R. v. Beveridge Date:, 2013 BCPC 430

Citation: R. v. Beveridge Date: 20130319 2013 BCPC 0430 File No: 30793-3 Registry: Williams Lake IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. JEFFREY SCOTT BEVERIDGE RULING ON APPLICATION OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE E.L. BAYLIFF Counsel for the Crown: S. Thompson Counsel for the Defendant: G. Wool Place of Hearing: Williams Lake , B.C. Date of Hearing: January 29, 2013 Date of Judgment: March 19, 2013 [ 1 ] This is my Ruling at the conclusion of an application by the defendant, Mr. Beveridge, for a judicial stay of proceedings

pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the basis that his s. 11(

b) right to trial within a reasonable time has been violated. In short, this is an “Askov” application for a judicial stay based on delay. [ 2 ] For the reasons set out below I have concluded that I must dismiss Mr. Beveridge’s application. [ 3 ] There is no question that Mr. Beveridge has been before the Provincial Court for a very long time - nearly 3 years - on this charge of Driving Without Due Care and Attention contrary to s. 144(1)(

a) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act. However, when I examine the matter more closely it is my conclusion that his s. 11(

b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time has not been violated. As my reasons will show, key factors in my conclusion are that I have decided to categorize as “neutral” the 9 months of delay that occurred in 2012 due to the illness of Crown counsel in April and the bomb threat in September. The other key factor is my assessment is that this is a trial of considerable complexity and seriousness involving, as it does, a very severe motor vehicle accident where causation is in issue and which resulted in serious injury to the two drivers, Mr. Beveridge and Ms. Parker, and the tragic death of Ms.

Parker’s passenger, Angela Fisher. [ 4 ] I will now explain my reasons in more detail beginning with a brief overview of the facts as alleged by the Crown witnesses I have heard to date. [ 5 ] I should add that I have received the package of e mails prepared and submitted by both counsel and have supplemented those with copies of the Trial Notices (‘pink slips’) which I located in the court file. I direct that this package of “Trial Scheduling E Mails and Trial Notices” be marked as Exhibit 2 on this application . I have also made copies of the two Summonses located in the court file that issued for Mr.

Beveridge (one returnable in August 2010 and the other in September of that year). Neither of these Summonses was served on Mr. Beveridge. Copies of these Summonses will be marked Exhibit 3. [ 6 ] I should also say that counsel have referred me to the following cases: R. v Morin [1992] 1 S.C.R. 772 , R. v. Cantrill , 2010 BCPC 318 , R. v. Blattler , 2012 BCPC 35 , R. v. Purchase , 2012 BCSC 208 , R. v. Haglof , 2012 BCSC 449 , R. v. Baldini , 2012 BCCA 206 , R. v. Saeed , 2012 BCPC, 178 . Facts [ 7 ] The afternoon of July 19 th , 2009 was sunny and hot in the Cariboo. Mr.

Beveridge was driving north on Highway 97 in the area of 140 Mile. Ms. Parker, with her passenger, Angela Fisher was driving south. Their vehicles collided head on. Ms. Fisher was killed instantly. Mr. Beveridge and Ms. Parker were both very seriously injured and were taken away by ambulance to hospital. The RCMP investigated the matter. Sgt. Nelson, an experienced collision reconstruction specialist, attended the scene and ultimately prepared a detailed report. Nearly 12 months later, on July 5 th , 2010, an Information was sworn charging Mr. Beveridge with the s. 144(1)(

a) Motor Vehicle Act offence. [ 8 ] A detailed history of the progress of this matter through the court from that point on is found in

Schedule A to my reasons. [ 9 ] In R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 772 the Supreme Court of Canada provided a helpful template for analysis of delay in court proceedings and I will follow that in the remainder of my reasons, beginning with the length of the delay. 1 . Length of Delay [ 10 ] As set out in Appendix A, the total time that has elapsed between the date of this tragic accident – July 19 th , 2009 – and the date that this trial is currently anticipated to conclude – May 10 th , 2013 - is nearly 4 years. Of that time, nearly 12 months was pre-charge delay.

Generally speaking, pre-charge delay is not considered as part of the s. 11(b) ‘delay’ equation. Justice Sopinka said the following about pre-charge delay in Morin , above: “Pre-charge delay may in certain circumstances have an influence on the overall determination as to whether post-charge delay is unreasonable but of itself it is not counted in determining the length of the delay.” [ 11 ] I will briefly mention pre-charge delay as an aspect of “4.

