ALPINE CANADA ALPIN Plaintiff - v. -, 1999 ABQB 454

Alpine Canada Alpin v. Non-Marine Underwriters , 1999 ABQB 454 Date: 1999 06 10 Action No. 9601 12054 IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF CALGARY BETWEEN: ALPINE CANADA ALPIN Plaintiff - and - M.J. OPPENHEIM IN HIS QUALITY AS ATTORNEY IN CANADA FOR THE NON-MARINE UNDERWRITERS, MEMBERS OF LLOYD’S, LONDON, ENGLAND and AMERICAN SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS INCORPORATED Defendants _______________________________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT of the HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE C.L.

KENNY _______________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendants who are insurance underwriters with respect to insurance contracts taken out to cover the possibility of cancellation of Women’s World Cup ski races to be held at Lake Louise, Alberta on November 25 th and 26 th , 1995 and December 2 nd and 3 rd , 1995.

RACE PREPARATION [ 2 ] The World Cup Ski races are awarded each year by Fédération Internationale de Ski (“FIS”) to a host country ski organization. In Canada that organization is Alpine Canada Alpin (“ACA”). It is the general practice that ACA will enter into an agreement with a local Race Organizing Committee (“ROC”) which is responsible for putting together the race. This would include recruiting volunteers and preparing the course together with the local mountain area to FIS standards.

In this case, an agreement was entered into between Alberta Alpine Ski Association (“Alberta Alpine”), Skiing Louise Limited (“Lake Louise”) and ACA whereby Alberta Alpine was set up as the Race Organizing Committee and was to work with Lake Louise in organizing the events. This agreement was dated November 10 th , 1995 and signed November 22 nd , 1995. The agreement provided inter alia that Lake Louise was responsible for performing certain technical and course preparation work including a limited amount of snow making and grooming. [ 3 ] For each race a jury is appointed by FIS.

The jury is composed of persons with a particular role in the race. For example, the jury for the Downhill race was composed of the technical delegate, the chief of race, the referee and the assistant referee. Under FIS rules, the jury for a particular race is the body which has the sole authority to cancel that race. They may do so for a number of reasons including technical problems, danger to skiers, irregular conditions and weather.

BACKGROUND OF RACE EVENTS Giant Slalom - November 25 th , 1995 and Slalom - November 26 th , 1995 [ 4 ] The Giant Slalom, along with the Slalom, were originally scheduled for Quebec with the Downhill and Super G races to be held December 2 nd and 3 rd , 1995 at Lake Louise. In about September of 1995 FIS decided to change the venue for the Giant Slalom and Slalom to Lake Louise from Quebec. [ 5 ] There had been cooler temperatures at the ski area in later October and early November, 1995 such that Lake Louise was able to make a great deal of snow, most of which had been placed on the public trails.

Those trails were in excellent condition prior to the races. The FIS officials arrived at Lake Louise on November 21 st , 1995. They found that the race course set for the Giant Slalom on November 25 th was not ready for a race. There was a lack of snow on certain parts of the course and piles of snow on other parts of the course where snow had been made and piled up. FIS rules allow the technical delegate to cancel a race in the event that the course is not properly prepared six days in advance of a race.

The technical delegate could have done that on November 21 st , however, the evidence of each of the FIS representatives was that in their opinion the course could be prepared and the race could be staged with colder temperatures which would allow for proper snow making. The forecast was for cooler temperatures between the 21 st of November and the 25 th of November. Unfortunately, despite weather forecasts which indicated freezing temperatures each evening this did not materialize.

The weather that week was unseasonably warm which did not allow for snow making or proper compaction of the course. [ 6 ] The November 25 th and 26 th races were technical races as opposed to speed races, the latter to be held on December 2 nd and 3 rd , 1995. As such, for the technical events the evidence of the FIS delegates was that the course must have a minimum snow depth of 8 to 12 inches. The base must then be compacted into an extremely hard surface, almost as hard as ice, so that when the skiers are turning around the gates at high speeds the course will remain compacted.

If there is not sufficient depth to create a solid base or if the snow is too soft, ruts and ridges can develop which would make the course extremely dangerous for the skiers. [ 7 ] On Friday, November 24 th , 1995 the FIS jury met after having inspected the Giant Slalom course. They found that the course was very soft due to the warm temperatures and continuously falling new snow over the preceding several days. Chemicals had been used to try and harden the snow without success however the weather forecast was for colder temperatures.

