2022 QCCA 569, 2022 QCCA 569

Droit de la famille — 22667 2022 QCCA 569 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-029989-225 ( 500-12-347138-202 ) MINUTES OF HEARING WARNING : Disclosure and circulation prohibited: The Code of Civil Procedure (“ C.C.P .”) provides that, except as authorized by the court, no person shall disclose or circulate any information that would allow a party or a child whose interests are at stake in a proceeding in a family matter to be identified (arts. 15 and 16 C.C.P .). DATE: April 22, 2022 THE HONOURABLE FRÉDÉRIC BACHAND, J.A. APPLICANT COUNSEL M. E.

Mtre Pamela O'Reilly By videoconference RESPONDENT COUNSEL A. C. Mtre Linda Schachter ( Devine Schachter Polak ) By videoconference DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment terminating the proceeding rendered on March 2, 2022 by the Honourable Paul Mayer of the Superior Court , District of Montreal . Clerk at the hearing : Mélanie Camiré Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING Continuation of the hearing held on April 21 st , 2022. The parties were excused from appearing in Court. BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 3. Mélanie Camiré, Clerk at the hearing

JUDGMENT WARNING : Disclosure and circulation prohibited: The Code of Civil Procedure (“ C.C.P .”) provides that, except as authorized by the court, no person shall disclose or circulate any information that would allow a party or a child whose interests are at stake in a proceeding in a family matter to be identified (arts. 15 and 16 C.C.P .). [ 1 ] The applicant seeks leave to appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her application — made at the provisional stage of a divorce proceeding — asking for permission to relocate to Geneva, Switzerland, with the parties’ two children, now aged two and five. [1] [ 2 ] It is well established that leave to appeal from provisional judgments in family matters is only granted in exceptional circumstances. [2] By their very nature, such judgments do not finally determine any aspect of the dispute.

Moreover, they often address issues — such as the custody of children — on which Superior Court judges enjoy extensive discretion, [3] which entails that they will attract considerable deference on appellate review. As my colleague Justice Bich aptly explained: [4] [2] La jurisprudence est claire : en matière de mesures provisoires accessoires à une instance en divorce, la Cour en défère généralement au jugement de première instance et n’intervient que de manière exceptionnelle et seulement lorsque ce jugement est entaché d’une erreur flagrante ou importante causant un préjudice grave et irréparable.

La chose s’explique, en gros, 1° par le vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré au juge de première instance en pareille matière, 2° par le caractère temporaire des mesures en question, le jugement qui les prononce ne liant pas le juge saisi du fond de l’affaire, 3° par le fait qu’on peut modifier ces mesures en cours de route, au besoin, si la situation le justifie, 4° par la volonté de la Cour d’éviter de perturber le dossier de première instance par un appel qui risque d’en détourner le cours au détriment des parties et 5° par le fait que, souvent, les mesures en cause sont caduques ou proches de l’être au moment où la Cour peut entendre le pourvoi. [3] Il va sans dire que cette norme d’intervention fort exigeante définit également la manière de considérer la requête pour permission d’appeler du jugement qui décide de telles mesures provisoires : la requête ne pourra être accueillie que si l’on établit l’apparence d’une erreur flagrante ou importante dans le jugement de première instance, erreur de nature à engendrer un préjudice grave et irréparable, méritant de ce fait un examen plus poussé du dossier par la Cour et permettant d’envisager sérieusement une intervention de celle-ci. [References omitted] [ 3 ] The application points to more than 20 errors allegedly made by the judge.

The applicant also claims that the impugned judgment causes irremediable harm in a number of respects, namely: • should she relocate to Geneva, her bond with her children would be irreparably destroyed by the forced separation; • should she stay in Town A, she would effectively forgo her career as a physician because she is qualified to practice medicine in Switzerland but not in Quebec; • the judgment places her in an unthinkable bind, forcing her to either forego her career and the place she calls home or her children — a predicament that will undoubtedly result in her mental breakdown; • should she relocate to Geneva, the judge seized of the merits will be left with the impression that she abandoned her children.

The applicant also asserts that granting leave to appeal would serve the interests of justice “because decisions rendered on matters of relocation are life-changing for families, and must be taken seriously”. [5] [ 4 ] In my opinion, this is not one of those exceptional cases where leave to appeal ought to be granted.

Not only are most of the judge’s findings with which the applicant takes issue findings of fact, but, in many respects, her application amounts to a request that the Court redo the trial and reweigh both the evidence and the various factors that bear upon decisions regarding the relocation of children. That, of course, is not the Court’s role. Lastly, her assertions on the issue of irremediable harm strike me as overlooking the fact that the judgment only dealt with the issue of relocation at the provisional stage.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 5 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, without legal costs given the nature of the dispute. FRÉDÉRIC BACHAND, J.A.