McIsaac v. Pye, 2015 ONCJ 725

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file: This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 45(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE DATE: 2015·07.31 COURT FILE No.: 28/10-01 CITATION: McIsaac v. Pye , 2015 ONCJ 725 BETWEEN: JOSEPH MCISAAC Applicant — AND — LYNN PYE Respondent

Before Justice A. L. Guay Motion to vary a Custody and Access Order of January 11, 2013 and for other Procedural Relief released on July 31, 2015 Douglas Kearns ................................................................................ counsel for the Applicant T. Frederick Baxter ....................................................................... counsel for the Respondent GUAY J.: Case History [ 1 ] The present motions relate to 2 young girls, Sierra McIsaac, born July 24, 2004 and Savana McIsaac, born July 9, 2005.

The applicant, Joseph McIsaac is the father of the 2 girls; the respondent, Lynn Pye, is their mother. After a long trial which concluded with a written decision by Humphrey J. of this court on January 11, 2013, custody was awarded to the respondent mother, subject to biweekly and summer access as well as special periods of access to the applicant father.

That trial capped approximately 2 years of intense and bitter litigation between the parties. [ 2 ] The present motions, the principal one of which is the request by the respondent father to award custody of the girls to him, were brought a mere 6 months after the January 2013 decision. The motion to vary seeks to completely reverse the January 2013 decision.

The applicant father alleges that there had been a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the custody and access order by virtue of the fact that the respondent mother has not complied or delayed in complying with some of the order’s 21 conditions. The respondent mother opposes the father’s motion, insisting that she has complied with the conditions of the order awarding her custody of the girls. Procedure [ 3 ] Following a number of adjournments in 2014, the motion to vary was scheduled to be heard in February 2015. At that time, the matter was finally adjourned for hearing on June 15, 2015.

Prior to the start of the hearing, I reviewed the extensive affidavit material filed by the parties. Since the two-step procedure outlined in Gordon v. Gertz ( 1996, Can Lii, 1996 , 2 S.C.R. 27), stipulates that a material change of circumstances must first be shown to have occurred before a custody and access order is varied, I directed counsel to address this matter before calling evidence and cross-examining witnesses.

Given the short time within which the motion to vary was brought following the lengthy hearing in late 2012 and given the litigious and acrimonious nature of those proceedings and the behavior of the parties towards each other, I had some concern about the merits of proceeding at all with a hearing of this matter. It is not useful nor appropriate to conduct a full trial to establish the preliminary condition to a motion to vary, particularly when extensive affidavit evidence is available which may very likely enable the court to deal with that issue in a

summary manner before the start of the trial. Subrule 16 (12) provides that the court may on motion decide a question of law before trial if the decision may dispose of all or part of the case, substantially shorten the trial or save substantial costs. Subrule 16 (13) provides that on a motion under Subrule (16)12, evidence is admissible only if the parties consent or the court gives permission. In the present case, viva voce evidence was not required and I relied on the affidavit evidence filed in the matter.

My sense was that if the moving party, here the applicant father, could establish a prima facie case that there had been a material change in circumstances since the making of the order, the trial proper could proceed. The Father’s Allegations [ 4 ] The applicant father did not allege that all of the conditions which formed a part of the January 13, 2013 custody and access order had been breached. He did, however, allege that the respondent mother has failed to do the following: (

a) She had not continued Savana’s enrollment in speech and language therapy; (

b) She had not enrolled Sierra and Savana in counseling; (

c) She had not herself taken personal counseling to address her anger issues; (

d) She had not established a voluntary service agreement with the local Children’s Aid Society; (

e) She had attempted to change the children’s school during the current (2012-2013) school year; (

f) She had failed to engage the children in reasonable physical activity in the community as the children may have expressed a wish to do; (

g) She had not provided the father with reasonable telephone access to the girls and done what needed to be done to assure that this telephone access between himself and the children was maintained; (

h) She had allowed the children to have access to information and/or material about the litigation between herself and him and had spoken badly about him to the children. The Respondent Mother’s Response