Prejudice to the accused” but otherwise will not consider it. [ 12 ] The date the Information is sworn is the date the clock starts ticking for the purpose of assessing delay. In the case at bar that date was July 5 th , 2010. The rationale for this is that the accused is not in jeopardy, in a legal sense, until a charge is laid against him. [ 13 ] In the case at bar the post-charge delay will be 34 months or nearly 3 years as of the anticipated date for the conclusion of this trial (May 10 th , 2013). Is this delay sufficient to raise an issue as to its reasonableness? The answer is clearly “Yes.” 2.

Waiver of Time Periods [ 14 ] I find that there was no waiver of time periods in this case. 3 . The Reasons for the Delay (

a) Inherent Time Requirements [ 15 ] There are two aspects of this case that fall under the heading “Inherent Time Requirements”. The first is what I have termed “Intake” time on the attached

Schedule A. [ 16 ] When a defendant is first charged there is a period of time that is taken up with getting the matter to the point of being trial ready. As Justice Sopinka put it in the Morin case: “…it takes time for the fire truck to get to the fire.” The defendant must be served with a Summons or brought into court for the first time in some way. He must receive disclosure of the Crown particulars and have time

to absorb them. He must have time to retain and instruct a lawyer. It then takes time for the lawyer and the court to find trial dates that are mutually satisfactory and to appear in court to have those dates fixed. [ 17 ] In the case at bar it took from July to December, 2010 (5 months) to get Mr. Beveridge into court for the first time. This is longer than the usual range of 6 weeks to 3 months ( Morin). Mr. Wool argues that the police were guilty of laches in failing to get the Summonses served on Mr. Beveridge either in time for the August or September, 2010 court dates. He points out that Mr.

Beveridge’s address had not changed and the police always knew how to reach him if they had turned their mind to the problem. There is no better indication of this, he says, than the fact that Cst. Meaver, the officer in charge of this investigation, eventually picked up the telephone and called Mr. Beveridge in November of that year to advise him that there was a warrant out for his arrest, whereupon Mr.

Beveridge promptly took himself into the nearest police station (Coquitlam) where he was given a Promise to Appear for a court date in Williams Lake in December. [ 18 ] The evidence is sketchy about why the police were not able to get Mr. Beveridge notified of his first court date prior to November, 2010. It is clear that Mr. Beveridge did not move and that Cst. Meaver, who was familiar with the case, had no trouble locating Mr. Beveridge when he put his mind to it. However, this does not automatically equate with laches on the part of the police.

I take judicial notice of the fact that the RCMP, even in a small town like Williams Lake, is made up of many individual police officers and support staff. It seems likely to me that there are systems in place for the orderly and timely processing of court documents such as Summonses. Since Mr. Beveridge does not live in the Williams Lake area, those procedures likely involved liaising with one or more police agencies in the Lower Mainland to get the documents served.

It may have been that the RCMP or the other police agency “sat on” the Summonses for a number of months and did nothing to move the paperwork along and get Mr. Beveridge served. Or, it may be that all procedures were properly followed, and in a timely way but, because of the distance and the involvement of another police agency, service was still not successfully affected by the returnable dates. The onus is on the defendant on a balance of probabilities and I simply do not have enough information to know which is the correct characterization of what occurred in this case.

Therefore, I have categorized the full 6 month period, between the date the Information was laid (July 5, 2010) and the date the trial date was fixed (January 26, 2011), as “Intake”, or part of the inherent time requirements of the case. [ 19 ] The second aspect to the inherent time requirements of the case concerns the complexity of the case and the amount of time needed to try it. Although the charge is a relatively minor one – Drive Without Due Care and Attention contrary to the Motor Vehicle Act – and, although it is quasi-criminal rather than criminal, I find that it is both serious, and complex, in nature.

Ms. Angela Fisher lost her life in this accident and for that reason alone the matter is serious. It is serious for many other reasons as well – the injuries suffered by the two people who survived the accident, Ms. Parker and Mr. Beveridge, the stigma for Mr. Beveridge, if convicted, as well as the sentence and the civil consequences that he may face. The case is complex because the cause of the accident is not clear cut and there is an expert witness involved. Both Crown and Defence counsel originally estimated that the case would require 2 days. The case has been very fully defended, and rightly so.

