2015 QCCA 1554, 2015 QCCA 1554

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. c. Québec (Procureure générale) 2015 QCCA 1554 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL N°: 500-09-024341-141 (500-17-052494-096) DATE: September 28, 2015 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE PAUL VÉZINA, J.A. MANON SAVARD, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. IMPERIAL TOBACCO CANADA LIMITED JTI-MACDONALD CORP. ROTHMANS, BENSON & HEDGES INC. APPELLANTS - plaintiffs v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC RESPONDENT – defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellants appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Mr.

Justice Robert Mongeon), rendered on March 5, 2014, dismissing their amended motion for declaratory judgment to have the Tobacco-related Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act declared constitutionally invalid on the grounds that it is contrary the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Charter of human rights and freedoms . [ 2 ] For the reasons of Marcotte, J.A., with which Vézina and Savard, JJ.A., agree, THE COURT : [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeal, with costs. PAUL VÉZINA, J.A. MANON SAVARD, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A.

Mtre Éric Préfontaine Mtre Julien Morissette OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP For the appellant Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited Mtre François Grondin Mtre Patrick Plante BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS, LLP For the appellant JTI-Macdonald Corp. Mtre Simon V. Potter, Ad. E. Mtre Pierre-Jérôme Bouchard MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT, LLP For the appellant Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. Mtre Benoit Belleau

Mtre Francis Demers Mtre Marilène Boisvert Mtre Dana Pescarus Direction générale des affaires juridiques et législatives BERNARD ROY (JUSTICE-QUÉBEC) For the respondent Date of hearing: June 18, 2015 REASONS OF MARCOTTE, J.A. [ 4 ] The appellants appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Mr.

Justice Robert Mongeon) rendered on March 5, 2014, which dismissed their amended motion for declaratory judgment to have the Tobacco-related Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (”the Act ”) [1] declared constitutionally invalid on the grounds that it is contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Charter of human rights and freedoms . CONTEXT [ 5 ] The Act , which came into effect in June of 2009, establishes specific rules to facilitate the Government of Quebec’s recovery of tobacco-related health care costs attributable to a wrong by one or more tobacco product manufacturers.

It amends certain rules of the civil liability regime relating to evidence and prescription, and provides for two methods of bringing suit, through either class or individual actions. It also extends the application of these new rules to individual and class actions against manufacturers and is modelled on the statute enacted in British Columbia entitled the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (”the British Columbia Act ”), which the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally valid in 2005 in British Columbia v.

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd . [2] (” Imperial Tobacco ”). [ 6 ] In 2012, the Government of Quebec relied on the Act to sue the appellants for more than $60 billion dollars to reimburse the costs of tobacco-related health care provided to the Quebec population. [3] [ 7 ] Earlier, in 1998, two class actions had also been brought against the appellants. In June of 2015, in a Superior Court judgment, the appellants were condemned to pay members of the groups concerned more than $16 billion in moral and punitive damages, in accordance with the Act , [4] among other things.

That judgment has also been appealed. [5] [ 8 ] The appeal before us now, however, concerns only the constitutional validity of the Act .

JUDGMENT A QUO [ 9 ] In his judgment, the trial judge provided a detailed overview of the relevant provisions of the Act before outlining the arguments of the parties, including that of the appellants who claimed that the cumulative effect of the new rules of evidence and prescription in the Act violates their fundamental rights as protected under sections 6 and 23 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms (” Quebec Charter ”) [6] and gives an undue advantage to the government and other recipients. [ 10 ] He then referred to the judgment in Imperial Tobacco .

In his view, the judgment at issue, which recognizes the constitutional validity of the British Columbia Act , [ translation ] “therefore evacuated any possible grounds for the inoperability of a similar (or in many respects identical) statute under Canadian constitutional law”, even though that judgment does not deal with [ translation ] “the specificity of the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms ”. [ 11 ] Therefore, although he stated that his analysis would be limited to the Quebec Charter , [7] he began by reiterating the principles established in Imperial Tobacco , which, in his opinion, decide the entire issue here, even though that case does not discuss sections 6 and 23 of the Quebec Charter .

He emphasized the Supreme Court’s analysis of the issues of judicial independence and rule of law which, in his view, apply in their entirety. [ 12 ] He noted that the Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ argument whereby the British Columbia Act removed the “free will” of the courts, either in whole or in part, by creating presumptions and limiting court access to certain relevant facts (due to the impossibility of accessing patient files to verify the statistical data used to establish the quantum of the health care). [ 13 ] In rejecting the assertions of the manufacturers regarding the lack of fairness and logic in the specific rules set out in the British Columbia Act , he quoted the following remarks of Major J.: [49] The rules in the Act with which the appellants take issue are not as unfair or illogical as the appellants submit .

They appear to reflect legitimate policy concerns of the British Columbia legislature regarding the systemic advantages tobacco manufacturers enjoy when claims for tobacco-related harm are litigated through individualistic common law tort actions. That, however, is beside the point. The question is not whether the Act’s rules are unfair or illogical , nor whether they differ from those governing common law tort actions , but whether they interfere with the courts’ adjudicative role , and thus judicial independence . [8] [ 14 ] He also cited the passages discussing the role of the courts in the

interpretation and application of both procedural and

substantive law, their contribution to the evolution of the law, and the fact that the legislator may define the law as it sees fit, within the limits of the Constitution. In this respect, he notes that, according to the teachings in Wells v. Newfoundland , [9] it is not the role of the courts to question legislative choices or apply only the laws that meet with their approval. [ 15 ] He also cited the following passage in the reasons of Major, J. concerning the amendment of the rules of civil procedure and evidence: [55] ...

The fact that the Act shifts certain onuses of proof or limits the compellability of information that the appellants assert is relevant does not in any way interfere, in either appearance or fact, with the court’s adjudicative role or any of the essential conditions of judicial independence . Judicial independence can abide unconventional rules of civil procedure and evidence . [10] [ 16 ] He inferred therefrom that the amendment of the traditional rules of evidence by statute does not mean that the independence of the courts is [ translation ] “automatically infringed”. He also noted that in this case,

section 13 of the Act , which eliminated the need to identify the recipients, prove the cause of the disease, or establish the actual cost of the health care for a given recipient, is subject to

section 14. However,

section 14 allows the defendants to request "statistically meaningful samples" that satisfy the parties and the court. In his view, this provision opens up the possibility of tendering contradictory expert evidence on the reliability of the data, regarding which the courts will retain all of their jurisdictional and decision-making independence. [11] [ 17 ] The trial judge also noted that Imperial Tobacco deals with the notion of a fair civil trial as part of its analysis of the notion of the rule of law.

In paragraph 104 of his judgment, he remarked: [ translation ] [104] It is clear that the legal principle whereby the notion of a fair civil trial is part of the notion of rule of law is in no way removed from Major, J.'s reasoning or decision. Without necessarily referring to

section 23 of the Quebec Charter , he did not ignore its guiding principles. [ 18 ] He cited excerpts from the judgment which set aside the argument relating to the mandatorily prospective and general nature of statutes, stating that the Supreme Court has recognized that a statute may be retrospective or retroactive or serve to upend well- established expectations in a manner that may appear to be unfair but that is not necessarily constitutionally invalid. [12] [ 19 ] He also addressed the arguments concerning the unfairness of legislative amendments that target one industry in particular and diminish its capacity to argue its position successfully, referring to the passage of the judgment in which Major, J. points out that the Supreme Court has already recognized the constitutional validity of such amendments. [13] [ 20 ] He also concluded that the Supreme Court’s final judgment on the dispute concerning the right to a fair civil trial can be found in paragraph 76 of the judgment, which he quotes: [76] Additionally, the appellants’ conception of a “ fair ” civil trial seems in part to be of one governed by customary rules of civil procedure and evidence .

