2019 NBCA 52, 2019 NBCA 52

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 74-18-CA KALEB JEFFREY KENNETT APPELLANT KALEB JEFFREY KENNETT APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Kennett v. R., 2019 NBCA 52 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French The Honourable Justice LaVigne Kennett c.

R., 2019 NBCA 52 CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French l’honorable juge LaVigne Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: October 4, 2017 (conviction) June 5, 2018 (sentencing) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 4 octobre 2017 (déclaration de culpabilité) le 5 juin 2018 (détermination de la peine) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: February 19, 2019 Appel entendu : le 19 février 2019 Judgment rendered: June 27, 2019 Jugement rendu : le 27 juin 2019

Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice LaVigne Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Margaret Gallagher, Q.C. For the respondent: Mélanie Ferron Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge LaVigne Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l'audience : Pour l’appelant : Margaret Gallagher, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Mélanie Ferron THE COURT The appeal from conviction is dismissed. Leave to appeal sentence is granted.

The sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking is reduced from 30 months to 25 months’ incarceration (less 137 days credit for time served) and the concurrent sentence for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking is reduced from 24 months to 19 months’ incarceration. In all other respects, the sentence is unaltered. LA COUR L’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité est rejeté. L’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la peine est accordée.

La peine pour possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic est ramenée de 30 à 25 mois d’incarcération (moins une réduction de 137 jours pour la période déjà purgée), et la peine concurrente pour possession de méthamphétamine en vue d’en faire le trafic est ramenée de 24 à 19 mois d’incarcération. À tous les autres égards, la peine demeure inchangée. The judgment of the Court was delivered by LAVIGNE, J.A. I. Overview [ 1 ] This case is primarily about whether state misconduct was a relevant factor which should have been considered at the time of passing sentence.

In my view, it was. [ 2 ] Having reasonable and probable grounds to believe stolen property was present at a given address in Zealand, N.B., RCMP officers attended at that address without a warrant. They arrested Mr. Kaleb Jeffrey Kennett and another man who were found on the deck of the residence. The officers peered through the windows of the house and took photographs of the inside of the house from the outside. Then, they entered Mr. Kennett ’s residence and looked into every room. They also searched the cell phone seized from Mr. Kennett.

Later, an Information to Obtain a search warrant (“ITO”) was prepared and the search warrant was executed the next day. This second search of the residence resulted in the seizure of illicit drugs which became the basis for the conviction under appeal – drugs having an approximate street value of $10,130.

[ 3 ] Relying on s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , Mr. Kennett sought the exclusion of the drugs, alleging the state conduct breached his Charter protected rights, and arguing that in the circumstances, the admission of the impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Pursuant to a voir dire, a Provincial Court judge concluded the warrantless search of Mr. Kennett’s residence – including peering into the residence and the taking of the photographs – and the search of his cell phone were searches carried out in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

She expunged from the ITO the information gathered through the warrantless searches, and she adjourned the s. 24(2) analysis until the conclusion of the trial. [ 4 ] At the end of the trial, the judge concluded Mr. Kennett had possession of the drugs, some of which were for the purpose of trafficking, and she proceeded with an analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter . She held the search warrant, which resulted in the seizure of the drugs, could have been issued even if the information gathered through the illegal searches was expunged from the ITO.

Although she determined the breaches were egregious and impacted the Charter protected rights of the accused, she denied Mr. Kennett’s motion to exclude the drugs from the evidence, concluding the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. She convicted Mr. Kennett of all offences charged, i.e. one violation of s. 4(1) (a

summary conviction offence) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , S.C., 1996, c. 19 , and four violations of s. 5(2) (indictable offences) of the Act . [ 5 ] Mr. Kennett was sentenced to 30 months in jail for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking ( less 137 days credit for time served , resulting in a net sentence of 25 months and 16 days).

He received concurrent time for the remaining charges; namely, 24 months for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, 10 months for possession of cannabis (marihuana) for the purpose of trafficking, 6 months for possession of methylphenidate for the purpose of trafficking and 6 months for possession of amphetamine. Other ancillary orders were issued. [ 6 ] Mr. Kennett appeals his conviction on the basis the trial judge erred in law by admitting the drugs into evidence, notwithstanding the violations of his Charter rights.

He asks the Court to allow the appeal, exclude the contested evidence and order a verdict of acquittal. In the alternative, he applies for leave to appeal his sentence, and asks that his sentence be reduced by six months due to state misconduct. He submits the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the misconduct of the state agents during the sentencing proceedings in accordance with the principles endorsed by the Supreme Court in R. v.

Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, and this error resulted in the imposition of an unfit sentence, therefore justifying appellate intervention. [ 7 ] These reasons explain why I would dismiss the appeal from conviction, grant leave to appeal sentence, and reduce the overall custodial sentence by five months . II. The Appeal from Conviction A. The warrantless searches (March 6) and the execution of the search warrant (March 7) [ 8 ] Shortly before 5:00 pm on March 6, 2016, a complainant arrived at the RCMP detachment. He told Cpl.

Lach he had been viewing houses with a real estate agent earlier that day and had observed about an hour earlier, at a property situated at a specified address in Zealand, N.B., on the deck and in the residence, many items − such as generators, pumps, reciprocating saws, a laser and so on, that he believed had been stolen from Charmac Construction. Some of the items had stickers with that name on them, and his brother-in-law had stated this company had suffered a break and enter a few months prior and some of the items he observed were, in fact, stolen. He described two men he observed at the residence.

A search of the RCMP database confirmed that Charmac Construction had been broken into on November 16, 2015, and goods were stolen − some of the items listed as stolen matched the description given by the complainant. [ 9 ] Cpl. Lach, who had been an officer since 2007, was the lead investigator. He concluded he had reasonable and probable grounds to believe items stolen from Charmac Construction were at the address provided, and he planned to go to that address and arrest anyone on the property.

He felt he had enough information to obtain a search warrant, but it could not be obtained and executed for several hours; therefore, he intended to secure the house to safeguard the allegedly stolen items in the interim. Around 6:00 pm, three marked patrol vehicles arrived at the specified address.

[ 10 ] Mr. Kennett and another man were standing on the deck of the residence. They matched the description given by the complainant; therefore, they were arrested for possession of stolen property, searched incident to arrest and taken into custody. The men cooperated with the police. Cpl. Lach seized from Mr. Kennett more than $2,000 cash and a cell phone, which he searched once he returned to the detachment. [ 11 ] Cpl. Lach observed on the deck a water pump bearing a sticker with the name Charmac Construction − an item described by the complainant and listed in the database as stolen .

He also saw a generator and a water pressure pump by the garage door, just down from the deck. [ 12 ] Police officers peered through the windows and took photographs of the inside of the house through the windows. Cpl. Lach and Cst. Thompson then entered the residence and remained there for a few minutes, looking inside every room and bathroom to ascertain whether there was anyone in the residence. They didn’t find anyone; they observed more tools, but did not see any drugs. [ 13 ] The search warrant was executed on March 7, 2016. Tools and equipment, thought to be stolen goods, were found and seized.

Although they were in the house to search for stolen goods, police also found and seized the drugs which became the subject of the charges in this matter. B. Voir dire to determine whether Mr. Kennett’s Charter rights had been breached − April 21, 2017 [ 14 ] Mr. Kennett sought to have the drugs excluded from the evidence. The trial began with a voir dire to determine whether Mr. Kennett’s Charter rights had been breached. 1. Warrantless search of the residence [ 15 ] The Crown conceded the entry into the residence by the police violated Mr. Kennett’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter . Cpl.

Lach testified the entry into and the sweep of the residence were necessary to ensure no one was in the residence, which would be guarded overnight by a sole officer to secure the premises from unknown persons destroying evidence. He admitted they had no reason to objectively believe anyone was in the residence since they had arrested the two men the complainant had observed at the residence; however, due to his concern for the safety of officers, he testified this was his usual practice and he would do the same thing again tomorrow.

No drugs were found as a result of the house sweep, and no information was gathered at the residence with respect to the drugs. [ 16 ] Although the trial judge accepted the search of the house was a safety search, rather than a search to gather evidence, she remarked that nothing really explained why photos of the inside of the house were taken from the outside through the windows before the safety search was undertaken, and she was not satisfied exigent circumstances existed. She said it appeared Cpl.

