofar as the effects of this decision violated the fundamental rights of persons on its territory at that time. According to Ward , this is a public law action directly against the state, and not against its individual representatives. [41] [ 103 ] At this stage of our analysis, we find that Bérubé's action successfully meets steps 1 and 2 set out in Ward .

Essentially, his freedom of expression and his right to be protected against arbitrary detention were violated. As a result, in principle, he is entitled to an appropriate and just remedy. the circumstances of the plaintiff's detention [ 104 ] But what about the third step of the test in Ward , according to which the public authorities may establish a justification, in this case based on public safety. [ 105 ] Ward states that a concern for good governance is one of the countervailing factors negating a monetary constitutional remedy. 33. ...

A complete catalogue of countervailing considerations remains to be developed as the law in this area matures.

At this point, however, two considerations are apparent: the existence of alternative remedies and concerns for good governance. [42] [ 106 ] As noted above, before Ward , Justice LeBel's commentary states that a civil liability remedy flowing from fundamental rights could be based on an infringement, or in other words, a disruption of the balance between an infringing act and acts that are necessary in certain circumstances. [ 107 ] In other words, this case highlights the delicate balance between two fundamental values that must co-exist: democratic vitality and public safety. [ 108 ] These values are clearly noted in prior decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada. [ 109 ] Regarding freedom of expression, it has stated: ...

Freedom of expression was entrenched in our Constitution and is guaranteed in the Quebec Charter so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream.

Such protection is, in the words of both the Canadian and Quebec Charters, "fundamental" because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the individual. ... [43] [ 110 ] Regarding public safety, the highest court has affirmed: 1 One of the most fundamental responsibilities of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens. This may require it to act on information that it cannot disclose and to detain people who threaten national security.

Yet in a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably and in conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it guarantees. These two propositions describe a tension that lies at the heart of modern democratic governance.

It is a tension that must be resolved in a way that respects the imperatives both of security and of accountable constitutional governance. [44] Emphasis added. [ 111 ] Constitutional law authors Brun, Tremblay and Brouillet make the following observations on this subject: [ translation ] … While it is true that the State must ensure its own safety, it is also true that those who are responsible for doing so must never be legally empowered to act as they wish. [45] [ 112 ] The facts established before us demonstrate that the tension between the right to peacefully protest and the obligation to ensure public security resulted in an unreasonable infringement of the plaintiff's rights. [ 113 ] Let us summarize the facts: ▪ the protesters, including the plaintiff, are young adults and students who were marching in the streets to express their opinion; ▪ it was a peaceful protest, compromising neither persons nor property; ▪ the group consisted of a limited number of persons; ▪ the route taken by the protesters was short; ▪ the route was know to police officers; ▪ the protest took place in an area dedicated to the exercise of democracy, starting at the National Assembly and remaining primarily around the periphery of Parliament Hill; ▪ it was not an isolated, one-time protest: the police department was well aware of the type of demonstration it would be; ▪ there was no confrontation with other protesters or motorists;

▪ the alleged offence is non-indictable; ▪ the police were in control of the situation at all times; ▪ the protesters cooperated fully with the police upon arrest; ▪ there is a reasonable alternative to arrest which nevertheless remains true to the mission of the police to ensure public safety; ▪ the police department command must and in fact did know what would result from the refusal to release the plaintiff and the group of protesters. [ 114 ] With regard to Bérubé, his handcuffing, the filmed identification lineup to which he was subjected, his prolonged detention to check his identity, and his removal to a location far from the site of the alleged offence were unjustified in the circumstances and unduly intrusive on the freedom of movement of a citizen who chose to protest in a public roadway, even if such protest was illegal. [ 115 ] Let us recall that, as Lieutenant Pétrin and student leader Léo Bureau-Blouin had discussed, these violations could have been avoided.

In this respect, the Court recognizes that the police department has a discretionary power to issue statements of offence.

That evening, however, the exercise of this discretion would clearly have been less intrusive if it had resulted in an agreement to wipe the slate clean and allow the protesters to disperse. [ 116 ] Moreover, a look at the events as recorded in the document filed by the City in no way reveals that the situation was out of control, either near the National Bank building where the arrests took place or, in the hour before that, along the route the protesters took from the National Assembly building. [ 117 ] The faults alleged against the City and its police department are acts of authority that strayed from their original purpose of ensuring public security.

Bérubé claims that the defendant hoped to quell the student movement by stopping them. The Court will not go that far, but it must acknowledge that the police methods used during the events clearly had a significant indirect effect of disproportionately repressing the exercise of freedom of expression in a public place of a group of peaceful protesters. [ 118 ] Finally, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to consider the lack of less restrictive police methods, for example, the issuing of statements of offence on the spot with electronic devices.

If such methods already exist in businesses, for home deliveries, and even in parking meter systems, why would they not be appropriate to use when preparing statements of offence for groups?