But, the result is that the initial estimate of 2 days has proved grossly inaccurate. To date, the case has taken 4 days of trial time and it is estimated 2 further days are required to complete it, for a total of 6 days. (

b) Actions of the Accused [ 20 ] There are two ways in which the actions of the accused or his counsel have contributed to the delay in this case. The first is a one month period in February, 2012, when Mr. Wool was away. [ 21 ] The second is a much more significant factor in the delay that has occurred in this case, but it is much more difficult to quantify. It concerns the inaccurate time estimate of 2 days which was originally given for this case. I recognize that it is very difficult to come up with accurate estimates for trial time, in advance.

And, I note that both the Crown and the Defence supported the initial “2 day” estimate. The fact remains that had counsel given a more realistic estimate, in the range of 4 to 6 days rather than 2 days back when this matter was first scheduled, in January, 2011, this number of days could have been reserved from the very beginning. Had this been done, it may well have resulted in this case being concluded 12 months earlier than is currently forecast. [i] As it is, the matter has staggered forward on a day by day basis since January 30 th , 2012.

Each time a further day is required, another 3 to 5 months of delay has resulted. (

c) Actions of the Crown [ 22 ] There have been four ways in which the actions of the Crown have contributed to the delay in this case although only one of these is ultimately attributable as “Crown” delay. [ 23 ] First, Crown Counsel was ill on April 24, 2012, a day scheduled for the continuation of Mr. Beveridge’s trial. As a result the trial had to be adjourned. The new date that was fixed was September 4 th , 2012, resulting in a 5 month delay. I have concluded, on the authority of R. v. Cantrill , 2010 BCPC 318 , ¶ 29 , that this should not be categorized as “Crown” delay.

Illness is not something that is within the control of the person struck down. It is therefore a “Neutral” factor, much like adverse weather conditions or other “Acts of God”. [ 24 ] Second, it is clear from the e mail exchanges of February 27 – March 5, 2012 (see Exhibit 2) that the busy

schedule of the Crown’s expert witness, Sgt. Nelson, was a factor in finding trial time for the continuation of this matter. The court had a number of dates available in March, 2012, Mr. Wool also had two dates available that month. However, Sgt. Nelson was not available until April. Therefore, of the 2 months between Mr. Wool’s return in late February, 2012 and the continuation date of April 24, 2012, I have allocated 1 month to lack of court time or “Institutional Delay” and 1 month to the Crown (Sgt.

Nelson’s schedule). [ 25 ] Third, from the e mail exchanges after the April 24 th , 2012 adjournment (April 26 – 30, 2012), it is difficult to say how the 5 month delay which followed should be allocated. There is evidence that the court’s schedule, Mr. Wool’s

schedule and Sgt. Nelson’s

schedule were all factors. In the absence of any clear evidence that the only reason for the delay after the April 24 th adjournment was because of one or other of those factors, I have concluded that the entire delay (5 months) should be left in the “Neutral” category because it results, first and foremost, from illness.

[ 26 ] Fourth, Crown counsel, like Defence counsel, gave an initial estimate for this trial of 2 days. This has proved to be grossly inadequate. As such, the Crown also bears some responsibility for the fact that this matter was not allocated sufficient court time from the beginning. As I said when discussing this issue under “Actions of Defence” above, the failure to provide the court with a more accurate time estimate has likely resulted in the matter taking up to 12 months longer to complete than it should have. (

d) Limits on Institutional Resources “… [T]his is the period that starts to run when the parties are ready for trial but the system cannot accommodate them.” Morin , above. [ 27 ] Mr. Beveridge and his lawyer were ready for trial on January 26, 2011 or very soon thereafter. As Justice Sopinka comments, in a perfect world there would be courtrooms, judges, court clerks, Crown prosecutors and Sheriffs available so that the trial could take place the moment the defendant and his counsel were ready. However, we do not live in a perfect world.

Many other people also want court time and taxpayers simply cannot afford to fund a level of service that would see everyone receive a trial, immediately. The result is a waiting list for court time. [ 28 ] In this case the initial wait – from January 26 th to November 14 & 15, 2011 – was 10 months. This is within the guidelines set by the court in R. v. Morin – 8 to 12 months for a

summary conviction trial, including complex trials. Unfortunately, Mr. Beveridge’s trial could not proceed on those dates in November, 2011 because the judge assigned to hear the matter, Judge Tindale, as he then was, was elevated to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Mr. Beveridge’s trial had to be adjourned. Court time was found two months later, on January 16 th and 20 th (and later time was also found on January 30 th ), 2012.

