R v. HOWARD CHARLES KIRBY, 2024 QCCS 322

R. c. Kirby 2024 QCCS 322 SUPERIOR COURT CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF terrebonne No: 700-01-179173-201 DATE: JANUARY 31, 2024 ___________________________________________________________________ presided BY THE HONOURABLE PIERRE LABRIE, J.S.C. ___________________________________________________________________ HIS MAJESTY THE KING PROSECUTOR v.

HOWARD CHARLES KIRBY ACCUSED ___________________________________________________________________ WRITTEN REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT on sentencing RENDERED VERBALLY ON JANUARY 24, 2024 [1] ___________________________________________________________________ OVERVIEW [ 1 ] On December 15, 2023, a jury found Mr. Howard Charles Kirby guilty of manslaughter in relation to the killing of Ms. Bonnie- Lyn Finnigan on October 14, 2020. [ 2 ] Ms. Finnigan, a neighbor of Mr.

Kirby, was killed by a single gunshot from a .12-gage shotgun in the context of a long lasting feud. [ 3 ] The parties presented their submissions on sentencing on December 20, 2023. [ 4 ] The Crown is asking for a sentence of 12 to 15 years of imprisonment. [ 5 ] The Defence is asking for a sentence of 8 years of imprisonment. [ 6 ] The Court must now determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed to Mr. Kirby. THE CONTEXT [ 7 ] At trial, Mr. Kirby claimed that when he shot Ms.

Finnigan, he was acting under provocation. [ 8 ] The Court decided, in a ruling following the end of the evidence in this case, that the defence of provocation, as stated at

section 232 of the Criminal Code , had to be left to the jury for consideration. [ 9 ] The exact conduct of an accused can be difficult to determine in a case decided by a jury, especially in a case like this one where there were two ways for the jury to conclude to a verdict of manslaughter. The jury could have concluded to a verdict of manslaughter based on a reasonable doubt on the requisite state of mind for murder. The jury could also have concluded to a verdict of manslaughter if they accepted the defence of provocation. For

section 232 of the Criminal Code to apply, the jury had first to conclude that Mr. Kirby had committed a murder when he killed Ms. Finnigan. [ 10 ] Section 724(2) of the Criminal Code states that, where the Court is composed of a judge and a jury, the Court shall accept as proven all facts, expressed or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty and may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact.

[11] In R. v. Ferguson[2], the Supreme Court of Canada stated: [15] The appropriateness of a sentence is a function of the purpose andprinciples of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code asapplied to the facts that led to the conviction.

It follows that the appropriatenessof the minimum sentence of four years that Parliament has prescribed forConstable Ferguson’s offence depends on what the jury concluded aboutConstable Ferguson’s conduct. [16] This poses a difficulty in a case such as this, since, unlike a judge sittingalone, who has a duty to give reasons, the jury gives only its ultimate verdict.The sentencing judge therefore must do his or her best to determine the factsnecessary for sentencing from the issues before the jury and from the jury’sverdict.

This may not require the sentencing judge to arrive at a complete theoryof the facts; the sentencing judge is required to make only those factualdeterminations necessary for deciding the appropriate sentence in the case athand. [17] Two principles govern the sentencing judge in this endeavour. First, thesentencing judge “is bound by the express and implied factual impli​cations of thejury’s verdict”: R. v.

Brown, (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518, p. 523.The sentencing judge “shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, thatare essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty” (Criminal Code, s. 724(2)(a)), andmust not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict rejected bythe jury: Brown; R. v. Braun (1995), (MB CA), 95 C.C.C.(3d) 443 (Man. C.A.). [18] Second, when the factual implications of the jury’s verdict areambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical processof the jury, but should come to his or her own inde​pendent determination of therelevant facts: Brown; R. v.

Fiqia (1994), 1994 ABCA 402 , 162 A.R.117 (C.A.). In so doing, the sentencing judge “may find any other relevant factthat was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven” (s. 724(2)(b)). To relyupon an aggravating fact or previous conviction, the sentencing judge must beconvinced of the existence of that fact or conviction beyond a reasonable doubt;to rely upon any other relevant fact, the sentencing judge must be persuaded on abalance of probabilities: ss. 724(3)(

d) and 724(3)(e); see also R. v. Gardiner, (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Lawrence (1987), (ON SC), 58 C.R. (3d) 71 (Ont. H.C.). It follows from the purposeof the exercise that the sentencing judge should find only those facts necessary topermit the proper sen​tence to be imposed in the case at hand. The judge shouldfirst ask what the issues on sentencing are, and then find such facts as arenecessary to deal with those issues. [12] The Court is of the view that elements of the evidence regarding provocation were relevant to the jury instructions regarding theintent for murder as well as for the defence of provocation stated at

section 232 of the Criminal Code. These elements of the evidencewill therefore be taken into consideration as they are relevant to the verdict of manslaughter, regardless of the path the jury may havetaken to reach the verdict. [13] The Court will now address the evidence relevant to Mr. Kirby’s sentence. [14] Mr. Kirby and Ms. Finnigan were neighbors. They lived in a rural setting in Brownsburg-Chatham. [15] Ms. Finnigan moved to 101 Edina Road in 2000. Mr. Kirby has been living at 105 Edina Road since 1993. He bought theproperty at 105 Edina Road in 2000. [16] At first, their relation was cordial.

Having no electricity, Mr. Kirby had an electricity connection to Ms. Finnigan’s house forwhich he paid $20 a month. [17] At some point, Ms. Finnigan wanted to raise the cost for Mr. Kirby’s electricity from $5 to $10 more which he refused. [18] Following this, the relation got sour and conflicts ensued. The feud lasted for 10 to 12 years. [19] The conflict between Mr. Kirby and Ms. Finnigan revolved around many issues. [20] There was a conflict concerning the property line. Mr. Kirby claimed that Ms. Finnigan put flowers and cut trees on hisproperty. Mr. Kirby complained about Ms.

Finnigan encroaching and trespassing on his property. [21] There was also an issue concerning Ms. Finnigan’s sceptic tank. Mr. Kirby claimed that he could smell odors from hisresidence. [22] Mr. Kirby also complained about strong lights and surveillance cameras pointing at his property from Ms. Finnigan’s residence. [23] There were also complaints by Mr. Kirby about Ms. Finnigan’s dog being loose on his property.