The effectiveness of such a method would obviate the need to handcuff, film, and remove the protesters to a location away from the scene of the offence. [ 119 ] In short, all that is needed to be less intrusive is a little imagination. [ 120 ] To conclude, we answer the first question in the affirmative and find that Bérubé's constitutional rights were violated. question 2 : did bérubé suffer bodily injury caused by the actions of the police officers? [ 121 ] The plaintiff faults the C.C.U. officers for clubbing him a few times as he began running to avoid them a few minutes after he left the front of the National Assembly building. [ 122 ] It is possible, indeed even likely, that Bérubé was struck with a club a few times as he alleges while he was trying to avoid the police who were attempting to prevent the protesters on Grande-Allée westbound from turning onto the streets skirting the parliamentary precinct.

In our view, he was aware of this risk and assumed it. This was not his first street protest making social and political claims in the context of the tuition hikes. In the spring of 2012, he had taken

part in many of the protests held in Quebec City, if not all of them. In his own eyes and in the eyes of others, he was a leader of the cause. [ 123 ] The presence and possible use of clubs by the police to control a crowd of protesters is not synonymous with police brutality. It is merely the concrete manifestation of a very real [ translation ] “tension” that must be managed in the name of public safety. [ 124 ] Whatever the case may be, Bérubé did not succeed in proving any physical sequelae. On the contrary, in his testimony he did not hide the fact that he practices extreme sports.

He states that this allowed him to shield himself from several blows from the police clubs. [ 125 ] It should be noted that he was able to continue walking with the other protesters entirely normally. One excerpt from the video filed by the defence even shows him with a smile on his face in the minutes following the alleged altercation. He himself acknowledges that he was pounding his feet on the bus with the other occupants when they arrived at their destination, Place Fleur-de-Lys, shortly before they were released.

He appears to have been able to do this with no functional limitation to his body. [ 126 ] As for any psychological sequelae he may have suffered, it is appropriate to recall that Bérubé is used to asserting his rights publicly. He does not appear to be faint-hearted in this respect. The Court does not fault him for this.

But the stress of having to face well-armoured and club-carrying police officers seems in his case to have been negligible, given the circumstances that have been proved before us. [ 127 ] Question number 2 must therefore be answered in the negative. question 3 : what is the appropriate remedy? [ 128 ] Let us first recall the precedents already cited: 1 st bérubé [46] [ 129 ] In that case, this Court awarded the plaintiff $3,000 in moral damages because the City was found to have infringed his constitutional right to protest peacefully in a public square in August of 2012 by maintaining a camp as part of the Occupy movement.

2 nd Ward [47] [ 130 ] The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 2007 trial judgment awarding $5,000 for an incident that had taken place in 2002. Ward, a citizen, was subjected to a nearly complete strip search in violation of his constitutional rights. This amount was awarded in moral damages. 3 rd kavanaght [48] [ 131 ] The protest in Montreal in 1996 gave rise to a class action resulting in an award of $1500 in moral damages per protester in compensation for the violation of their fundamental rights.

It should be noted that the Superior Court judge awarded this amount even though Kavanaght himself, in whose name the class action had been authorized, lacked credibility 4 th khoury [49] [ 132 ] This Court awarded $5,000 in moral damages in a 2004 judgment in compensation for an unlawful detention that took place in 2000. [ 133 ] These precedents can be distinguished from this case. [ 134 ] Here, the infringement of Bérubé's constitutional rights was not as serious as the strip search in Ward . [ 135 ] This action is individual.

It is not a class action, which would necessarily lead to a reduction of the amount properly representative of individual prejudice. [ 136 ] In Bérubé No. 1, the plaintiff was not detained, handcuffed, filmed, or deprived of his freedom for three hours, unlike the facts in evidence before us here. [ 137 ] As for Khoury , two police officers were impleaded and personally sued in addition to their employer, the City of Montreal.

In the case before us, the proceeding targets a collective police action in the context of a public demonstration. [ 138 ] This brings us quite close to the perspective adopted by the Supreme Court in Ward , whereby the quantum of damages to be awarded need not be substantial or put excessive strain on public funds to play its remedial role based on the objects of vindication and deterrence: 72 The objects of vindication and deterrence engage the seriousness of the state conduct. The corrections officers’ conduct was serious and reflected a lack of sensitivity to Charter concerns.

That said, the officers’ action was not intentional, in that it was not malicious, high-handed or oppressive. In these circumstances, the objects of vindication and deterrence do not require an award of substantial damages against the state. [50] [ 139 ] Taking all of this into account, we find that the plaintiff is entitled to $4,000 in moral damages. [ 140 ] It is not appropriate to award punitive damages.

As in the opinion of our colleague Jacques Tremblay J. on this subject, we add that the element of deterrence is incorporated into the award of moral damages in compliance with Ward and that in this case, the damages serve the pedagogical function sought. [51] [ 141 ] In addition, it is important to state that the declaratory nature of this judgment is in our view sufficient to prompt an improvement of the working methods of police officers in a capital city that will be required to be the setting for peaceful demonstrations in the future. [ 142 ] Only the legal interest should be added to the moral damages award because in our view the additional indemnity sought is a surcharge that should not be paid out of public funds. [ 143 ] No costs should be awarded because the plaintiff was exempted from paying them when he filed his motion.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: CONDEMNS the city of Quebec to pay $4,000 plus legal interest only, as of November 28, 2012, without costs. __________________________________ DANIEL LAVOIE

Date of hearing: April 22, 2014