T.J.M. v. S.M., 2022 BCPC 229

Citation: T.J.M. v. S.M. 2022 BCPC 229 Date: 20221004 File No: 31350 Registry: Cranbrook IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: T.J.M. APPLICANT AND: S.M. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE K. D. SKILNICK Counsel for the Applicant: E. MacKinnon Counsel for the Respondent: L. Beaudry Place of Hearing: Cranbrook , B.C. Date of Hearing: September 28, 2022 Date of Judgment: October 4, 2022

Introduction [ 1 ] The Applicant T.J.M. and the Respondent S.M. are the mother and father of a little girl named B.L.M., who was born on [omitted for publication]. An Order of what was then the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench (now the Court of King’s Bench) awarded both of the parties what is referred to as “join custody” of this child. That order was made on June 18, 2018. It provided that the parties would have the care of B.L.M. under a shared parenting arrangement. The child was to reside with each parent on alternating weeks with the exchange of the child taking place on alternating Mondays. This parenting

schedule was arrived at as the result of mediation that took place in Saskatchewan. [ 2 ] At the time of the making of that Order, the parties were living in Regina, Saskatchewan. Sometime in late 2018 or early 2019, the Applicant moved to Cranbrook, British Columbia and the child remained in Regina with the Respondent. The Applicant exercised some parenting time with the child, but the child resided primarily in the Applicant’s care, and the parenting

schedule in the Saskatchewan court order was largely ignored by both parties. [ 3 ] In December of 2021, the Respondent moved the child to Cranbrook, British Columbia. The two of them resided with the Applicant and his new partner briefly, but when that didn’t work out, the Respondent had to move to a women’s shelter. The Respondent was unable to get the job she hoped to get and could only find part-time work.

The child was enrolled in a local school in Cranbrook and the parties shared parenting time with the child according to the terms of the Saskatchewan Order. [ 4 ] In May of 2022, during her scheduled parenting time, the Respondent text messaged the Applicant to tell him that she had taken the child to Regina to her mother’s home “for the long weekend.” Four days later, she messaged him again to tell him that she decided to keep the child in Regina and would not be returning to Cranbrook. [ 5 ] On June 10, 2022, the Applicant brought an Application for an order recognizing the Saskatchewan Order in British Columbia.

His application for an interim order without notice to the Respondent was rejected by the Honourable Judge Doerksen of this Court, who questioned whether this was the proper jurisdiction in which to bring the Application. A week later, on June 17, 2022, the Applicant filed a new Application asking for an order prohibiting the Respondent from relocating the child’s residence to Regina and requiring her to return the child to Cranbrook. [ 6 ] The matter was set down for hearing and it was decided at a pre-trial conference that the hearing would proceed on affidavit and submissions.

The issue of jurisdiction was to be adjudicated first (for the obvious reason that if this Court lacked jurisdiction, then it also lacked the power to make other significant orders). The parties were also asked to address what orders were being sought in the event that a finding was made that this Court had jurisdiction in this matter. [ 7 ] It should be mentioned that the quality of advocacy from both counsel on this matter was outstanding. Both of the parties in this action have been very well represented by their lawyers. Following is a

summary of the law applicable to this matter, an application of the undisputed facts and the reasons for making the order that will follow. Analysis [ 8 ] This case concerns a child who was born in Saskatchewan and who has lived in that province for almost all of her life ([omitted for publication]) except for a period from sometime in late December of 2021 until late May of 2022. While the child was in British Columbia, the parties shared parenting time with the child equally.

But when the Respondent took the child back to Saskatchewan last May (without telling the Applicant until the child was back in Regina), it became unclear whether the Applicant was required to seek a remedy in British Columbia or in Saskatchewan. [ 9 ] The parties can be excused for not knowing the answer to this question. It is not an easy one to decide, and not one that is obvious to the lawyers or to the judges who have had to deal with this matter. On the one hand, the child has lived for most of her life (by my rough math, almost 95% of it) in Saskatchewan.