The jury decided to postpone the Giant Slalom race from Saturday, November 25 th to Sunday, November 26 th followed by the Slalom race on Monday, November 27 th , 1995.

[ 8 ] On Saturday, November 25 th , 1995 the jury met again to discuss the Giant Slalom course. A significant amount of snow had fallen the night before however the forecasted colder temperatures did not materialize. The jury looked at alternatives to hardening the course including chemicals, boot packing and watering the course. They decided none of these would help given the warm temperatures.

Although colder temperatures continued to be forecast, the jury was satisfied that they would not materialize in the next 24 hours or so which made it, in the jury’s view, impossible to run a fair and safe race for all of the competitors. As a result, the jury cancelled both the Giant Slalom event to be held on Sunday the 26 th of November and the Slalom event to be held on Monday the 27 th of November.

The jury report reads, inter alia , "that because of the soft snow conditions on the tracks, the jury felt that a fair and safe race for all competitors could not be guaranteed". [ 9 ] The plaintiff called five witnesses; three FIS employees — Mr. Sluiter, the technical delegate, Mr. Hoch, chief race director and Mr. Tischhauser, race director, Mr. Gardner with Alpine Canada who negotiated the insurance contracts and was present during the races and Mr.

LaForge, the president and CEO of Alpine Canada. [ 10 ] The defendants argue that an adverse inference should be drawn against the plaintiff because they failed to call some key members of Alberta Alpine and Alpine Canada who were involved in preparation for the races. This included the chief of race who was also chair of the ROC and a jury member. The onus, say the defendants, was on the plaintiff to call this evidence to show that the problems were beyond the control of Alpine Canada.

The plaintiff says that the key witnesses, being the FIS members of the jury, who were present and who made the decision to cancel the races, was the best evidence available and that if the defendants wanted to call other witnesses in this regard, they could have. [ 11 ] It is not necessary that all witnesses with respect to a matter testify, particularly if they have nothing to add. The plaintiff called those witnesses it felt were able to provide the best evidence. If the defendants thought others who were present could add to the evidence, they could have called those witnesses. They did not.

I do not draw an adverse inference from the failure of the plaintiff to call all witnesses present and involved in the decision to cancel the races. Downhill Race - December 2 nd , 1995 [ 12 ] The Downhill course had been prepared with some difficulty by the ROC because of the warm temperatures a few days before December 1 st , 1995. There was to be a training run on Thursday, November 30 th however, because of a recent snowfall and soft snow, the training run was cancelled. The racers did train on December 1 st , 1995.

On December 2 nd the Downhill race was started in good weather, however, by racer #15 it started to cloud over and the light started to get flat. During the run of racer #29 a big snow storm hit the mountain. One of the jury members, Mr. Hoch, stopped the race by closing his

section of the course because of the visibility. His partner, also a FIS jury member, Mr. Tischhauser, had closed his

section of the race course moments earlier. Approximately 15 to 20 centimetres of snow came in quickly, reducing visibility to next to nil. After the snow stopped, there was an effort by everyone involved in the ROC and the ski area to pack down and prepare the course so that the race could continue. Volunteers sideslipped down the hill on their skis in an effort to clear the course. They continued to do this for a significant period of time and eventually the course itself was cleared of snow, however, there was still significant snow accumulation between the line which the racers ski down and the safety nets.

The FIS members indicated that the race could not be held until all of the snow had been moved outside of the safety nets as it was extremely dangerous for any racer at the speeds which they travel were they to get caught in the soft snow at the edge of the course. Despite all of the work on December 2 nd , 1995 the jury determined that conditions had not improved to a level which was safe for the skiers and the race was therefore cancelled and rescheduled for Sunday, December 3 rd , 1995. On December 3 rd the Downhill race originally scheduled for December 2 nd was run and completed.