This was clearly a delay that was caused by the internal functioning of the court, specifically the elevation of Judge Tindale, and I have therefore categorized the 2 month delay that resulted as “Institutional Delay”. [ 29 ] As of January 16 th and 30 th , 2012, the total delay attributable to limitations on institutional resources (what I have termed “Institutional Delay”) was 12 months.

This is still within the Morin guideline for complex matters. [ 30 ] Of the 3 months that went by between January 30 th and the next day that was set, April 24 th , 2012, I have allocated 1 month (February) to the Defence as Mr. Wool was away, 1 month (March) to “Institutional Delay” as late March was the first time court dates were available, and 1 month (April) to “Crown” delay as the witness, Sgt. Nelson, was not available until April. [ 31 ] As it turned out, Mr. Beveridge’s case did not continue until some 9 months later, on January 18 th , 2013.

I have concluded that the whole of this 9 month period must be categorized as “Neutral” in the delay analysis. I have already mentioned that the delay in April was due to the illness of the Crown prosecutor and that illness is clearly regarded as a “Neutral” factor. [ 32 ] The matter was adjourned to continue on September 4 th , 2012 but, because of a bomb threat the court house was evacuated before court started that morning and the evacuation remained in effect until the late afternoon. As a result, Mr. Beveridge’s trial was adjourned yet again, this time to January 18 th , 2013. Mr.

Wool argues that the delay resulting should be attributed to the “Crown” or to “Institutional Delay” because it is in the nature of the court institution that it will be targeted by those inclined to make such threats. I cannot agree. In my view is something that is not only completely unpredictable, but also completely outside the control of the court.

Therefore, it is correct to categorize any delay that results from an incident of this sort as “Neutral”. [ 33 ] The only other delay in this case which is attributable to limits on institutional resources or “Institutional Delay” is the total of 4 months between the most recent trial date, January 18 th , 2013 and the dates that have been reserved for the continuation of this matter on April 9 th and May 10 th , 2013.

The Trial Notice prepared by the Judicial Case Manager does not indicate what factors were at play in the choice of these dates and I have no e mail record documenting the scheduling of these particular dates. I am prepared to assume that this time is entirely attributable to “Institutional Delay” although in doing so I am being generous to the Defence since the defendant bears the burden and has adduced no evidence about this portion of the delay. [ 34 ] In

summary, the total “Institutional Delay” in this case is 17 months. This is 5 months more than the Morin guideline for complex cases of 8 – 12 months. [ 35 ] The Morin guideline is, however, simply that – a guideline – it is not to be applied mechanically. It will, on occasion, give way to other factors. The key factors in the case at bar are that Mr. Beveridge’s case is serious and complex, requiring a multi-day trial and that the initial two day estimate was grossly inadequate. Once the two days that had been scheduled were used up as of January 20 th , 2012, the court had to attempt to pry further time out of a

schedule that was already fully booked with other cases waiting in the queue. As a result, the case has staggered forward in 1 day increments since then, generally separated by 3 to 5 months of delay on each occasion. (

e) Other Reasons for Delay [ 36 ] In this case, a significant portion of the delay (9 months) is attributable to other factors – the illness of Crown counsel on April 24 th , 2012 and a bomb threat that resulted in the evacuation of the court house on September 4 th , 2012. For the reasons earlier set out I have concluded that these two events and the delay that resulted from each are “Neutral” in nature and cannot be attributed to “Crown”, “Defence” or to “Institutional Delay”. 4. Prejudice to the Accused “Section 11(

b) protects the individual from impairment of the right to liberty, security of the person, and the ability to make full answer and defence resulting from unreasonable delay in bringing criminal trials to a conclusion.” Morin , above. [ 37 ] Prejudice to the accused can be inferred from prolonged delay. The longer the delay, the more likely that prejudice will be inferred. Morin , above. See also R. v. Godin , 2009 SCC 26 at ¶ 34 and 37 . However, if prejudice to the accused cannot be inferred

from the length or circumstances of the delay and if prejudice to the accused is not otherwise proved, the accused’s claim that his s. 11(

b) right to trial within a reasonable time has been violated will be seriously undermined. [ 38 ] This is a case where prejudice can be inferred simply from the length of the delay. The earliest this trial can be expected to conclude is in May, 2013. By then Mr. Beveridge will have had the matter hanging over him for 34 months, post-charge (of which, 17 months is due to lack of institutional resources or “Institutional Delay”). [ 39 ] In addition, Mr. Beveridge has filed an Affidavit in which he deposes two other sources of actual prejudice flowing from the delay in this case.