[ 24 ] Mr. Alexandre Roy, dogcatcher for Brownsburg-Chatham at the time, testified about complaints made by Mr. Kirby in relation to Ms. Finnigan’s dog. There were admissions filed by the parties about tickets issued to Ms. Finnigan in relation to dog issues [3] . [ 25 ] There were several complaints made by Mr. Kirby to the police and the municipality of Brownsburg-Chatham regarding issues with Ms. Finnigan. [ 26 ] The municipal inspector, Mr. Benoit Cadieux, testified to that effect. Admissions were filed by the parties in relation to calls made by Mr. Kirby to the Sûreté du Québec about Ms.

Finnigan [4] . [ 27 ] There were also court proceedings in a civil case between Mr. Kirby and Ms. Finnigan. A judgment granting a sum of money was rendered in favor of Ms. Finnigan [5] . [ 28 ] The recording of Ms. Finnigan’s testimony at the civil trial [6] confirms the feud with Mr. Kirby. Ms. Finnigan testified about problems with Mr. Kirby, the animosity between them and the fact that she was scared of him. [ 29 ] Ms. Julie Paquet, an acquaintance of Mr. Kirby, testified about the feud between Mr. Kirby and Ms. Finnigan. According to her testimony, Mr.

Kirby was fed up and was upset with lawyers’ fees in relation with his court case with Ms. Finnigan. [ 30 ] In a statement given to the police on October 14 and 15, 2020, Mr. Kirby spoke about his feud with Ms. Finnigan and explained that on the day he shot her, he snapped. [ 31 ] At trial, Mr. Kirby testified about the feud with Ms. Finnigan that lasted 10 to 12 years. He said that despite his complaints to the municipality and the police, nothing was done, and that Ms. Finnigan kept cutting his trees. He testified that on the day he shot Ms. Finnigan, he saw her cut branches from a tree on his property. Mr.

Kirby testified that he felt violated. [ 32 ] On the day he shot Ms. Finnigan, Mr. Kirby was observing her from the top of a slope on his property. We can see him going back and forth on the video evidence [7] . Mr. Kirby testified that he saw Ms. Finnigan break a big branch from a tree and move a log from a fence. At some point, Mr. Kirby went to his house, took his shotgun from a case and loaded it with four cartridges. [ 33 ] Mr. Kirby came back with his shotgun pointing it towards Ms. Finnigan. Mr. Kirby then lowered his firearm. He testified that he was looking to get a clear shot at Ms.

Finnigan because there was a tree in front of him. When Ms. Finnigan started running towards her house, Mr. Kirby aimed at her, followed her trajectory with the barrel of his shotgun and shot her in the back. [ 34 ] Mr. Kirby testified that when he shot Ms. Finnigan, he had lost it, that he snapped. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had decided to shoot Ms. Finnigan. [ 35 ] On that day, Mr. Kirby was not under the influence of alcohol or any other substance. [ 36 ] Ms.

Finnigan died from a single shot of .12-gauge caliber in her back. [ 37 ] It was admitted by the Defence that, at the time of the events, Mr. Kirby’s weapon was not registered and that he had no permit for the possession or the acquisition of a firearm. THE EVIDENCE AT THE SENTENCING HEARING 1. The Crown’s evidence [ 38 ] Ms. Finnigan’s daughters testified on the impacts of the crime.

a) Ms. Katerine Flynn [ 39 ] Ms. Flynn read her statement that was filed into the Court’s record [8] . [ 40 ] She learned about her mother’s death on social media. This started a trauma and made the situation more stressful. [ 41 ] The death of her mother put a strain on all of her relationships. [ 42 ] She suffered from depression. She experienced anger, frustration and anguish. [ 43 ] Ms. Flynn has constant distressing thoughts and has difficulties to find peace. She has lost trust in the world and feels constantly unsafe. [ 44 ] Ms. Flynn said that she not only lost her mother, but also her best friend and that her family will never be the same.

b) Ms. Crystal Finnigan [ 45 ] Ms. Finnigan read her statement that was filed into the Court’s record [9] . [ 46 ] Her mother’s killing has created grief and left wounds that will never heal. Her mother’s fear during her final moments will impact her for the rest of her life and the images of her mother’s final moments will haunt her forever.

[ 47 ] Ms. Finnigan described her emotional toll as unimaginable and extremely hard to navigate. She speaks about intense sadness, anger, fear and regrets. [ 48 ] Ms. Finnigan explains that she felt alone and isolated at times. Her children have suffered from her lack of emotional availability. She struggles to control her anxiety, to sleep at night and to be a mother, partner, sister and friend to people she loves. [ 49 ] Ms. Finnigan is not able yet to accept the reality of her mother’s death. [ 50 ] She finds that grief from a traumatic loss is very complicated to navigate and difficult to process.

The legal proceedings were a constant reminder of the events. While being thankful for the judicial process, she added that it does not come without anguish and heartbreak. [ 51 ] Ms. Finnigan also explains that the passing of her mother left a financial burden on her family. [ 52 ] Ms. Finnigan wrote that losing a loved one to a violent crime affects her perception of reality. [ 53 ] She now lives in fear that anyone is capable of hurting someone she loves. She gets extremely nervous during any form of disagreement. She fears that it could end in violence. This increases her anxiety and fears. [ 54 ] Ms.

Finnigan feels that she failed to protect her mother. She reflects about what more she could have done to protect her. She does not forgive herself. [ 55 ] Ms. Finnigan wrote that this tragedy robbed her family from a grandmother, from a truly good woman. [ 56 ] She hopes that one day, she will be able to tell her children that justice was served.

c) Ms. Kelly Flynn [ 57 ] Ms. Flynn read her statement that was filed into the Court’s record [10] . [ 58 ] When she learned of her mother’s passing, it felt like the world had stopped moving. She felt disconnected and nothing felt real. [ 59 ] As she learned more details, she started experiencing high levels of stress. She was haunted by flashbacks and was plagued by nightmares. [ 60 ] Ms. Flynn struggled with grief, guilt, dissociation and anger. Emotional outbursts became common.