As should be evident from the analysis concerning judicial independence, there is no constitutional right to have one’s civil trial governed by such rules . Moreover, new rules are not necessarily unfair. Indeed, tobacco manufacturers sued pursuant to the Act will receive a fair civil trial, in the sense that the concept is traditionally understood: they are entitled to a public hearing, before an independent and impartial court, in which they may contest the claims of the plaintiff and adduce evidence in their defence .

The court will determine their liability only following that hearing, based solely on its understanding of the law as applied to its findings of fact.

The fact that defendants might regard that law (i.e., the Act) as unjust , or the procedural rules it prescribes as unprecedented , does not render their trial unfair . [Emphasis added by the trial judge.] [ 21 ] On the basis of the above excerpt, he determined that while there is no express procedural guarantee of fairness in civil trials under the Canadian Charter and Canadian constitutional law as there is under the Quebec Charter , the concept of a fair civil trail is inherent to Canadian law.

Also, in his view, insofar as the Supreme Court has also recognized the validity of the British Columbia Act , it must be concluded that the Act does not deprive the appellants of their right to a fair trial and that it is constitutionally valid. [ 22 ] That said, he proceeded to analyze the Quebec Charter arguments raised by the appellants to determine whether they might lead to a different result and found that the Act does not violate the Quebec Charter either. [ 23 ] In this respect, he begins by referring to the case law recognizing that the protection under

section 23 of the Quebec Charter concerns procedural rather than “substantive” rights. According to him, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the Act contravened this provision, which is akin to paragraph 2(

e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights , [14] which provides litigants with only procedural guarantees. [ 24 ] He also refused to recognize that

section 23 of the Quebec Charter offers protection that is contrary to a new statute or legislative amendment and could change the existing law or risk paralyzing the legislative system. [ 25 ] He cites case law from this Court confirming that

section 23 of the Quebec Charter constitutionalizes the right to natural justice in both criminal and civil matters, the components of which are (1) the right to a judgment rendered by an independent tribunal and (2) the right to be heard, and that this provision guarantees certain procedural protections rather than protection from the application of substantive law provisions. [15] [ 26 ] He cited the remarks of McLachlin, C.J. (dissenting on the merits) in Régie des rentes du Québec v.

Canada Bread Company , [16] a judgment from 2013 upholding the validity of a statute with retroactive effect, where the legislator had clearly expressed its scope: [53] It is a settled principle that laws can take effect retroactively, so long as the legislature indicates its intention in clear statutory

language. In this way, the legislature can change the outcome of a legal dispute, by enacting provisions which apply to a pending case.As the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated in Barbour v. University of British Columbia 2010 BCCA 63, 282 B.C.A.C. 270, leaveto appeal refused, [2010] 1 S.C.R. vi: We consider it is clear in Canada that the Legislature may enact legislation that has the effect of retroactively altering the law applicableto a dispute.

While a Legislature may not interfere with the Court’s adjudicative role, it may amend the law which the court is required toapply in its adjudication. (See also British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49 , [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at paras. 69-72; Sociétécanadienne de métaux Reynolds ltée v. Québec (Sous-ministre du Revenu), [2004] R.D.F.Q. 45 (C.A.), at paras. 16-17.) [27] The trial judge also noted that the appellants rely in particular on a singular judgment of the Court of Quebec, namely,Restaurant Brossard v.

Quebec (Deputy Minister of Revenue),[17] which cannot be qualified as a precedent as it is approximately twentyyears old and has never been cited by higher courts. He also pointed out that the appellants base themselves on judgments of Europeancourts that were rendered in a sometimes far different legislative context and are not necessarily binding on Canadian courts. [28] Thus, in his opinion, even though the expression “en pleine égalité” (full and equal) in

section 23 of the Quebec Charter alsoappears in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,[18] it must nevertheless be interpreted inlight of Canadian law. As the Court of Appeal has already interpreted

section 23 without expanding its application to substantive laweven though it has had occasion to do so,[19] it is not appropriate to do so in this case, in his opinion.. [29] The judge also rejected the argument regarding

section 6 of the Quebec Charter raised as a result of the elimination of theotherwise applicable three-year extinctive prescription. He noted that this provision, which contains a significant limitation in theexpression “except to the extent provided by law”, confers on the legislature the right to legislate to amend the rights of any persons orclasses of person to the free disposition and peaceful enjoyment of their property. [30] Drawing inspiration from the comments of Major, J. in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General)[20] concerning the protectionprovided by

section 2(

e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which is comparable to

section 6 in matters of expropriation, he concluded thatno one is guaranteed the permanence of legislation. He cited De Belleval v. Quebec (City of), in support of the principle that there are no“judicial vested rights” in constitutional law.[21] [31] In his view, the prescription barrier is not so unalterable or permanent that it may not be modified or removed by a later statute.Thus, the legislator may intervene at any given time to amend an existing law, and even do so retroactively so that it applies to pendingcases, provided, of course, that it is acting within its jurisdiction. ISSUE [32] The appellants raise three grounds of appeal, all exclusively related to

section 23 of the Quebec Charter. They may be groupedunder a single question: - Did the trial judge err in concluding that the Tobacco-related Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act does not violatesection 23 of the Quebec Charter? ANALYSIS [33] The appellants have reviewed their approach since Imperial Tobacco and no longer raise the judicial independence argument.Instead, they attack the validity of the Act, basing themselves on the specificity of the Quebec Charter, which was not considered inImperial Tobacco, and denounce the effects of the Act on their right to be heard in a fair trial.

They also submit that the Act is notidentical to the British Columbia Act, which does not apply to pending cases. [34] More specifically, the appellants maintain that the trial judge erred in holding that the Act did not contravene

section 23 of theQuebec Charter, when its provisions significantly affect their right to be heard and their right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by thisprovision. [35] According to the appellants, by enacting these rules, the legislator is trying to make the courts shoulder the burden ofdetermining their fault by dictating the outcome of the case in advance through specific rules that considerably restrict their right to beheard and to present a full defence. These rules make a mockery of the trial and contravene

section 23 of the Quebec Charter without thelegislator invoking the notwithstanding clause in

section 52 of the Quebec Charter. [36] The appellants argue that the notion of a fair trial is impaired by the cumulative effect of the specific rules in the Act.

They referto the combined effect of the presumptions (sections 16 and 17), the possibility of establishing causation on the basis of statisticalevidence (section 15), the exemption from identifying the individual members of the population for whom the government presents itsclaim without having established the cause of their disease or proving the costs incurred for each person (section 13), and the eliminationof prescription (section 27). [37] In their opinion, the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Imperial Tobacco that the right to a fair trial in civil matters is not anunwritten constitutional principle does not mean that this right is not guaranteed by the Quebec Charter.

Thus, the comments of Major, J.in paragraph 76 of Imperial Tobacco whereby the British Columbia Act does not prevent a fair trial from being held must be consideredobiter and, in any event, cannot apply given

section 23 of the Quebec Charter, which confers a broader scope on the notion of a fair trialthan the common law does.

[38] In the alternative, the appellants argue that the expression “en pleine égalité” (full and equal) in

section 23 of the QuebecCharter must be given a broad and liberal

interpretation so as to include the principle of equality of arms, as defined by the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights. In their view, the trial judge erred in refusing to consider this principle, as well as the only relevant Quebecjudgment on this issue, Restaurant Brossard, supra.[22] [39]

Section 23 of the Quebec Charter, which appears at the beginning of

Chapter III “Judicial Rights”, sets out the right to animpartial hearing before an independent tribunal in the following terms: 23. Toute personne a droit, en pleine égalité, àune audition publique et impartiale de sa causepar un tribunal indépendant et qui ne soit paspréjugé, qu’il s’agisse de la détermination de sesdroits et obligations ou du bien-fondé de touteaccusation portée contre elle 23. Every person has a right to a full and equal,public and fair hearing by an independent andimpartial tribunal, for the determination of hisrights and obligations or of the merits of anycharge brought against him.