He had planned to apply to join the Vancouver Police Department recruit training program at the end of 2010 but was informed that first, he had to dispose of the charge against him. He has been waiting ever since to do so and his career plans have been on hold now for more than 2 years, awaiting the conclusion of this trial. [ 40 ] Mr. Beveridge also raises a concern about his ability to make full answer and defence since it is very hard for him to remember critical details this long after the event.

The RCMP did not get around to taking a statement from him until nearly a year after the accident, in June, 2010. [ii] So, he argues, it is not as if his memory can be refreshed from a statement taken shortly after the event. He admits that he gave a statement to ICBC just 2 months after the accident, but says he did not really think about the details of his driving and the cause(

s) of the accident when giving that statement. [ 41 ] I have no doubt that everything to do with the events of July 19 th , 2009 has been and continues to be a very large source of anxiety and stress for Mr. Beveridge (as well as for Ms. Parker and for members of Angela Fisher’s family). However, it is important to remember that the s. 11(

b) analysis is directed at the prejudice caused by undue delay in the trial and not at the stress flowing from simply having been a part of such a horrific event. Nor is it directed at the stress of being charged with the offence and going to trial per se. In Mr. Beveridge’s case I do find that he has suffered a certain amount of prejudice in the form of anxiety and emotional burden from the delay in the trial but I find that it is much less than the stress he has endured as a result of the other factors – the accident itself and the fact that he was charged. [ 42 ] I do find that Mr.

Beveridge has also established some prejudice in the form of the delay in his application to the Vancouver Police Department. However, as the Crown points out an application of that sort is likely to take into account a wide range of personal details about Mr. Beveridge and it is difficult to say, on the Affidavit evidence available, whether this unresolved Motor Vehicle Act charge was the only thing holding up his application. [ 43 ] Finally, I do find that Mr.

Beveridge has established some potential prejudice of his right to make full answer and defence because his memory has faded in the nearly 4 year since the accident and there was no statement taken from which he can refresh his memory. However, he did provide a statement to ICBC shortly after the incident which should be of some assistance. He also provided a statement to the RCMP in June, 2010 and, as I understand it, civil proceedings are ongoing and both he and Ms. Parker have undergone examination for discovery which, again, I expect would be of some assistance.

Conclusion [ 44 ] The anticipated delay until Mr. Beveridge’s trial can conclude will be 34 months, post charge. 17 months of this is attributable to “Institutional Delay”. Is a judicial stay of proceedings warranted in these circumstances? In my view it is not. [ 45 ] I note that in a separate but concurring judgment in R. v.

Morin , supra, Justice McLachlin spoke about the need on an application of this sort to balance society’s interest against the accused’s interest: “The task of a judge in deciding whether proceedings against the accused should be stayed is to balance the societal interest in seeing that persons charged with offences are brought to trial against the accused’s interest in prompt adjudication.

In the final analysis the judge, before staying charges, must be satisfied that the interest of the accused and society in a prompt trial outweighs the interest of society in bringing the accused to trial.” [emphasis added] [ 46 ] I will start with the second element in this balance – the interest of society in bringing Mr. Beveridge to trial. Mr. Beveridge is charged with an offence under the Motor Vehicle Act. Although the charge is regulatory in nature, it is a very serious matter because Angela Fisher lost her life and two others, Mr. Beveridge and Ms. Parker, were severely injured in this accident.

For this reason there is a significant societal interest in seeing Mr. Beveridge brought to trial on this charge. [ 47 ] The other element in the balance is the combined societal and individual interest in having a prompt trial. For the reasons set out above I find that Mr. Beveridge has established some real prejudice to his interests as a result of the delay in this case. I also find that society has a very real interest in having a prompt trial in this and most other cases. [ 48 ] In this case there was a longer than usual “Intake” period and a long period of delay due to “Neutral” factors.

