R. v. Elkins Date:, 2016 BCPC 196

Citation: R. v. Elkins Date: 20160623 2016 BCPC 196 File No: 26280 Registry: Quesnel IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. LANE IRVINE JACK ELKINS REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. DOULIS Counsel for the Crown: A. Gal-Or Counsel for the Defendant: F. Fatt Place of Hearing: Quesnel , B.C. Date of Hearing: June 17, 2016 Date of Judgment: June 23, 2016 Introduction

[1] On Information 26280-1, Lane Irvine Jack Elkins and Jarrett John Jimmie, are charged by indictment with the followingoffences: Count 1: assault on Andrew Baptiste, contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code; Count 2: robbery of Andrew Baptiste, contrary to s. 344 of the Criminal Code; Count 3: assault of Florence Mary Rose Jimmie, contrary to S. 266 of the Criminal Code. [2] All offences occurred in the late afternoon of August 7, 2015, on or near the wooden footbridge across the Fraser River inQuesnel, B.C.

The footbridge is monitored by the City of Quesnel with a number of surveillance video cameras. [3] The trial of Lane Irvine Jack Elkins came before me on June 17, 2016. [4] The Crown called three witnesses, Constable Takhar, Andrew Baptiste and Florence Mary Rose Jimmie. The Defence calledno witnesses. I reserved my decision until Thursday, June 23, 2016. Surveillance Video Recordings [5] In the presentation of its case, the Crown relied extensively on the “silent witness” of the surveillance video cameras the Cityof Quesnel had installed on the footbridge.

The resultant video recordings, approximately 45 minutes in total, show the scene and theincident, giving rise to the offences from three different angles. At the outset of the trial, the Defence agreed the surveillance videorecordings were authentic and accurately and fairly represented of the scene they purport to depict. [6] The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nikolovski, (SCC), indicated what use that can be made of videorecordings: 28. Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomesadmissible and relevant evidence.

Not only is the tape (or photograph) real evidence in the sense that that term has been used in earliercases, but it is to a certain extent, testimonial evidence as well. It can and should be used by a trier of fact in determining whether acrime has been committed and whether the accused before the court committed the crime. It may indeed be a silent, trustworthy,unemotional, unbiased and accurate witness who has complete and instant recall of events. It may provide such strong and convincingevidence that of itself it will demonstrate clearly either the innocence or guilt of the accused. Also see, R. v.

Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251 . Issues [7] The issues in this trial are as follows: 1. Was Mr. Elkins entitled to rely on the defence of a person for his use of force against Mr. Baptiste? 2. Did Mr. Elkins assault Florence Jimmie? 3. Did Mr. Elkins intend to rob Mr. Baptiste? Background Facts [8] On August 7, 2015, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Andrew Baptiste was walking from downtown to West Quesnel. He had justfinished work. He cashed his pay cheque and was heading home via the West Quesnel wooden footbridge at 200 Front Street inQuesnel, B.C.

He was wearing his designer baseball cap and a red backpack containing his iPhone, charger and lunch. [9] Around the time Andrew Baptiste was heading home, Jarrett Jimmie and Lane Elkins were on or near the footbridge. Theywere hanging out and drinking from an open bottle of Old English beer. Mr. Jimmie was shirtless. Mr. Elkins was wearing a t-shirt. From their gait, demeanour and manner, Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Elkins appeared intoxicated. [10] At about 4:38 p.m., Mr. Baptiste encountered Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Elkins at the west end of the footbridge. Mr. Baptiste knewMr. Jimmie and considered Mr. Elkins a friend. Mr.