Lach “inexplicably did not understand the limitations of the law.” She concluded the entry and sweep of the house and the photos taken of the inside of the house were invalid searches in breach of Mr. Kennett’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter . 2. Warrantless search of the cell phone [ 17 ] Cpl. Lach explained he decided to search Mr. Kennett’s cell phone once he returned to the detachment − approximately an hour and a half after he had seized it − as he was concerned the cell phone could be wiped remotely; the trial judge commented Cpl. Lach did not explain who would have wiped the phone since Mr.

Kennett was in custody. Cpl. Lach believed the cell phone was relevant to the investigation for trafficking in stolen property and he was looking for text messages, recent phone calls, Facebook posts, emails and photos. He testified his practice was to search cell phones incident to arrest to look for evidence that may help his investigation. He would usually just search back a few days, but here he may have gone back as far as November 2015, the time at which the items were allegedly stolen.

He was not looking for evidence of drug deals and he had no idea at the time of his search there were drugs in the residence. The search of the cell phone did not yield any evidence concerning the drugs. Although he took photos

of information he thought relevant, Cpl. Lach did not have detailed notes of what he searched for, what he examined on the cell phone orexactly how far back he searched. [18] The trial judge noted that although police are permitted to search phones to preserve evidenceand for the purpose of public safety, the nature and extent of such searches were limited. She determined the search of the cell phone wasnot in the spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v.

Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, the extent of the search carried outrequired a warrant and the accused’s expectations of privacy were undermined. She concluded the search of the cell phone constituted aninvalid search in breach of Mr. Kennett’s s. 8 Charter rights. [19] She decided the immediate remedy for the

section 8 Charter breaches was to expunge from theITO the information obtained as a result of these searches and then determine whether sufficient grounds remained on which the issuingjudge could have authorized the warrant.

She ordered that the information obtained as a result of the search of the cell phone, the photostaken through the windows of the residence and the comments respecting the information gathered during the safety sweep of theresidence, be expunged from the ITO. [20] She deferred the decision on whether there would be a further remedy under s. 24(2) for the s. 8Charter breaches until after the hearing of the evidence at the trial proper. C. The trial judge’s decision on the issuance of the search warrant and the s.24(2) application − October 4, 2017 1.

The issuance of the search warrant [21] The trial judge concluded the search warrant, which resulted in the seizure of the drugs, couldhave been issued even if the information gathered through the illegal searches was expunged from the ITO, since sufficient informationremained on which the issuing judge could have authorized the warrant. This decision is not challenged. 2. The s. 24(2) application [22] Having found the evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the constitutional rights ofMr. Kennett, the trial judge then proceeded with an analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter and denied Mr.

Kennett’s motion to excludethe seized drugs, concluding the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Mr. Kennett appealshis conviction on the basis the trial judge erred in law in not excluding the impugned evidence. [23] Reviewing courts will not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on s. 24(2) absent anapparent error as to the applicable principles or rules of law or an unreasonable finding. It is a question of mixed fact and law as itinvolves the application of a legal standard to a set of facts. As stated by Fish J. in R. v.

Cole, 2012 SCC 53 , [2012] SCC 53,[2012] 3 S.C.R. 34: The standard of review is deferential: “Where a trial judge has considered the proper factors and has not made any unreasonable finding,his or her determination is owed considerable deference on appellate review” (R. v. Côté, 2011 SCC 46, [2011] 3. S.C.R. 215, at para.44).

But where the relevant factors have been overlooked or disregarded, a fresh Grant analysis is both necessary and appropriate. [para.82] [24] This Court has affirmed the importance of deferring to the findings of lower courts in thecontext of s. 24(2) on numerous occasions; the longstanding principles have withstood the test of time and were reaffirmed by QuiggJ.A., for a unanimous Court, in R. v. Bonnell, 2015 NBCA 6, 430 N.B.R. (2d) 1, at para. 59.

[ 25 ] The question at the heart of an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter is the following: having regard to all the circumstances, would the admission of the evidence in question bring the administration of justice into disrepute? The formulation of a principled answer involves a consideration of the three lines of inquiry prescribed by the Supreme Court in R. v. Grant , 2009 SCC 32 , [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 71 . [ 26 ] The trial judge referred to this framework in her analysis.

Concerning the first Grant factor − the seriousness of the Charter -infringing state conduct – she found the search of a cell phone and an entry into a private property without exigent circumstances were serious breaches. She noted the officer made no attempt to hide his conduct or disassociate himself from the conduct, but he seemed ignorant of his duty towards the Charter -protected rights of the accused, which touched on the second Grant factor − the seriousness of the impact of the Charter breach on the Charter -protected interests of the accused.

She reasoned that although she was convinced the officer would have received judicial authorization to enter the residence and search the cell phone, Mr. Kennett’s expectations of privacy were undermined by the warrantless searches. When considering the behaviour of Cpl.

Lach, she observed it could not be due to inexperience and stated ignorance of the law was not an excuse. [ 27 ] She determined, “the breaches were egregious and impacted the Charter protected rights of the accused.” [ 28 ] At the third stage of the analysis, the final Grant factor – society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits – she considered whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by the admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion. She found the evidence was reliable, necessary to the prosecution’s case and discoverable.

She explained the court had disassociated itself from the fruit of the unlawful conduct by expunging the ITO. She also noted the unlawful searches did not yield any evidence concerning the drugs. Finally, she concluded the exclusion of the impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 29 ] In support of his application for exclusion of the drugs from the evidence, Mr. Kennett referred to R. v. Kelly , 2010 NBCA 89 ; 367 N.B.R. (2d) 1.

In Kelly , this Court found the impugned evidence – marihuana − was seized from a residence pursuant to an improperly obtained warrant and concluded the deficiencies in the ITO coupled with the prior unlawful police conduct justified a finding that the admission of the seized marihuana into evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter and the Court directed a verdict of acquittal. [ 30 ] The trial judge correctly distinguished the facts in the present case from the facts in Kelly : “The search was conducted after the police had adequate information to proceed to obtain a warrant and their conduct was overzealous but not at the level which existed in Kelly where the police failed to disclose important information and the search of the residence was much more egregious.” In Kelly , the drugs were seized from a residence pursuant to an improperly obtained warrant, obtained without the requisite reasonable grounds and on the basis of material non-disclosure and misleading statements in the ITO.

Such is not the situation in the present matter. [ 31 ] This is an exercise in discretion. The trial judge properly balanced her assessments under each of the lines of inquiry and determined, based on all of the circumstances, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I cannot say her finding is unreasonable. [ 32 ] In the context of s. 24(2), this Court is not to substitute its opinion for that of the trial judge. Considerable deference is owed to the judge's assessment since she considered the appropriate factors. Mr.

Kennett has not, in my view, identified any error as to the applicable principles or rules of law; therefore, appellate intervention is not justified and I would dismiss the appeal against conviction. III. The Appeal from Sentence [ 33 ] The decision on the voir dire was rendered on April 21, 2017. On October 4, 2017, the s. 24(2) analysis was carried out and Mr. Kennett was convicted. The sentence hearing was held on June 5, 2018. [ 34 ] The Crown asked for a jail sentence between 30 and 36 months, while the defence suggested the range was between 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment.

The sentencing judge determined the range of sentence for these sorts of offences

was 24 to 36 months. She imposed 30 months − which was the upper range suggested by the defence − and deemed concurrent sentences were appropriate for the remaining drug charges. The Charter breaches were not raised by counsel who represented the parties at the sentencing hearing (who were different than those who appeared before this Court) nor mentioned by the sentencing judge. [ 35 ] Mr. Kennett does not take issue with the range of sentence referred to by the trial judge nor dispute that the 30-month sentence would have been appropriate, were it not for the Charter breaches.

He submits it was an error in principle for the sentencing judge not to consider the state misconduct, and this resulted in an inappropriate sentence. He seeks a reduction of six months in the sentence imposed to remedy the Charter breaches. [ 36 ] The Crown submits that since the trial judge provided a remedy for the Charter breaches – by expunging from the ITO the intelligence gathered unlawfully – nothing more is required.

It further submits that if the sentencing judge erred in not considering a relevant factor, the error had no impact on the sentence, which was reasonable and fit; however, if the Court was to consider a sentence reduction for the misconduct, then the Crown suggests a reduction of no more than three months is appropriate. A. Standard of review [ 37 ] A deferential standard of review applies to a trial judge’s imposition of sentence. This is explained in part by the discretionary nature of a sentence decision. In R. v.

