2010 QCCA 2271, 2010 QCCA 2271

Droit de la famille — 103348 2010 QCCA 2271 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-019946-094 (500-12-266395-023) DATE: DECEMBER 10, 2010 PRESEN T: THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. L. P. PETITIONER – appellant v. LO. S. RESPONDENT – respondent JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is an application “to suspend provision execution of judgments” made pursuant to s. 65 of the Supreme Court Act . [1] L.

P. asks that the execution of the judgment of the Court of Appeal rendered on April 21, 2010 relating to spousal support be stayed pending the decision on her appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. She also asks that a stay of execution be ordered of the judgment of the Superior Court rendered on July 23, 2009, which had been the object of the appeal. [ 2 ] On June 21, 2010, the petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted on October 21, 2010.

The notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 2010. [ 3 ] In the conclusions to her motion brought before me, the petitioner asks that execution of the decrease and cancellation upon term of spousal support ordered by the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court be provisionally suspended. The Superior Court had ordered as follows: [143] ORDERS Lo. S. to pay spousal support for L.

P. in the following manner: − from the date of the present judgment until February 28, 2010, in the amount of $3,000 per month; − from March 1, 2010 until August 31, 2010 in the amount of $2,000 per month; […]. [ 4 ] The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for the sole purpose of substituting the following for paragraph [143] of the judgment of the Superior Court: [5] ACCUEILLE l'appel principal sans frais à la seule fin de substituer le paragraphe suivant au paragraphe 143 du jugement entrepris : ORDERS Lo. S. to pay spousal support for L.

P. in the following manner: From the date of the present judgment until August 31, 2010 in the amount of $3,000 per month; […]. [ 5 ] While framed as a motion to stay “execution”, the petitioner in fact seeks to suspend the effects of the judgments in the courts below pending the outcome of her appeal in the Supreme Court.

While the title and conclusions to her motion speak of suspending execution, at paragraph 8 of her motion, the petitioner asks for the following: [...] the suspension of the effects of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal and the judgment of first instance with regards to the conclusions: a. Reducing spousal support from $4,294.48 a month to $3, 000 a month as [of] July 23, 2009, the date of the first instance judgment. b.

Providing for no fixed amount of spousal support as of August 31, 2010. [ 6 ] In point of fact, the petitioner asks that the terms of the "Consent to Judgment on Provisional and Accessory Measures" dated April 13, 2003, as incorporated into a judgment in divorce dated May 13, 2003, establish the basis for spousal support payments until final adjudication of the matter by the Supreme Court of Canada.

According to the Consent to judgment, the respondent agreed, inter alia , to pay monthly spousal support of $3,688, indexed, and which was not stipulated to be subject to a term. [ 7 ] The petitioner did not file a motion to suspend execution before leave was granted. She does now, after leave has been

granted, on the basis of s. 65 of the Supreme Court Act which provides as follows: Sursis d'exécution 65.

(1) Dès le dépôt du cautionne​ment et de l’avis d’appel, ainsi que la signification de ce dernier, en conformité avec l’article 60, il est sursis à l’exécution du jugement dans la cause en première instance. Il n’y a toutefois pas sursis :

a) dans le cas où le jugement attaqué ordonne la cession ou livraison de documents ou de biens mobiliers, tant que les objets visés n’ont pas été présentés devant le tribunal ou placés sous la garde du fonctionnaire ou séquestre nommé par celui-ci, ni avant la fourniture d’un cautionnement — approuvé par la juridiction inférieure ou l’un de ses juges et dont le montant est fixé par l’une ou l’autre — garantissant que l’appelant se conformera au jugement de la Cour;

b) dans le cas où le jugement attaqué prescrit la souscription d’un acte translatif de propriété ou de tout autre acte, tant que l’acte n’a pas été souscrit et déposé auprès du fonctionnaire compétent de la juridiction inférieure, dans l’attente du jugement de la Cour;