Super G - December 3 rd , 1995 [ 13 ] This race was to be held December 3 rd , however, with the movement of the Downhill race from December 2 nd to December 3 rd the Super G race was cancelled. FIS rules in 1995 would not allow the running of ski races back to back, therefore it would not be possible to run both the Downhill and the Super G on the same day. In addition, Mr. Hoch indicated that it is a mammoth undertaking to make travel plans and move the amount of equipment and people involved in the World Cup circuit to the next venue for World Cup races. Several flights are required just to move the equipment.

Given the cost of airfares and the amount of equipment to move, the travel plans are made far in advance to accommodate the World Cup schedule. In this case, the teams were booked to leave on Sunday evening and therefore it was not possible to run the Super G race on Monday. INSURANCE POLICIES

[ 14 ] There are two insurance policies which relate to coverage for these events. In general terms, Policy #58 covers the loss of television revenue in the event that the races are cancelled or abandoned. The coverage is $30,000 U.S. per event. Policy #59 covers the plaintiff's profit, net of expenses, for marketing the event. The coverage is $17,500 per event. [ 15 ] With the cancellation of the Giant Slalom, Slalom and Super G races, the claim of the plaintiff against the defendants under the contracts of insurance is in the total sum of $90,000 U.S. under Policy #58 and $52,500 under Policy #59.

The policies were issued and effective November 10, 1995. [ 16 ] The key provisions of the policies which are relevant to this matter are as follows: Interest - This Insurance is to indemnify the Insured for their Ascertained Net Loss, as defined herein, up to but not exceeding the stated Limit of Liability, should any of the insured Event(

s) be necessarily Cancelled or Abandoned in whole or in part, which necessary Cancellation or Abandonment is a sole and direct result of any cause beyond the control of the Insured and/or the participants therein subject to all terms, Conditions and Exclusions contained herein or endorsed hereon. (emphasis added) 8. Conditions - Upon discovery of any event likely to give rise to a claim under this Insurance the insured shall immediately give notice thereof to Insurer thereon. 9.

The insured shall use due diligence and do and concur in doing all things reasonably practicable to avoid or diminish any loss herein insured, including, but not limited to, allowing a representative appointed by Insurer to participate in any negotiations that take place in the settlement of loss... 13. It is understood and agreed that in order to cancel the insured Event(

s) due to weather, at least one (1) of the following two (2) conditions must apply:

a) the weather must be of such severity as to pose an undue threat to a professional World Cup Skier;

b) the snow base is of insufficient depth on the day of the insured Event(s). Exclusions p. The inability to meet course safety requirements. ARGUMENT [ 17 ] There was evidence given at the trial of this matter by Mr. Gardner, a representative of the plaintiff insured and by Ms. Brennan, a representative of the defendant insurer. These were the two individuals who negotiated the terms of the insurance contracts. Both were relatively new to their respective positions and neither had a history of negotiating insurance contracts for World Cup Ski Racing.

In crafting the policies, these two individuals discussed situations which may arise wherein a World Cup Ski Race would be cancelled. These discussions revolved primarily around weather conditions; for example, extreme cold, either too much or not enough snow, fog, rain, etc. There were also discussions about other situations unrelated to weather which may also cause cancellation such as a power failure. Ms. Brennan and Mr.

Gardner agreed however that if an event was cancelled due to something beyond Alpine Canada's control and if that cancellation did not violate any of the exclusions or conditions of the policy then the insured would be covered. Therefore, while they did have general discussions on a number of issues, I am satisfied that the policies themselves clearly and specifically set out the coverage along with the exclusions and conditions.

[ 18 ] It is the position of the plaintiff that the Giant Slalom and Slalom races to be run November 25 th and 26 th , 1995 were cancelled because of weather which was so severe as to cause injury to the skiers. The decision to ultimately cancel these two races was made by the FIS jury. The FIS jury is a body completely independent of Alpine Canada and under FIS rules for World Cup Ski racing, the jury has the ultimate and sole ability to decide whether or not a race will be cancelled.

As such, Alpine Canada has no control over a decision which the jury may make. [ 19 ] It is the position of the defendants that the onus is on the plaintiff to show that all of the conditions of the policy have been met. The onus would then shift to the defendants in the event that there were any exclusions. The defendants say that the insured did have control over the situation and did not do everything they could have done to ensure that these two races took place.