Together, these two categories amount to nearly half (15 months) of the 34 months of post-charge delay. A negligible amount of delay is attributable to the actions of Crown and Defence (2 months) and the remainder (17 months) is due to limitations on institutional resources or “Institutional Delay”. This is only 5 months in excess of the Morin guideline of 12 months for complex cases. And, I bear in mind that counsels’ time estimates were grossly inadequate in this case, which, I conclude makes it particularly difficult for the court, as an institution, to

schedule the matter in a way that is most likely to avoid undue delay. See R. v. Baldini , 2012 BCCA 206 at ¶ 52 to 54 . [ 49 ] In my view, the strong societal interest in bringing a matter of this seriousness to trial outweighs the societal and individual interest in having a prompt trial. This is not one of the “clearest of cases” where a judicial stay of proceedings is warranted. I therefore dismiss Mr. Beveridge’s application.

________________________________ E. L. Bayliff Provincial Court Judge

SCHEDULE A Date Event Category Delay July 19, 2009 Motor vehicle accident. The car driven by Mr. Beveridge and the car driven by Ms. Chelsea Parker are involved in a head on collision. Ms. Angela Fisher, riding in the Parker vehicle, is killed. July 5, 2010 Information laid charging Mr. Beveridge with Drive Without Due Care and Attention contrary to s. 144(1) (

a) of the Motor Vehicle Act. Summons to issue, returnable August 11, 2010. Pre-charge delay 12 months August 11, 2010 No proof of service. Summons to re-issue for September 29, 2010. Intake 1 month September 29, 2010 No proof of service. Warrant in the first instance. Intake 2 months Mid November, 2010 Cst. Meaver phones Mr. Beveridge to advise there is a warrant for his arrest. Mr. Beveridge attends Coquitlam detachment and is released on a Promise to Appear for December 15, 2010 ( Exhibit 1).

Intake 4 months December 15, 2010 First Appearance Intake 5 months January 12, 2011 Arraignment Hearing, not guilty plea entered, adjourned to January 26, 2011 to fix a date. (Two day estimate given by counsel.) Intake 6 months January 21 - 24, 2011 Exchange of e mails re: dates. Insufficient detail to determine if anything other than institutional delay was a factor in the dates fixed. ( Exhibit 2.) Intake 6 months

January 26, 2011 Trial date fixed: Nov. 14 & 15, 2011. Intake 6 months October 5, 2011 November, 2011 trial dates confirmed. October 20, 2011 Exchange of e mails. Due to elevation of then Judge Tindale to Supreme Court, November trial dates must be cancelled. (Institutional Delay) November 6 – 8, 2011 Exchange of e mails re: dates. Insufficient detail to determine if anything other than institutional delay was a factor. November 9, 2011 New trial date fixed: January 16 & 20, 2012. November 14 & 15, 2011 First trial date scheduled.

Did not proceed because of Judge Tindale’s elevation (see October 20, 2011, above.) Institutional Delay 10 months December 21, 2011 January, 2012 trial dates confirmed. January 16, 2012 Day 1 of Trial. Argument on pre-trial issues heard. Evidence of Chelsea Parker commenced but not completed. *This is the first time Mr. Beveridge appears in person in Williams Lake. Institutional Delay 12 months (18 months since Information laid) (30 months since date of accident) January 17, 2012 Exchange of e mails. January 20 is overbooked with Mr. Wool’s other trials.

January 30 may have time if Crown will clear other matters. (Matter was left on the list to continue on January 20.) January 20, 2012 Day 2 of Trial. Cross examination of Ms. Parker completed (by video). Evidence of Cst. Buckingham heard. Adjourned to January 30 th to continue. (Part of the day spent on Mr. Wool’s other urgent continuations.) Institutional Delay 12 months

January 30, 2012 Day 3 of Trial. Evidence of Cst. Meaver heard. (Part of day spent on Mr. Wool’s other urgent continuations.) Adjourned to fix a date to continue (1 day time estimate given by counsel.) Institutional Delay 12 months February 1, 2012 Appearance to fix a date. Adjourned to March 7, 2012 to do so as Mr. Wool was going to be away for the month of February, 2012. Defence 1 month February 27 – March 5, 2012 Exchange of e mails upon Mr. Wool’s return re: dates. April 24, 2012 is the date fixed upon to continue. Court and Mr. Wool have dates available in March but Sgt.