Suter , 2018 SCC 34 , [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, after reminding us once again “that appellate courts cannot interfere with sentencing decisions lightly”, because “trial judges have ‘broad discretion to impose the sentence they consider appropriate within the limits established by law’” (para. 23), Moldaver J., writing for the majority, reiterated what the Supreme Court held in R v.

Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089: In Lacasse , a majority of this Court held that an appellate court could only interfere with a sentence in one of two situations: (1) where the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge is “demonstrably unfit” (para. 41); or (2) where the sentencing judge commits an error in principle, fails to consider a relevant factor, or erroneously considers an aggravating or mitigating factor, and such an error has an impact on the sentence imposed (para. 44).

In both situations, the appellate court may set aside the sentence and conduct its own analysis to determine a fit sentence in the circumstances. [para. 24] [ 38 ] This same analytical framework continues to be applied by this Court and was recently reaffirmed by Quigg J.A. in Cormier v. R. , 2018 NBCA 38 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 150 (QL), at para. 20 . However, like Drapeau C.J.N.B., as he then was, stated in Steeves v.

R. , 2010 NBCA 57 , 360 N.B.R. (2d) 88: “while great deference is owed to the sentencing judge's weighting of the relevant factors, correctness is the standard by which his or her understanding of the governing principles is reviewed on appeal” (para. 23). B. The Supreme Court decision in Nasogaluak [ 39 ] The law relating to sentence reduction as a Charter remedy for police violence and other state misconduct was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Nasogaluak .

That case raised the following issue: The central issue in this appeal concerns the possibility of reducing an offender's sentence to take account of a violation of his or her constitutional rights. Our Court must determine whether a s. 24(1) remedy is necessary to address the consequences of a Charter breach or whether this can be accomplished through the sentencing process. […] [para. 39] [ 40 ] Mr. Nasogaluak pleaded guilty to impaired driving and flight from police. He attempted to evade the police in a high-speed chase.

His efforts to resist arrest resulted in two officers punching him several times in the head and ribs. The officers did not report the force they had used during the arrest, provided little to no information about the incident and failed to get medical attention for Mr. Nasogaluak, notwithstanding clear evidence he required it. When Mr. Nasogaluak was released the following morning, he was found to have suffered broken ribs and a collapsed lung that required emergency surgery. [ 41 ] The sentencing judge held the police misconduct amounted to a breach of the accused’s s. 7

Charter rights. He refused to stay the proceedings, but concluded a reduction in sentence was an appropriate remedy under s. 24(1) of theCharter. Instead of the otherwise warranted sentence of 6 to 18 months’ incarceration, he granted a conditional discharge on both charges− a punishment available on the count of flight from police but not on the count of impaired driving because of the minimum punishmentprovided in such cases.

The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings that the officers used excessiveforce in breach of s. 7 of the Charter and his decision to grant reduced sentences under s. 24(1); however, they set aside the conditionaldischarge granted on the impaired driving count and substituted it with the statutorily mandated minimum fine. [42] The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that a sentence reduction was anappropriate response to the Charter breach, but held police violence and other state misconduct may be addressed as part of thesentencing process, as mitigating circumstances in the ordinary application of ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code without resorting tos. 24 of the Charter. [43] Lebel J., writing for a unanimous Court, held the sentencing regime of the Criminal Codeprovided sentencing judges with some scope to take into account not only the conduct of the offender, but also that of state actors indetermining a fit sentence, and that state misconduct relating to the circumstances of the offence or offender was relevant in thedetermination of a fit sentence, regardless of whether the misconduct amounted to a Charter infringement or fell short of such a standard.The Supreme Court explained that even where the state misconduct amounted to a Charter breach, s. 24(1) did not need to be resorted toin order for the misconduct to be considered in determining a fit sentence (Nasogaluak, at para. 3). [44] Lebel J. emphasized the court’s duty under s. 718.2 of the Code to consider any relevant factorrelating to the offence or the offender: […]

Section 718.2(

a) of the Code provides that a court should reduce a sentence “to account for any relevant ... mitigating circumstancesrelating to the offence or the offender”.

It would be absurd to suggest that simply because some facts also tend to suggest a violation ofthe offender’s Charter rights, they could no longer be considered relevant mitigating factors in the determination of a fit sentence. […][para. 47] [Emphasis in original.] [45] The Court upheld the sentence reduction as a remedy available within the enabling scheme ofPart XXIII of the Code, but stated that as a general rule the reduction could not extend beyond the limits imposed by the Criminal Code.The sentence imposed must comply with the statutory minimums and other provisions which restrict or prohibit certain forms of sentencein respect of specific offences (Nasogaluak, at paras. 55 and 63).

C. Earlier decisions from this Court [46] In Nasogaluak, Lebel J. noted “[t]he New Brunswick Court of Appeal has also employed theremedy of sentence reduction fairly liberally in a number of Charter cases” and mentioned three cases, namely: R. v. Dennison (1990), (NB CA), 109 N.B.R.(2d) 388, [1990] N.B.J. No. 856 (QL) (application for leave to appeal refused by the SupremeCourt of Canada, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 448); R. v. MacPherson (1995), (NB CA), 166 N.B.R. (2d) 81, [1995] N.B.J.No. 277 (QL); and, R. v. Zwicker (1995), (NB CA), 169 N.B.R. (2d) 350, [1995] N.B.J.

No. 502 (QL), at para. 59. [47] In Dennison, this Court reduced a jail sentence, under s. 24(1) of the Charter, for attemptedmurder from 12 years to 9 years because of the refusal of the sentencing judge to permit the convicted person to speak to sentence.

TheCourt found this violated the Charter and the principles of a fair hearing. [48] In MacPhearson, this Court found the appropriate remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter was tosubstantially reduce the appellant’s sentence for possession of stolen goods from six months to three months' incarceration because hehad not been taken before a justice without unreasonable delay, as required by s. 503 of the Criminal Code. The accused was arrested ona Friday and was taken in front of a Provincial Court judge on the following Monday.

Even though the chances the accused would havebeen released on bail were negligible, the Court found a reduction of the sentence was required to emphasize that the violation of theaccused’s s. 9 Charter rights was serious. [49] In Zwicker, counsel for the Crown at the sentence hearing had represented the appellant when

he entered a plea of guilty to the charge of theft of a fishing vessel. At that time, he had made a strong plea for a non-custodial sentence. However, at the sentencing hearing, the same counsel, now representing the Crown, sought a significant jail sentence. This Court found the Crown’s actions amounted to a breach of the solicitor-client relationship as well as prosecutorial misbehaviour and the appellant was entitled to a remedy for the s. 7 breach, under s. 24(1) of the Charter . The sentence of imprisonment of one year imposed on Mr.

Zwicker was reduced to time served and the two-year Probation Order was set aside. D. Post-Nasogaluak decisions [ 50 ] Other courts have recognized and applied the principles endorsed by the Supreme Court in Nasogaluak . The parties brought to my attention one decision from this province, as well as some from other provinces where the Nasogaluak principles have been applied to reduce an otherwise appropriate sentence to account for Charter breaches and arrive at a fit sentence. In many ways, they are reflective of the position this Court had taken in the earlier decisions. [ 51 ] In R. v.

Martin , 2013 NBQB 322 , 409 N.B.R. (2d) 8, (verdict set aside by this Court on an unrelated issue and a new trial ordered: 2015 NBCA 40 , 438 N.B.R. (2d) 17) Morrison J. found Mr. Martin’s s. 8 Charter rights were violated when the RCMP played back an intercepted conversation after it was learned a lawyer, Mr. Martin, was a party to the conversation. The conversation between Mr. Martin and his client’s wife was intercepted by the RCMP and formed the basis of the evidence against Mr. Martin.

The trial judge found that while the breach of the accused's rights in having his communications intercepted was serious, it was not so egregious as to warrant a discharge. However, he concluded the breach of Mr. Martin’s Charter rights must be taken into consideration in mitigation of sentence under the principles enunciated in Nasogaluak . This, together with the other sentencing factors considered, led him to conclude the sentence should be less than the 22 to 30-month range established by the case law for obstruction of justice. He sentenced Mr. Martin to a term of incarceration of 16 months. [ 52 ] In R. v.

Lima , 2016 ONCJ 167 , [2018] O.J. No. 1580 (QL), the trial judge found that lost evidence, absent a satisfactory explanation, as well as the arbitrary, irrational decision not to charge the accused for five months, both amounted to s. 7 Charter violations; however, granting a stay was not an appropriate remedy. Instead, a significant reduction in the quantum of sentence was to be applied to reflect the seriousness of the breach. [ 53 ] In R. v. Zarecky , 2018 ONCJ 191 , [2018] O.J. No. 1588 (QL), the trial judge found a s. 7 Charter breach based on the prosecution's loss of the statement of a witness.