In particular, it was suggested that perhaps the ski area had not made sufficient snow in October and early November when there were colder temperatures which would have allowed for a sufficient compacted base on the race course in time for the races. The evidence indicates that the base and snow was very good on the public runs for the few days before the race and, in fact, the racers had conducted training runs on the public runs. The evidence of Mr. Hoch and Mr.

Tischhauser, the FIS representatives, when they arrived at the mountain on November 21 st , was that the course was not in a condition such that a race could be held. They both confirmed, however, that although they could have cancelled the races right then and there they did not do so as their past experience told them that there was plenty of time for the course to be prepared for the races on the 25 th and 26 th of November given the forecast for colder weather. This would allow the ski area to make more snow and to prepare a very hard course for the race to take place on.

What happened, however, was that those forecasts never did materialize and the ski area was caught in unseasonably warm temperatures which had not been predicted and were unexpected.

The evidence further indicates that there were more than sufficient resources in terms of equipment and manpower available during this period of time to prepare the course; the difficulty was the warm temperatures and the soft snow so that no matter what was done, it was simply not possible to create a base hard enough on which the skiers could race. [ 20 ] It is the position of the defendants that the weather was not "severe" as required under the policy. In their view severity means extreme cold and would not refer to warm temperatures.

The plaintiff's position is that severe weather conditions when talking about World Cup Ski racing would be any weather that would pose a threat to the safety of the skiers. That could include cold weather, warm weather, fog, rain, snow, etc. [ 21 ] On November 25 th , 1995, the day scheduled for the Giant Slalom race, the jury cancelled that race along with the Slalom race scheduled for the next day.

The defendants argue that there was no need to cancel the races at that time and, in fact, the jury could have waited until Sunday or Monday to cancel the races after waiting to see whether or not the temperature would get colder and the races could be run. The evidence of the FIS delegates, however, was that they relied on their experience gathered through many World Cup Races. They looked at the condition of the course and the snow and the anticipated forecast and determined that it would not be possible to run the races on either the Sunday or the Monday.

In hindsight, upon inspection of the course on the Sunday and Monday in preparation for the Downhill race, the conditions had not improved which simply confirmed their earlier decision. [ 22 ] There is no insurance claim for the Downhill race. This race was scheduled for Saturday, December 2, however, it was postponed midway through the race because of excessive snowfall.

The race eventually took place the next day, Sunday, December 3 rd , 1995. [ 23 ] With respect to the Super G race which was to take place on December 3 rd , 1995 this race could not take place on that date because the Downhill race took place then. The FIS rules indicate that it is not possible to run two different races back to back on the same day. Therefore, it would not have been possible because of the rules to run the Super G race on the same day as the Downhill race.

There was further evidence which indicated that even if it was possible to run two races back to back, it would not have been possible in this circumstance for a number of reasons. Firstly, although the Downhill race was moved up to a start time of 10:30 a.m., it would still take a couple of hours to run the race. The Super G course is a different course than the Downhill course in terms of configuration and therefore once the Downhill race was completed it would be necessary to reset a Super G course, do the appropriate inspections and then run the race.

The evidence was that this would not be possible given the short daylight hours at that time of year. The changing light and conditions would not guarantee a fair race for all competitors. [ 24 ] The FIS representatives indicated that it was not unusual and, in fact, relatively common to have to postpone races for weather related or other reasons. It appears, therefore, that the Super G race could have been held on December 4 th , 1995 and, in fact, the insurance policies were in effect until that date.

The evidence discloses, however, that it was not possible to run the Super G race because the travel arrangements for the teams and officials had been made well in advance and required that everyone leave on December 3 rd , 1995. The plaintiff argues that the travel arrangements are beyond the control of Alpine Canada and they are not excluded under the policy and therefore should be covered. The defendants submit that since postponements are common on the World Cup Race circuit it was up to Alpine Canada to let the insurance company know that there was a risk that the race would be cancelled and not rescheduled

because of travel arrangements so that that issue could be addressed. Mr. Gardner did not so advise the insurer. One of the warranties in the insurance policy is that the insured will make all the necessary arrangements for fulfilment of the event in a prudent and timely manner and insure that provisions are made for sufficient allowances for travel time, set up and/or preparation time.