c) dans le cas où le jugement attaqué prescrit la vente ou la livraison de biens-fonds ou de biens personnels immobiliers, avant la fourniture d’un cautionnement — approuvé par la juridiction inférieure ou l’un de ses juges et dont le montant est fixé par l’une ou l’autre — garantissant d’une part que l’appelant, tant qu’il restera en possession des biens, ne dégradera pas ceux-ci ni ne permettra qu’ils soient dégradés, d’autre part que, si le jugement est confirmé, il paiera la valeur de l’usage et de l’occupation des biens à compter du jour où l’appel est interjeté jusqu’à leur livraison, et qu’en outre, si le jugement prescrit la vente de biens et le paiement du déficit en résultant, il acquittera la différence;

d) dans le cas où le jugement attaqué prescrit le paiement d’une somme soit pour dette soit pour dommages-intérêts ou frais, tant que l’appelant n’a pas fourni un cautionnement — approuvé par la juridiction inférieure ou par un de ses juges — garantissant que l’appelant paiera le montant prescrit par le jugement, si celui-ci est confirmé dans sa totalité, ou la fraction de ce montant pour laquelle il y a confirmation, ainsi que tous les dommages-intérêts adjugés contre lui à l’issue de l’appel. Pourvoi contre le jugement d’une cour d’appel

(2) Lorsque la juridiction inférieure est une cour d’appel, et que les actes, documents ou objets visés par les alinéas du paragraphe (1) ont été confiés à la garde du fonctionnaire compétent du tribunal devant lequel est survenu le fait générateur, la

partie qui désire se pourvoir devant Stay of execution 65.

(1) On filing and serving the notice of appeal and depositing security as required by

section 60, execution shall be stayed in the original cause, except that (

a) where the judgment appealed from directs an assignment or delivery of documents or personal property, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed until the things directed to be assigned or delivered have been brought into court, or placed in the custody of such officer or receiver as the court appoints, or until security has been given to the satisfaction of the court appealed from, or of a judge thereof, in such sum as that court or judge directs, that the appellant will obey the judgment of the Supreme Court; (

b) where the judgment appealed from directs the execution of a conveyance or any other instrument, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed until the instrument has been executed and deposited with the proper officer of the court appealed from, to abide the judgment of the Supreme Court; (

c) where the judgment appealed from directs the sale or delivery of possession of real property or chattels real, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed until security has been given to the satisfaction of the court appealed from, or a judge thereof, in such amount as that court or judge directs, that during the possession of the property by the appellant the appellant will not commit, or suffer to be committed, any waste on the property, and that if the judgment is affirmed, the appellant will pay the value of the use and occupation of the property from the time the appeal is brought until delivery of possession thereof, and also, if the judgment is for the sale of property and the payment of a deficiency arising on the sale, that the appellant will pay the deficiency; and (

d) where the judgment appealed from directs the payment of money, either as a debt or for damages or costs, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed until the appellant has given security to the satisfaction of the court appealed from, or of a judge thereof, that, if the judgment or any part thereof is affirmed, the appellant will pay the amount thereby directed to be paid, or the part thereof with respect to which the judgment is affirmed, if it is affirmed only with respect to part, and all damages awarded against the appellant on the appeal. Where court appealed from is a court of appeal

(2) Where the court appealed from is a court of appeal, and the assignment or conveyance, document, instrument, property or thing referred to in subsection (1) has been deposited in the custody of the proper officer of the court in which the cause originated, the consent of the party desiring to appeal to the Supreme Court,

la Cour est liée, une fois qu’elle a consenti à cet état de choses dans l’attente de l’arrêt de la Cour, par son consentement, qui vaut observation des conditions posées à cet égard par le présent article. Acte de cautionnement

(3) Dans tous les cas où il peut y avoir sursis sous le régime du présent

article moyennant un cautionnement, celui-ci peut être donné au moyen de l’acte par lequel le cautionnement prescrit à l’article 60 est fourni. Modification de l’ordonnance de sursis

(4) La Cour, la juridiction inférieure ou un de leurs juges peut modifier ou annuler le sursis visé au paragraphe (1). that it shall so remain to abide the judgment of the Court, is binding on that party and shall be deemed a compliance with the requirements in that behalf of this section. As to instrument

(3) In any case in which execution may be stayed on the giving of security under this section, the security may be given by the same instrument whereby the security prescribed in

section 60 is given. Modification of stay of execution

(4) The Court, the court appealed from or a judge of either of those courts may modify, vary or vacate a stay of execution imposed by subsection (1). [ 8 ] As a preliminary matter, I asked counsel for the parties to make representations as to my authority to order a stay of execution given the fact that, pursuant to both the judgments of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal, the time period imposed for the payment of spousal support is over.