Le tribunal peut toutefois ordonner le huis closdans l'intérêt de la morale ou de l'ordre public. The tribunal may decide to sit in camera,however, in the interests of morality or publicorder. [40] Although most of the provisions in

Chapter III protect the rights of the accused,

section 23 expressly applies to both civil andcriminal proceedings with the inclusion of the statement “for the determination of his rights and obligations”. This is not the case withsection 11(

d) of the Canadian Charter, which applies only to “any person charged”.[23] [41] That said, other than the observation that the wording of

section 23 of the Quebec Charter is inspired by internationalinstruments, the legislative history of this provision does not ground any specific conclusions on the legislative intent in regard to thisprovision. [42] The Quebec Charter is the Quebec version of the fundamental rights and freedoms that have been internationally recognized ashuman rights. Its quasi-constitutional status is well established, as recently recalled by Wagner and Côté, JJ. of the Supreme Court inQuébec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v.

Bombardier inc.:[24] [30] This Court has confirmed that the Charter, like the human rights legislation of the other provinces, has a specialquasi-constitutional status: Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc., (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345, at p. 402, reproduced in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v.Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 (“City of Montréal”), at para. 28; see also de Montigny v. Brossard(Succession), 2010 SCC 51 , [2010] 3 S.C.R. 64, at para. 45.

Indeed, unless otherwise provided, ss. 1 to 38 ofthe Charter prevail over other Quebec statutes: s. 52 of the Charter. Furthermore, s. 53 of the Charter provides that, “[i]f any doubtarises in the

interpretation of a provision of the Act, it shall be resolved in keeping with the intent of the Charter.” The Quebec Chartertherefore limits the power of the Quebec legislature to legislate in violation of the rights it sets out, save for the express notwithstandingclause in

section 52. As a quasi-constitutional act, it commands a large and liberal

interpretation in light of its purposes and context. [43] Thus, the Quebec Charter limits the power of the Quebec legislature to legislate in a manner contrary to the rights it sets out,except when it avails itself of the express notwithstanding clause found in

section 52.[25] As a quasi-constitutional statute, it commandsa large and liberal

interpretation in light of its purposes and context.[26] Its

preamble states that it recognizes equality both before the lawand in law, as well as the right to human dignity.[27] It requires the use of principles of

interpretation flowing from the constitutionalstatus of the Canadian Charter, which must be applied to the Quebec Charter, mutatis mutandis,[28] whereby words are given theircommon meaning consistent with the purposes and context of the Canadian Charter, while furthering its development along with that ofsociety.[29] [44] The Supreme Court first analyzed the scope of

section 23 of the Quebec Charter in the context of criminal prosecutions forvarious offences against municipal regulations and the Highway Safety Code.[30] Asked to determine whether sections 608 and 608.1 ofthe Cities and Towns Act, which allowed part-time municipal court judges to continue to practice law, violated paragraph 11(

d) of theCanadian Charter and

section 23 of the Quebec Charter, a majority of the Court, per Gonthier J., held that these provisions did notviolate judicial independence. The minority opinion, per Lamer J., which analyzed the issue from the perspective of institutionalimpartiality, came to the same conclusion. The majority and minority opinions of the Supreme Court considered the guarantees providedunder paragraphs 11(

d) of the Canadian Charter and

section 23 of the Quebec Charter in a parallel fashion, thereby suggesting acommon

interpretation of the notions of independence and impartiality enshrined therein. [45] A few years later, in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature,[31] Gonthier, J. wrote that the right to be judged by an impartial andindependent tribunal is an integral part of the principles of fundamental justice contemplated in

section 7 of the Canadian Charter. TheSupreme Court had to decide whether sections 263 and 265 of the Courts of Justice Act, which enabled Court of Quebec judges to lodgea complaint against a judge of their court and assigned the role of the president of the Conseil de la magistrature to the Chief Justice ofthe Court of Quebec, violated

section 7 of the Canadian Charter and/or

section 23 of the Quebec Charter. Again, Gonthier J. opted foran overall analysis of the issue, finding that “the protection provided by the Canadian Charter (s. 7) and the Quebec Charter (s. 23) isessentially the same”.[32] The next year, he wrote in 2747-3174 Québec inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool):

Section 23 of the Charter entrenches in Quebec the right of every citizen to a public and fair hearing by an independent and impartialtribunal. Despite the variations in terminology, it recognizes classic principles relating to judicial impartiality and independence.[33] [46] In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court stated that

section 7 of the Canadian Charter did not require a particular type of process, but afair process having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the interests at stake, listing of the elements that constitute such a processas follows: This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent andimpartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it entails the right to know the case put

against one, and the right to answer that case. Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for s. 7 to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance. [34] [Emphasis in original.] [ 47 ] Although the stakes in Charkaoui were admittedly far different from those in this case, the fact remains that, in Imperial Tobacco , Major, J. provided an analogous definition of a fair trial in civil matters, [35] not to mention the fact that the Supreme Court has already recognized that

section 7 of the Canadian Charter and

section 23 of the Quebec Charter offer essentially the same guarantees of independence and impartiality [36] [ 48 ] In light of these judgments, and considering the fact that the Quebec Act is practically identical to the British Columbia Act , the trial judge was correct to hold that Major, J.’s analysis of the principle of judicial independence in Imperial Tobacco applies here in its entirety. [ 49 ] The appellants claim that

section 23 of the Quebec Charter guarantees a fair trial, the terms of which go beyond the right to be heard by an impartial and independent tribunal, particularly because of the words “ en pleine égalité ” (full and equal). [ 50 ] The Supreme Court case law, however, is not conclusive on the scope of this provision. As for the case law of the Court of Appeal, it consistently confirms that the protection is purely procedural, [37] as the trial judge in fact correctly points out in the judgment under appeal. [38] He outlined the case law of this Court, which establishes that

section 23 of the Quebec Charter codifies the principles of natural justice usually recognized in procedural and administrative law, namely, the right to a full and equal, , public and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. [39] [ 51 ] The appellants nevertheless criticize the trial judge for unduly relying on Crane Canada [40] when that case was decided in an entirely different context. While it is true that Crane Canada concerned the validity of

article 396.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure , which limits examinations on discovery to disputes involving $25,000 or more, and while the dispute dealt with the definition of the term “hearing”, in my opinion, the excerpt cited by the judge nevertheless perfectly summarizes the

interpretation of

section 23 of the Quebec Charter in the case law: [ translation ]

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the principle that hearings are public.

Article 23 of the Quebec Charter constitutionalizes in both penal and civil matters the right to natural justice, which consists of: (1) the right to a decision rendered by an independent tribunal and (2) the right to be heard. This provision sets out certain procedural guarantees, but it does not create a substantive right to a particular remedy . In principle, as Professors Brun and Tremblay have noted,

article 23 adds nothing to judicial and administrative law except the possibility of contesting explicit legislative standards. [41] [Emphasis added] [ 52 ] Thus, in my opinion, the appellants are wrong when they claim that the principles described by the Court in this case should be set aside. Nor are they correct in maintaining that the trial judge held that the specific rules established by the Act cannot be contrary to

section 23 of the Quebec Charter because they are legislative in origin. The conclusion that

section 23 guarantees only procedural rights simply means that the Quebec Charter does not preclude the amendment of substantive rules of the general law. His conclusion is consistent with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, which requires the non-intervention of courts in legislative choices, save where legislation is contrary to the Constitution. [42] Thus, the courts may intervene with regard to the procedural rights guaranteed in

section 23 of the Quebec Charter only when the statutory provisions at issue are contrary to the principles of natural justice. [ 53 ] And what of the expression “ en pleine égalité ” (full and equal) in

section 23 ? [ 54 ] The appellants maintain that, because of the objectives of the Quebec Charter and the rules governing the internal consistency of statutes, the expression “ en pleine égalité ” (full and equal) must be interpreted to include the principle of equality of arms, an

interpretation that is in their view reinforced by the external case law cited, particularly that of the European Court of Human Rights (”European Court”). [ 55 ] On this point, it should be recalled that although the Quebec Charter was enacted to align Quebec law with international human rights law, nothing in the parliamentary history indicates the legislative intent to give

section 23 of the Quebec Charter the meaning that the appellants have attributed to this section.