Jimmie approached Mr. Baptiste and threatened him. Andrew Baptiste doesn’tremember what Mr. Jimmie said or what set him off. [11] Mr. Baptiste told Mr. Jimmie to “F- off.” Mr. Jimmie pushed and punched Mr. Baptiste. [12] Mr. Baptiste fought back and soon had Mr. Jimmie pinned to the ground. He said he began to choke Mr. Jimmie to calm himdown. Up until this point, Mr. Elkins was not involved in the altercation. [13] When Mr. Baptiste began to choke Mr. Jimmie, Mr. Elkins entered the fray. He began punching Mr. Baptiste who fell to theground. Mr. Elkins was punching Mr. Baptiste from behind. Mr.

Baptiste tried to protect his face. The intensity of Mr. Elkins’ blows

were somewhat diminished by the presence of Mr. Baptiste’s backpack. Mr. Baptiste said because he had so much adrenaline he did not even feel Mr. Elkins’ punches until he looked up and saw what was happening. [ 14 ] Although Mr. Baptiste was unaware of it at the time, his mother, Florence Jimmie, was following him. She was trying to catch up to her son to get some money from him to buy groceries. She was on the footbridge when she saw Mr. Baptiste being assaulted. At this point Mr. Baptiste was on the ground with Mr. Elkins punching him. Florence Jimmie ran to Mr. Baptiste’s side and tried pulling Mr.

Elkins off of him. Soon another unknown female joined Florence Jimmie in her attempt to stop the beating. [ 15 ] While Florence Jimmie and the female Samaritan were trying to break up the fight, Mr. Elkins began forcefully tugging at Mr. Baptiste’s backpack, saying, “gimme your backpack.” Mr. Baptiste tried to hold on to his backpack because it contained his iPhone and charger. Mr. Jimmie kicked Mr. Baptiste in the face, perhaps once or twice. Florence Jimmie and the female Samaritan tried separating Mr. Elkins and Mr. Jimmie from Mr. Baptiste. In her efforts to pull Mr. Elkins off of Mr.

Baptiste, Florence Jimmie fell to the ground and Mr. Baptiste landed beside her. Mr. Elkins continued to punch Mr. Baptiste and yard on his backpack. This ended when Mr. Baptiste was able to stand up. He readjusted his backpack which remained intact. At this point, the altercation more or less fizzled out. [ 16 ] Mr. Jimmie grabbed Mr. Baptiste’s hat from the ground where it had fallen and put it on his head. Florence Jimmie forced Mr. Baptiste to leave with her. He didn’t want to go without his hat. Mr. Elkins took a few more swings at Mr. Baptiste as Florence Jimmie was leading him away. As he did this, Mr.

Elkins hit Florence Jimmie in the arm. [ 17 ] Florence Jimmie has known Lane Elkins and Jarrett Jimmie her entire life. She thought they were both under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident. She said had they been sober, this incident would not have happened. [ 18 ] Mr. Baptiste said it was Mr. Jimmie who started the fight. Mr. Elkins only intervened and started throwing punches when Mr. Baptiste had pinned Mr. Jimmie to the ground and began choking him. Mr. Baptiste thought Mr. Jimmie was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but wasn’t sure which. He thought Mr.

Elkins was either close to or black out drunk. He described Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Elkins as pumped up and in a fighting mood. [ 19 ] As the result of the incident, Mr. Baptiste had some bruises and a red eye. He said about a month and one-half after the incident, Mr. Elkins came up to him in the 7-11 and apologized to him. [ 20 ] Florence Jimmie, who is 53, is said she suffered swollen leg as a result of the altercation and had to go to the hospital for an inflammatory shot. Mr. Baptiste said Florence Jimmie also suffered bruises, but could not recall where on her body. [ 21 ] The only thing taken from Mr.

Baptiste in the altercation was his hat, and that was taken by Mr. Jimmie. Legal Analysis Was Mr. Elkins entitled to rely on the defence of a person for his use of force against Mr. Baptiste? Assault 265.

(1) A person commits an assault when (

a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; (

b) he attempts or threatens, by

an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose . . . Defence of Person 34.

(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (

a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (

b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (

c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.

