2014 NBCA 22, 2014 NBCA 22

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 147-12-CA RONALD GAUTREAU and GLORIA GAUTREAU APPELLANTS RONALD GAUTREAU et GLORIA GAUTREAU APPELANTS - and - - et - RICHARD SAULNIER and JUNE SAULNIER RESPONDENTS RICHARD SAULNIER et JUNE SAULNIER INTIMÉS Gautreau et al. v. Saulnier et al., 2014 NBCA 22 Gautreau et autre c.

Saulnier et autre, 2014 NBCA 22 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Richard CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Richard Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: October 9, 2012 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 9 octobre 2012 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: March 18, 2014 Appel entendu : le 18 mars 2014 Judgment rendered: March 18, 2014 Jugement rendu : le 18 mars 2014

Counsel at hearing: For the appellants: Mélanie McGrath For the respondents: Andr é -Guy Savoie Avocats à l’audience : Pour les appelants : Mélanie McGrath Pour les intimés : Andr é -Guy Savoie THE COURT The appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500. The following is the judgment delivered by THE COURT (Orally) [ 1 ] The parties, who were represented by counsel, resolved their legal dispute at a settlement conference held pursuant to Rule 50 (“Pre-Trial Conference and Settlement Conference”) of the Rules of Court .

The terms of the settlement were incorporated in an order of the Court of Queen’s Bench to which both sides consented. The appellants did not seek leave to appeal, which is required under Rule 62.03. Nonetheless, they refused to comply with the settlement order’s terms. [ 2 ] As a result, the respondents applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench to enforce the settlement order. The appellants, who were represented by a different solicitor, opposed enforcement, contending their consent to the settlement order was invalid because it was prompted by a misapprehension of the facts on their part.

The appellants did not produce any evidence in support of that contention.

In any event, the admissibility of evidence of that nature is doubtful in light of Rule 50.10(3), which reads as follows: 50.10(3) All discussions, statements or representations and any record, however made or stored, whether in printed form, on film, by electronic means or otherwise, of discussions, statements or representations of the parties, their solicitors, agents or representatives or of the settlement conference judge made at a settlement conference or in preparation thereof are without prejudice, privileged and confidential and shall not be referred to in any subsequent proceedings. 50.10(3) Toute discussion, déclaration ou représentation, et toute note prise ou conservée par quelque moyen que ce soit, y compris tout film ou toute impression par moyen électronique ou autrement de toute discussion, déclaration ou représentation par les parties, leurs avocats, leurs agents ou représentants ou du juge de la conférence de règlement amiable faits à la conférence de règlement amiable ou en vue de la préparer sont sans préjudice, privilégiés et confidentiels et ne doivent pas être évoqués dans toute autre procédure subséquente. [ 3 ] Moreover, the appellants did not suggest in first instance that the consent order failed to reflect

the settlement reached with the respondents. [4] After considering the affidavit evidence filed in support of the motion, the judge found theconsent settlement order was enforceable and the appellants had failed, without justification, to honor the obligations it imposed uponthem.

In the result, the respondents’ motion was allowed with costs. [5] In this Court, the appellants contest the enforcement decision on the grounds that their lawyers(at the settlement conference and on the hearing of the motion for enforcement) acted incompetently, most notably by failing to bringinto play documents and information which, the appellants claim, were relevant and significant. Correlatively, the appellants applied forleave to adduce supporting evidence pursuant to Rule 62.21(2).

We dismissed the motion because the proffered evidence does not meetthe requirements for admissibility adopted in Workers’ Compensation Board of New Brunswick and Ayles v. McCarthy and EasternPaving Limited (1982), (NB CA), 42 N.B.R. (2d) 160, [1982] N.B.J. No. 309 (QL) (C.A.), and re-affirmed inCassista v. Cyr (1988), (NB CA), 93 N.B.R. (2d) 177, [1988] N.B.J. No. 1126 (QL) (C.A.) and other more recentcases. [6] At any rate, the appellants’ complaint of incompetence on the part of their counsel in the Courtof Queen’s Bench proceedings, even if substantiated, could not justify intervention by this Court.

In our view, the issues of professionalmalpractice and consequential losses stand to be litigated and determined in other proceedings. [7] A final thought. The fact that the settlement order is a consent order does not diminish, in anyway, its binding effect as an order of the Court of Queen’s Bench. The motion judge rightly held that, absent reversal on appeal,compliance with the settlement order’s terms was obligatory. [8] That being so, there is no principled basis for intervention by the Court. Accordingly, theappeal is dismissed. Costs on appeal are fixed at $2,500. ______________________________________ J.

ERNEST DRAPEAU, CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW BRUNSWICK _______________________________________ M.E.L. LARLEE, J.A. _______________________________________ J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A.