She became jumpy and fearful of others and had trouble managing her temper. [ 61 ] This took a toll on her mental health, impacting every aspect of her life. She did not complete her semester at school. [ 62 ] While her employer was understanding, they also expressed concerns about her behavioural changes. [ 63 ] She withdrew from social media and stopped her work as a circus performer. [ 64 ] Ms.

Flynn began counseling and was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Syndrome Disorder. [ 65 ] The events affected her physical health in several ways, including insomnia, nausea, headaches, eating disorder and high levels of stress. [ 66 ] The events also had a significant impact on herself and her partner. She lost money from leaving school at mid-semester and from missing work. She also had to pay for counselling as well as for travel expenses during the trial. [ 67 ] The killing of her mother makes her fear for the safety of her loved ones. She experiences distrust of others.

She fears how confrontation or standing up for herself could end. Even a minor disagreement can trigger panic. [ 68 ] Ms. Flynn feels distant and isolated from people, unable to connect. [ 69 ] She is afraid how this trauma will continue to affect her family in the years to come. [ 70 ] The media coverage of her mother’s killing makes her unable to properly grief and move on. She is reliving the worst moment of her life over and over. [ 71 ] She is constantly reminded that she no longer has her mother, her best supporter, with whom to share happiness.

d) Ms. Kaleigh Flynn [ 72 ] Ms. Flynn’s statement was filed into the Court’s record [11] . [ 73 ] She is the spouse of Ms. Finnigan’s son Ryan. [ 74 ] She wrote that he suffered immensely and does not want to seek counselling. His relationship with their children also suffered. [ 75 ] Ms. Flynn wrote that it is difficult to explain to the children the death of their grandmother. One of her children had to do psychotherapy sessions. [ 76 ] She is afraid that their children may come across the video recording of Ms. Finnigan’s final moments online.

[ 77 ] The images will haut her for the rest of her life. [ 78 ] She is also afraid that her children will live in fear of Mr. Kirby. 2. The Defence’s evidence [ 79 ] The Defence did not present any evidence at the sentencing hearing. [ 80 ] However, the Defence made reference to one of the conclusions of a psychological report from Dr. Randolph Stephenson, in relation to the risk of violent recidivism, which was admitted by the Crown.

SECTION 726 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE [ 81 ] Mr. Kirby was offered the opportunity to address the Court pursuant to

section 726 of the Criminal Code . [ 82 ] As it is his right to do so, Mr. Kirby declined the offer. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES 1. The Crown’s position [ 83 ] The Crown submits that in this case, because the manslaughter is close to a murder, the range of sentences is between 9 to 15 years of imprisonment, with the majority of the cases ranging between 10 to 15 years. [ 84 ] Therefore, the Crown is asking the Court to impose to Mr.

Kirby a sentence of 12 to 15 years of imprisonment. [ 85 ] The Crown points out the impact the crime had on the victim’s family. [ 86 ] The Crown also submits that the violent nature of the crime should be considered as well as the choice of the weapon used by Mr. Kirby. [ 87 ] The Crown also refers to the injuries on the victim’s body described by the pathologist, Dr. Caroline Tanguay. [ 88 ] The Crown argues that Mr. Kirby put the blame on the victim. Based on the video evidence, the Crown questions the fact that Ms. Finnigan had a provoking behaviour. [ 89 ] The Crown points out that Mr.

Kirby’s .12-gauge shotgun was not registered and that he did not have a permit for the possession or for the acquisition of a firearm. [ 90 ] The Crown submits that Mr. Kirby expressed resentment towards Ms. Finnigan and that he had a motive to kill her because of the civil trial and the money it costed him. The Crown also refers to death threats towards Ms. Finnigan as told by Ms. Julie Paquet. [ 91 ] The Crown argues that even if Mr. Kirby was provoked, he still had the intent to kill Ms. Finnigan. The Crown adds that Mr.

Kirby had full control of his capacities. [ 92 ] The Crown insists on the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, both general and specific. [ 93 ] The Crown submits that the vulnerability of Ms. Finnigan at the time she was shot is an aggravating circumstance, and that Mr. Kirby did

an act of dominance. [ 94 ] According to the Crown, because of his age, Mr. Kirby should have been wiser and therefore, his age should be considered as an aggravating circumstance. [ 95 ] The Crown also submits that Mr. Kirby has a military training and that he showed control when he shot Ms. Finnigan. [ 96 ] With respect to mitigating circumstances, the Crown submits that provocation cannot be ignored. [ 97 ] Finally, the Crown is asking the Court to issue the mandatory orders for DNA and for the prohibition of weapons. 2.

The Defence’s position [ 98 ] The Defence submits that the Court should rely on the principles stated in R . v. Ferguson [12] to determine the factual basis for the sentencing of Mr. Kirby. [ 99 ] According to the Defence, the same facts apply whether it is for the state of mind required for murder or for the defence of provocation. [ 100 ] Therefore, the Defence submits that the factual determinations of the jury’s verdict are not ambiguous and that the Court should consider the evidence relating to provoking conduct from Ms.

Finnigan. [ 101 ] Regarding the gravity of the offence, the Defence agrees that it is one of the most serious offence.

[ 102 ] The Defence concedes that the manslaughter in this case is a quasi-murder, that the victim was helpless and that the crime had an impact on the family members of Ms. Finnigan. [ 103 ] According to the Defence, the use of a firearm in this case should not be an aggravating circumstance because it is accounted for with the minimum imprisonment of 4 years stated at

section 236

a) of the Criminal Code . In this regard, the Defence relies upon R . v . Lacasse [13] , and R . c. Lévesque [14] . [ 104 ] The prior convictions of Mr. Kirby for assault in 1966 and for possession for purpose of trafficking in 1991 were admitted at trial [15] . [ 105 ] However, the Defence submits that because of their nature and their remoteness, they have no bearing for this sentence. [ 106 ] The Defence submits that provocation should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in this case. In this regard, the Defence relies upon R . v. Ston e [16] . [ 107 ] The Defence points out that, according to Dr.

