R. v. G.D., 2020 MBPC 27

CITATION: R. v. G.D. , 2020 MBPC 27 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen ) S. Sivarouban, for the Crown ) ) - and - ) ) ) G.D. ) ) B. Armstrong, for the Accused ) ) Reasons for Decision ) Delivered: June 10, 2020 C.A. DEVINE, P.J. Introduction and Factual Circumstances [ 1 ] Mr. G.D. has pleaded guilty to sexual assault that occurred between April 1 and April 30, 2018. At the time, he was 22 years of age and the complainant was 15 years of age; it was four months before her sixteenth birthday. [ 2 ] Mr.

G.D. is also pleading guilty to a breach of a release order, by having contact with the complainant in violation of a release order imposed on a subsequent charge of assaulting her in December, 2019. The breach occurred on January 1, 2020. The assault charge was stayed by the Crown in court last week. [ 3 ] The sexual assault charge was set for trial, but on the date of trial, November 26, 2019, Mr. G.D. agreed to plead guilty to

summary rather than indictable proceedings. The Crown is therefore confined to seeking a maximum sentence of 18 months, which is the sentence he is seeking. On the breach, the Crown is seeking a consecutive sentence of one month. The Crown is seeking a Probation Order of two years on the sexual assault. [ 4 ] The defence is asking that I impose a sentence of eight months on the sexual assault and a non-custodial sentence on the breach. The Accused has spent just over eight months in pre-trial custody.

The defence cites the Accused’s lack of criminal record and the circumstances of the offender and the particular circumstances in the communities of Pauingassi and Little Grand Rapids where he has spent most of his life, which defence argues impact on Mr. G.D.’s degree of moral culpability and on the seriousness of the offence, in terms of how the communities view such an offence. [ 5 ] The complainant and Mr. G.D. met through Facebook in the community of Pauingassi. When a fire occurred in that community, requiring the entire community to be evacuated to Winnipeg, the complainant and Mr. G.D. got together.

They commenced engaging in sexual activity. [ 6 ] There is no argument that the complainant was a “willing” participant, but she was incapable to consenting to engaging in sexual activity because she was under the age of sixteen. Moreover, because Mr. G.D. is more than five years older than her, the “close in age” exemption from criminal prosecution for having sex with a child, does not apply to him. [ 7 ] The complainant’s mother and Child and Family Services intervened in April, 2018, police were contacted and Mr.

G.D. was charged with sexual assault. [ 8 ] In the meantime however, the complainant became pregnant. Some time after the baby’s birth in January, 2019, the complainant and Mr. G.D. developed a relationship and were living together. This conjugal, common law relationship continued until Mr. G.D. allegedly assaulted the complainant on December 21, 2019. Since then, there has been a no contact condition in place. Mr. G.D. breached that no contact condition on January 1, 2020.

He went to the complainant’s home intoxicated and got in an argument with her. [ 9 ] At the sentencing hearing on May 26, 2020, the Crown stated that the complainant wanted no further contact with Mr. G.D. and was seeking protective conditions in a probation order. But, defence learned that morning from his client that the complainant had sent him a letter stating that she wanted to resume their relationship. I adjourned the sentencing for defence counsel to obtain a copy of the letter and for the Crown to contact the complainant and her family about that issue.

When we reconvened for that purpose last week on June 3, 2020, the Crown advised he had spoken to the complainant and she now wishes to have contact with Mr. G.D.. [ 10 ] Mr. G.D. does not have a criminal record. The Purpose of Sentencing [ 11 ] The fundamental purpose of sentencing as set out in the Criminal Code is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the

law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The sentencing provisions are imbued with Charter values includingequality, to ensure that sentencing incorporates equal protections for all offenders and victims, regardless of their age, gender, race andgeographical location. This is accomplished by imposing just sanctions that have one or more objectives.

Those objectives includedenouncing unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims, deterring the offender and others from committing offences and separatingoffenders from society where necessary, rehabilitation, reparations for harm done to victims or the community, and promoting a sense ofresponsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or the community. [12] Overarching those objectives is the fundamental principle of sentencing proportionality – the sentence imposed must beproportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility the offender had when they committed the offence.