He dismissed an application for a stay of the proceedings or exclusion of the testimony of the witness and ruled the remedy for the Charter breach was a reduction of sentence. He reduced an otherwise fit sentence of four months on the dangerous driving to 90 days intermittent and the sentence of five months consecutive and concurrent on the two flights from police counts, to consecutive four months conditional sentences to be served concurrently. [ 54 ] In R. v. Blanchard , 2010 NLTD(G) 123, [2010] N.J.

No. 218 (QL) , the accused was the driver and sole occupant of a motor vehicle registered to his mother in which fifty-nine bags of marijuana were seized. During the trial, a voir dire was held and the trial judge found the accused’s ss. 8 , 9 and 10(

b) Charter rights had been infringed, but the drug evidence seized by police was nevertheless admissible. Mr. Blanchard was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis. At the sentencing hearing, he sought consideration of the Charter breaches in the determination of his sentence. Butler J. noted the defence had acknowledged the breaches could be characterized as “technical” in comparison to the deliberate and egregious police actions that resulted in Mr. Nasogaluak’s injuries.

The Court found that while the Charter violations were not sufficient to warrant the exclusion of the evidence, and while the police behaviour was not deliberately unlawful, a remedy by way of a small reduction in sentence was warranted. The trial judge concluded a fit sentence would have been an 18 months conditional sentence, but she reduced it by three months due to the Charter violations. [ 55 ] In R. v. Ebanks , 2012 ONSC 5002 , [2012] O.J.

No. 4619, the trial judge found that as there were no reasonable grounds for a second strip search, it violated the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights, even though it seemed unlikely the second strip search had a significant impact upon the accused, given the unique context of the case. Baltman J. concluded that what would otherwise be the appropriate sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment for importing cocaine should be reduced by six months to reflect the police misconduct. [ 56 ] In R. v. Lam , 2014 ONSC 5355 , [2014] O.J. No. 4307 (QL), the offender was convicted of offering a bribe to police officers. Mr.

Lam offered two police officers 100 pounds of marijuana and $120,000 to let him go after they unlawfully entered his self-storage locker and arbitrarily detained him in violation of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights. Hill J. concluded an appropriate sentence would be nine months' incarceration with an agreed reduction for three months of pre-sentence custody and a further two-month mitigation for Nasogaluak considerations.

[ 57 ] In R. v. Williams , 2015 ONSC 322, [ 2015] O.J. No. 366 (QL) , the offender pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The plea followed an unsuccessful s. 24(2) Charter application to have the evidence excluded due to Charter breaches. The trial judge found the offender’s s. 10 Charter rights were breached when he was asked questions about the smell of marijuana during a traffic stop, and there was a breach of his s. 8 rights when police searched his pockets prior to arrest.

He concluded these Charter breaches constituted state misconduct that warranted a reduction in sentence. An appropriate sentence for Mr. Williams was three years, but the sentencing judge gave him a credit of three-and-a-half months because of the Charter breaches. [ 58 ] In Auclair v. R. , 2016 QCCA 1361 , [2016] Q.J.

No. 11062 (QL), in the context of negotiations with the prosecution, the applicants (more than 30), most in 2012 and 2013 and a few others later on, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to commit murder which, further to joint submissions, resulted in sentences ranging from 12 to 25 years of imprisonment without the possibility of parole before serving half their sentences. On October 9, 2015, while some of the applicants’ co-accused who did not plead guilty were being tried, the trial judge found the prosecution had breached its obligation to disclose and ordered a stay of proceedings.

Informed of this judgment, each of the applicants sought leave to appeal the verdicts resulting from their guilty pleas. In the alternative, they sought a reduction of their sentence. The Court did not order a stay of proceedings, but concluded proposed reductions in sentence (ranging from six to eight years) were appropriate in the circumstances and constituted a suitable remedy for the abuse alleged against the prosecution, because it obviated the prejudice suffered by the applicants while ensuring the integrity of the justice system. E.

Error in principle – not considering all relevant factors in passing sentence [ 59 ] Mr. Kennett is not calling into question the weight given to relevant factors; he is arguing the sentencing judge erred in law by not considering a relevant mitigating factor, i.e. the state misconduct. Although the trial judge found three instances of Charter breaches, which she characterized as egregious conduct, this misconduct was not considered when passing sentence. [ 60 ] The Crown notes that Mr.

Kennett was represented by counsel at the sentence hearing, counsel did not request a sentence reduction under Nasogaluak , and the appellant has not alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Kennett submits the sentencing judge had a duty to consider any relevant factor, whether it was raised or not by counsel at the sentencing hearing, as s. 718.2(

a) of the Code mandates that “[a] court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender ” (underlining is mine) and only a Charter -compliant sentence can be said to be fit, as was noted by Lebel J. in Nasogaluak , at para. 48 . [ 61 ] I am of the view that in the circumstances of this case, the sentencing judge should have considered the incidents of state misconduct during the sentencing proceedings. In R. v. Virani , 2012 ABCA 155 , [2012] A.J.

No. 507 (QL), the Court of Appeal stated the trial judge should have given counsel the opportunity to address the Charter breach at the sentencing proceedings even though counsel had not raised the issue. The Crown appealed the sentence disposition, arguing, amongst other things, the sentencing judge gave weight to an irrelevant consideration when imposing sentence – namely the inadequacy of the police investigation, and in particular, a police sergeant’s failure to make any notes concerning her contact with the accused at the date of the offence.

The Court noted these issues had been a matter raised in defence argument during the trial, but the judge was not persuaded the respondent suffered an unfair trial in consequence of this issue and convicted. During the trial, defence counsel had made some comment about the effect of the lack of notes and related non-disclosure, but not aimed at any sentence reduction. There was no indication in the record concerning the sentencing proceedings that the trial judge advised counsel to address this matter of a shortcoming as to note-taking and disclosure as being a topic relevant to sentence.

The Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge's consideration of these matters had little bearing on the sentence imposed and therefore it was unable to see any supportive effect for the Crown appeal arising from this consideration; however, it commented the trial judge should have brought up the Charter breaches during the sentence proceeding: [...] the trial judge ought to have given counsel for both sides the opportunity to address the question whether the Charter breach found at trial involved anything relevant to sentence.

The respondent's position on appeal embodies a practical contention that the failure of the police sergeant to file a report led to delay of the trial process which in turn thus meant the respondent spent more time on remand. In light of R. v. Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, both counsel should have had a chance to say something about this. [para. 18] In the same way, the sentencing judge, in the present case, should have brought up the Charter breaches and given both counsel the

opportunity to address the question. [ 62 ] The trial judge found the court had disassociated itself from the police misconduct by expunging the unlawfully obtained information from the ITO. Does this bar any further remedy at the time of passing sentence pursuant to sentencing provisions of Criminal Code ? The answer is no. The expunging of the ITO did not eliminate the need for proper application of the sentencing principles set out in the Code . [ 63 ] In R. v. Foster , 2018 ONCA 53 , [2018] O.J. No. 488 (QL) (leave to appeal dismissed: [2018] S.C.C.A.

No. 127), the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the three-year sentence imposed for importing cocaine by six months on account of state misconduct − the RCMP had conducted a second strip search of the accused without proper grounds and in an unreasonable manner. At a prior trial, the presiding judge had excluded a statement given by the appellant to the RCMP under s. 24(2) because it had been obtained by a breach of s. 8 of the Charter – the unlawful strip search. The trial judge expressed the view that, as a general rule, an offender was entitled to one remedy per Charter breach.

It followed that if, as here, an offender obtained an order excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter , she would not be entitled to the additional remedy of sentence reduction if later convicted of the offence. In a unanimous decision, Watt J. stated: The error involved a mischaracterization of the request for sentence reduction as a request for two remedies for the same constitutional infringement. No principle forecloses multiple remedies for the same infringement, provided the requisite conditions precedent have been satisfied.

But more importantly, sentence reduction is available without demonstration of a Charter -infringement predicate. This is made clear by the decision in R. v. Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206. [para. 125] Although the trial judge’s sentencing decision was cumbered by error, and thus not entitled to the usual deference, Watt J. was satisfied the errors had no impact on the sentence imposed, which was at the bottom end of the range counsel agreed was appropriate. [ 64 ] The discretionary nature of a reduction in sentence relating to a Charter breach is found at para. 47 of Nasogaluak .