Randolph Stephenson, Mr. Kirby presents a low risk of violent recidivism. [ 108 ] The Defence also submits that Mr. Kirby’s age should be considered as a mitigating circumstance. [ 109 ] With respect to the objectives of sentencing, the Defence concedes that denunciation and general deterrence are relevant in this case because of the unlawful killing of Ms.

Finnigan with a firearm. [ 110 ] According to the Defence, specific deterrence and the separation of the offender from society should not be given weight because of the low risk of recidivism and because the killing of the victim is an isolated event that resulted from a long-term conflict. [ 111 ] The Defence further submits that the rehabilitation of Mr.

Kirby remains a relevant objective even considering his age. [ 112 ] According to the Defence, the range of sentences for a manslaughter that qualifies as a quasi-murder is between 10 to 15 years according to legal scholars and from 8 to 12 years in Canadian provinces outside Quebec. In this regard, the Defence relies upon R . c . Lévesque [17] . [ 113 ] The Defence referred to decisions where the sentences vary from 5 to 10 years for manslaughter [18] . [ 114 ] The Defence submits that the principle of restraint stated at

section 718.2

d) of the Criminal Code should apply in this case. In other words, the Court should impose the least intrusive sentence and a sentence which will achieve the overall purpose of being an appropriate and just sanction. [ 115 ] The Defence is therefore asking for a sentence of 8 years of imprisonment minus the preventive custody since October 14, 2020. ANALYSIS 1. The purpose and principles of sentencing [ 116 ] The Court will consider the purpose and principles of sentencing stated at

section 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 117 ]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code states the following: Purpose 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 118 ]

Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code states the following fundamental principle: Fundamental principle 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[ 119 ]

Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code states other principles of sentencing: Other sentencing principles 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (

i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor, (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s intimate partner or a member of the victim or the offender’s family, (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years, (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation, (iii.2) evidence that the offence was committed against a person who, in the performance of their duties and functions, was providing health services, including personal care services, (iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, (

v) evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence, (vi) evidence that the offence was committed while the offender was subject to a conditional sentence order made under

section 742.1 or released on parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act , and (vii) evidence that the commission of the offence had the effect of impeding another person from obtaining health services, including personal care services, shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. [ 120 ] In R . v. Ipeelee [19] , the Supreme Court of Canada stated the following:

[35] In 1996, Parliament amended the Criminal Code to specifically codifythe objectives and principles of sentencing (An Act to amend the Criminal Code(sentencing) and other Acts in consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22 (Bill C-41)).

According to s. 718, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contributeto “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”.This is accomplished by imposing “just sanctions” that reflect one or more of thetraditional sentencing objectives: denunciation, general and specific deterrence,separation of offenders, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, and promoting asense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done tovictims and to the community. [36] The Criminal Code goes on to list a number of principles to guidesentencing judges.

The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentencemust be proportionate to both the gravity of the offence and the degree ofresponsibility of the offender. As this Court has previously indicated, thisprinciple was not borne out of the 1996 amendments to the Code but, instead, haslong been a central tenet of the sentencing process (see, e.g., R. v.Wilmott (1966), (ON CA), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 33 (Ont. C.A.), and,more recently, R. v. Solowan, 2008 SCC 62, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 309, at para. 12,and R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 40-42).

It alsohas a constitutional dimension, in that s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rightsand Freedoms forbids the imposition of a grossly disproportionate sentence thatwould outrage society’s standards of decency. In a similar vein, proportionality insentencing could aptly be described as a principle of fundamental justice under s.7 of the Charter. [37] The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) isintimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — the maintenance of ajust, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions.

Whateverweight a judge may wish to accord to the various objectives and other principleslisted in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principleof proportionality. Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, theprinciple ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This isclosely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims andensures public confidence in the justice system. As Wilson J. expressed in herconcurring judgment in Re B.C.

Motor Vehicle Act, (SCC),[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 533: : It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bearsome relationship to the offence; it must be a “fit” sentence proportionate to theseriousness of the offence. Only if this is so can the public be satisfied that theoffender “deserved” the punishment he received and feel a confidence in thefairness and rationality of the system. Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceedwhat is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

In thissense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justicefor the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is onethat reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at theexpense of the other. [121] In R. v. Lacasse[20], the Supreme Court also stated the following: [3] The credibility of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the publicdepends on the fitness of sentences imposed on offenders.

A sentence that isunfit, whether because it is too harsh or too lenient, could cause the public toquestion the credibility of the system in light of its objectives. 2. Application to the case at bar

a) The gravity of the offence [122] The offence of manslaughter with the use of a firearm is punishable by an imprisonment term that varies from a minimum of 4years to imprisonment for life[21]. [123] This indicates the gravity of this offence.

b) The objectives of denunciation and deterrence [124] In this particular case, given the circumstances of the killing of Ms. Finnigan, the Court is of the view that emphasis must be puton the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence. [125] The circumstances of this case are particularly shocking and it must be understood that behavior such as Mr. Kirby’s will beseverely punished.

[ 126 ] Hence, this crime must be denounced in a strong way and general deterrence must be an important objective in this case.

c) The principle of proportionality stated at

section 718.1 of the Criminal Code [ 127 ] In this case, Mr. Kirby is the sole perpetrator of the offence. [ 128 ] The Court must determine a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of Mr. Kirby.

d) The principles stated at

section 718.2 of the Criminal Code i. The aggravating circumstances [ 129 ] There are several aggravating circumstances in this case. In this regard, the Court will first address the use of firearm by Mr. Kirby and his prior convictions. [ 130 ] The Court does not consider the use of a firearm in itself as an aggravating circumstance in this case. [ 131 ] An essential element of the offence cannot constitute an aggravating circumstance [22] . [ 132 ] Furthermore,

section 236

a) of the Criminal Code provides with a minimum sentence of 4 years for a manslaughter where a firearm was used. [ 133 ] Therefore, because the use of a firearm is already taken into account in the minimum sentence of 4 years of imprisonment, it should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance [23] . [ 134 ] That being said, if the use of a firearm does not constitute an aggravating circumstance in itself, the Court is of the view that the circumstances surrounding the use of the firearm may constitute aggravating circumstances [24] , for instance, the way Ms. Finnigan was shot by Mr.