Analysis of this Offence in the Context of Child Sexual Offences Law [13] Because this case is one where the victim and offender were 15 years of age and 22 years of age respectively and subsequent tothe offence dates in the Information, the victim attained the age of consent and she and Mr. G.D. became involved in a common lawrelationship and had a baby, the issue of the age of consent became a focus of this sentencing hearing. [14] Over the past 30 years, the law has changed significantly with respect to sexual crimes against children, owing mostly to thefact that the law has been informed by social science.

The protections provided to children under the age of consent, 16 years, are as aresult of what we now know about child development, human sexual development and the harmful impacts of unwanted or prematuresexual activity on young people. The culmination of these advances in the law have been comprehensively discussed by the SupremeCourt of Canada in the recent case of R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9. [15] The criminal law captures not only forced sexual activity by older adults against young children.

It is more nuanced than that, inrecognition of the fact that exploitation of teenagers, especially girls and even more so, Indigenous girls, and girls from racialized groups,can lead to very harmful consequences to individual girls and more broadly, to all of society. [16] The criminal law exempts from censure sexual curiosity and exploration between consenting teenagers 14 or 15 years of agewhere the age difference is no more than five years. [17] I recognize that there can be significant differences between individual teenagers of the same age.

For example, not all 15 yearolds possess the same degree of maturity, confidence, sexual development and assertiveness. But the law must choose an age of consent.As the Alberta Court of Appeal majority stated trenchantly in R. v. Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222, All law is about line drawing. It is not for the courts to sidestep Parliament’s unequivocal policy choice to increase the age of consent,providing the age chosen is a reasonable one: AB, supra at para 40; Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 SCR429 at para 57.

And still less to do so indirectly through the sentencing process. (at para. 96)(Emphasis added.) [18] The age of consent of 16 makes Canadian law consistent with other countries and the United Nations. [19] It recognizes that teenagers under the age of 16 require protection from unwanted, forced and premature sexual activity fromadults or people more than five years older than them. The majority in Hajar stated: . . . Increasing the age of consent was intended to better protect 14- and 15-year-olds from undue influence, persuasion and manipulationby adults to engage in sexual activity.

Parliament’s deliberate and reasoned decision to reject the concept of any type of “consent” forthose below the age of consent is supported by social science, neuroscience and medical research data. It demonstrates that childrenunder 16 do not possess the psychological maturity and decision-making competence to agree to sexual activity with those outside theclose-in-age exceptions.

And most especially, it reveals how the power imbalance between children and those in the proscribed agegroups undermines true consent.(at para. 40)(Emphasis added.) [20] The bright line of 16 for age of consent also recognizes the inherent harm to 14 and 15 year olds and to society from prematuresexual activity. In this case, a 15-year-old became pregnant. At 16 she became a mother. The situation turned her family upside down. Itwas her mother and CFS who initially contacted the police. After some time, after the birth of the baby, the girl’s mother supported arelationship between Mr. G.D. and her daughter.

But, after an allegation of assault at the end of 2019, she told the Crown that althoughshe had once trusted him, she no longer did. [21] Sexual assault is a highly gendered crime which impacts girls and women disproportionately. The Supreme Court addressed thisin Friesen: Sexual violence also has a disproportionate impact on girls and young women. Like the sexual assault of adults, sexual violence againstchildren is highly gendered (Goldfinch, at para. 37).

The “intersecting inequalities of being young and female” thus make girls andyoung women especially vulnerable to sexual violence (”The ‘Statutory Rape’ Myth”, at p. 292). In 2012, 81% of child and youth victimsof police-reported sexual offences were female and 97% of persons accused of such offences were male (Police-reported sexual offencesagainst children and youth in Canada, 2012, at pp. 10 and 14).

Sexual violence against children thus perpetuates disadvantage andundermines gender equality because girls and young women must disproportionately face the profound physical, emotional,psychological, and economic costs of the sexual violence (see R. v. Osolin, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.), at p.669; Goldfinch, at para. 37). Girls and young women are thus “still punished for being female” as a result of being disproportionatelysubjected to sexual violence (see The Hon. C. L’Heureux-Dubé, “Foreword: Still Punished for Being Female”, in E. A.