(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: (

a) the nature of the force or threat; (

b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there was other means available to respond to the potential use of force; (

c) the person's role in the incident; (

d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; (

e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident;

(

f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force andthe nature of that force or threat; (f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident; (

g) the nature and proportionality of the person's response to the use or threat of force; and (

h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful. [22] Mr. Elkins is not guilty of assault unless the Crown disproves at least one of the following: 1) Mr. Elkins believed onreasonable grounds the force or a threat of force was being used or made against him or Mr. Jimmie; 2) Mr. Elkins’ acts were done forthe purpose of defending or protecting himself or Mr. Jimmie; 3) the act was reasonable in the circumstances. [23] There is no burden on an accused to persuade the Court he was acting in defence of another person.

Where there is an air ofreality to a possible defence, the Crown is required to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to determine whether there is anair of reality to defence of a person, I must consider the entire evidentiary record: R. v Cinous, 2002 SCC 29. This evidence does nothave to come from the accused: Cinous at paragraph 53; R. v. Davie (SCC), at paragraph 77. I am required to assumeas true the evidence most favourable to Mr. Elkins: Cinous, paragraph 221, and R. v. Grant, 2015 SCC 9 at paragraph 20. [24] In this case, there is evidence from Mr.

Baptiste and the surveillance video that are reasonably capable of supporting theinference that Mr. Elkins intervened in the altercation to defend Mr. Jimmie. Accordingly, the Crown must prove the defence of aperson provision of s. 34 do not apply beyond a reasonable doubt: Cinous, paragraph 39. [25] Section 34(2) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors I must consider in determining if the force Mr. Elkins used against Mr.Baptiste was “reasonable”. (

a) the nature of the force or threat [26] On August 7, 2015, Mr. Baptiste was walking peacefully across the footbridge when Mr. Jimmie approached, threatened,pushed and punched him. Mr. Baptiste fought back. When Mr. Baptiste began choking Mr. Jimmie, Mr. Elkins began punching Mr.Baptiste. The surveillance videos show Mr. Elkins attacking Mr. Baptiste within seconds. Mr. Elkins continued punching Mr. Baptistein the face with a closed fist long after any threat to Mr. Jimmie had dissipated. (

b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means available to respond to the potential useof force [27] Mr. Elkins continued punching Mr. Baptiste when he was on the ground trying to protect his head from the blows. Mr. Jimmiewas no longer in danger and Mr. Elkins was never in danger. (

c) the person’s role in the incident [28] I find that Mr. Elkins was intoxicated and, as Mr. Baptiste says, pumped up and in a fighting mood.” The surveillance videosshow that shortly before the altercation, Mr. Elkins was carrying some tool or implement in his hand, although he did not have or use thisimplement in the ensuring fight. When Mr. Baptiste got the upper hand over Mr. Jimmie, Mr. Elkins did not try and pull him off of orseparate him from Mr. Jimmie. In this regard, Mr. Elkins actions were very different than those of Florence Jimmie and the femaleSamaritan. Instead of trying to break up the fight, Mr. Elkins made it his own. (

d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon [29] None of the persons involved in the altercation used or threatened to use a weapon. (

e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident [30] Mr. Elkins, Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Baptiste are of the same gender and similar in age and stature. (

f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident, including any prior use or threat offorce and the nature of that force or threat [31] Mr. Baptiste and Mr. Elkins were friends. There is no direct evidence as to why Mr. Elkins attacked Mr. Baptiste so ferociouslyother than he was heavily intoxicated and “in a fighting mood.” The Crown points to Mr. Elkins’ yarding on Mr. Baptiste’s backpack asthe fight progressed as evidence Mr. Elkins and Mr. Jimmie intended to rob Mr. Baptiste. If that was the case, then I would have thoughtthat Mr. Jimmie would have assisted Mr.