While I agree with the Crown’s argument that a sentencing judge is not obliged to reduce the sentence every time a Charter breach is found, it is a factor that should be considered. The discretion comes in when deciding whether or not this factor will impact the sentence which would have otherwise been imposed. [ 65 ] In my respectful view, the sentencing judge committed an error by failing to consider the state misconduct as a relevant factor and this error impacted the sentence and resulted in the imposition of an unfit sentence.

It simply cannot be said that consideration of this factor would not have made a difference. I would grant leave to appeal and turn the analysis to what constitutes a fit sentence in the circumstances. F. A fit sentence for Mr. Kennett [ 66 ]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code describes the fundamental purpose of sentencing as that of contributing to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.” The Nasogaluak principles clearly apply to the case of Mr. Kennett. The conduct of state actors was directly related to the circumstances of the offence and the offender, and resulted in not just one, but three serious breaches of Mr.

Kennett’s Charter rights, calling for a sentence that would respect not only his own rights, but also “society's collective interest in ensuring that law enforcement agents respect the rule of law and the shared values of our society” ( Nasogaluak , at para. 49 ). [ 67 ] A sentencing judge may take into account Charter breaches while crafting a fit and proportionate sentence. Remedies granted to redress Charter wrongs are intended to meaningfully vindicate a claimant's rights and freedoms: Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) , 2003 SCC 62 , [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 55 .

The expunging of the ITO, which had no impact on the trial, is insufficient to remedy the impropriety of the state actions. [ 68 ] The more egregious the breach, the more attention is to be paid to it in determining a fit sentence: Nasogaluak , at para. 48 . The trial judge conducted an analysis of the seriousness of the breaches of Mr. Kennett’s Charter rights. I will not repeat the details that I already noted when I dealt with the trial judge’s review of them and her s. 24(2) analysis.

Suffice it to say that although it was done in the context of s. 24(2) of the Charter , nonetheless, the trial judge concluded: “the breaches were egregious and impacted the Charter protected rights of the accused.” I agree with her findings and remarks concerning the behaviour of the state actors and its impact on Mr. Kennett.

[69] This case reflects a casual, cavalier approach to the investigation. Without a warrant andwithout any objective indicators pointing to the possibility of persons inside Mr. Kennett’s residence, officers entered the residence andcarried out a search of every room, for the stated purpose of confirming the residence was unoccupied. One of those officers was anRCMP corporal with significant experience in law enforcement.

In his testimony, he said he would do it again and attempted to make acase for “exigent circumstances” to justify the warrantless entry and warrantless search of the cell phone; however, the judge found noexigent circumstances justifying the warrantless searches. It is no excuse to say the approach he took here is one he or other officerswould have taken, or that it is an accepted practice.

If that were so, it would simply be indicative of a wider spread systemic problem. [70] The fact the lead investigator testified he would repeat his unconstitutional behaviour pointstowards a disregard of an accused’s Charter rights. The police conduct represented a serious departure from well-establishedconstitutional norms; the officers were not operating in unknown legal territory. Both a residence and a cell phone carry highexpectations of privacy. [71]

Section 8 of the Charter guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonablesearches and seizures which extends at least so far as to protect the right of privacy from unjustified state intrusion. Warrantless searchesare prima facie unreasonable under s. 8. I can only conclude the warrantless entry and search of Mr. Kennett’s home and his cell phonewas carried out with indifference for the law and Mr. Kennett’s constitutional rights.

It may be time to remind us all once again of theimportance of a person’s home for s. 8 purposes and the age-old principle of the inviolability of the dwelling-house which the SupremeCourt articulated in R. v. Silveira, (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38 (QL): […] There is no place on earth where persons can have a greater expectation of privacy than within their “dwelling-house”.

No matterhow good the intentions of the police may have been, their entry into the dwelling-house without a warrant infringed the appellant'srights guaranteed by s. 8 of the Charter. […] It must be the final refuge and safe haven for all Canadians. It is there that the expectation of privacy is at its highest and where thereshould be freedom from external forces, particularly the actions of agents of the state, unless those actions are duly authorized.

Thisprinciple is fundamental to a democratic society as Canadians understand that term. […] [paras. 140-141] [72] As for the search of the cell phone, I agree with Cromwell J.’s comment in Fearon: “Any searchof any cell phone has the potential to be a very significant invasion of a person’s informational privacy interests” (para. 96).

Finally, themessage of Nasogaluak, at para. 32, also bears repeating: “Courts must guard against the illegitimate use of power by the police againstmembers of our society, given its grave consequences.” [73] Considering the police misconduct, I would reduce by five months the otherwise appropriateoverall jail sentence of 30 months imposed by the sentencing judge to provide Mr. Kennett with a meaningful remedy for the violationsof his rights.

The reduction does not reduce the sentence below a statutory mandated minimum and it is not outside of the general rangeset by case law in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing. [74] It is not for this Court, in this appeal, to concern itself with punishment of the police; however,it is for this Court to affirm the fundamental values and ensure that rights under the Charter are not, in substance, meaningless. IV. Disposition [75] I would dismiss the appeal against conviction.

I would grant leave to appeal the sentence, allowthe appeal and vary the sentence as follows: I would reduce the sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking from 30months to 25 months’ incarceration (less 137 days credit for time served) and reduce the concurrent sentence for possession ofmethamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking from 24 months to 19 months’ incarceration, commencing on the date the sentence wasinitially imposed. In all other respects, I would leave the sentence unaltered.

Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE LAVIGNE I. Aperçu [1] En l’espèce, il s’agit surtout de savoir si l’inconduite de la part de l’État était un facteur pertinent dont il aurait fallu tenir compte au moment de prononcer la peine. À mon avis, elle était pertinente. [2] Ayant des motifs raisonnables de croire que des biens volés se trouvaient à une certaine adresse à Zealand, au Nouveau-Brunswick, des agents de la GRC se sont présentés à cette adresse sans mandat. Ils ont appréhendé Kaleb Jeffrey Kennett et un autre homme qui se trouvaient sur le patio de la résidence.

Les agents ont regardé par les fenêtres de la maison et ont pris des photos de l’intérieur de la maison à partir de l’extérieur. Ensuite, ils sont entrés dans la résidence de M. Kennett et ont regardé dans chaque pièce. Ils ont aussi fouillé le téléphone cellulaire saisi de M. Kennett. Plus tard, une dénonciation en vue d’obtenir un mandat de perquisition a été préparée, et le mandat de perquisition a été exécuté le lendemain.

Cette seconde perquisition dans la résidence a abouti à la saisie de drogues illicites qui a été le fondement de la déclaration de culpabilité portée en appel, drogues dont la valeur de revente était d’environ 10 130 $. [3] Invoquant le par. 24(2) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés , M. Kennett a demandé l’exclusion des drogues et soutenu que la conduite de l’État avait violé ses droits garantis par la Charte et que, dans les circonstances, l’admission de la preuve contestée déconsidérerait l’administration de la justice.

À la suite d’un voir-dire, une juge de la Cour provinciale a conclu que la perquisition sans mandat dans la résidence de M. Kennett, y compris le fait de regarder dans la résidence et de prendre les photos, ainsi que la fouille de son téléphone cellulaire, ont été effectuées en violation des droits que lui garantit l’ art. 8 de la Charte . Elle a exclu de la dénonciation l’information recueillie au moyen de la perquisition et de la fouille menées sans mandat et a différé l’analyse fondée sur le par. 24(2) jusqu’à la fin du procès. [4] À la fin du procès, la juge a conclu que M.

Kennett avait la possession de drogues, dont certaines en vue d’en faire le trafic, et elle a procédé à une analyse fondée sur le par. 24(2) de la Charte . Elle a déclaré que le mandat de perquisition, qui a abouti à la saisie des drogues, aurait pu être décerné même si l’information recueillie au moyen de la perquisition et de la fouille illégales avait été exclue de la dénonciation. Bien qu’elle ait déterminé que les violations étaient inacceptables et avaient porté atteinte aux droits de l’accusé protégés par la Charte , elle a rejeté la motion de M.