Sheehy, ed.,Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (2012), 1, at p. 2). (at para. 68.) [22] Defence counsel urged me to take the particular circumstances of Mr. G.D.’s Indigeneity and the Indigenous communitieswhere he has lived into consideration to impose a lower sentence. He stated that in the communities of Little Grand Rapids andPauingassi many people start families young. [23] He also claimed that peer groups for teenagers are typically very large, perhaps 50 or 60 people. In cities, a large peer group of

50 or 60 teenagers would all be within two-year age range, but in smaller communities the same size peer group of 50 or 60 people must span a much wider age range. Defence counsel argued that in Pauingassi, the peer group might well encompass teenagers and young people between the ages of 15 and 22. [ 24 ] Leaving aside the accuracy of this observation, which was not supported by any evidence, the arguments undermine the line that Parliament has drawn in the sand. Courts are bound to uphold that line. Similar arguments were rejected in Hajar .

The age of consent protects young people from premature sexual activity with people much older than they are. [ 25 ] This is particularly the case for Indigenous girls. The Supreme Court recognized their disproportionate victimization in Friesen : Children who belong to groups that are marginalized are at a heightened risk of sexual violence that can perpetuate the disadvantage they already face. This is particularly true of Indigenous people, who experience childhood sexual violence at a disproportionate level (Statistics Canada, Victimization of Aboriginal people in Canada, 2014 (2016), at p. 10).

Canadian government policies, particularly the physical, sexual, emotional, and spiritual violence against Indigenous children in Indian Residential Schools, have contributed to conditions in which Indigenous children and youth are at a heightened risk of becoming victims of sexual violence (see British Columbia, Representative for Children and Youth, Too Many Victims: Sexualized Violence in the Lives of Children and Youth in Care (2016), at p. 8 (” Too Many Victims ”); The Sexual Exploitation of Children in Canada: the Need for National Action , at pp. 29-33).

In particular, the over-representation of Indigenous children and youth in the child welfare system makes them especially vulnerable to sexual violence ( Too Many Victims , at pp. 11-12). We would emphasize that, when a child victim is Indigenous, the court may consider the racialized nature of a particular crime and the sexual victimization of Indigenous children at large in imposing sentence (T. Lindberg, P. Campeau and M. Campbell, “Indigenous Women and Sexual Assault in Canada”, in E. A.

Sheehy, ed., Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (2012), 87, at pp. 87 and 98-99). (at para. 70) (Emphasis added.) [ 26 ] The predation is not only from non-Indigenous offenders. Sexual exploitation of girls within Indigenous communities is widespread. It is particularly dangerous, harmful and insidious. Girls in remote communities who are sexually exploited are often alone, unprotected and trapped. To the extent that sexual exploitation of children and teenage girls is normalized or internalized by victims in some communities, does not make it right or legal.

It creates another layer of harm and victimization. [ 27 ] To suggest that sexual activity between a 15-year-old and a 22-year-old is “normal” because of the circumstances in remote, northern Indigenous communities leads inexorably to the conclusion that the age of consent for sexual activity should be lower in these communities or should be decided on a case by case basis. That line of reasoning ultimately will result in a lack of protection for Indigenous girls and an exacerbation of the already disproportionate effect of sexual violence against them.

Relevant Sentencing Objectives in this Case [ 28 ] I noted earlier in this decision the sentencing objectives listed in the Criminal Code at section718 . In this case, all of the objectives are relevant: (

a) Denunciation (

b) Deterrence, general and specific (

c) Separation of the offender from society, where necessary (

d) Rehabilitation (

e) Reparations to victims and the community (

f) To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community [ 29 ] The sentence must clearly observe the line that Parliament has drawn, to protect young people from premature sexual activity with adults and to express its denunciation for those who cross the line. This line is in place for all Canadian teenagers, including 15- year-old Indigenous girls from remote, northern communities and including circumstances where the offender subsequently wants to be in a relationship with the girl.

Denunciation is not reserved for the worst, most horrendous case. [ 30 ] The sentence must also send a message of deterrence. The line is clear for all. It is 16. [ 31 ] And Mr. G.D. must be deterred from committing an offence like this in the future. It is clear from the presentence report that he has no insight into his offending behaviour. It is likely that the best method of deterring him in the future is for him to take sex offender treatment. Mr.

G.D. must learn more about premature sexual activity and its negative and long term impacts, the particular vulnerabilities of young, Indigenous girls, his own power and his probably unintentional exploitation of that power over younger sexual partners. Thus, deterrence is likely achieved through rehabilitation. [ 32 ] Finally, Mr. G.D. must learn some things about how this type of offence affects Indigenous girls and how it impacts negatively on Indigenous communities.