[ 5 ] In her affidavit material, the respondent mother noted the following in reply to the father’s allegations: (

a) Following the January 2013 custody and access order, Savana had continued to receive speech therapy to correct her pronunciation difficulty and was involved in speech therapy at her school. This therapy had been continued until the therapist concluded that Savana had made sufficient progress to bring it to a halt. Consequently, Savana’s speech therapy had concluded some time ago; (

b) The respondent mother had inquired into counseling for the girls, but had been informed that they could not be re-enrolled in counseling while there was an ongoing court case, the counselors being unwilling to involve themselves in the counseling process for fear of criticism by one of the parties. The children were, in fact, enrolled in counselling. Prior evidence in this matter suggested that the applicant father had himself opposed dealing with such matters until the litigation process had stopped (see Report of the Children’s Lawyer filed in the earlier trial as an attachment to the trial affidavit of Clinical Investigator, Joey Doherty, dated March 6,2012); (

c) The respondent mother indicated that there had been some delay in immediately complying with the condition that she take counseling to deal with her anger issues. She stated that she was very much preoccupied at the time the order was made with the care of her youngest child as she been unable to find anyone reliable to look after him. This occurred when her oldest daughter, Laryssa, finished high school. She noted that she was finally able to see a counsellor in 2014 and that stopped seeing the counselor when he indicated to her that there was no need for her to continue with that counseling.

A review of the applicant father’s evidence in this respect indicates that he too followed the same path with respect to the anger counseling demanded of him by the order, although it should be noted that the order required him to also take counseling for other issues (see Report of the Children’s Lawyer, page 32). While it is reasonable to accept, like the mother that he had taken the recommended anger management counseling, the short time he spent in counseling (as indicated by him in his evidence) suggests that he had himself not fully complied with the major part of the counselling condition; (

d) The respondent mother indicated in her affidavit material that the local Children’s Aid Society had closed its file with respect to her family “more than a year ago”. The available evidence suggested that this had indeed occurred; (

e) The respondent mother denied her intention to change the children’s school in 2013. The applicant father believed this strongly enough however, that he initiated a motion to prevent her from doing so. In the end, the evidence is clear that the girls continued to attend that school, a Catholic school, and that the respondent mother supports the applicant father in his desire to expose the girls to that religious environment, even though neither he nor she are themselves Catholic; (

f) The parties’ affidavits devoted much time to a discussion of what extracurricular activities the children should be involved in. The father alleged that the mother had withdrawn the girls from all extracurricular activity of a physical nature, contrary to the condition in the custody and access order. There is a condition in the order which suggests that such activities shall be those in which the girls have expressed an interest to participate. Clearly, the order does not direct the mother to keep the children in soccer, basketball, baseball or any other sport.

In her affidavit material, the respondent mother indicated that the girls were not in favor of strenuous, physical activity and that she had tried to keep them physically active by involving them in swimming and family-related outings, including those at her fiancé’s chalet or summer camp. Here, it is important to recognize that the choice of children’s activities is ordinarily left to the custodial parent.

While the applicant father has access to all information relating to the upbringing of the children, this does not mean that he can either determine their extracurricular activities or that he is entitled to decide which activities the children will participate in, except, of course, when they are with him. The January 2013 order sets out a number of conditions in what appears to have been the court’s attempt to pre-empt parenting future parenting conflict.

A reasonable inference here is that the overarching purpose of the order’s conditions was to establish guidelines designed to promote the health and well-being of the children. I do not find that the court’s intention was to create ironclad rules limiting or controlling every aspect of the custodial parent’s parenting; (

g) The respondent mother denied that she had not provided the applicant father with telephone access as directed in the custody and access order. While there is some evidence that there may have been a problem here initially, the respondent mother offered an explanation of the difficulties encountered with this type of access. Whatever the problem was, this complaint seems to have been resolved some time ago, the applicant father presently enjoying considerable telephone access to the children when they are not with him; (

h) The respondent mother denied that she provided information regarding the present litigation to the children or that she disparaged the applicant father in the eyes of the children. While the evidence in support of this allegation is scarce, there is evidence that the mother’s current partner (fiancé) did refer to the father as a pedophile in front of the children. This was not something which the applicant mother herself did.