In the Debates of the National Assembly, neither the principle of equality of arms nor the meaning of the words “ en pleine égalité ” were the subject of discussion when the Quebec Charter was enacted. [ 56 ] It is true that the legislative history of the Quebec Charter reveals that it was enacted to harmonize Quebec with the international obligations set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights , [43] and that some of its expressions or concepts reiterate those of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .

While these international instruments may prove useful when interpreting Quebec Charter provisions given the similarity between

section 23 of the Quebec Charter and

Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , [44] international instruments and foreign law do not, however, support the

interpretation of

section 23 of the Quebec Charter proposed by the appellants, which moreover diverges from that developed in Quebec case law. [ 57 ] On the one hand, the

interpretation of the notion of “equality of arms” put forward by the appellants does not appear to be a faithful reflection of the case law of international courts. [ 58 ] The appellants claim that equality of arms prevents any form of legislative interference in pending cases. This statement requires some qualification.

First, the European Court has unequivocally recognized the principle whereby the legislative authority may, in civil matters, regulate rights arising from statutes currently in force through new provisions with retroactive effect. [45] Moreover, what it prevents the government from doing is legislatively “judging” a case to which it is a party by violating the fairness of the process,

except where there is an obvious and compelling public interest.[46] Furthermore, in cases involving private parties, the European Courtheld that legislative interventions that could not be justified on the basis of public interest and that had the effect of finally andretroactively settling the merits of an ongoing dispute and rendering any continuation of the proceedings pointless, were contrary toArticle 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.[47] [59] On the other hand, in this case, contrary to what the appellants argue, the Act does not definitively and retroactively settle themerits of a current dispute between them and the government.

Indeed, it does not settle the dispute between the parties definitively.Moreover, in light of the remarks of Major J. in Imperial Tobacco,[48] there appears to be a sufficiently compelling public interest likelyto demonstrate that the legislative interference is justified in the case at hand. [60] The appellants also contend that the case law of the European Court confirms the fact that an amendment to the rules ofprescription is an infringement of procedural fairness.

Once again, a qualification is in order, since the European Court has expresslyrecognized the legislator’s power to establish different rules of prescription for different types of actions.[49] What emerges from thiscase law is that the parties must receive fair treatment with regard to procedural delays, and that a court may not interpret or apply astatute to exempt the government from its obligation to comply with the rules of prescription.

It is for that reason that a prescriptionperiod twenty times shorter than the one granted to the opposing party was held to be unfair,[50] as was the suspension of a proceduraldelay against only one of the two parties.[51] [61] Finally, the appellants submit that a statute that creates an overwhelming burden or seeks to confer an advantage on one of theparties is contrary to the notion of equality of arms.

They cite no case law in direct support of such an assertion, however. [62] The notion of equality of arms is defined in the case law of the European Court as one of the main elements of the broaderprinciple of a fair trial that imposes the obligation to give each party a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case – including theevidence – in conditions that do not place the party at a clear disadvantage in relation to his or her opponent.[52] This case law does not,however, suggest that the legislator may not amend the general rules of evidence, procedure, and prescription to develop a specificremedy, as is the case here. [63] To return to Quebec case law, however, it is important to note that, in my view, two judgments of the Superior Court incorrectlyconclude that the expression “en pleine égalité” (full and equal) found in both

section 23 and

section 10 of the Quebec Charter aresimilar. The latter prohibits discrimination based on a list of grounds.[53] These cases are based on a judgment of this Court in whichTourigny, J.A. wrote the following, in obiter: [translation] “I am far from certain that the words ‘en pleine égalité’ in this provision referto another type of equality than that set out in

section 10 of the Quebec Charter, which refers to grounds of discrimination”.[54] [64] Authors Brun and Tremblay, however, note that nothing in the wording of

section 23 of the Quebec Charter connects theprocedural fairness it guarantees to the grounds of discrimination enumerated in

section 10.[55] The authors state: [translation] XII-7.111 –

Section 23 of the Quebec Charter also deals with the right to equality, but without referring to

section 10. It states that everyperson has the right to a full and equal [”en pleine égalité”] public and fair hearing of his or her case. In cases involving judicial or quasi-judicial procedure, this provision thus appears to protect against differential treatment without regard to the grounds of distinction andthe notion of discrimination in

section 10. XII-7.112 – The possibility that

section 23 protects against different procedural treatment does not mean, however, that every distinctionof this nature will be deemed contrary to the right to equality in

section 23. Here, as with all rights, absolutism is bound to butt heads withthe requirements of reality; it is likely that a “reasonableness” test will apply to procedural fairness.[56] [Emphasis added; citations omitted.] [65] If they are correct,

section 23 would therefore in essence contemplate the protection of equal procedural treatment, that is, theright of both parties to a fair judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, or in other words, a public hearing, an independent and impartialdecision-maker, a judgment based on the facts and the law, and the possibility of being apprised of the evidence or the nature of thefaults or wrongs alleged against them and to answer to the same. [66] It also remains possible for the legislator to amend the general law rules of civil liability at any time.[57] [67] The appellants find it shocking that the onus on the government and the other recipients is retroactively modified by the Act,even as regards pending proceedings.

They also find it unacceptable that the Act allows the applicants to prove causation solely on thebasis of statistical information or information derived from epidemiological, sociological or any other studies. [68] In my view, they are not completely wrong. Indeed, the Act is particularly strict in their regard and considerably lightens theonus on the government and the other recipients of the Act. The legislator chose to target the tobacco products industry and to adopt whatmight be described as [translation] “tough” civil liability measures against it.

Despite this observation, the fact remains that it is not therole of this Court to question the legislator’s choices or the appropriateness of a statute. This is what Major, J. stated in Imperial Tobacco: 51 The judiciary has some

part in the development of the law that its role requires it to apply. Through, for example, its

interpretation oflegislation, review of administrative decisions and assessment of the constitutionality of legislation, it may develop the lawsignificantly. It may also make incremental developments to its body of previous decisions — i.e., the common law — in order to bringthe legal rules those decisions embody “into step with a changing society”: R. v. Salituro, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654,at p. 666. See also Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at paras. 91-92.

But thejudiciary’s role in developing the law is a relatively limited one. “[I]n a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and notthe courts which has the major responsibility for law reform”: Salituro, at p. 670. 52 It follows that the judiciary’s role is not, as the appellants seem to submit, to apply only the law of which it approves. Nor is it to

decide cases with a view simply to what the judiciary (rather than the law) deems fair or pertinent. Nor is it to second-guess the lawreform undertaken by legislators, whether that reform consists of a new cause of action or procedural rules to govern it. Within theboundaries of the Constitution, legislatures can set the law as they see fit. “The wisdom and value of legislative decisions are subjectonly to review by the electorate”: Wells v. Newfoundland, (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 59. [Emphasis added.] [69] In such circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the amendment of the traditional rules of civil liability in terms of bothevidence and prescription contravenes

section 23 of the Quebec Charter, or prevents the appellants from presenting a full defence withinthe meaning of this provision, although I must admit that the Act as enacted facilitates the proof that the government or other recipientsare required to adduce against the appellants and deprives them of certain defences that were previously available to them. [70] The Act does not, however, compromise the independence and impartiality of the court that will eventually hear the action orprevent that court’s judgment from being based on the facts and the law established by the legislator.