Counsel for the respondent confirms that, pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Appeal, his client has not paid spousal support since August 31, 2010. * * * [ 9 ] The problem appears to be as follows. Execution is of course the process by which a judgment is enforced. Under s. 65, a stay of execution thus suspends the right of a creditor under a judgment to issue the process by which the judgment is enforced. [2] [ 10 ] Here, on its face, the judgment has already been executed: after August 31, 2010, the orders made by both the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court have been satisfied completely.

A stay of execution would be of no assistance to the petitioner because there appears to be nothing left to stay and nothing left to execute. It is true that in paragraph [46] of the reasons in the Court of Appeal, echoing paragraph [122] of the reasons for judgment of the Superior Court, Rochon, J.A. said that the petitioner could seize the Superior Court of an application for support as of September 1, 2010, when the term the Court set had expired.

But that, of course, refers to a distinct proceeding permitted under the Divorce Act and did not form part of the conclusions of the Court from which leave to appeal was granted. [ 11 ] By asking that the Consent to judgment of 2003 be revived, and that the orders of the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court be set aside as to the quantum and term of spousal support, the petitioner is not asking for a "stay of execution", nor is she asking for a "stay of proceedings" under s. 65.1 of the Act , at least as "proceedings" are generally construed. [3] [ 12 ] Instead, as I noted above, the petitioner is asking for an order that suspends the effects of the judgment of the Court of Appeal rather than an order that suspends the execution of that judgment or suspends the proceedings themselves. [ 13 ] Rather than a stay of execution or a stay of proceedings, she is asking me to "grant other relief" (in French "un autre redressement") to invoke a phrase that I take from Rule 62 of the Supreme Court Rules . (I note that a judge of a court of appeal does not have the power to grant that relief under Rule 62).

This would seem to me to be in the nature of a safeguard order which, in my view, a judge of this Court sitting alone cannot order in these circumstances. [ 14 ] I recognize that a judge of a court of appeal, sitting alone, has authority to make certain orders under s. 65, including in paragraph 65(1)(

d) where "the judgment appealed from directs the payment of money". [4] Subsection 65(4) provides, in addition, that he or she may modify, vary or vacate a stay of execution imposed by subsection (1). Can one argue that the stay of execution, imposed automatically in this case by virtue of subsection 65(1) when leave was granted, be varied by a judge alone to allow the relief sought by the petitioner, notwithstanding the expiry of the term for support? I think not.

It seems to me that to grant this relief would do more than vary or vacate a stay of execution, as subsection (4) permits, but would transform a stay of execution into a safeguard order to provide spousal support, which is another kind of relief altogether. [ 15 ] Had the petitioner presented a motion to a judge in this Court before leave was granted and before the August 31, 2010 deadline, the outcome might have been different.

At that time, a stay of execution could have been granted under s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act and art. 522.1 C.C.P. given that the term of the order for support had not expired. [ 16 ] I note that Binnie J. held in Commission des droits de la personne v. Montreal (City of) that "[t]he right to apply [under

section 65.1 ] is not cut off by the granting of leave" [5] and that this has been relied upon to decide a stay under s. 65.1 by a court of appeal. [6] I note further that in G.(L.) v. B.(G.) , Sopinka J. left open the possibility that what he characterized as a request for "interim maintenance" be awarded pursuant to subs. 65(1) and former Rule 27. [7] But in the case before me, in which the judgment is fully executed, I remain of the view that neither s. 65 nor s. 65.1 of the Act would allow me to provide the relief sought by the petitioner at this stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction to provide this "other relief", in my view, lies elsewhere.

FOR THESE REASONS , the undersigned: [ 17 ] DISMISSES the motion to suspend provisional execution of judgments, [ 18 ] Without costs. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.A. Mtre Miriam Grassby GRASSBY & ASSOCIÉS For the petitioner Mtre Donald Devine DEVINE SCHACHTER POLAK For the respondent Date of hearing: December 1, 2010