Elkins with trying to relieve Mr. Baptiste of his backpack. Instead, when he got back on hisfeet, Mr. Jimmie kicked Mr. Baptiste and makes off with his hat. (f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident [32] There is no evidence of Mr. Elkins and Mr. Baptiste interacting or communicating with one another prior to the incident. (

g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force [33] In assessing proportionality, I am mindful of Lord Morris oft-quoted words from Palmer v. The Queen (1971), 55 Cr. App. R.223, at p. 242:

If there has been attack so that defence is reasonably necessary, it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action. See R. v. Williams, 2013 BCSC 1774 , at paragraph 68 . [ 34 ] Also in Williams , at paragraph 77 , Romilly J. points out that when considering self-defence under s. 34(2), the trial judge must examine the accused’s state of mind and give him the benefit of a reasonable doubt. The question in this case, therefore, is not whether Mr. Jimmie was unlawfully assaulted when Mr.

Baptiste started choking him, but rather, did Mr. Elkins reasonably believe Mr. Jimmie was being unlawfully assaulted. [ 35 ] Viewed objectively, Mr. Elkins’ attack on Mr. Baptiste was out of proportion to any perceived threat to Mr. Jimmie. He continued to beat on Mr. Baptiste long after Mr. Jimmie was freed. Mr. Elkins resisted Florence Jimmie and the female Samaritan attempts to try and disengage him. Even as Florence Jimmie was leading Mr. Baptiste away, Mr. Elkins was still throwing punches at him. (

h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful [ 36 ] Given the manner in which the altercation between Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Baptiste unfolded, I cannot say Mr. Elkins’ attack on Mr. Baptiste was or was not in response to a threat of force he knew was lawful. After all, Mr. Baptiste was not a uniformed peace officer. There was no evidence to indicate whether Mr. Elkins saw or heard Mr. Jimmie threaten Mr. Baptiste. Did Mr. Elkins assault Florence Jimmie? [ 37 ] Florence Jimmie says she was kicked, punched and injured when she tried to protect Mr.

Baptiste from Mr. Elkins. The surveillance videos make it clear the target of Mr. Elkins’ aggression was Mr. Baptiste, not Florence Jimmie. Still, he did make contact with her. The common law doctrine of transferred intent applies in these circumstances. In R. v. Gordon, 2009 ONCA 170 , the Ontario Court of Appeal explained this doctrine at paragraph 68: 68 The common law doctrine of transferred intent takes the mens rea of an offence in relation to an intended victim and transfers it to the actus reus of the same offence committed upon another victim.

Considered separately, each prospective crime lacks an essential part. The mens rea (intended victim) lacks an actus reus . And the actus reus (actual victim) lacks mens rea . In combination, however, they amount to a whole crime through the application of a legal fiction. [ 38 ] This means that the mens rea of Mr. Elkins’ assault on Mr. Baptiste is transferred to the actus reus of assault committed on Florence Jimmie. Did Mr. Elkins intend to rob Mr. Baptiste? [ 39 ]

Section 343 of the Criminal Code sets out the constituent elements of robbery: 343. Robbery Every one commits robbery who (

a) steals, and for the purpose of extorting whatever is stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to the stealing, uses violence or threats of violence to a person or property; (

b) steals from any person and, at the time he steals or immediately before or immediately thereafter, wounds, beats, strikes or uses any personal violence to that person; (

c) assaults any person with intent to steal from him; or (

d) steals from any person while armed with an offensive weapon or imitation thereof. [ 40 ]

Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines stealing as meaning “to commit theft” and theft is defined in

section 322 of the Criminal Code as follows: Theft

Everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything,whether animate or inanimate, with intent (

a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it, or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of the thing or of hisproperty or interest in it; [41] In R. v. Bourassa, 2004 NSCA 127 , the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, considered the

definitions of steal and theft inthe Criminal Code and states at paragraph 7: From these