Moreover, it does not limit the rightof the appellants to obtain access to the evidence brought against them (which will not include the medical files of all of the recipientscontemplated, as noted above) and to respond to same. This becomes even clearer upon completing a more detailed analysis of the scopeof the impugned provisions. [71] As for the reversal of the burden of proof, it should be recalled that in civil matters, the use of presumptions does not contraveneprocedural fairness as guaranteed under

section 23 of the Quebec Charter.[58] It is a means of proof contemplated in the Civil Code ofQuébec,[59] which sets out several dozen legal presumptions[60] and leaves to the courts the task to assess whether those presumptionsof fact are serious, precise and concordant.[61] [72] The presumption mechanism in the Act makes it in fact possible to establish a rational and causal connection where it wouldotherwise be practically impossible to do so under the ordinary rules of the civil law, which require evidence of a causal connection foreach recipient.[62] In any event, the reversal of the burden of proof in this case is not total. [73] In fact, under

section 16 of the Act,[63] the government first has the burden of proving the failure of the manufacturers, inaddition to establishing that exposure to tobacco can cause or contribute to a disease or general deterioration of a person’s health. It mustalso show a connection in time between the wrong alleged against the manufacturers and the sale of their products. [74] It is only once this evidence is established that the presumptions in

section 17 of the Act come into play.[64] This provisionprovides that the Court presume that (1) exposure to the type of tobacco product manufactured by the defendant resulted from a failureon the part of the manufacturers and (2) the exposure caused or contributed to disease or general deterioration of health, or to the risk ofdisease. [75]

Section 18[65] states that where the presumptions apply, the court sets the cost of all the health care required after the date ofthe first failure of the manufacturer.

Section 19[66] describes how the presumption may be rebutted, namely, by a defendant provingeither that its failure did not cause or contribute to the exposure of the recipients to the type of product involved in the action or to adisease or general deterioration of health.

It also allows the court to reduce the amount of health care costs for which it is liableaccordingly, or to adjust its share of responsibility. [76] In light of the foregoing, it becomes difficult to successfully argue that the reversal of the burden of proof provided in the Actviolates the right to a fair trial when the presumptions it creates are rebuttable, not to mention that the Supreme Court has alreadyrecognized the legitimacy of irrebutable presumptions, in the matter of Time in particular.[67] [77] As for the administration of evidence,

section 13 of the Act[68] exempts the government from identifying the individualmembers of the population for whom it presents its claim and from establishing the cause of the illness of each member, and proving theexpenses incurred for each person. Its second paragraph provides that no one can be compelled to appear to be examined on his or herhealth and to file medical records. Under

section 14, however, the manufacturers may ask the Court to order the filing of statisticallysignificant samples of records concerning the recipients or the care provided and set the conditions for disclosure of the samples whilebearing in mind measures to ensure the protection of the identity of these recipients. [78] The primary goal of these provisions is to protect the privacy of those who received the health care and not to deprive themanufacturers of crucial evidence.

They do not limit their right to become familiar with the evidence filed against them or respond to it,since this information (which concerns individual members of the population) will likely not be put in evidence by the government,whose action is not based on subrogation. In any event,

section 14 of the Act[69] allows the manufacturers to request a statisticallymeaningful sample. [79]

Section 15[70] also provides that the causal connection and health care costs may be established on the basis of statisticalinformation or information drawn from epidemiological, sociological or any other studies. Under

section 25,[71] these rules areapplicable to any action in damages for harm caused by a tobacco-related wrong committed in Quebec by one or moremanufacturers.[72] [80] Major, J. recognized that similar provisions in the British Columbia Act counteracted the systemic advantages under thetraditional rules of civil liability that favour the manufacturers. These comments, although made in a common law context, can easily betransposed to this case.[73] [81] Similarly,

section 15 of the Act serves to remedy the systemic inequality inherent in the general law in civil liability matters,while the recent judgment rendered against the tobacco product manufacturers in two class actions illustrates that it is not necessarilyeasy to prove causation on the basis of epidemiological or statistical information.[74] [82] As for prescription, contrary to what the appellants argue,

section 27 of the Act[75] does not have the effect of eliminating itcompletely, although this provision does allow the government and other recipients to invoke the fault of the manufacturers regardless of

the date of their failure. [83]

Section 27 of the Act provides for three situations: (1) prescription may not be a ground to dismiss any action instituted within athree-year window, i.e. between June 19, 2009, and June 19, 2012; (2) actions brought before the coming into force of the Act anddismissed because of prescription may be revived until June 19, 2012; and (3) these amendments to the rules of prescription apply both toactions to recover tobacco-related health care costs brought by the government and to individual or class actions to recover damages fortobacco-related injury. [84] While it is true that prescription is a tool that ensures legal certainty, making it possible to mitigate the consequences of time onmemory and other evidence and to ensure the diligence of the creditors, it is not an immutable institution.

The case law has consistentlyrecognized the legislator’s power to enact retroactive statutes of all kinds, even when it interferes with litigious rights, as long as suchretroactivity is explicit.[76] [85] Here, in

section 31[77] of the Act, the legislator expressly states that the statute is retroactive, which confirms the retroactivityof the amendments to the rules of prescription set out in

section 27. [86] In short, Parliamentary supremacy allows the legislator to amend the law as it sees fit, so long as such amendments fall withinconstitutional limits. Here, the appellants have not shown how the elimination of prescription or the other changes to the rules ofevidence and civil procedure would infringe their right to a fair trial, even if it actually does deprive them of some of their defences. [87] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal, with costs. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. [1] C.Q.L.R., c. R-2.2.0.0.1. [2] 2005 SCC 49 , [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473. [3] Quebec (Attorney General) v.

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. et al. (docket 500-17-072363-123) [4] Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., 2015 QCCS 2382. [5] Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. v. Conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé et al., 500-09-025385-154; JTI-MacDonald Corp. v.Conseil québécois sur le tabac et la santé et al., 500-09-025386-152; Rothmans, Benson & Hedges inc. v. Conseil québécois sur le tabacet la santé et al., 500-09-025387-150. [6] C.Q.L.R., c. C-12. [7] Judgment a quo at para. 43. [8] Ibid. at para. 95, citing British Columbia v.

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra note 2. [9] (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199, as cited in British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra note 2 atpara. 52. [10] Ibid. at para. 55. [11] Judgment a quo at para. 97. [12] British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra note 2 at paras. 70–71. [13] Ibid. at paras. 73–75. [14] S.C. 1960, c.

Section 2(

e) is drafted as follows:

2. Toute loi du Canada, à moins qu’une loidu Parlement du Canada ne déclareexpressément qu’elle s’appliqueranonobstant la Déclaration canadienne desdroits, doit s’interpréter et s’appliquer demanière à ne pas supprimer, restreindre ouenfreindre l’un quelconque des droits ou deslibertés reconnus et déclarés aux présentes,ni à en autoriser la suppression, ladiminution ou la transgression, et enparticulier, nulle loi du Canada ne doits’interpréter ni s’appliquer comme 2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it isexpressly declared by

an Act of theParliament of Canada that it shall operatenotwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights,be so construed and applied as not toabrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorizethe abrogation, abridgment or infringement ofany of the rights or freedoms hereinrecognized and declared, and in particular, nolaw of Canada shall be construed or appliedso as to […] …

e) privant une personne du droit à uneaudition impartiale de sa cause, selon lesprincipes de justice fondamentale, pour ladéfinition de ses droits et obligations. (

e) deprive a person of the right to a fairhearing in accordance with the principles offundamental justice for the determination ofhis rights and obligations. [15] Béliveau v. Comité de discipline du Barreau du Québec, (QC CA), [1992] R.J.Q. 1822 (C.A.); SCFP Local2466 v. Ville de Jonquière, (QC CS), [1996] R.J.Q. 621 at 622; Association des policiers provinciaux du Québec v.Sûreté du Québec, 2007 QCCA 1087; Centrale de l’enseignement du Québec v.

Attorney General of Quebec, (C.A.)(leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused: [1999] 3 S.C.R. 8). [16] 2013 SCC 46 , [2013] 3 S.C.R. 125. [17] [1993] J.Q. 2906 (C.Q.). [18] 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221, ETS 5, section 6(1). It should nevertheless be noted that this provision does not contain theexpression “en pleine égalité”, as appears from the wording: 6(1).