Kennett visant à exclure les drogues de la preuve en concluant que l’exclusion de cette preuve déconsidérerait l’administration de la justice. Elle a reconnu M. Kennett coupable de toutes les infractions dont il était accusé : une violation (infraction de procédure

sommaire) du par. 4(1) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances , L.C. 1996, ch. 19 , et quatre violations (actes criminels) du par. 5(2) de cette loi. [5] M. Kennett a été condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement de 30 mois pour possession de cocaïne en vue d’en faire le trafic (moins une réduction de 137 jours pour la période déjà purgée, ce qui a donné une peine nette de 25 mois et 16 jours).

Il a reçu des peines concurrentes pour les autres chefs d’accusation, à savoir 24 mois pour possession de méthamphétamine en vue d’en faire le trafic, 10 mois pour possession de cannabis (marihuana) en vue d’en faire le trafic, 6 mois pour possession de méthylphénidate en vue d’en faire le trafic, et 6 mois pour possession d’amphétamine. D’autres ordonnances accessoires ont été rendues. [6] M. Kennett appelle de sa déclaration de culpabilité pour le motif que la juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit en admettant les drogues en preuve en dépit des violations des droits que lui garantit la Charte .

Il demande à la Cour d’accueillir l’appel, d’écarter les éléments de preuve contestés et d’inscrire un verdict d’acquittement. Subsidiairement, il demande l’autorisation d’appeler de sa peine et demande que sa peine soit réduite de six mois en raison de l’inconduite de la part de l’État. Il soutient que la juge du procès a commis une erreur de principe en ne tenant pas compte de l’inconduite des mandataires de

l’État pendant les procédures de détermination de la peine, contrairement aux principes reconnus par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt R. c. Nasogaluak , 2010 CSC 6 , [2010] 1 R.C.S. 206, et que cette erreur a entraîné l’infliction d’une peine qui est inappropriée et justifie donc une intervention en appel. [7] Les présents motifs expliquent pourquoi je rejetterais l’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité, j’accorderais l’autorisation d’appel, et je réduirais de cinq mois la peine totale d’emprisonnement. II. L’appel de la déclaration de culpabilité A.

La perquisition et la fouille sans mandat (6 mars) et l’exécution du mandat de perquisition (7 mars) [8] Peu avant 17 h le 6 mars 2016, un plaignant est arrivé au détachement de la GRC.

Il a dit au caporal Lach qu’il avait visité des maisons avec un agent immobilier plus tôt ce jour-là et avait remarqué environ une heure plus tôt, dans une propriété sise à une certaine adresse à Zealand, au Nouveau-Brunswick, sur le patio et dans la résidence, beaucoup d’articles, tels que des génératrices, des pompes, des scies alternatives à châssis, un laser et ainsi de suite, qu’il croyait avoir été volés à Charmac Construction.

Certains des articles avaient des autocollants portant ce nom, et son beau-frère avait affirmé que cette société avait été victime d’une introduction par effraction quelques mois auparavant et que certains des articles qu’il avait observés avaient effectivement été volés. Il a décrit deux hommes qu’il avait observés à la résidence.

Une recherche dans la base de données de la GRC a confirmé qu’une introduction par effraction avait été perpétrée à Charmac Construction le 16 novembre 2015 et que des biens avaient été volés; certains des articles dans la liste des objets volés correspondaient à la description donnée par le plaignant. [9] Le caporal Lach, qui était agent depuis 2007, était l’enquêteur en chef. Il a conclu qu’il avait des motifs raisonnables de croire que les articles volés à Charmac Construction se trouvaient à l’adresse fournie, et il projetait d’aller à cette adresse et d’appréhender quiconque s’y trouvait.

Il estimait qu’il avait assez d’information pour obtenir un mandat de perquisition, mais celui-ci ne pouvait pas être obtenu et exécuté avant plusieurs heures; il avait donc l’intention de mettre sous garde les articles présumés volés en attendant. Vers 18 h, trois auto-patrouilles identifiées sont arrivées à l’adresse indiquée. [10] M. Kennett et un autre homme étaient debout sur le patio de la résidence. Ils correspondaient à la description donnée par le plaignant; ils ont donc été arrêtés pour possession de biens volés, ont été fouillés accessoirement à l’arrestation et placés sous garde.

Les hommes ont coopéré avec la police. Le caporal Lach a saisi à M. Kennett plus de 2 000 $ en espèces et un téléphone cellulaire, qu’il a fouillé après son retour au détachement. [11] Le caporal Lach a observé sur le patio une pompe à eau avec un autocollant portant le nom de Charmac Construction, un

article décrit par le plaignant et mentionné dans la base de données comme objet volé. Il a également vu une génératrice et une pompe de pression pour eau près de la porte du garage, juste en bas du patio. [12] Les agents de police ont regardé par les fenêtres et pris des photos de l’intérieur de la maison par les fenêtres. Le caporal Lach et le caporal Thompson sont ensuite entrés dans la résidence et y sont restés quelques minutes, regardant dans chaque pièce et dans chaque salle de bains pour s’assurer s’il y avait quelqu’un dans la résidence.

Ils n’y ont trouvé personne; ils ont remarqué d’autres outils, mais n’ont pas vu de drogues. [13] Le mandat de perquisition a été exécuté le 7 mars 2016. Des outils et de l’équipement considérés comme des biens volés ont été trouvés et saisis. Même si la police était dans la maison pour chercher des biens volés, elle a aussi trouvé et saisi les drogues qui ont fait l’objet des accusations en l’espèce. B. Voir-dire pour déterminer s’il y avait eu violation des droits garantis à M. Kennett par la Charte – 21 avril 2017 [14] M. Kennett a demandé que les drogues soient exclues de la preuve.

Le procès a commencé par un voir-dire pour déterminer s’il y avait eu violation des droits garantis à M. Kennett par la Charte .

1. Perquisition sans mandat dans la résidence [15] Le ministère public a admis que l’entrée de la police dans la résidence avait violé les droits garantis à M. Kennett par l’ art. 8 de la Charte . Le caporal Lach a témoigné que l’entrée dans la résidence et son examen rapide étaient nécessaires pour assurer que personne n’était dans la résidence, qui serait gardée pendant la nuit par un seul agent pour protéger les lieux contre des inconnus qui pourraient détruire de la preuve.

Il a admis que les agents n’avaient objectivement aucune raison de croire qu’il y avait quelqu’un dans la résidence, puisqu’ils avaient appréhendé les deux hommes que le plaignant y avait observés; toutefois, il a témoigné que c’était sa pratique habituelle et qu’il referait la même chose demain en raison de son souci de la sécurité des agents.

Aucune drogue n’a été trouvée par suite de l’examen rapide de la maison, et aucune information n’y a été recueillie au sujet des drogues. [16] Bien que la juge du procès ait admis que la perquisition dans la maison avait été effectuée pour la sécurité plutôt que pour recueillir de la preuve, elle a remarqué que rien n’expliquait réellement pourquoi des photos de l’intérieur de la maison avaient été prises de l’extérieur par les fenêtres avant que la perquisition de sécurité soit entreprise, et elle n’était pas convaincue que la situation était urgente.

Elle a dit qu’il semblait que le caporal Lach, [TRADUCTION] « inexplicablement, ne comprenait pas les restrictions de la loi ». Elle a conclu que l’entrée dans la maison, son examen rapide et les photos de l’intérieur de la maison qui ont été prises constituaient des perquisitions invalides effectuées en violation des droits garantis à M. Kennett par l’ art. 8 de la Charte . 2. Fouille sans mandat du téléphone cellulaire [17] Le caporal Lach a expliqué qu’il avait décidé de fouiller le téléphone cellulaire de M.

Kennett après son retour au détachement, environ une heure et demie après l’avoir saisi, car il craignait que les données du téléphone cellulaire ne puissent être effacées à distance; la juge du procès a remarqué que le caporal n’avait pas expliqué qui aurait effacé les données puisque M. Kennett était sous garde. Le caporal Lach croyait que le téléphone cellulaire était pertinent pour l’enquête sur le trafic de biens volés, et il cherchait des messages texte, des appels téléphoniques récents, des entrées sur Facebook, des courriels et des photos.

Il a témoigné qu’il avait pour pratique de fouiller les téléphones cellulaires accessoirement à l’arrestation pour chercher des éléments de preuve qui pourraient aider à son enquête. Habituellement, il ne cherchait que quelques jours en arrière, mais en l’espèce il a peut-être remonté jusqu’en novembre 2015, lorsque les biens auraient été volés. Il ne cherchait pas de preuve de trafic de drogues, et il ne savait pas du tout au moment de sa perquisition qu’il y avait des drogues dans la résidence. La fouille du téléphone cellulaire n’a produit aucune preuve concernant les drogues.