Kirby. [ 135 ] Regarding Mr. Kirby’s prior convictions, they will not be considered as aggravating circumstances because of their remoteness. [ 136 ] Therefore, the Court considers, as aggravating circumstances, the following elements: • The fact that Ms. Finnigan was unarmed and vulnerable; • The fact that Mr. Kirby used a vantage point to shoot Ms. Finnigan; • The fact that Mr. Kirby waited to have clear shot to shoot Ms. Finnigan; • The fact that Mr. Kirby shot Ms. Finnigan in the back when she was trying to flee; • The fact that Mr.

Kirby did not have a permit for the possession or the acquisition of a firearm and the fact that the firearm used by Mr. Kirby was not registered; • The impact of the crime on Ms. Finnigan’s family. ii. The mitigating circumstances : [ 137 ] There are few mitigating circumstances in this case. [ 138 ] The Court is of the view that provocation should be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. This does not constitute a « double advantage » for the accused [25] . [ 139 ] The Court must also determine if the age of Mr.

Kirby [26] is as a mitigating circumstance in this case. [ 140 ] In this regard, in O’Reilly c. R . [27] , the Quebec Court of Appeal stated the following: [37] Finally there is the question of age. Simply put, the appellant submits that his advanced age weighs strongly against the imposition of a prison sentence and, instead, justifies a conditional sentence served in the community. [38] The advanced age of an accused must be taken into account when determining a sentence, as Chief Justice Lamer indicated in R. v.

M. (C.A.) : [74] However, in the process of determining a just and appropriate fixed- term sentence of imprisonment, the sentencing judge should be mindful of the age of the offender in applying the relevant principles of sentencing. After a certain point, the utilitarian and normative goals of sentencing will eventually begin to exhaust themselves once a contemplated sentence starts to surpass any reasonable estimation of the offender's remaining natural life span.

Accordingly, in exercising his or her specialized discretion under the Code, asentencing judge should generally refrain from imposing a fixed-term sentencewhich so greatly exceeds an offender's expected remaining life span that thetraditional goals of sentencing, even general deterrence and denunciation, haveall but depleted their functional value.

But with that consideration in mind, thegoverning principle remains the same: Canadian courts enjoy a broaddiscretion in imposing numerical sentences for single or multiple offences,subject only to the broad statutory parameters of the Code and the fundamentalprinciple of our criminal law that global sentences be “just and appropriate”. [39] The age factor must, however, be considered in light of the health ofthe offender as it relates to his life expectancy.

Consequently, the mere fact thatan accused is elderly is not, in and of itself, a mitigating factor in determining aprison sentence, unless the evidence reveals that he has little chance of servingthe sentence before passing away. This is increasingly true with the generalaging of the Canadian population and the raised probability of longer lifeexpectancies. [40] As such, in the recent decision Thibault v. R., the Court was called toreview an 18-month prison sentence imposed upon Ms.

Thibault after she wasfound guilty of committing fraud and breach of trust against the governmentsof Canada and Quebec between 1997 and 2007 while she was LieutenantGovernor of Quebec. She relied on Justice Lamer’s remarks in R v. M. (C.A.),to argue that the judge had erred in failing to account for her advanced age –she was 76 when the judgment was rendered – her state of health and herphysical handicap which, in her view, justified a conditional sentence. TheCourt refused to intervene because, despite Ms.

Thibault’s advanced age,nothing suggested that she would not complete her sentence before her demise. [41] In R. v. Swope, the Court of Appeal for British Colombia had toconsider the impact of a 78-year old offender’s age when imposing a 39-monthprison sentence and concluded that, while age was a factor that had to beconsidered, it was not determinative but merely a factor among others: [32] I turn, then, to the matter of Mr. Swope's age and health.

I acknowledgethat, in sentencing an elderly offender, a court must be cognizant of the fact thatthe limited life expectancy is a factor in gauging the severity of the sentence.[…] [33] It might also be acknowledged that subjective experience of time inprison is likely to differ with the age of an offender. A person whose health andlife are rapidly slipping away may well consider time in jail to be particularlyharsh, as their last opportunities for liberty are lost. [34] The importance of the offender’s anticipated lifespan, as a sentencingconsideration should not, however, be overstated.

As Finch J. (as he then was)said for the majority of this Court in R. v. Shah (1994), (BCCA), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 45 at 50: [E]ven where there is a risk that an accused may not outlive the time he isrequired to serve, the compassion that would evoke is not a controlling ordecisive factor in deciding on the appropriate sentence. It is one of manyfactors to be taken into account in sentencing. [35] There is scope for courts to be compassionate towards aged andinfirm persons in the course of sentencing; this Court has affirmed thatproposition in both Shah and R. v.

Potts, 2011 BCCA 9 at para. 85. [36] The judge in this case did take Mr. Swope’s age into considerationin passing sentence. While the time he will spend in prison is likely to be asignificant portion of his remaining lifespan, I am not persuaded that thesentence runs afoul of the above-quoted comments from C.A.M. I am unable tosay that the sentence that the judge imposed was overly-long or oppressive. Inote that, despite the fact that Mr. Swope has been on bail pending appeal, hewill, when returned to prison, be eligible for day parole in less than fivemonths’ time and for full parole in less than one year.

There are specialprovisions in s. 121 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992,c. 20, that may be used to expedite parole in the event of certain deteriorationsin a prisoner’s health. [42] As a result, if at the time a sentence is imposed, the offender’s state ofhealth does not suggest that he is unlikely to complete the sentence before hisdemise, the judge then has the necessary discretion to impose an appropriate

sentence in light of all the usual factors and criteria. This is the case here, given Gérald O’Reilly’s state of health (“[g]enerally in good health”) when he was sentenced on July 2, 2014. It is also worth mentioning that, in light of the provisions of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act , it is unlikely that Gérald O’Reilly would still be incarcerated today had his sentence not been suspended for the duration of the appeal. [43] It is possible that an offender’s state of health deteriorates following sentencing. This possibility increases with the age of the offender.