DECISION [ 25 ] I am satisfied that the insured has satisfied the onus of proving that the Giant Slalom and Slalom races scheduled for November 25 th and 26 th , 1995 were cancelled as a direct result of conditions beyond the control of the insured. The evidence is that although there was sufficient snow on November 25 th , 1995, the condition of that snow given the unseasonably warm temperatures was such that running a race on it would pose an undue threat to a professional World Cup skier. I find that unseasonably warm weather fits within the definition of severe weather.

The defendants suggest that these races could have been run if Lake Louise had made a sufficient base, however, the agreement between Lake Louise, Alberta Alpine and Alpine Canada setting out their respective responsibilities was not signed until approximately November 20 th , 1995. Although there had been colder conditions on the mountain earlier in the season, there were unseasonably warm temperatures for a couple of weeks before the scheduled races.

All of the evidence which was uncontradicted is that all that was needed was a couple of nights of colder temperatures as forecast in order to put the race course in shape so that the races could be held. These forecasted colder temperatures did not occur. Everything was done by Lake Louise and the Race Organizing Committee at that stage to attempt to run the races. Everybody wanted the races to take place and they would have had the forecasted temperatures materialized. They did not. Therefore, without a firm base, the soft snow posed an undue threat to the skiers from the ruts which would be created.

The surface must be rock hard and that was not possible given the weather conditions.

I find that there are no exclusions or conditions that would apply with respect to these events and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to judgment pursuant to the insurance contract for the cancellation of these two races in the sum of $60,000 U.S. under policy #58 and $35,000 under policy #59 plus interest thereon pursuant to the Judgment Interest Act . [ 26 ] With respect to the Super G race to be held on December 3 rd , 1995 I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has proven that the cancellation was due to something beyond the control of Alberta Alpine and does not violate any of the exclusions or conditions of the policy.

Postponements are a common occurrence in World Cup Racing and, in fact, that is exactly what happened with the Downhill on December 2 nd . It was postponed to December 3 rd . The policies were in force and effect through to December 4 th , 1995. The race could have been held on December 4 th , 1995 but for the travel arrangements of the teams. One of the warranties in the policy specifically talks about an obligation on the insured to provide for sufficient travel time.

If postponements are an ordinary event in the World Cup circuit, then arrangements should have been made to ensure that time was available on the 4 th of December to run the race in the event it had to be postponed or, in the alternative, the insurer should have been notified that travel arrangements could be a reason that the event would be cancelled. They were not so advised. All of the discussion was around weather related conditions and other unexpected events. Travel arrangements are not unexcepted and, in fact, are planned a significant time in advance.

The plaintiff argues that weather caused the postponement of the Downhill race from December 2 nd to December 3 rd and that is the reason of the cancellation for the Super G on December 3 rd . I do not find that that is the reason for the cancellation. The reason for the cancellation was travel plans. Therefore, I find that the cancellation of the Super G race on December 3 rd , 1995 does not fall within the coverage of the insurance policies and therefore there will be no payment by the defendants with respect to that event.

PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT IN FOREIGN CURRENCY [ 27 ] Any reference to money in legal proceedings must be stated in the currency of Canada, Currency Act , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-52, s. 12 . One of the policies, the subject matter of this action, is set out in U.S. dollars. The issue is whether or not the judgment should reflect payment using an exchange rate at or near the date of breach of the contract or, in the alternative, at the date of judgment. [ 28 ] Canadian Courts have been virtually evenly divided on this issue.

Where there has been instability in the currency markets, the Courts have tended to follow Batavia Times Publishing Co. v. Davis (1978), 1978 CanLII 1721 (ON SC) , 20 O.R. (2 nd ) 437 , however, when the dollar has been stable the Courts have tended towards Gatineau Power Company v. Crown Life , 1945 CanLII 33 (SCC) , [1945] S.C.R. 655 . [ 29 ] The difficulty is in trying to do justice based on the particular circumstances of each case in determining the currency conversion rates.

It may be that in a particular circumstance choosing either the date of breach or the date of judgment may create an injustice to one party. [ 30 ] Historically, the Canadian Courts have looked to British jurisprudence for guidance on the issue of currency conversion. The

Supreme Court in Gatineau Power , supra , indicates that conversion of currency is to be made as of the date of breach. Following that decision in 1978 the House of Lords in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. , [1975] 3 All E.R. 801 at 811 stated that justice and commercial convenience ought to prevail over legal precedence. Lord Wilberforce states that: ...justice demands that the creditor should not suffer from fluctuations in the value of sterling... since ...he has bargained for his own currency ..