Même s’il a pris des photos de l’information qu’il croyait pertinente, le caporal Lach n’avait pas de notes détaillées indiquant ce qu’il cherchait, ce qu’il a examiné sur le téléphone cellulaire ou jusqu’où exactement il est remonté dans le passé. [18] La juge du procès a indiqué que, même s’il est permis à la police de fouiller les téléphones pour préserver la preuve et pour la sécurité publique, la nature et l’étendue de ces fouilles étaient limitées. Elle a déterminé que la fouille du téléphone cellulaire n’était pas dans l’esprit de la décision de la Cour suprême dans l’affaire R. c.

Fearon , 2014 CSC 77 , [2014] 3 R.C.S. 621, que l’étendue de la fouille effectuée nécessitait un mandat, et que la fouille allait à l’encontre des attentes de l’accusé en matière de respect de la vie privée. Elle a conclu que la fouille du téléphone cellulaire constituait une fouille invalide, en violation des droits garantis à M.

Kennett par l’ art. 8 de la Charte . [19] Elle a décidé que la mesure réparatoire immédiate pour les violations de l’ art. 8 de la Charte serait d’exclure de la dénonciation l’information obtenue par suite de cette perquisition et de cette fouille, puis de déterminer s’il restait des motifs suffisants pour permettre au juge d’autoriser le mandat.

Elle a ordonné que l’information obtenue par suite de la fouille du téléphone cellulaire, les photos prises par les fenêtres de la résidence et les remarques concernant l’information obtenue pendant l’examen rapide de la résidence pour la sécurité soient exclues de la dénonciation. [20] Elle a reporté après l’audition de la preuve pendant le procès proprement dit la décision d’imposer ou non, au

titre du par. 24(2), une mesure réparatoire additionnelle pour les violations de l’ art. 8 de la Charte . C. La décision de la juge du procès sur la délivrance du mandat de perquisition et la demande fondée sur le par. 24(2) – 4 octobre 2017 1. La délivrance du mandat de perquisition

[21] La juge du procès a conclu que le mandat de perquisition, qui a abouti à la saisie des drogues,aurait pu être délivré même si l’information obtenue grâce à la perquisition et à la fouille illégales avait été écartée de la dénonciation,puisqu’il serait resté une information suffisante pour permettre au juge d’autoriser le mandat. Cette décision n’est pas contestée. 2. La demande fondée sur le par. 24(2) [22] Ayant conclu que la preuve avait été obtenue d’une manière qui a violé les droitsconstitutionnels de M.

Kennett, la juge du procès a ensuite procédé à une analyse fondée sur le par. 24(2) de la Charte et a rejeté lamotion de M. Kennett visant à exclure de la preuve les drogues saisies, ayant conclu que l’exclusion de cette preuve déconsidéreraitl’administration de la justice. M.

Kennett appelle de sa déclaration de culpabilité pour le motif que la juge du procès a commis une erreurde droit en n’excluant pas la preuve contestée. [23] Les tribunaux de révision ne modifient pas les conclusions du juge du procès sur l’applicationdu par. 24(2) en l’absence d’une erreur manifeste sur les principes applicables ou sur les règles de droit et en l’absence d’une conclusiondéraisonnable. C’est une question mixte de fait et de droit, qui suppose l’application d’une norme juridique à un ensemble de faits.Comme l’a affirmé le juge Fish dans l’arrêt R. c.

Cole, 2012 SCC 53 , [2012] CSC 53, [2012] 3 R.C.S. 34 : La norme de contrôle commande la retenue : « Lorsque le juge du procès a pris en compte les considérations applicables et n’a tiréaucune conclusion déraisonnable, sa décision justifie une grande déférence en appel » (R. c. Côté, 2011 CSC 46, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 215,par. 44).

Cependant, lorsque les facteurs pertinents ont été négligés ou ignorés, une nouvelle analyse fondée sur l’arrêt Grant estnécessaire et opportune. [Par. 82] [24] Notre Cour a affirmé à maintes occasions l’importance de la retenue à l’égard des conclusionsdes tribunaux inférieurs dans le contexte du par. 24(2); ces principes de longue date ont résisté au passage du temps et ont été confirmés par la juge d’appel Quigg, qui rendait le jugement unanime de la Cour, dans l’arrêt Bonnell c.

R., 2015 NBCA 6, 430 R.N.-B. (2e) 1, aupar. 59. [25] La question qui est au cœur d’une demande fondée sur le par. 24(2) de la Charte est lasuivante : compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, l’admission de la preuve en question déconsidérerait-elle l’administration de lajustice? L’élaboration d’une réponse fondée en droit dépend de la prise en compte des trois facteurs d’analyse que la Cour suprême duCanada a cernés, notamment dans l’arrêt R. c. Grant, 2009 CSC 32, [2009] 2 R.C.S. 353, au par. 71. [26] La juge du procès s’est appuyée sur ce cadre dans son analyse.

Au sujet du premier facteurénoncé dans l’arrêt Grant (la gravité de la conduite de l’État en violation de la Charte), elle a conclu que la fouille d’un téléphonecellulaire et l’entrée dans une propriété privée sans que la situation soit urgente constituaient de graves violations.

Elle a signalé quel’agent n’avait aucunement tenté de cacher sa conduite ou de s’en dissocier, mais qu’il semblait ignorant de son obligation à l’égard desdroits de l’accusé protégés par la Charte, ce qui se rapportait au deuxième facteur énoncé dans l’arrêt Grant : l’importance de l’effet qu’ala violation de la Charte sur les droits qui y sont garantis à l’accusé. Son raisonnement était que, même si elle était convaincue quel’agent aurait reçu l’autorisation judiciaire d’entrer dans la résidence et de fouiller le téléphone cellulaire, la fouille et la perquisition sansmandat ont passé outre aux attentes de M.

Kennett en matière de respect de la vie privée.

En examinant le comportement ducaporal Lach, elle a remarqué qu’il ne pouvait pas être attribuable à l’inexpérience et que son ignorance déclarée du droit n’était pas uneexcuse. [27] Elle a déterminé que [TRADUCTION] « les violations étaient inacceptables et avaient portéatteinte aux droits de l’accusé protégés par la Charte ». [28] Au troisième volet de l’analyse, le dernier facteur énoncé dans l’arrêt Grant (l’intérêt de lasociété à ce que l’affaire soit jugée au fond), elle s’est demandé si la fonction de recherche de la vérité que remplit le procès criminel estmieux servie par l’utilisation ou par l’exclusion d’éléments de preuve.

Elle a conclu que la preuve était fiable et nécessaire à la poursuiteet pouvait être découverte. Elle a expliqué que la Cour s’était dissociée du fruit de la conduite illégale en expurgeant la dénonciation.Elle a également signalé que la perquisition et la fouille illégales n’avaient apporté aucune preuve concernant les drogues. Enfin, elle aconclu que l’exclusion de la preuve contestée déconsidérerait l’administration de la justice. [29] Pour étayer sa demande voulant que les drogues soient exclues de la preuve, M. Kennett a

invoqué l’arrêt Kelly c. R. , 2010 NBCA 89 , 367 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 1. Dans l’arrêt Kelly , notre Cour a conclu que la preuve contestée (de la marihuana) avait été saisie dans une résidence conformément à un mandat obtenu de façon irrégulière et que les lacunes de la dénonciation, ajoutées à la conduite illégale de la police, justifiaient une conclusion voulant que l’admission en preuve de la marihuana saisie soit susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice.

La preuve a été exclue en vertu du par. 24(2) de la Charte , et la Cour a ordonné un verdict d’acquittement. [30] La juge du procès a eu raison de distinguer les faits de l’espèce de ceux de l’affaire Kelly : [TRADUCTION] « La perquisition a été effectuée après que la police a eu une information suffisante pour obtenir un mandat, et la police a agi avec un excès de zèle, mais pas au degré constaté dans l’affaire Kelly , où la police a omis de divulguer une information importante et où la perquisition dans la résidence a été beaucoup plus inacceptable. »

Dans l’affaire Kelly , les drogues ont été saisies dans une résidence conformément à un mandat obtenu de façon irrégulière, c’est-à-dire sans les motifs raisonnables requis et sur le fondement d’une non-divulgation importante et d’affirmations trompeuses dans la dénonciation. Telle n’est pas la situation en l’espèce. [31] La juge a exercé un pouvoir discrétionnaire. Elle a soupesé correctement ses évaluations selon chacun des facteurs d’analyse et a déterminé, eu égard à toutes les circonstances, que l’admission de la preuve ne déconsidérerait pas l’administration de la justice.