Toute personne a droit à ce que sacause soit entendue équitablement,publiquement et dans un délai raisonnable,par un tribunal indépendant et impartial,établi par la loi, qui décidera, soit descontestations sur ses droits et obligations decaractère civil, soit du bien-fondé de touteaccusation en matière pénale dirigée contreelle. Le jugement doit être rendupubliquement, mais l'accès de la salled'audience peut être interdit à la presse et aupublic pendant la totalité ou une

partie duprocès dans l'intérêt de la moralité, de l'ordrepublic ou de la sécurité nationale dans unesociété démocratique, lorsque les intérêts desmineurs ou la protection de la vie privée desparties au procès l'exigent, ou dans lamesure jugée strictement nécessaire par letribunal, lorsque dans des circonstancesspéciales la publicité serait de nature àporter atteinte aux intérêts de la justice. 6(1).

In the determination of his civil rights andobligations or of any criminal charge againsthim, everyone is entitled to a fair and publichearing within a reasonable time by anindependent and impartial tribunal established bylaw.

Judgment shall be pronounced publicly butthe press and public may be excluded from all orpart of the trial in the interests of morals, publicorder or national security in a democratic society,where the interests of juveniles or the protectionof the private life of the parties so require, or tothe extent strictly necessary in the opinion of thecourt in special circumstances where publicitywould prejudice the interests of justice. [19] Judgment a quo at para. 135. [20] 2003 SCC 39 , [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40. [21] De Belleval v. Québec (City), 2012 QCCS 2668 at paras. 166–169. [22] Restaurant Brossard v.

Québec (Deputy Minister of Revenue), supra note 17. [23]

Section 19(

d) of the Canadian Charter reads as follows:

11. Tout inculpé a le droit : 11. Any person charged with an offence hasthe right […] …

d) d’être présumé innocent tant qu’il n’estpas déclaré coupable, conformément à la loi,par un tribunal indépendant et impartial àl’issue d’un procès public et équitable; (

d) to be presumed innocent until provenguilty according to law in a fair and publichearing by an independent and impartialtribunal; [24] Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier inc., 2015 SCC 39. See also Québec(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City), 2000 SCC 27 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665. [25] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 982,notes XII 2.54-5.

Section 52 of the Quebec Charter reads as follows: 52. Aucune disposition d'une loi, mêmepostérieure à la Charte, ne peut déroger auxarticles 1 à 38, sauf dans la mesure prévuepar ces articles, à moins que cette loin'énonce expressément que cette dispositions'applique malgré la Charte. 52. No provision of any Act, even subsequentto the Charter, may derogate from sections 1to 38, except so far as provided by thosesections, unless such Act expressly states thatit applies despite the Charter. [26] Voir Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v.

Bombardier inc., supra, note 24; Québec(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City), supra, note 24. See also Béliveau St-Jacques v.Fédération des employées et des employés de services publics, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 354 at para. 42; Québec (Commission des droits de lapersonne et des droits de la jeunesse) v.

Montreal (City), 2000 SCC 27 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 at para. 27. [27] “Considérant que tous les êtres humains sont égaux en valeur et en dignité et ont droit à une égale protection de la loi”, “Whereasall human beings are equal in worth and dignity, and are entitled to equal protection of the law”, paragraph 2 of the

Preamble of theCharter of human rights and freedoms, RLRQ, c. C-12. [28] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Constitutional Law, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que. : Yvon Blais, 2014) at 1007, noteXII 3.37; Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier inc., supra note 24 at para. 31;Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et des employés de services publics, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 354 at para. 43. See, by analogy,Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink, (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 158; Robichaud v.

Canada (TreasuryBoard), (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84. [29] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 999–1002, notes XII 3.12-19. See also Pierre-André Coté, Interprétation des lois, 4th ed. (Montreal, Que.: Thémis, 2009) at 305, note 1013. [30] R. v. Lippé, (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114. [31] Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267. [32] Ibid. at para. 46. [33] 2747-3174 Québec inc v. Québec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 at para. 17.

In that case, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the revocation of a liquor permit under the Act respectingliquor permits complied with

section 23 of the Quebec Charter. The Supreme Court used this opportunity to clarify the scope of section23, particularly with regard to administrative bodies exercising a quasi-judicial function. [34] Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 at paras. 20 and 29.

That caseconcerned the constitutional validity of the provisions on the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act establishing a procedure for theMinister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Public Security and Civil Protection to issue a certificate attesting that analien or permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada, for security reasons for example, and leading to the detention of the person namedin the certificate.

The certificate and the detention were subject to review by a Federal Court judge ruling on its reasonableness withoutthe possibility of appeal or judicial review of the judgment and the person named in the certificate of access was deprived of access to allor part of the information on the basis of which the certificate had been issued and the detention ordered. [35] British Columbia v.

Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, 2005 SCC 49 at para. 76: “they are entitled to a publichearing, before an independent and impartial court, in which they may contest the claims of the plaintiff and adduce evidence in theirdefence”.

[36] Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, supra note 31 at para. 46. [37] Association des Policiers Provinciaux du Québec v. Surêté du Québec, [2007] J.Q. No. 8352, 2007 QCCA 1087 at para. 109;Centrale de l’enseignement du Québec v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1998] J.Q. No. 2914 (C.A.) at para. 48 (leave to appeal to theS.C.C. refused, [1999] 3 S.C.R. p. VIII); Syndicat de la fonction publique, Local 2466 v. Ville de Jonquière, (QC CA),[1996] R.D.J. 621 (C.A.) at para. 9; Béliveau v.

Comité de discipline du Barreau du Québec, (QC CA), [1992] R.J.Q.1822 (C.A.) at para. 11 (leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused, [1999] 3 S.C.R. p. V. See also: 2760-5450 Québec Inc v. Québec, [1996]J.Q. No. 5753 (Sup. Ct.) at paras. 18–19. [38] Judgment a quo at para. 113. [39] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 999–1002, notes XII 3.12–19. See also Pierre-André Coté, Interprétation des lois, 4th ed. (Montreal, Que.: Thémis, 2009) at 1201, note XII6.142. [40] Crane Canada inc. v.

Sécurité Nationale, compagnie d’assurances, [2004] J.Q. No. 13746 (C.A.). [41] Ibid. at para. 16, citing 2747-3174 Québec inc. v. Québec (Régie des permis d'alcool), (SCC), [1996] 3S.C.R. 919; Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781; Béliveau v. Comité de discipline du Barreau, (QC CA), [1992] R.J.Q. 1822 (C.A.);Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique v. Ville de Jonquière, (QC CA), [1996] R.D.J. 621 (C.A.). [42] Wells v.

Newfoundland, (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 at paras. 52–59. [43] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 947, noteXII 1.18. [44] Ibid., XII 1.21. See Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, 2007 SCC 54. In that case, the Supreme Court had to determinewhether the long-time refusal of a husband to grant a get (a Jewish divorce) to his wife despite an undertaking to do so was justifiable byfreedom of religion. The Supreme Court drew from the case law of various foreign courts that had discussed similar issues. [45] See Cabourdin v.

France (11 April 2006) 60796/00 at paras. 28 et seq. [46] National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. United Kingdom,No. 117/1996/736/933-935, 23 October 1997 at para. 72; Forrer-Niedenthal v. Germany, (20 February 2003) 47316/99 at para. 64;Ogis-Institut Stanislas, Ogec St. Pie X and Blanche de Castille and others v. France, (27 May 2004) 42219/98, 54563/00 at paras. 61–72;EEG-Slachthuis Verbist v. Belgium (10 November 2005) 60559/00. [47] Cabourdin v. France, supra note 46 at paras. 29–39; Vezon v.

France (18 September 2006) 66018/01 at paras. 28–38; Arras andothers v. Italy (14 February 2012) 17972/07 at paras. 42–51. [48] British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., supra note 2 at para. 49. [49] Dacia S.R.L. v. Moldova (18 March 2008) 3052/04 at para. 76: “The Court does not call into question the power of the legislator toestablish different limitation periods for different types of lawsuits”. See also: Varnima Corporation International S.A. v. Greece (28May 2009) 48906/06 at para. 26. [50] See also: Varnima Corporation International S.A. v.