Proportionality [ 33 ] I believe that the discussion about child sexual offences and the age of consent above shows that society views this offence as serious. This is not “your worst nightmare” sexual assault where an older adult violently sexually assaulted a pre-teen child. But, more troubling, the circumstances of this offence, where the victim was a willing participant and the age difference was seven years, makes the offence liable to arguments such as the ones I heard, which tend towards undermining the protections put in place by Parliament and appellate courts.

There is no doubt however, that the victim in this case was subjected to serious harm. The majority in Hajar discussed the phenomenon of this type of sexual offence at length:

We reject the idea that the harm done to children by the crime of sexual interference is variable to the vanishing point where the child hasgiven “de facto consent” to the sexual activity. Parliament has determined that sexual activity between a child under 16 and an adult (andothers not within the close-in-age exception) is inherently harmful – and therefore prohibited in all circumstances. This applies withequal force to both sexual interference and sexual assault.

For child victims of both major sexual interference and major sexual assault,that harm includes a serious violation of the victim’s body and sexual integrity and a breach of their human dignity and privacy. Andarguably more. Indeed, many victims of child sexual abuse have something very important stolen from them – their childhood. As oneauthor explained: Children and adolescents who are exposed to sexual experiences of one sort or another with an adult have been cheated out of theiropportunity to experience sexual contact in a situation of genuine choice in the context of an equal power relationship.

They may alsohave been fooled into making faulty self-attributions of consent. In addition, there is always injury in terms of the affront to humandignity arising from having bodily and psychological integrity infringed without giving informed consent independent of any resultantpsychological symptoms, level of resilience, or reports of psychological harm.(Sonja Grover, “On Power Differentials and Children’sRights: A Dissonance

Interpretation of the Rind and Associates

(1998) Study on Child Sexual Abuse” (2003) 5:1 Ethical HumanSciences and Services 21 at 29 [Grover].) (at para. 62) [34] As I indicated above, the law’s acceptance of the proposition that premature sexual activity by a 15-year-old with an adult evenas young as 22, is based in science. The sentencing judge in Hajar qualified psychologist Dr. Mike Boyes as an expert to provide opinionevidence in the areas of human psychology and human development generally, and specifically the risks and consequences that arisewhen adolescents become sexually involved with older males.

The Court of Appeal cited his reports extensively on this issue. TheSupreme Court of Canada cited Hajar favourably on the issue of rejecting the idea that “de facto consent” is a mitigating factor onsentence, due to the inherent harm that this type of sexual offence causes.(Friesen, at para. 149) [35] The very type of “relationship” that existed in this case is perilous and harmful. The majority in Hajar summarized andaccepted Dr. Boyes’ evidence as follow: Dr. Boyes’ evidence may be summed up this way.

For children under 16 who engage in sexual relations with older partners, there is aforeseeable and significantly increased risk of profound short- and long-term negative developmental and psycho-social outcomes evenwhere the children gave their de facto consent, including in the context of a “relationship” with an older “partner” (EKE, A65). In theReasons at paras 40-41, the sentencing judge accepted Dr. Boyes’ evidence about the likelihood of harm: ... In speaking of the negative developmental consequences of sexual activity in childhood or being forced into non-consensual sexualacts during adolescence, Dr.

Boyes comments that these activities “increase the likelihood, in both the developmental short and longerterms, of lowered self-esteem, depression, suicidal ideation, poor school performance or lower levels of educational attainment or schoolcompletion and significant negative impact upon current and future social relationships and intimate relationships”. Dr.

Boyes suggests that in addition to these negative consequences, the early onset of sexual activity and involvement in sexual activitieswith an older partner “are both associated with significantly increased risk or odds of negative consequences or problematicdevelopmental outcomes” Dr. Boyes’ evidence on harm to children is fundamental to understanding the seriousness of this crime. It stands in testament to thelikelihood of often multiple cascading and destructive consequences even where a child has given de facto consent in a “relationship”with an older partner.

This harm may be even more serious than the violation of the child’s physical integrity but less obvious, indeedeven unascertainable, at sentencing. At this stage, the child may not recognize, much less accept, the extent of any existing harm or thelikelihood of harm in the future.