The sentencing judge may not, however, speculate on this subject and must determine the sentence in accordance with the evidence before him when it is rendered. If the offender’s health subsequently declines, this is no longer a question relating to the determination of the sentence, but rather a question relating to its application. In such circumstances, it is incumbent on the relevant correctional authorities to take appropriate measures taking into account, notably, s. 121 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act : 121

(1) Subject to

section 102 — and despite sections 119 to 120.3 of this Act, sections 746.1 and 761 of the Criminal Code […] and any order made under

section 743.6 of the Criminal Code […] — parole may be granted at any time to an offender 121

(1) Sous réserve de l’article 102 mais par dérogation aux articles 119 à 120.3 de la présente loi, aux articles 746.1 et 761 du Code criminel , […] et même si le temps d’épreuve a été fixé par le tribunal en application de l’

article 743.6 du Code criminel […], le délinquant peut bénéficier de la libération conditionnelle dans les cas suivants : (

a) who is terminally ill;

a) il est malade en phase terminale; (

b) whose physical or mental health is likely to suffer serious damage if the offender continues to be held in confinement; (

c) for whom continued confinement would constitute an excessive hardship that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the offender was sentenced; or […] [References ommited]

b) sa santé physique ou mentale risque d’être gravement compromise si la détention se poursuit;

c) l’incarcération constitue pour lui une contrainte excessive difficilement prévisible au moment de sa condamnation; […] [ 141 ] Also, in De l’Étoile c.

R . [28] , the Cour of Appeal stated: [12] L’appelant a raison de souligner que l’âge de l’accusé est un facteur que le juge qui détermine la peine doit prendre en considération afin que celle- ci ne dépasse pas « toute estimation raisonnable du temps qu’il reste normalement à vivre au délinquant ». [13] Notre Cour précise toutefois que : [39] […] le seul fait qu’un accusé soit d’un âge avancé ne constitue pas en soi un facteur atténuant dans l’établissement d’une peine d’incarcération, à moins qu’il ne ressorte de la preuve que ce dernier n’a que peu de perspectives de compléter sa peine avant son décès. […]» [14] Le juge a tenu compte de l’âge de l’appelant lorsqu’il a apprécié l’expertise du Dr Morissette.

Il a même reconnu qu’il s’agissait d’un facteur atténuant. [15] En outre du fait que l’âge de l’appelant ne peut être vu comme un facteur déterminant sur l’établissement de la peine globale, nous notons que celui-ci n’a présenté aucune preuve pouvant mener à la conclusion qu’il « n’a que peu de perspectives de compléter sa peine avant son décès ». [References omitted] [ 142 ] In this case, Mr. Kirby did not present any evidence suggesting that he would have little chance to complete a sentence in the range proposed by the Crown before passing away.

[ 143 ] For these reasons, the Court does not consider Mr. Kirby’s age as a mitigating circumstance in this case. The Court will nonetheless consider Mr. Kirby’ age with respect to the length of the imprisonment term to be imposed. [ 144 ] The Court will therefore consider the following elements as mitigating circumstances: • The fact that there is evidence supporting the conclusion that Mr. Kirby was provoked; • The fact that, according to Dr. Randolph Stephenson, psychologist, Mr. Kirby presents a low risk of violent recidivism.

e) The appropriate sentence in the circumstances of this case [ 145 ] The offence of manslaughter carries a wide range of sentences given the various situations it applies to [29] . [ 146 ] In R . c. Vallée [30] , the Quebec Court of Appeal stated the following: [7] Une difficulté dans ce dossier tient à la nature de la plus sérieuse des deux infractions dont l’intimé a été trouvé coupable.

L’homicide involontaire coupable est compatible avec une gamme étendue de peines car, comme on l’a souvent fait observer, dans sa forme la plus grave, il jouxte le meurtre, alors qu’à un autre extrême il se rapproche de l’accident, étant entendu par ailleurs qu’il doit comporter une forme d’illicéité obligeant à le distinguer d’un simple accident. À cet égard, les propos que tenait le juge LeBel, alors de la Cour d’appel, dans l’arrêt Laplante c. R. , conservent toute leur actualité : [15] Le premier juge devait sévir devant l'une des infractions les plus graves prévues au Code pénal.

Celui-ci laisse, par contre, une très large discrétion au juge dans la détermination de la peine, à l'égard de l'homicide involontaire coupable. Le maximum est fixé à l'emprisonnement à vie. Le minimum peut être une simple sentence suspendue. Le juge du procès doit donc situer la peine à l'intérieur de ce continuum très ouvert. La présence même de cette discrétion suggère qu'à l'intérieur des cas qui, juridiquement, tombent dans la classification d'homicide involontaire coupable, au sens de l'

article 217 C.cr ., se retrouvent des actes de nature très variable. Le juge de première instance était bien conscient, ici, de cette difficulté. Il cite d’ailleurs un extrait des motifs du juge LeBel dans l’arrêt R. c. Lemay , un passage dont la teneur est très semblable à celle de la citation qui précède. [8] On peut cependant regretter que le juge n’ait pas été plus explicite dans les motifs qu’il a livrés.

La requérante lui fait donc grief d’avoir insuffisamment motivé sa décision et il semble opportun d’examiner d’un peu plus près les facteurs atténuants ou aggravants qui étaient susceptibles de jouer pour ou contre l’intimé. [9] Avant de faire cet exercice, relevons que l’étalement des peine appropriées en fonction de des facteurs atténuants ou aggravants a fait l’objet d’une étude des auteurs Hughes Parent et Julie Desrosiers dans leur traité , sous le

titre « L’homicide volontaire coupable non spécifié ». Il s’agit de l’infraction en cause ici. Sans vouloir donner à la synthèse de la jurisprudence que ces auteurs présentent le caractère d’une codification – cela dépasserait la portée de leur propos – on note qu’ils distinguent deux catégories d’homicides coupable non spécifiés, dont chacune comporte une gradation. Il y a d’abord l’homicide involontaire coupable se rapprochant du meurtre (quasi-meurtre), pour lequel les peines d’emprisonnement vont de 9 ans à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, avec prédominance des peines de 10 à 15 ans d’emprisonnement.