definitions and the jurisprudence which has considered them, one sees that in simplistic terms the difference between“robbery” and “theft” is that robbery is committed by confronting and intimidating the person whose property is taken, whereas theft iscommitted without violence or threats of violence, and often occurs secretly, such that the victim is left unaware of being relieved of theirproperty. [42] In in R. v. Jean, 2012 BCCA 448 , Chief Justice Finch in order to prove robbery, the violence must be instrumental tothe theft: Robbery within the meaning of s. 343(

a) therefore requires the use of violence or threats of violence in the course of, and for the purposeof, taking whatever is being stolen. In other words, the violence or threat must occur before or contemporaneously with the theft… [43] The Crown argues that Mr. Jimmie and Mr. Elkins intended to steal Mr. Baptiste’s backpack and used violence in furtherance ofthat goal. Robbery is evidenced by their assault on Mr. Baptiste, Mr. Elkins’ attempts to tear away Mr. Baptiste’s backpack and hisdemand “gimme your backpack.” The Crown says that although the robbery was simplistic and opportunistic, it was a robbery none theless. Party Liability [44] The indictment engages

section 21 of the Code which defines four ways in which a person can be criminally liable for

an act. A person can be a principal, an aider, an abettor, or have common intention to commit an offence.

Section 21 states: Parties to offence 21 (1) every one is a party to an offence who (

a) actually commits it; (

b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or (

c) abets any person in committing it. Common intention

(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and anyone of them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or ought to have known that thecommission of the offence would be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence. [45] A person can be principally liable for an offence or secondarily as a party to the offence.

Either way, the accused will beconvicted of the substantive offence because s. 21(1) places an aider or abettor in the commission of a crime on the same footing as theprincipal. This is why the Crown need not specify in an indictment the nature of an accused’s participation in an offence: R. v. Pickton,2010 SCC 32 , at paragraph 51. Co-Principal [46] Pursuant to section 21(1)(a), an accused may be liable as a principal or as a co-principal if he personally committed that offence. This is still the case even though each has not performed every act which makes up the actus reus of the offence: R. v.

Ball, 2011 BCCA11 , at paragraph 137, citing, R. v. Mena, (ON CA). Madam Justice Ryan states in Ball: [25] Where two persons commit a crime as co-perpetrators it may be the case that they have agreed to do so before embarking on theendeavour. For purposes of liability under s. 21(1)(

a) of the Code, however, agreement to carry out a common purpose is not necessary. The question is whether there is an indication of common participation, not a common purpose.

[47] It is clear that Mr. Elkins’ directly participated in the assault on Mr. Baptiste. He is also the person who yanked on Mr.Baptiste’s backpack and ordered Mr. Baptiste to give it to him. So, if these actions prove robbery, they do so regardless of whether ornot Mr. Elkins’ participation was undertaken as part of any joint plan or common criminal object. Accordingly, it is unnecessary toconsider whether Mr. Elkins was liable as a party to the robbery under s. 21(1)(

b) and s. 21(1)(

c) of the Criminal Code. [48] Although the Crown was not required to establish any “common intention” on the part of Mr. Elkins and Mr. Jimmie to rob Mr.Baptiste, the Crown is still required to prove Mr. Elkins engaged in whatever action he took with the requisite intent. (See Ball,paragraphs 26 and 27). Specific Intent [49] Unlike assault, which is a general intent offence, robbery requires specific intent: R. v. George, (SCC).

Theclassification of an offence as one involving general or specific intent has important consequences for the accused because the law doesnot allow them to rely on self-induced intoxication, falling short of automatism as an excuse for general intent offences: R. v.Daley, 2007 SCC 53 . Advanced intoxication can be defence to robbery. On the other hand, loss of self-control or irresistibleimpulse caused by voluntarily induced intoxication is not a defence to a criminal charge in Canada: Courville v.

The Queen, (SCC). [50] In George, Ritchie J. expressed the difference between offences of general and specific intent, at p. 890: In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be drawn between “intention” as applied to acts done to achieve an immediateend on the one hand and acts done with the specific and ulterior motive and intention of furthering or achieving an illegal object on theother hand.