Given the strong hostility between the parties and what was established previously about the childrens’ allegations, it is not unreasonable to conclude that both parties have disparaged each other in the eyes of the children, perhaps more so earlier in this matter than has recently been the case. [ 6 ] In

summary, while there have obviously been some problems with adherence to the terms of the January 2013 custody and access order, the order seems to have served its purpose as much as such orders are capable of doing. If there has not been total or immediate compliance with the terms of the order by the mother (and the father), compliance has by far been more a feature of the order than non-compliance.

I have not commented on criticisms by the respondent mother of the applicant father because he too has offered explanations as to why some of the criticisms against himself arose and how he tried to comply with the conditions. I did not find that these criticisms and his reply to them were very pertinent to the case as the respondent mother is not seeking a change in the status quo.

A review of the evidence as a whole makes it difficult not to conclude that the respondent father’s complaints arise on the part of someone who had de facto custody of the children for more than 2 years and who still sees himself in the role of the custodial parent. From his perspective, it must be very difficult for him to accept and live with the custody and access order made in January 2013. Despite that order and the lengthy trial behind it, he still desperately wishes to recover custody of the girls.

That is his goal and not the best interest of the children. [ 7 ] While the children’s mother is hardly perfect and, like the father, has what might be called a fairly rough past, she has raised 5 children mostly on her own. The fact that the Children’s Aid Society of Algoma would close their file on her and her family and keep it

closed for more than a year now indicates that there are no serious complaints from service professionals involved with the family in the past or with the children’s school concerning her parenting skills and her care of the children. The girls appear to be doing well since they were returned to her care in January 2013. On the basis of the affidavit evidence filed, the girls clearly appear to enjoy the company of their older sister, Laryssa, and their infant brother, Dallas.

While the applicant father and the respondent mother’s partner (fiancé) are not enamored of one another, the mother’s partner seems supportive of her and the children. Whatever the role he does play in the daily life of the mother and her family, and it would not appear to be a full-time one, the evidence establishes that he is much more of an asset to her and the children than the contrary. Merits of the Applicant Father’s Claim to Custody [ 8 ] Referring to P.C.P. v.

L.C.P. ( 2013 ONSC 2564 Court, File Number: FS–07–60498–00, June 24, 2013), a case involving non-compliance by a parent with the terms of an existing joint custody order, the court found that non-compliance could amount to a material change in circumstances justifying a variation of the existing custody and access order. In its conclusion, the court in that case noted: In

summary, I find that P.C.P.’s numerous breaches of Murray J’s Order and the harmful effect they have had on J.A. amount to a material change in circumstances that affects J.A.’s well-being and requires the Order to be varied. I find that the conflicts, and the parents’ chronic inability to communicate, render joint custody undesirable, and that P.C.P.’s repeated disregard of Murray J’s Order discloses an inability to focus on J.A.’s best interests and thereby renders even an Order for shared custody unworkable. P.C.P. v.

L.C.P. is one of a number of cases in which the court has found non-compliance with the terms of a custody and access order to constitute a material change in circumstances justifying a change in the order (see also Kerr v. Easson , ONCA 225, 25 March 2014,Docket No. C57157; Zaidi v. Qizilbash , 2014 O.J. No.3333 ; 2014 ONSC 3652 ; Merkand v. Merkand

(2006) O.J. No.528 ,ONCA;145 ACWS (2d) 646, Docket No. C43178,ONCA; V.J.S. v. L.J.G.

(2014) O.J. No. 2238 (S.C.J.) ) [ 9 ] In Kerr v. Easson , the court confronted a situation where the child’s father had behaved in a way which was inimical to his son’s best interests. Under an existing order, the boy was in his father’s care overnight on Tuesday and Thursday evenings and alternate weekends. The boy’s teachers complained that he was falling behind in his reading and that he had told them that his father allowed him to watch inappropriate video games including “The World of Warcraft” and “Diablo”.

The evidence established that the father had not only refused to cooperate with the mother and the child’s teachers to address his reading problem but had tampered with the child’s Reading Log and Agenda book in an attempt to prove that he had been doing his son’s reading with him when he stayed overnight on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. A note from the boy’s teacher in the Agenda book expressing concern for the father exposing the boy to violent, adult video games had been cut out from the book by the father and not responded to by him.