Vient ensuite l’homicide involontaire coupable résultant d’un acte dangereux comportant une prévision objective du risque , pour lequel les peines s’étalent de 5 à 9 ans d’emprisonnement (avec possibilité de peines plus importantes dans les cas de « grande violence ») si cette prévision permet d’entrevoir la mort, de 5 à 7 ans lorsqu’elle permet d’entrevoir des lésions corporelles graves, et de 5 ans ou moins lorsqu’elle permet d’entrevoir des lésions corporelles (situation qui se rapproche de l’accident). [References omitted] [ 147 ] In Adnane c. R . [31] , the Court of Appeal stated:

[10] Le principal grief du requérant porte sur la qualification retenue par le juge de l’homicide involontaire. Selon lui, le juge ne pouvait conclure, sans commettre une erreur de principe, que la situation s’approchait « davantage du quasi-meurtre que de la négligence ou d’un accident ». L’infraction, ajoute-t-il, s’apparente plutôt à un homicide involontaire coupable « résultant d’un acte dangereux comportant une prévision objective du risque de lésions corporelles graves ».

N’eût été cette erreur, le juge aurait appliqué une fourchette de peine se situant de 5 à 7 ans, de sorte que celle retenue (10 à 15 ans) serait excessive dans les circonstances. [11] La Cour ne partage pas cet avis. [12] Dans R. c. Vallée , la Cour écrit : [7] Une difficulté dans ce dossier tient à la nature de la plus sérieuse des deux infractions dont l’intimé a été trouvé coupable.

L’homicide involontaire coupable est compatible avec une gamme étendue de peines car, comme on l’a souvent fait observer, dans sa forme la plus grave, il jouxte le meurtre, alors qu’à un autre extrême il se rapproche de l’accident, étant entendu par ailleurs qu’il doit comporter une forme d’illicéité obligeant à le distinguer d’un simple accident. À cet égard, les propos que tenait le juge LeBel, alors de la Cour d’appel, dans l’arrêt Laplante c. R. , conservent toute leur actualité : [15] Le premier juge devait sévir devant l'une des infractions les plus graves prévues au Code pénal.

Celui-ci laisse, par contre, une très large discrétion au juge dans la détermination de la peine, à l'égard de l'homicide involontaire coupable. Le maximum est fixé à l'emprisonnement à vie. Le minimum peut être une simple sentence suspendue. Le juge du procès doit donc situer la peine à l'intérieur de ce continuum très ouvert. La présence même de cette discrétion suggère qu'à l'intérieur des cas qui, juridiquement, tombent dans la classification d'homicide involontaire coupable, au sens de l'

article 217 C.cr ., se retrouvent des actes de nature très variable . Le juge de première instance était bien conscient, ici, de cette difficulté. Il cite d’ailleurs un extrait des motifs du juge LeBel dans l’arrêt R. c. Lemay , un passage dont la teneur est très semblable à celle de la citation qui précède. [Renvois omis] [13] Tout comme dans cette affaire, le juge de première instance était bien conscient de cette difficulté et s’y attarde afin de situer l’infraction dans la fourchette des peines applicables.

Il conclut que les circonstances de l’infraction se rapprochent davantage d’un « quasi-meurtre », écartant le caractère accidentel de l’évènement. Eu égard à l’ensemble de la preuve, le caractère volontaire et conscient du geste posé, soit d’asséner le coup de couteau mortel à la victime, ne soulève à ses yeux aucun doute raisonnable. [14] Le requérant ne démontre pas en quoi cette conclusion de fait, qui mérite déférence , est déraisonnable.

Comme le juge l’indique, la localisation du seul coup asséné (au thorax, touchant le cœur) et la profondeur de la plaie (13,5 cm) supportent l’inférence que le geste était volontaire, et qu’il a été porté avec une force considérable. Sa conclusion repose également sur l’ensemble des circonstances entourant la commission de l’infraction, dont la possession d’un couteau, son usage alors que la victime n’était pas armée, le vol de la chaîne en or au cou de la victime – que le juge qualifie de « geste gratuit » – qui est à l’origine de l’altercation initiale, et sa fuite après les évènements.

Aux fins de son analyse, le juge ne pouvait isoler le fait qu’il n’y ait eu qu’« un seul » coup de couteau pour conclure qu’il s’agissait d’un accident, comme le requérant invite la Cour à le faire. Il ne s’agit pas là d’un obstacle à ce que le geste soit néanmoins qualifié de quasi-meurtre . La qualification de l’infraction devait tenir compte de l’ensemble des circonstances. [References omitted] [ 148 ] In R . c. McLaughlin-Thibault [32] , the Court of Appeal also stated: [24] Dans R. c.

Vallée , 2017 QCCA 666 , la Cour décrit ainsi la fourchette des peines en matière d’homicide involontaire coupable : [9] […] Sans vouloir donner à la synthèse de la jurisprudence que ces auteurs présentent le caractère d’une codification – cela dépasserait la portée de leur propos – on note qu’ils distinguent deux catégories d’homicides coupables non spécifiés, dont chacune comporte

une gradation. Il y a d’abord l’homicide involontaire coupable se rapprochant du meurtre (quasi-meurtre), pour lequel les peines d’emprisonnement vont de 9 ans à l’emprisonnement à perpétuité, avec prédominance des peines de 10 à 15 ans d’emprisonnement.

Vient ensuite l’homicide involontaire coupable résultant d’un acte dangereux comportant une prévision objective du risque , pour lequel les peines s’étalent de 5 à 9 ans d’emprisonnement (avec possibilité de peines plus importantes dans les cas de « grande violence ») si cette prévision permet d’entrevoir la mort, de 5 à 7 ans lorsqu’elle permet d’entrevoir des lésions corporelles graves, et de 5 ans ou moins lorsqu’elle permet d’entrevoir des lésions corporelles (situation qui se rapproche de l’accident). [Références omises] [25] Les auteurs Hugues Parent et Julie Desrosiers vont dans le même sens dans leur ouvrage Traité de droit criminel : La peine, Tome III, 3 e éd., Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 2020 : 582.