Je ne peux pas dire que sa conclusion est déraisonnable. [32] Dans le contexte du par. 24(2), notre Cour ne doit pas substituer son opinion à celle de la juge du procès. L’appréciation de la juge appelle à une déférence considérable, puisqu’elle a pris en considération les facteurs appropriés. M. Kennett, à mon avis, n’a pas signalé d’erreur sur les principes applicables ou sur les règles du droit; en conséquence, une intervention en appel n’est pas justifiée, et je rejetterais l’appel à l’encontre de la déclaration de culpabilité. III.

L’appel contre la peine [33] La décision sur le voir-dire a été rendue le 21 avril 2017. Le 4 octobre 2017, l’analyse fondée sur le par. 24(2) a été effectuée, et M. Kennett a été déclaré coupable. L’audience sur la peine a eu lieu le 5 juin 2018. [34] Le ministère public demandait une peine d’emprisonnement de 30 à 36 mois, tandis que la défense suggérait que l’échelle soit de 24 à 30 mois d’emprisonnement. La juge qui a déterminé la peine a établi que la fourchette de peines pour ces genres d’infractions était de 24 à 36 mois.

Elle a infligé 30 mois, ce qui était au haut de l’échelle suggérée par la défense, et a estimé que des peines concurrentes étaient appropriées pour les autres chefs d’accusation relatifs aux drogues. Les violations de la Charte n’ont pas été soulevées par les avocats qui représentaient les parties lors de l’audience de détermination de la peine (ce n’étaient pas les mêmes que ceux qui ont comparu devant notre Cour) ni mentionnées par la juge qui a déterminé la peine. [35] M.

Kennett ne conteste pas la fourchette de peines mentionnée par la juge du procès, et il ne conteste pas que la peine de 30 mois aurait été appropriée, n’eût été les violations de la Charte . Il soutient que c’était une erreur de principe de la part de la juge qui a déterminé la peine de ne pas tenir compte de l’inconduite de la part de l’État, et que cela a entraîné l’imposition d’une peine inappropriée.

Il demande une réduction de six mois de la peine infligée, comme réparation pour les violations de la Charte . [36] Le ministère public soutient que, puisque la juge du procès a accordé une mesure réparatoire pour les violations de la Charte , en excluant de la dénonciation les renseignements recueillis illégalement, rien d’autre n’est nécessaire.

Il soutient de plus que si la juge qui a déterminé la peine a fait erreur en ne tenant pas compte d’un facteur pertinent, cette erreur n’a pas eu de conséquence sur la peine, qui était raisonnable et appropriée; toutefois, si la Cour envisageait une réduction de la peine en raison de l’inconduite, le ministère public soutient qu’alors une réduction de pas plus de trois mois est appropriée. A. Norme de contrôle [37] Une norme de contrôle déférente s’applique à l’imposition d’une peine par le juge du procès. Cela s’explique en

partie par le caractère discrétionnaire de la décision relative à la peine. Dans l’arrêt R. c. Suter , 2018 CSC 34 , [2018] 2 R.C.S. 496, après nous avoir rappelé une fois de plus « que les tribunaux d’appel ne peuvent modifier à la légère les décisions relatives à la peine » parce que « le juge de première instance jouit “d’une grande discrétion pour prononcer la peine qui lui semble appropriée dans les limites déterminées par la loi” » (par. 23), le juge Moldaver, au nom de la majorité, a réitéré les propos tenus par la Cour

suprême dans l’arrêt R. c. Lacasse , 2015 CSC 64 , [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089 : Dans l’arrêt Lacasse , les juges majoritaires de notre Cour ont statué qu’une cour d’appel ne peut modifier une peine que dans l’une ou l’autre des deux situations suivantes : (1) la peine infligée par le juge de la peine est « manifestement non indiquée » (par. 41); (2) le juge de la peine commet une erreur de principe, ne tient pas compte d’un facteur pertinent ou encore, prend erronément en considération un facteur aggravant ou atténuant, et une telle erreur a une incidence sur la peine infligée (par. 44).

Dans les deux cas, la cour d’appel peut annuler la peine et procéder à sa propre analyse pour déterminer la peine indiquée dans les circonstances. [Par. 24] [38] Le même cadre d’analyse continue d’être appliqué par notre Cour et a été réaffirmé récemment par la juge d’appel Quigg dans l’arrêt Cormier c. R. , 2018 NBCA 38 , [2018] A.N.-B. n o 150 (QL), au par. 20 . Toutefois, comme l’a affirmé le juge en chef Drapeau (tel était alors son titre) dans l’arrêt Steeves c.

R . , 2010 NBCA 57 , 360 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 88, « quoique le poids que le juge chargé de déterminer la peine a accordé aux facteurs pertinents requière une grande déférence, la norme de contrôle applicable en appel à sa compréhension de ces principes est celle de la décision correcte » (par. 23). B. La décision de la Cour suprême dans l’affaire Nasogaluak [39] Le droit relatif à la réduction de la peine comme mesure réparatoire accordée en vertu de la Charte pour des actes de violence policière et d’autres actes d’inconduite de la part de l’État a été examiné par la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Nasogaluak .

Cette affaire soulevait la question suivante : La question essentielle que pose le présent pourvoi est celle de la possibilité de réduire la peine d’un délinquant dont les droits constitutionnels ont été violés. Notre Cour doit décider si une réparation fondée sur le par. 24(1) est nécessaire pour remédier aux conséquences d’une violation de la Charte ou si ce résultat peut être accompli par la mise en œuvre du processus de détermination de la peine. […] [Par. 39] [40] M. Nasogaluak a plaidé coupable aux accusations d’avoir conduit avec les facultés affaiblies et d’avoir fui les policiers.

Il a tenté d’échapper aux policiers dans une poursuite à haute vitesse. Par suite de ses efforts pour résister à l’arrestation, deux agents lui ont donné à plusieurs reprises des coups de poing à la tête et aux côtes. Les agents n’ont pas établi de rapport concernant la force appliquée au cours de l’arrestation, n’ont donné que peu ou pas d’information sur les circonstances de cette dernière et n’ont pas veillé à ce que M. Nasogaluak obtienne des soins médicaux, malgré les indications claires montrant qu’il en avait besoin. Quand M.

Nasogaluak a été libéré le lendemain matin, on a constaté qu’il avait subi des fractures des côtes et un affaissement pulmonaire, qui a nécessité une chirurgie d’urgence. [41] Le juge qui a déterminé la peine a déclaré que les actes répréhensibles des policiers constituaient une violation des droits garantis à l’accusé par l’ art. 7 de la Charte . Il a refusé d’arrêter les procédures, mais il a conclu qu’une réduction de la peine constituait une réparation convenable fondée sur le par. 24(1) de la Charte .

Au lieu de la peine, justifiée par ailleurs, de 6 à 18 mois d’incarcération, il a accordé une absolution sous conditions à l’égard des deux infractions, sanction possible pour le chef de fuite des policiers, mais pas pour le chef de conduite avec facultés affaiblies, étant donné la sanction minimale qui est prévue dans de tels cas. Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d’appel de l’Alberta ont confirmé les conclusions du juge du procès selon lesquelles les agents avaient eu recours à une force excessive, en contravention de l’ art. 7 de la Charte , ainsi que sa décision d’accorder des réductions de peine au

titre du par. 24(1) ; toutefois, ils ont annulé l’absolution sous conditions accordée quant à l’infraction de conduite avec facultés affaiblies et l’ont remplacée par l’amende minimale prescrite par la loi. [42] La Cour suprême a convenu avec la Cour d’appel qu’une réduction de la peine était une mesure appropriée pour une violation de la Charte , mais elle a déclaré que des actes de violence policière ou d’autres conduites répréhensibles de représentants de l’État peuvent être considérés dans le cadre du processus de détermination de la peine, en tant que circonstances atténuantes dans l’application ordinaire des art. 718 à 718.2 du Code criminel , sans recours à l’ art. 24 de la Charte . [43] Le juge LeBel, au nom d’une Cour unanime, a déclaré que le régime de détermination de la peine du Code criminel accordait aux juges qui prononcent les peines une certaine latitude pour considérer non seulement la conduite du délinquant, mais également celle des représ

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