2020 QCCA 435, 2020 QCCA 435

Droit de la famille — 20393 2020 QCCA 435 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-028731-198 ( 500-12-344055-193 ) MINUTES OF HEARING DATE: March 13, 2020 THE HONOURABLE MANON SAVARD, J.A. APPLICANT COUNSEL Y. F. Mtre Muriel Librati ( Teitelbaum Librati ) RESPONDENT COUNSEL E. H. Mtre FABRIZIO MANCUSO ( Devine Schachter Polak ) DESCRIPTION: Application for leave to appeal from a judgment rendered in the course of the proceeding on November 14, 2019 by the Honourable Marie-Anne Paquette of the Superior Court , District of Montreal (Art. 31 C.C.P ) . Clerk at the hearing : Mélanie Camiré Courtroom: RC-18 HEARING

9:35 Commencement of the hearing. Identification of counsel. Recess of the hearing. 10:28 Resumption of the hearing. Submissions by Mtre Librati. 10:51 Submissions by Mtre Mancuso. 11:06 Reply by Mtre Librati. 11:09 Recess of the hearing. Resumption of the hearing. BY THE COURT: Judgment – see page 3. Conclusion of the hearing. Mélanie Camiré, Clerk at the hearing JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The applicant seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court dated November 14, 2019 that adjudicated interim measures valid until December 18, 2019 in a contested divorce proceeding.

He also seeks to suspend the provisional execution of said judgment pending the appeal. [ 2 ] The only two [1] conclusions of the judgment that are in issue relate to: (1) the obligation of the applicant to pay spousal support, which, in his view, should be reduced from $2,500 to $700; and (2) the provision for costs. The applicant’s main contention is that an interim order should not have the effect of changing the status quo.

In addition, he argues that the obligations imposed by the trial judge are excessive and go beyond his financial means, which, in his view, justifies the granting of leave to appeal. [ 3 ] The applicant’s motion for leave to appeal is governed by s. 21(6) of the Divorce Act and art. 31 C.C.P. ( Droit de la famille – 121718 , 2012 QCCA 1229 ).

In Droit de la famille – 171472 , 2017 QCCA 1032 , Bich, J.A. summarized the requirements in such matters as follows: [8] Comme le rappelle la juge Bélanger dans Droit de la famille — 17358 [renvoi omis] : [1] La permission d’appeler d’une ordonnance de sauvegarde n’est accordée que de manière exceptionnelle . La raison en est que l’ordonnance de sauvegarde peut être révisée lors de l’audience au fond ou encore modifiée par un juge en première instance, si nécessaire. Ainsi, une ordonnance de sauvegarde décide rarement du litige de façon définitive.

C’est le cas en l’espèce. [9] Le propos est transposable à la présente affaire, sans compter que la norme régissant l’intervention de la Cour en matière familiale, particulièrement à un stade provisoire, est extrêmement exigeante , et qu’elle l’est plus encore lorsque l’appel envisagé porte sur les faits et l’appréciation de ceux-ci par le ou la juge de première instance ou encore l’exercice par le tribunal d’un certain pouvoir discrétionnaire [renvoi omis]. [Emphasis added] [ 4 ] The applicant did not convince me of the existence of these exceptional circumstances, as the case law requires.

The judgment under appeal has not been in effect since December 18, 2019; this alone would suffice to dismiss the application. [2] The fact that, since then, the interim order has been renewed and will be in effect until March 19, 2020, according to the parties, does not bind the next judge who will hear the application for its renewal. [3] The latter will have to decide the application, based on the evidence in support thereof. In addition, the hearing on the provisional measures has already been fixed for two days in August 2020.

In these circumstances, the judgment of the Court, should leave be granted, will have limited value, if any. [ 5 ] Furthermore, the applicant did not convince me of the existence of an “irremediable injury / prejudice irremediable” under art. 31 C.C.P.

As Schrager, J.A. wrote: “[…] un préjudice monétaire, tel que celui alléguée par le requérant, n’est pas irréparable, vu qu’il est sujet à correction sur le fond ou advenant un changement dans les circonstances des parties”. [4] [ 6 ] Lastly, the applicant did not demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances that would justify granting the leave to appeal. In the present case, the Superior Court was faced with conflicting affidavits. The trial judge based her conclusions on the evidence before her while taking the best interests of the children into account.

Granting the applicant’s motion would be a violation of the proportionality principle (art. 18 C.C.P. ). The following passage written by Bich, J.A. in Droit de la famille – 171472 , supra , applies to the case at hand:

[11] […] Il serait contre-productif que les parties dépensent des sommes considérables pour un débat – interlocutoire – qui sera vraisemblablement repris devant la Cour supérieure. Les parties ont en réalité tout intérêt à faire cheminer diligemment les procédures pendantes devant ce tribunal, ce qu’un appel ne favoriserait pas. [ 7 ] The same can be said here, especially in view of the hearing date on the provisional measures, where the judge will then have the benefit of viva voce evidence and lengthy representations by the parties.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 8 ] DISMISSES the motion for leave to appeal; [ 9 ] DISMISSES the request for a stay of execution pending appeal which was included in the motion for leave to appeal, on the basis that it is moot; [ 10 ] WITHOUT costs, given the nature of the file. MANON SAVARD, J.A.