Greece (28 May 2009) 48906/06 at paras. 26–35. [51] Platakou v. Greece (11 January 2001) . 38460/97 at paras. 47–48; Wynen and Centre hospitalier interrégional Edith-Cavell v.Belgium (5 November 2002) 32576/96 at para. 32. [52] Szabowicz v. Sweden (30 June 1959) 343-58; Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands (27 October 1993) 14448/88 at para. 33;Gryaznov v. Russia (12 June 2012) 19673/03 at paras. 53–54; Krčmář e v. The Czech Republic (3 March 2000) 35376/97 at para. 39;Juričić v. Croatie (26 July 2011) 58222/09 at para. 72; Batsanina v.

Russia (26 May 2009) 3932/02 at para. 22; Steck Risch and others v.Liechtenstein (19 May 2005) 63151/00 at paras. 54–55; Walston (No. 1) v. Norway (3 June 2003) 37372/97 at para. 56. [53] Gladstone v. Dankoff, (QC CS), [2003] R.J.Q. 1534 (Sup. Ct.); Lessard v. Quebec (Deputy Minister ofRevenue), 2007 QCCS 929 , 2007 R.J.Q. 999 (Sup. Ct.). [54] Droit de la famille – 1741, [1993] J.Q.

No. 217 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused: [1993] 2 S.C.R. vi). [55] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 1201,note XII 6.143. [56] Ibid. at 1256, notes XII 7.111-2. [57] Quebec (Public Curator) v.

Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St-Ferdinand, (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R.211 at para. 32. [58] See Droit de la famille – 1741, (QC CA), [1993] R.J.Q. 647 (C.A.). [59] See articles 2811, 2846 and 2847 C.C.Q. [60] For example, see articles 69, 80, 85, 127, 156, 194, 337, 387, 398, 423, 447, 460, 469, 487, 525, 561, 603, 628, 633, 647, 650,

651, 745, 746, 756, 849, 884, 887, 918, 921, 923, 925, 928, 934, 955, 1003, 1028, 1045, 1253, 1282, 1285, 1329, 1335, 1336, 1339, 1343, 1421, 1422, 1525, 1606, 1632, 1633, 1689, 1696, 1744, 1756, 1853, 1871, 1890, 1925, 1945, 1948, 1962, 1966, 1993, 2064, 2080, 2133, 2153, 2215, 2268, 2297, 2315, 2375, 2428, 2448, 2467, 2512, 2550, 2562, 2624, 2805, 2813, 2830, 2848, 2870, 2943, 2968, 3027 and 3113 C .C.Q . [61] See

article 2849 C .C.Q . [62] Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp. , supra , note 4 at paras. 691–694. [63]

Section 16 of the Act reads as follows: 16. Pour que la responsabilité d'un défendeur

partie à une action prise sur une base collective soit engagée, le gouvernement doit faire la preuve, relativement à une catégorie de produits du tabac visée par l'action: 16.

For a defendant who is a party to an action brought on a collective basis to be held liable, the Government must prove, with respect to a type of tobacco product involved in the action, that 1° que le défendeur a manqué au devoir de respecter les règles de conduite qui, suivant les circonstances, les usages ou la loi, s'imposaient à lui envers les personnes du Québec qui ont été exposées à la catégorie de produits du tabac ou pourraient y être exposées; (1) the defendant failed in the duty to abide by the rules of conduct, to which the defendant is bound in the circumstances and according to usage or law, in respect of persons in Québec who have been or might become exposed to the type of tobacco product; 2° que l'exposition à la catégorie de produits du tabac peut causer ou contribuer à causer la maladie ou la détérioration générale de l'état de santé d'une personne; (2) exposure to the type of tobacco product may cause or contribute to a disease or the general deterioration of a person's health; and 3° que la catégorie de produits du tabac fabriqués par le défendeur a été offerte en vente au Québec pendant tout ou

partie de la période où il a manqué à son devoir. (3) the type of tobacco product manufactured by the defendant was offered for sale in Québec during all or part of the period of the failure. [64]

Section 17 of the Act reads as follows: 17. Si le gouvernement satisfait aux exigences de preuve prévues à l'article 16, le tribunal présume: 17. If the Government establishes the elements of proof required under

section 16, the court presumes 1° que les personnes qui ont été exposées à la catégorie de produits du tabac fabriqués par le défendeur n'y auraient pas été exposées n'eût été son manquement; (1) that the persons who were exposed to the type of tobacco product manufactured by the defendant would not have been exposed had the defendant not failed in its duty; and 2° que l'exposition à la catégorie de produits du tabac fabriqués par le défendeur a causé ou a contribué à causer la maladie ou la détérioration générale de l'état de santé, ou le risque d'une maladie ou d'une telle détérioration, pour une

partie des personnes qui ont été exposées à cette catégorie de produits. (2) that the exposure to the type of tobacco product manufactured by the defendant caused or contributed to the disease or general deterioration of health, or the risk of disease or general deterioration of health, of a number of persons who were exposed to that type of product. [65]

Section 18 of the Act reads as follows:

18. Lorsque les présomptions visées àl'article 17 s'appliquent, le tribunal fixe lecoût afférent à tous les soins de santérésultant de l'exposition à la catégorie deproduits du tabac visée par l'action qui ontété prodigués postérieurement à la date dupremier manquement du défendeur. 18. When the presumptions set out in section17 apply, the court sets the cost of all thehealth care required following exposure tothe category of tobacco products involved inthe action and provided after the date of thedefendant's first failure.

Chaque défendeur auquel s'appliquent cesprésomptions est responsable de ce coût enproportion de sa part de marché de lacatégorie de produits visée. Cette part,déterminée par le tribunal, est égale aurapport existant entre l'un et l'autre deséléments suivants: Each defendant to whom the presumptionsapply is liable for the costs in proportion toits market share in the type of productinvolved.

That share, determined by thecourt, is equal to the relation between 1° la quantité de produits du tabacappartenant à la catégorie visée par l'actionfabriqués par le défendeur qui ont été vendusau Québec entre la date de son premiermanquement et la date de l'action ; (1) the quantity of tobacco products of thetype involved in the action that weremanufactured by the defendant and thatwere sold in Québec between the date of thedefendant's first failure and the date of theaction; and 2° a quantité totale de produits du tabacappartenant à la catégorie visée par l'actionfabriqués par l'ensemble des fabricants deces produits qui ont été vendus au Québecentre la date du premier manquement dudéfendeur et la date de l'action. (2) the total quantity of tobacco products ofthe type involved in the action that weremanufactured by all the manufacturers ofthose products and that were sold in Québecbetween the date of the defendant's firstfailure and the date of the action. [66]

Section 19 of the Act reads as follows: 19. Le tribunal peut réduire le montant ducoût des soins de santé auquel un défendeurest tenu ou rajuster entre les défendeurs leurpart de responsabilité relativement au coûtdes soins de santé si l'un des défendeursprouve soit que son manquement n'a nicausé ni contribué à causer l'exposition despersonnes du Québec qui ont été exposées àla catégorie de produits visée par l'action,soit que son manquement n'a ni causé nicontribué à causer la maladie ou ladétérioration générale de l'état de santé, oule risque d'une maladie ou d'une telledétérioration, pour une

partie de cespersonnes. 19. The court may reduce the amount of thehealth care costs for which a defendant isliable or adjust among the defendants theirshare of responsibility for the health carecosts if one of the defendants proves eitherthat its failure did not cause or contribute tothe exposure of the persons in Québec whowere exposed to the type of productinvolved in the action, or that its failure didnot cause or contribute to the diseasesuffered by, or the general deterioration ofhealth of, a number of those persons, orcause or contribute to the risk of such adisease or such deterioration. [67] Richard v.

Time inc., 2012 SCC 8 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 265 at para. 124. This is the presumption set out in

section 272 of theConsumer Protection Act, which allows the courts to conclude that the prohibited practice contemplated in that provision is deemed tohave had a harmful effect on the consumer, once the consumer has proved the elements of the practice.