Illegal acts of the former kind are done “intentionally” in the sense that they are not done by accident or through honestmistake, but acts of the latter kind are the product of preconception and are deliberate steps taken towards an illegal goal. The formeracts may be the purely physical products of momentary passion, whereas the latter involve the mental process of formulating a specificintent. A man, far advanced in drink, may intentionally strike his fellow in the former sense at a time when his mind is so befogged withliquor as to be unable to formulate a specific intent in the latter sense.

The offence of robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code, requiresthe presence of the kind of intent and purpose specified in ss. 269 and 288, but the use of the word “intentionally” in defining “commonassault” in s. 230(

a) of the Criminal Code is exclusively referable to the physical act of applying force to the person of another. The burden of proving all of the elements in the definition of the crime charged, including the mental element, is always upon theCrown. The presence or absence of evidence of intoxication in no way affects that burden. [51] It is Mr. Elkins’ intent to rob Mr. Baptiste which is very much in issue in this case. [52] The evidence indicates Mr.

Elkins was intoxicated, perhaps significantly so. [53] In Daley, the Supreme Court, at paragraph 41, considered three levels of intoxication: 1) mild intoxication where there has beena relaxation of inhibitions and socially acceptable behaviour; 2) advanced intoxication where alcohol has affected the accused’s ability toforesee the consequences of his actions; and 3) extreme intoxication where because of the consumption of alcohol, the accused is in astate akin to automatism.

It is only where an accused`s level of intoxication affects his intention to commit the offence that intoxicationmay provide a defence. [54] The test in specific intent offences is not simply whether the accused had the capacity to form the intent to commit the offence(as in R. v.

MacAskill, (SCC)) but whether the accused’s intoxication raises a reasonable doubt as to whether he had theintent at the time he committed the offence: Daley. [55] In the appropriate circumstances, the Court will make the common sense inference that “a person usually knows what thepredictable consequences of his or her actions are and means to bring them about”: R v. Walle, 2012 SCC 41 at paragraph 64. In this regard, the Crown seeks to rely on R. v.

Goard, 2014 ONSC 2215, in which Justice Trotter found, at paragraph 112, the tworobberies in issue, albeit not sophisticated or complicated, “reflected straightforward, goal-directed behaviour carried out logically andwithout falter.” With respect to the defence of intoxication, the trial judge found, at paragraph 116, at most, Mr.

Goard “may haveachieved the disinhibiting state of mild drunkenness, as described in Daley”, but did not raise any doubt “he was labouring under theeffects of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to compromise the mental state required for the offences for which he stands charged.” [56] In this case, Mr. Elkins was more than mildly intoxicated. Still, the evidence fell short of establishing he was in a state ofadvanced intoxication such that he did not have the necessary intent to commit the offence. Nevertheless, I am still unable find beyond areasonable doubt that Mr. Elkins intended to rob Mr. Baptiste.

The attack on Mr. Baptiste appeared impulsive, spontaneous, and chaotic. His yarding on Mr. Baptiste’s backpack occurred after Mr. Elkins had been throwing punches for a time. It is unclear to me whetherMr. Elkins intended to make off with the backpack or remove it as an obstacle to his assault on Mr. Baptiste. There was no evidencebefore the Court as to why Mr. Elkins might want Mr. Baptiste’s backpack or that he was even aware of its contents. I am left with areasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent to steal Mr. Baptiste’s backpack. Disposition [57] I find Mr.

Elkins guilty of Count 1 for assaulting Andrew Baptiste on August 7, 2015, in Quesnel, B.C. [58] I find Mr. Elkins not guilty of Count 2 for robbing Andrew Baptiste on August 7, 2015, in Quesnel, B.C. [59] I find Mr. Elkins guilty of Count 3 for assaulting Florence Jimmie on August 7, 2015, in Quesnel, B.C.

__________________________ The Honourable Judge J. Doulis Provincial Court Judge Province of British Columbia