Nevertheless, in sentencing for major sexual interference, the sentencing judge must take into accountthe likelihood of serious psychological or emotional harm to the child victim irrespective of the child’s de facto consent.(at paras. 64 –65)(Emphasis added.) [36] The degree of responsibility the offender had in committing the offence is also part of the proportionality analysis. The moralculpability of a 22-year-old committing a sexual offence against someone under age is high. There is no evidence that Mr. G.D. wasintoxicated. The sexual activity was planned for some time on Facebook.

He does not appear to be a sophisticated person. [37] And I also take into account the circumstances in which he finds himself as an Indigenous person growing up in northernManitoba. Justice LeBel stated the following in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13: The Court must consider the unique systemic and background factors that have played a

part in bringing the offender before the courts. Itis intrinsic to the proportionality analysis fundamental to the law of sentencing. (Ipeelee at para. 87) . . . the logical meaning to be derived from the special reference to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders, juxtaposed as it is against ageneral direction to consider "the circumstances" for all offenders, is that sentencing judges should pay particular attention to thecircumstances of aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique, and different from those of non-aboriginal offenders.(Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para. 37) [38] There is a two-part analysis that is required by Criminal Code

section 718.2(e). The first part of that analysis determines howthe Indigenous person’s background impacts the proportionality analysis: First, systemic and background factors may bear on the culpability of the offender, to the extent that they shed light on his or her level ofmoral blameworthiness. . . . . Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack ofopportunities and limited options for positive development.

While this rarely - if ever - attains a level where one could properly say thattheir actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances maydiminish their moral culpability. As Greckol J. of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench stated, at para. 60 of R. v. Skani, 2002 ABQB1097, 331 A.R. 50, [page478] after describing the background factors that lead to Mr.

Skani coming before the court, "[f]ew mortalscould withstand such a childhood and youth without becoming seriously troubled." Failing to take these circumstances into accountwould violate the fundamental principle of sentencing - that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the

degree of responsibility of the offender. (Ipeelee, at para. 73) And in Gladue: The background factors which figure prominently in the causation of crime by aboriginal offenders are by now well known. Years ofdislocation and economic (under) development have translated, for many aboriginal peoples, into low incomes, high unemployment, lackof opportunities and options, lack or irrelevance of education, substance abuse, loneliness, and community fragmentation. (Gladue, atpara. 67) [39] Mr.

G.D.’s family history is marked by many of the traumas affecting Indigenous people in this country – parental alcohol andneglect, apprehension by a child protection agency, poverty, inadequate food, no father figure, premature deaths of siblings – one byaccident, one by suicide, extreme domestic violence against his mother, another sibling in a penitentiary for murder, incompleteeducation, no employment history, no income, no bank account, and a history of problems with alcohol. The communities where Mr.G.D. grew up – Pauingassi and Little Grand Rapids are afflicted with these same factors.

Pauingassi is actually a break-off communityfrom Little Grand Rapids. Defence counsel, who has been counsel in the communities for close to two decades, told me how bothcommunities suffer from alcohol and solvent abuse, staggering unemployment, poor education, loss of the old way of life and very younggirls getting pregnant. In short, defence counsel stated that the behaviour of Mr. G.D. and the victim was spawned by a community thathas failed them.

He also argued that using jail as a general deterrent is “as effective as using leeches in medicine.” Indeed, theeffectiveness of jail as a general deterrent was questioned by the Supreme Court in Gladue and Ipeelee. (See also a poignant discussion ofthe effect of jail on Indigenous communities in Peace and Good Order, Harold R. Johnson, McLelland and Stewart, 2019.) [40] I leave for another day a comprehensive analysis of lateral violence and internalized racism and sexism within oppressedgroups, such as Indigenous people in Manitoba and how Gladue circumstances impact on these types of crimes.

However, I adopt theobservation made by Chief Justice Richards of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that a more nuanced evaluation of the extent thatGladue factors impact on the offender’s moral culpability be undertaken. (in R. v. Chanalquay, 2015 SKCA 141 ) [41] It is clear from the presentence report that Mr. G.D. has no insight into how this crime may have impacted the victimnegatively. To the extent that Mr. G.D.’s behaviour may be normalized among some of the population, it is not normalized among mostpeople and cannot be tolerated nor condoned by the court.

He says he just wants to be with her and he just wants to see his child. I notehowever that Mr. G.D. has two other children from a previous relationship whom he has not seen in one and a half years. I have listedthe Gladue factors affecting his life. I would observe that his actions and lack of insight demonstrate a view of women and girls andhuman sexuality that is unsophisticated and dangerous.