The court found that the father’s behaviour and lack of cooperation with his son’s school had impacted severely enough the boy’s best interests as to amount to a material change in circumstances.

In the court’s mind, the resulting material change in circumstances permitted it to vary the father’s access by reducing his mid-week access to a few hours after school on Tuesday and Thursday evenings from the previous overnight access previously permitted on those occasions. [ 10 ] While the court focused on the father’s lack of cooperation with the mother and his son’s school on the reading issue and the matter of exposing the boy to inappropriate, violent video games, a review of the case indicates that there were other serious concerns about the father’s behaviour, including fostering the boy’s alienation from his mother as well as his failure to cooperate with the mother on the question of his religious upbringing.

The father had unilaterally begun taking the child to the Evangelical Church, without first speaking to the mother about it and contrary to her wishes. When she approached him to discuss the matter, he refused to reply to her and proved himself unwilling to use an available mediation remedy to address the disagreement. [ 11 ] While refusing to change the existing joint custody order to an order of sole custody in favor of the mother, the court was clearly troubled by the father’s attitude and how his behaviour impacted negatively on his son’s best interests.

At paragraph 62 of the decision, however, the court offered that “not … every circumstance detrimentally affecting the child is to be necessarily considered a material change in circumstances” stating that, “Parents are not perfect and they will make mistakes.

The court will not assume jurisdiction to correct every mistake in the guise of a material change in circumstances.” [ 12 ] What the court was saying, in effect, was that parental mistakes in and of themselves will not necessarily constitute a material change in circumstances but when a parent behaves in a way which negatively impacts on his or her child’s best interests, a change in circumstances will result which opens the door to a variation of the existing order. [ 13 ] The court’s approach in Kerr v. Easson (above) was applied in Zaidi v.

Qizilbash (above) where a distraught mother was unable to appreciate the impact of her emotional turmoil on her relationship with her 2 sons and her daughter. The court had previously made an order placing the boys in the custody of their father, permitting their daughter to reside on alternate weeks with each of them. Afraid that placing the daughter in the mother’s sole custody would lead to her alienation from her father, the court granted custody of the daughter to the father.

At paragraph 16 of its decision, the court noted that the mother “cannot get past her own feeling of grievance and this affects her ability to do what is best for the children.” At paragraph 41, the court further noted that if the mother “continues her alienating behaviour and the best interests of her daughter are adversely affected even more, that can constitute a material change in circumstances and the mother’s access could be restricted even further.” On the other hand, the court continued, “if she (the mother) produces convincing evidence in the future she has learned that her alienating behaviour is wrong; that it will not recur; and that she will henceforth encourage a positive relationship with the applicant, this could constitute a material change in circumstances and could lead to increased access.” [ 14 ] In its decision, the court in Zaidi referred to the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Merkand v.

Merkand (above) where the father complained about the imposition on him of an indefinite supervised access order. The Court was not impressed with what it agreed was the father’s attempt to manipulate the children into residing with him and his readiness to have them repeatedly assessed. It found that if the trial judge’s access order were varied, the father would revert to pressuring the children to reside with him. The Court disagreed with the father’s contention that the indefinite aspect of the supervision order prevented him from having it varied in the future.

The Court (see paragraph 6 of the Order) found that this was not so and that the father was not precluded from seeking to vary the terms of access upon proof of a material change in circumstances. While the Court found that it would have been open to the trial

judge to impose conditions on the father’s access “which if fulfilled might establish a material change in circumstances”, it did not fault the trial judge for the decision she made, pointing out that the father had not been precluded by her failure to impose conditions from taking appropriate steps aimed at establishing a material change in circumstance. [ 15 ] In its reasons, the Court referred to the 2004 decision in V.S.J. v. L.J.G . (above) where the issue of material change in circumstance and its impact on variation of an existing order was addressed at length.

After an extensive review of the evidence, the court in that case declined to vary the supervised aspect of the father’s access until such time as he had been fully, psychiatrically assessed and had participated in the counselling and psychotherapy expected to follow from it. At paragraph 149 of that decision, the court stated: Although supervised access can continue on more than a short term basis, it is never a permanent solution to access problems. Therefore I strongly recommend that both Ms. V.S.J. and Mr.