Nelson, Crown expert, not available until April. ***I allocate 1 month to “Institutional Delay” and 1 month to “Crown”. (See April 24, 2012) March 7, 2012 Date for continuation of trial fixed: April 24, 2012. April 24, 2012 Continuation of Trial. Did not proceed due to illness of Crown Counsel. (“Neutral”) (See September 4, 2012). Institutional Delay Crown (witness unavailability) (See February 27, 2012) 1 month (+ 12 months) = 13 months 1 month April 26 – 30, 2012 Exchange of e mails re: dates. Once again, Sgt. Nelson’s schedule, Mr. Wool’s

schedule and the Court’s

schedule were all factors in choosing the date of September 4, 2012 to continue. ***However, the delay between April 24, 2012 and September 4, 2012 will be categorized as “Neutral” since it arose from the illness of the Crown prosecutor. (See September 4, 2012).

September 4, 2012 Continuation of Trial. Did not proceed due to bomb threat. Court house evacuated for the day. *** The delay resulting (September 4, 2012 to January 18, 2013 will be categorized as “Neutral” since it arose from a cause external to the court administration or either of the parties. (See January 18, 2012) Neutral (See April 26, 2012.) 5 months September 5, 2012 Appearance to fix a date for continuation of trial. Trial Notice (‘pink slip’) printed on this dates says “Dates offered: Sept. 28, Dec. 18, 20, 28, Jan 3-11”. The matter is scheduled for continuation on January 18, 2013.

January 18, 2013 Day 4 of Trial. Sgt. Nelson testifies all day but cross examination not completed by day’s end. Adjourned to fix a date to continue. (Court estimates that 2 more days will be required.) Neutral (See September 4, 2012) 4 months January 22, 2013 E mail fixing ‘Askov’ application for January 29, 2013 due to collapse of another of Mr. Wool’s matters. January 29, 2013 ‘Askov’ application argued. Decision reserved. * This is the second day Mr. Beveridge appears in person in Williams Lake. March 19, 2013 Date for decision on ‘Askov’ application.

April 2, 2013 Day 5 of Trial (anticipated.) No evidence available about the degree to which court, Crown and Defence schedules affected this choice of date. ***I will assume the 3 months of delay (January 18 to April 2, 2013) is due to “Institutional Delay” alone. Institutional Delay 3 months May 10, 2013 Day 6 of Trial (anticipated). Institutional Delay 1 month

SUMMARY TOTAL DELAY SINCE DATE OF INCIDENT July 19, 2009 to May 10, 2013 46 months (nearly 4 years) TOTAL PRE- CHARGE DELAY July 19, 2009 to July 5, 2010 12 months (nearly 1 year) TOTAL POST- CHARGE DELAY July 5, 2010 to May 10, 2013 34 months (nearly 3 years) POST-CHARGE DELAY BREAKDOWN INTAKE July 5, 2010 to January 26, 2011 6 months INSTITUTIONAL DELAY January 26, 2011 to November 14 & 15, 2011, to January 16 & 30, 2012 (12 months) plus March, 2012 (1 month) plus January 18, 2013 to April 2, 2013 (3 months) plus April2, 2013 to May 10, 2013 (1 month) 17 months CROWN April 1 – 24, 2012 (1 month) 1 month DEFENCE February, 2012 (1 month) 1 month

NEUTRAL April 24, 2012 to September 4, 2012 (5 months) plus September 4, 2012 to January 18, 2013 (4 months) 9 months TOTAL POST- CHARGE DELAY July 5, 2010 to May 10, 2013 34 months (nearly 3 years) [i] “Had this [giving a realistic time estimate of 4 to 6 days when the matter was first being scheduled in January, 2011] been done, it may well have resulted in this case being concluded 12 months earlier than is currently forecast.” I arrive at this conclusion by taking judicial notice of the fact that the Judicial Case Manager usually books long trials 10 to 12 months in advance which would have taken us to about January 2012.

Alternately, if she had booked the trial in 2 day segments with 2 or 3 months between segments the trial would likely have taken place over the course of 6 months or so from about November, 2011 to about May, 2012. As it is, the trial is currently scheduled to complete a year later than that, in May, 2013. [ii] I gather, from having heard Cst. Meaver testify, that he was under the impression that both drivers were so severely injured that they would have no memory of the accident.