It demonstrates a lack of respect and consideration and perpetuates the inequalityand oppression experienced by women and girls, particularly Indigenous women and girls. [42] I also note that the Gladue factors impacting on Mr. G.D.’s life did not bring him before the courts before now, notwithstandingan alcohol problem since his teens. Other relevant Sentencing Principles: s. 718.2 [43]

Section 718.2(

a) requires the judge to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. It is mitigating in this case is that Mr. G.D.pleaded guilty, saving the victim from having to testify at trial. The plea came on the date of the trial. He has no record. He has takenAnger Management. [44] Aggravating factors are his lack of insight, essentially blaming the victim, whom he says just wanted to have a baby. The sexualoffender recidivism tool puts him at a high risk to reoffend.

The offence resulted in a pregnancy and there is a little child who now has asingle mother and a very difficult situation with respect to his biological father. [45] I have not lost sight of the principle of restraint and restorative principles. In this case however, the main sentencing objective isdenunciation. The Crown has proceeded summarily and is seeking a sentence of 18 months.

That sentence is far less than what theSupreme Court’s judgement in Friesen might suggest; the Crown stated that if he had proceeded by indictment in this case, the Friesencase would have directed him to ask for a penitentiary sentence of five years. [46] I do take into account the Gladue circumstances of Mr. G.D. and the communities of Pauingassi and Little Grand Rapids that ina sense allowed or entitled Mr. G.D. to trench on the sexuality of a 15-year-old and change her life forever. [47] A sentence in the provincial jail of sufficient length would usually allow Mr.

G.D. to take the sex offender treatment program atHeadingley Correctional Centre where he is currently on remand. The Assiniboine Treatment Centre at Headingley is a therapeuticcommunity for inmates charged with or convicted of sexual offences where they can receive programming, treatment and counselling toaddress sexual offending. The Presentence Report writer recommended the program and stated that a sentence of 18 months wouldensure that there was sufficient time for him to apply for and then participate in and complete the program.

We adjourned the sentencingso that counsel could check on the availability of the program. Last week at the continuation date, the Crown advised me that theprogram is not currently running due to COVID-19 and Corrections could not advise when it would be running again. I hope thatCorrections is able to provide this much-needed treatment to inmates serving sentences for sexual offences. [48] I believe that the treatment Mr. G.D. could receive in jail would be the best option for him to receive sex offender treatment.Mr.

G.D. would be in the program with many other Indigenous men, at least some of whom I expect could be from small communities inthe North. Such treatment is not available in Pauingassi. [49] The fact this treatment is not currently available is troubling. Mr. G.D. has no insight into the harm his offending causes.Releasing him now, without treatment, would expose the victim and other girls to his risk to reoffend. Notwithstanding my concern thatthere is no treatment available in Headingley today, it is my hope that the treatment will be available very soon, or alternatively, if it isnot, that Mr.

G.D. would be eligible to an early release by Corrections to a program in the community. [50] Denunciation requires a much lengthier jail sentence than the time he has already served.

Sentence [ 51 ] Given all the circumstances, the sentence on the sexual assault will be one of 18 months custody, and on the breach of the release order one week consecutive, followed by two years of supervised probation. As of today, Mr. G.D. has spent 174 days in custody. I will credit it at time and a half, which means he is deemed to have spent 261 days in custody.

Expressed in days, his sentence is 540 days on the sexual assault and 7 days on the breach, for a total of 547 days. [ 52 ] He has 286 days remaining on the custodial portion of his sentence. [ 53 ] That will be followed by two years of probation, supervised only for the purpose of taking any sex offender and other counselling he is required to take.

The conditions are as follows: − Report to Probation Services within two days of your release from jail. − Report as required by your Probation Officer. − Reside as directed by your Probation Officer and do not move without the permission of your Probation Officer. − Attend, participate and complete recognized sex offender treatment approved by your Probation Officer. − Take programming or counselling for alcohol abuse. − Take counselling to address childhood traumas. − You are not to be with girls between the ages of 12 and 17, unless there is a sober, responsible adult present. − You are to have no contact or communication with the victim until you have taken sufficient sex offender treatment, the sufficiency which will be determined by your Probation Officer.

Ancillary Orders - DNA primary compulsory - SOIRA 10 years - Waive victim surcharge “Original signed by:” C.A. Devine