L.J.G. reconsider what is in the S.V.G.’s best interests after completion of the psychiatric or psychological assessment and the results of what may be ongoing and long-term treatment or therapy. [ 16 ] In that case, then, the court determined that before the father’s access could be varied to unsupervised access and before it could be increased, he would have had to have participated in a full-scale psychiatric evaluation and begun the therapy and counseling indicated by it.

Clearly, the court was of the view that such a change would constitute a material change in circumstances justifying a variation of both the length of the father’s access as well as the level of supervision, if any, still required (see paragraph 147). The Father’s Approach [ 17 ] It is clearly the applicant father’s strategy to use any non-compliance by the respondent mother to his advantage in his desire to recover custody of the children.

While, however, non-compliance with the conditions of a custody and access order clearly sets the stage for a variation of that order, the evidence in this case and particularly that adduced in the course of a recent trial at the end of 2012, including a Report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, must be considered in determining whether such breaches in the existing order as did occur, do in fact constitute a material change in circumstances. If, as noted in Kerr v.

Easson ( above), every mistake by a parent will not amount to a material change in circumstances, then it stands to reason that even when parental mistakes are made or there is less than strict or timely compliance with some of the multiple conditions in an order, such non-compliance must be considered in light of the grounds constituting the basis of that order.

The Report of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer [ 18 ] In the OCL Report dated March 6, 2012, the clinical investigator from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommended that the respondent mother be awarded sole custody of the children, Sierra and Savana. At the same time, she also recommended that the applicant father’s significant involvement in the lives of the children be maintained. In arriving at her recommendation for sole custody to the mother, however, the clinical investigator made some disturbing findings with respect to the father.

These findings bear review and are clearly relevant and probative with respect to the matter of the children’s best interests. Having given the applicant father his due as a parent, the clinical investigator stated (page 32 of her Report): Where Mr. McIsaac does not meet Sierra and Savana’s need is around being able to set boundaries. This has been an issue that has followed Mr. McIsaac through his life. He was unable to set a boundary with Savana around her behavior. For Sierra and Savana to feel emotionally safe, they have to know their parent can set boundaries for them. Mr.

McIsaac has struggled with social and sexual boundaries for a long time. It seems unlikely that he will be able to teach his children such an important part of their lives if he has not dealt with his own inadequacies. [ 19 ] Further to this observation, the clinical investigator noted: Another big issue that stands out in Mr. McIsaac’s ability to provide consistent care for Sierra and Savana is his lack of responsibility. He presents himself as a victim, blaming others for his own actions. He blames Ms.

Pye for him not taking the girls out in town, and for hiding in the basement with them and even for making him do drugs. He told Sierra and Savana not to tell Ms. Pye that Savana had been sent home on the Friday before the observation with lice putting Ms. Pye’s family at risk as well as the investigator. Mr. McIsaac has drawn Sierra and Savana into feeling sorry for him because of what their mother has done. These are not issues that children should be exposed to. [ 20 ] Mr. McIsaac’s mental health issues have been present since his teen years.

He has suffered from depression, suicidal attempts, self-harm, unexpressed anger and sexuality issues. These have gone unaddressed. These are not issues that will just go away without treatment. He is a serial offender of sexual assault X 3 and has been admittedly inappropriate in his boundaries with his ex- stepdaughter. There seems to be a lack of emotional awareness on Mr. McIsaac’s part to Sierra and Savana’s needs. He was unable to understand why Savana might be emotionally upset after seeing her mother and then leaving her for the first time in 5 months. Mr.

McIsaac verbally states that he wants Sierra and Savana to have a relationship with their mother and siblings but has taken action after action to prevent this from happening. He wants reassurance that he won’t be accused of sexual assault again and that Sierra isn’t told of Roy Wallace. He is unable to see what that request really means for Sierra and Savana. These children need to be able to disclose if something untoward is happening to them and be believed. It would put them in an incredibly dangerous and vulnerable position to decide that even if Sierra and Savana disclose something to Ms.