En ce qui concerne, par ailleurs, les homicides involontaires coupables se rapprochant du meurtre, mais comportant une ou quelques circonstances atténuantes permettant de s’éloigner du maximum légal admissible, ceux-ci entraînent généralement des peines variant entre 10 ans et 15 d’emprisonnement.

Parmi les circonstances permettant de diminuer quelque peu la peine envisagée, mentionnons la jeunesse de l'accusé, son état d’ivresse, l’'expression de remords sincères et véritables, le caractère isolé et spontané du crime et l’acte de défense, qui sans être légitime, diminue néanmoins la culpabilité morale du délinquant. [Références omises] [26] En invitant la Cour à intervenir, la requérante évoque un certain nombre d’erreurs que le juge aurait commises, dont le fait qu’il a estimé qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’un homicide involontaire coupable se rapprochant du meurtre (un « quasi-meurtre ») en concluant que l’affaire devait plutôt « être classée dans le haut de la catégorie des homicides involontaires avec prévisibilité objective de mort ». [27] J’estime que le juge a erré en concluant de la sorte.

On peut en effet s’interroger sur la définition d’un quasi-meurtre si les faits de la présente affaire n’en constituent pas un. À tire d’exemple, dans Adnane c. R ., 2020 QCCA 1338 , la Cour confirmait l’avis du juge du procès selon lequel les faits suivants démontraient la perpétration d’un quasi- meurtre : [3] Le 23 mai 2017, vers 23 h 33, M. Campeau-Mendes, la victime, marche sur la rue Crescent et est interpellé par M. Motty, qui est alors en compagnie du requérant. Elle s’arrête et discute avec eux.

Alors que la victime semble reprendre son chemin, le requérant s’approche d’elle, regarde de près la chaîne en or qu’elle porte au cou, la tire d’un coup sec et l’arrache. La victime tente de la récupérer. Après un court échange verbal entre eux, la victime agrippe le requérant avec sa main gauche et le frappe au visage avec sa main droite. Les deux s’empoignent, alors que M. Motty s’y implique brièvement. La victime est finalement poussée au sol. Le requérant s’enfuit, suivi de M. Motty, mais la victime les rejoint. Il s’ensuit une très courte altercation qui a lieu devant la vitrine d’un restaurant.

Le requérant poignarde la victime avec un couteau rétractable avant de fuir les lieux avec M. Motty. La victime s’effondre. D’une profondeur de 13,5 cm, le coup de couteau a entraîné un traumatisme cardiaque qui a causé la mort de la victime. Celle-ci présente également six autres plaies superficielles causées par une arme piquante et tranchante, dont cinq au thorax et une au dos du majeur gauche. [28] On ne voit pas vraiment en quoi les faits de cette affaire se rapprocheraient plus d’un meurtre que ceux du présent dossier. [29] Néanmoins, il faut relativiser cette erreur.

Je doute qu’elle ait eu un impact véritable sur la détermination de la peine puisque le juge a, de toute façon, infligé une peine qui se situe dans la fourchette des peines imposées en cas de quasi-meurtre, fourchette qu’il a décrite avec précision dans son jugement. […] [37] On comprend que le juge mentionne l’absence d’intention de tuer au moment de déterminer les faits prouvés. On comprend moins toutefois que cela puisse être retenu au

chapitre de la responsabilité morale puisque le verdict rendu par le jury, en acquittant l’intimé de meurtre, rend cette absence d’intention sans réelle pertinence au moment de déterminer la peine. On ne peut évidemment pas refuser de qualifier un homicide involontaire coupable de quasi-meurtre parce que le délinquant n’avait pas l’intention de tuer. On ne peut pas davantage retenir l’absence d’intention de tuer pour réduire le niveau de responsabilité morale en cas d’homicide involontaire coupable.

[38] Que l’intimé n’ait pas eu l’intention de tuer la victime ne diminue en rien sa responsabilité morale à l’égard d’un homicide involontaire coupable : voir notamment R. v. Ferguson , 2006 ABCA 261 , paragr. 65-66 . [ 149 ] The Court is of the view that the offence of manslaughter in this case is much closer to a murder than an accident.

It qualifies as a quasi-murder. [ 150 ] The Court finds that the appropriate range of sentencing in this case is between 10 to 15 years of imprisonment. [ 151 ] After reviewing all the relevant circumstances and the purpose and principles of sentencing, the Court is of the view that the appropriate sentence in this case is 12 years of imprisonment. [ 152 ] In the Court’s opinion, this sentence reflects the gravity of the offence and is in accordance with the purpose and principles of sentencing stated at

section 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 153 ] From this sentence, the Court will deduct the preventive custody, which in this case is 1,198 days as of January 24, 2024. [ 154 ] The parties agree that the usual conversion ratio of 1.5 should apply to the preventive custody in this case. Consequently, the total preventive custody to be deducted amounts to 1,797 days which can be rounded to 59 months. [ 155 ] The Court will render the mandatory orders with respect to DNA and weapons. [ 156 ] Finally, the Court will impose to Mr. Kirby the payment of the victim surcharge pursuant to

section 737 of the Criminal Code . A delay of 90 days for the payment was asked by the Defence. CONCLUSIONS FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 157 ] IMPOSES to Mr. Howard Charles Kirby a sentence of 12 years of imprisonment minus 59 months of preventive custody, the remaining period of imprisonment to be served being 7 years and 1 month from today; [ 158 ] PROHIBITS Mr. Howard Charles Kirby, pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, explosive substance, prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life; [ 159 ] AUTORIZES the taking from Mr. Howard Charles Kirby, for purpose of forensic DNA analysis, of any number of samples of one or more bodily substances that is reasonably required for that purpose, by means of the investigating procedures described in subsection 487.06(1) of the Criminal Code ; [ 160 ] ORDERS that Mr. Howard Charles Kirby pay the victim surcharge pursuant to

section 737 of the Criminal Code within a delay of 90 days. __________________________________ PIERRE LABRIE, J.S.C. Me Steve D. Fontaine Me Jonathan Rabchuck Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions Counsels for the prosecutor Me Maxime Chevalier Maxime Chevalier, avocat Me Gabriel Bérubé-Bouchard Gabriel Bérubé-Bouchard, avocat Counsels for the accused Hearing date: December 20, 2023