The relevant certainty which the rule ought to achieve is that which gives the creditor neither more nor less than he bargained for. [ 31 ] Following that reasoning, the Court in Batavia, supra , sought to apply the same principles.

Carruthers, J. stated at p. 439: I have concluded that the choice of the proper date of conversion that has been made is a product of judicial decision-making, and, in so far as Canadian cases dealing with the subject-matter are concerned they indicate that Canadian Courts have followed the English case law. [ 32 ] Given that Gatineau, supra , has not been overruled however, a chasm has been created in the case law between the Courts that refuse to interfere with the Supreme Court’s decision and those who break off to follow Batavia .

What has arisen, therefore, is a body of cases which have attempted to distinguish Gatineau based on the circumstances of each individual case. It is noted, as well, in Williams & Glyn’s Bank v. Belkin Packaging , 1983 CanLII 146 (SCC) , [1983] 1 S.C.R. 661 that the Supreme Court deferred the opportunity to re-appraise its earlier findings and implicitly acknowledges that the matter has been left unsettled. Following under this assumption, Batavia , having been affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, would then take precedence.

Uncertainty still exists, however, since Gatineau has yet to be explicitly overruled. [ 33 ] Most of the decisions dealing with the issue in recent times appear to advocate the use of judicial discretion to decide the matter. They focus on the equities in the particular circumstances of the case. The justifications for the breach date rule may be summarized as follows: (S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages , 2 nd ed., (Canada Law Book: Toronto, 1992), commencing at paragraph 7.80 (loose-leaf) at paragraph 7.100.) 1. An adequate award of interest can compensate between default and judgment more effectively. 2.

The creditor could have mitigated the loss by hedging against the change in exchange rates. 3. The creditor ought not to throw upon the debtor the risk of currency fluctuations. [ 34 ] The rationales for the judgment date rule are: 1. The creditor is entitled to be made whole according to the facts as they appear at the time of judgment. 2. It is the debtor’s default that has caused the creditor to bear the undesired risk of a decline in domestic currency. 3. Mitigation of loss by currency speculation is often impractical and may be illegal.

4. The particular problems that the Supreme Court feared in 1945 no longer exist. 5. Fluctuations in currency are now the rule rather than the exception (Lord Wilberforce in Miliangos at 809; Batavia at 442 - 445) 6. It is necessary to allow the judgment rule in order to remain consistent with cases disposed of by way of arbitration and liquidation. [ 35 ] I take the position that I have the discretion to choose a currency conversion rate which best promotes equity between the parties based on the particular circumstances of the case before me.

This is all the more important in times of dramatically fluctuating currency rates in which we find ourselves at this time. The Courts should not be hampered by a rigid rule which does not allow equity to be done in the circumstances of each individual case. In my view, the operative principle on the facts of this case is to provide the successful litigant with sufficient funds to purchase the amount awarded in foreign currency at the time of judgment.

The circumstances of the contract and the parties do not, in my view, allow for an award of interest to more properly compensate the parties than a conversion rate as at the date of judgment. In order to fulfill its obligation to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must receive the full sum of $60,000 U.S. The only way the plaintiff can receive those funds is to provide them with equivalent Canadian funds as at the present time which would allow them to purchase $60,000 in U.S. funds. [ 36 ] Counsel have provided to me, by agreement, various conversion rates.

I accept the conversion rate provided to me for May, 1999 at 1.4620 as being the conversion rate to be utilized in converting the U.S. dollars to Canadian dollars for the purpose of satisfying the judgment. The judgment award therefore in Canadian dollars is in the sum of $87,720. COSTS [ 37 ] Costs shall follow the event unless the parties wish to make submissions with respect to the matter of costs. If so, they should do so within 30 days of the date of this judgment. DATED at Calgary, Alberta this 10 th day of June , 1999. J. C.Q.B.A. APPEARANCES: James D’Andrea for the Plaintiff Ivan J.

Derer for the Defendants