Pye that she is forbidden to act on it. Ms. Pye of course needs to realize that any false disclosure also hurts Sierra and Savana’s safety. [ 21 ] Having arrived at these conclusions, it is not at all surprising that the clinical investigator would recommend a change in custody in favor of the mother.

While she was certainly critical of the mother’s role in the conflict with the father and was fully aware of the mother’s personal issues, she did note that the mother had raised her older children without incident and concluded that under all of the circumstances it would be in the girls’ best interests to resume being parented principally by her. [ 22 ] What has not changed at the time the applicant father brought his motion to vary the January 2013 custody and access order

are the underlying fundamentals which gave rise to that order in the first place. The clinical investigator pointed out that at the time her Report was prepared, the applicant father had done nothing to address his serious personal issues, issues detrimentally impacting on his parenting. That the respondent mother should not immediately or completely have complied with some of the 21 conditions in the January 2013 order simply cannot alter the clinical investigator’s earlier findings with respect to the applicant father. These findings are not allegations.

They were relied upon by this court in making the January 2013 order. It is clear from the affidavit material filed by the applicant father in support of his motion to vary that more than 2 years after the order was made, he has not even started to address the concerns of the clinical investigator with respect to his parenting of Sierra and Savana. Consequently, on the basis of the available evidence, I would have to conclude that even if the respondent mother were an incompetent parent, which she clearly is not, it would still not be in the children’s best interests to return the children to their father’s care.

In the end, we are left with the inescapable conclusion that what parenting failings the respondent mother does have, pale when compared with the parenting issues and deficits which the applicant father has yet to address. Whatever the present status of her counseling, the respondent mother is clearly capable of parenting her children. Since the existing order was made, not only has she managed to parent the children well, but she is now also able to maintain part-time employment with the Red Cross in Elliott Lake.

Conclusion [ 23 ] The applicant father has failed to establish that the respondent mother has not complied with the terms of the January 2013 custody and access order to a degree sufficient to constitute a material change in circumstances. The precondition to a variation of that order, a material change in circumstances, has not been met. I venture to state that even if non-compliance could be established to a greater degree than I have been able to determine, it would still not be advisable to vary the existing custody and access order.

Both parents must comply with that order and its operative terms where compliance is still lacking or weak. In particular, the applicant father would be well advised to take seriously the recommendations made by the clinical investigator with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to embark on the personal counseling and therapy she recommended to him and which the court ordered.

Future Leave to Vary [ 24 ] Having carefully considered this matter and the affidavit material and judicial endorsements made therein, it is my respectful view that the parties and, in particular, the applicant father, have abused the judicial system. They cannot be allowed to do so in the future. Consequently, I am ordering that any future court proceedings in this matter not proceed without the prior order of this court on notice to the opposite party.

If the need for such proceedings were to arise in the future, the party wishing to initiate them would first have to justify to the presiding justice where the motion is brought that such proceedings are warranted. [ 25 ] I am mindful of Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules (Ont.Reg.114/99 , as amen.) which states that the primary objective of the Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.

That, Rule 2 states, includes ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties, saving expense and time, dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity and giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases (see Subrule 2(3)) . Allowing a party or parties to engage in prolific litigation misuses court resources which should also be used to serve other members of the public.

Anyone having recourse to frequent litigation to settle parenting disputes of an everyday nature is abusing the court system and should be prevented from doing so. It has been my observation over the years that children involved in such litigation quickly tire of it and want to be left alone. They do not want to be poked and prodded by Children’s Aid workers, police officers, counselors, psychotherapists, doctors and lawyers. As one ten-year old boy recently stated: “I don’t want to sit anymore on a chair and be asked questions by a counselor.

I just want to be a normal kid and I want to be left alone.” [ 26 ] Family litigation comes at a price and the children involved in it pay that price dearly. The court must do everything it can to discourage such litigation, mindful that it is clearly not in the best interests of the children involved to either participate in it or be the subject of it, providing, of course, they are not placed in immediate danger by the conduct of one or both of their parents. For the reasons given then, I dismiss the applicant father’s motion to vary and related motions before the court at this time.

Released: July 31, 2015 Signed: “Justice A. L. Guay” (E.&O.E.)