To benefit from the presumption,consumers must prove the following four elements: (1) the violation by a merchant or manufacturer of one of the obligations imposed inTitle II of the Act; (2) the consumer’s awareness of the representation constituting the prohibited practice; (3) the formation, amendment,or execution of a consumer contract subsequent to this awareness; and (4) a sufficient proximity between the content of the representationand the good or service contemplated in the contract.

[68]

Section 13 of the Act reads as follows: 13. S'il prend action sur une base collective, le gouvernement n'a pas à identifier individuellement des bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé, non plus qu'à faire la preuve ni de la cause de la maladie ou de la détérioration générale de l'état de santé affectant un bénéficiaire déterminé de ces soins, ni de la part du coût des soins de santé afférente à un tel bénéficiaire. 13.

If the Government brings an action on a collective basis, it is not required to identify particular health care recipients individually or prove the cause of the disease suffered by, or the general deterioration of health of, a particular health care recipient or the portion of the health care costs incurred for such a recipient.

En outre, nul ne peut, dans une telle action, être contraint: Moreover, no one may be compelled in such an action 1° de répondre à des questions sur l'état de santé de bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé ou sur les soins de santé qui leur ont été prodigués; (1) to answer questions on the health of, or the health care provided to, particular health care recipients; or 2° de produire les dossiers et documents médicaux concernant des bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé ou les documents se rapportant aux soins de santé qui leur ont été prodigués, sauf dans la mesure prévue par une loi, une règle de droit ou un règlement du tribunal exigeant la production de documents sur lesquels se fonde un témoin expert. 2009, v. 34, a. 13. (2) to produce the medical records and documents of, or the documents related to health care provided to, particular health care recipients, except as provided by a law or a rule of law, practice or procedure that requires the production of documents relied on by an expert witness. [69]

Section 14 of the Act reads as follows: 14. Nonobstant le deuxième alinéa de l'article 13, le tribunal peut, à la demande d'un défendeur, ordonner la production d'échantillons statistiquement significatifs des dossiers ou documents concernant des bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé ou se rapportant aux soins de santé qui leur ont été prodigués. 14. Despite the second paragraph of

section 13, the court may, at the request of a defendant, order the production of statistically meaningful samples of records and documents concerning, or relating to health care provided to, particular health care recipients. Le tribunal fixe, le cas échéant, les conditions de l'échantillonnage et de la communication des renseignements contenus dans les échantillons, en précisant notamment la nature des renseignements qui pourront ainsi être divulgués. In that case, the court determines conditions for the sampling and for the communication of information contained in the samples, specifying, among other things, what kind of information may be disclosed.

L'identité des bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé visés par l'ordonnance du tribunal ne peut être divulguée, non plus que les renseignements permettant de les identifier. En outre, aucun dossier ou document concernant des bénéficiaires déterminés de soins de santé ou se rapportant aux soins de santé qui leur ont été prodigués ne peut être produit en exécution de cette ordonnance sans que les renseignements identifiant ou permettant d'identifier ces bénéficiaires en aient été extraits ou masqués au préalable.

The identity of, or identifying information with respect to, the particular health care recipients concerned by the court order may not be disclosed. Moreover, no record or document concerning, or relating to health care provided to, particular health care recipients may be produced under the order unless any information they contain that reveals or may be used to trace the identity of the recipients has been deleted or blanked out. [70]

Section 15 of the Act reads as follows: 15.

Dans une action prise sur une base collective, la preuve du lien de causalité existant entre des faits qui y sont allégués, notamment entre la faute ou le manquement d'un défendeur et le coût des soins de santé dont le recouvrement est demandé, ou entre l'exposition à un produit du tabac et la maladie ou la détérioration générale de l'état de santé des bénéficiaires de ces soins, peut être établie sur le seul fondement de renseignements statistiques ou tirés d'études épidémiologiques, d'études sociologiques ou de toutes autres études pertinentes, y compris les renseignements obtenus par un échantillonnage. 15.

In an action brought on a collective basis, proof of causation between alleged facts, in particular between the defendant's wrong or failure and the health care costs whose recovery is being sought, or between exposure to a tobacco product and the disease suffered by, or the general deterioration of health of, the recipients of that health care, may be established on the sole basis of statistical information or information derived from epidemiological, sociological or any other relevant studies, including information derived from a sampling.

Il en est de même de la preuve du coût des soins de santé dont le recouvrement est demandé dans une telle action. The same applies to proof of the health care costs whose recovery is being sought in such an action. [71]

Section 25 of the Act reads as follows:

25. Nonobstant toute disposition contraire,les règles du

chapitre II relatives à l'actionprise sur une base individuelle s'appliquent,compte tenu des adaptations nécessaires, àtoute action prise par une personne, seshéritiers ou autres ayants cause pour lerecouvrement de dommages-intérêts enréparation de tout préjudice lié au tabac, ycompris le coût de soins de santé s'il en est,causé ou occasionné par la faute, commiseau Québec, d'un ou de plusieurs fabricantsde produits du tabac. 25. Despite any incompatible provision, therules of

Chapter II relating to actions broughton an individual basis apply, with thenecessary modifications, to an action broughtby a person or the person's heirs or othersuccessors for recovery of damages for anytobacco-related injury, including any healthcare costs, caused or contributed to by atobacco-related wrong committed in Québecby one or more tobacco productmanufacturers. Ces règles s'appliquent, de même, à toutrecours collectif pour le recouvrement dedommages-intérêts en réparation d'un telpréjudice. Those rules also apply to any class actionbased on the recovery of damages for theinjury. [72]

Section 24 of the Act reads as follows: 24. Les dispositions de l'article 15, relativesà la preuve du lien de causalité existant entredes faits allégués et à la preuve du coût dessoins de santé, sont applicables à l'actionprise sur une base individuelle. 24. The provisions of

section 15 that relate tothe establishment of causation betweenalleged facts and to proof of health care costsare applicable to actions brought on anindividual basis. [73] See British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco at para. 49: The rules set out in the Act that the appellants contest are not as unfair or illogical as they claim. They appear to reflect legitimatepolicy concerns of the British Columbia legislature regarding the systemic advantages tobacco manufacturers enjoy when claims fortobacco-related harm are litigated through individualistic common law tort actions. [74] Létourneau v. JTI-MacDonald Corp., supra note 4 at paras. 668–767. [75]

Section 27 of the Act reads as follows: 27. Aucune action, y compris un recourscollectif, prise pour le recouvrement du coûtde soins de santé liés au tabac ou dedommages-intérêts pour la réparation d'unpréjudice lié au tabac ne peut, si elle est encours le 19 juin 2009 ou intentée dans lestrois ans qui suivent cette date, être rejetéepour le motif que le droit de recouvrementest prescrit. 27.

An action, including a class action, torecover tobacco-related health care costs ordamages for tobacco-related injury may notbe dismissed on the ground that the right ofrecovery is prescribed, if it is in progress on19 June 2009 or brought within three yearsfollowing that date. Les actions qui, antérieurement au 19 juin2009, ont été rejetées pour ce motif peuventêtre reprises, pourvu seulement qu'elles lesoient dans les trois ans qui suivent cettedate.

Actions dismissed on that ground before 19June 2009 may be revived within three yearsfollowing that date. [76] Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 669,notes VIII 57–9. See also Air Canada v. British Columbia, (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 at 1192–1193; Authorson v.Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, 2003 SCC 39; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.R. 473,

2005 SCC 49 ; R. v. Dineley , [2012] 3 S.C.R. 272, 2012 SCC 58 . [77]

Section 31 of the Act reads as follows: 31. Les dispositions de la présente loi ont l'effet rétroactif nécessaire pour assurer leur pleine application, notamment pour permettre au gouvernement d'exercer son droit de recouvrement du coût des soins de santé liés au tabac quel que soit le moment où a été commise la faute donnant ouverture à l'exercice de ce droit. 31. This Act has the retroactive effect necessary to ensure its full application, in particular to enable the Government to exercise its right to recover tobacco-related health care costs regardless of when the tobacco-related wrong was committed.