The only court order concerning the child’s parenting arrangements was made by a Saskatchewan Court, then known as the Court of Queen’s Bench (now the Court of King’s Bench.) On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that the Respondent brought the child to British Columbia with the intention of changing the child’s residence. Shortly after the child first arrived in British Columbia, the Respondent sent a text message tending to suggest that it was her intention to move the child out of Saskatchewan.

She says that “Regina was terrible and we are both already so happy.” The child was enrolled in a French immersion school in Cranbrook and in at least one sporting activity. From this and other circumstances, counsel for the Applicant argues that the child had now become habitually resident in British Columbia, and this court has now acquired jurisdiction over the child as a result. [ 10 ]

Part 4 of the British Columbia Family Law Act deals with the subject of “Care and Time with Children” and Division 7 of that Part sets out the law concerning “Extraprovincial Matters Respecting Parenting Arrangements.” The purposes of this Division are listed in

section 73 as being: (

a) to ensure that court applications respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child are determined on the basis of the best interests of the child; (

b) to avoid the making of orders respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, respecting the same child, in more than one jurisdiction; (

c) to discourage child abduction as an alternative to determining by due process the guardianship of, or parenting arrangements with respect to, a child;

(

d) to provide for effective enforcement of orders respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, and for therecognition and enforcement of extraprovincial orders. [11] Section 74 (2) of the Family Law Act allows that this court “may” make an order concerning “guardianship, parentingarrangements of contact with a child only if one of the following conditions is met: (

a) the child is habitually resident in British Columbia when the application is filed; (

b) the child is not habitually resident in British Columbia when the application is filed, but the court is satisfied that (

i) the child is physically present in British Columbia when the application is filed, (ii) substantial evidence concerning the best interests of the child is available in British Columbia, (iii) no application for an extraprovincial order is pending before an extraprovincial tribunal in a place where the child is habituallyresident, (iv) no extraprovincial order has been recognized by a court in British Columbia, (

v) the child has a real and substantial connection with British Columbia, and (vi) on the balance of convenience, it is appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised in British Columbia; (

c) the child is physically present in British Columbia and the court is satisfied that the child would suffer serious harm if the child wereto (

i) remain with, or be returned to, the child's guardian, or (ii) be removed from British Columbia. [12] The first step then is to determine whether this child is habitually resident in British Columbia. The Applicant filed anApplication About a Priority Parenting Matter on June 17, 2022, alleging the wrongful removal of the child, pursuant to section 77(2) ofthe Family Law Act. He sought an order under

section 69 of the Act prohibiting the relocation of the child to Regina, an order undersection 77 requiring the Respondent to return the child to Cranbrook, and an order requiring the Respondent to pay all expensesreasonably required to return the child. In order to determine if the Applicant can bring those applications, the first question to consider iswhat the child’s habitual residence was at the time the Application was filed. [13] The burden of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction to decide this Application rests with the Applicant. (Melich v.

Patel2021 BCSC 694 , 2021 B.C.S.C. 694 at paragraph [11]; Aleong v. Aleong 2013 BCSC 1428 , 2013 B.C.S.C. 1428 atparagraph [80]; D.L. v. M.Y. 2019 BCSC 881 , 2019 B.C.S.C. 881 at paragraph [27].) [14] In deciding if a child is habitually resident in British Columbia, the first consideration must be section 72(2) of the Family LawAct. A court can also consider common law principles, but, as was stated by Justice Brundrett in Melich v. Patel at paragraph [13], “thestatutory definition takes priority.” Section 72(2) reads as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this Division, a child is habitually resident in the place where the child most recently resided (

a) with his or her parents, (

b) if the parents are living separate and apart, with one parent (

i) under an agreement, (ii) with the implied consent of the other parent, or (iii) under an order of a court or tribunal, or (

c) with a person other than a parent on a permanent basis for a significant period of time. [15] This child most recently resided with both parents in Cranbrook, British Columbia, for a brief period of time. The Respondentstates in an affidavit: “When I first got to BC it was about a week before Christmas and [the child] and I were living with [the Applicant and his partner.] Theplan was for me to live with them for a week, as I thought I would be starting work and going out to live at the work camp after that.

Ithought this would be an okay arrangement, but my employer ended up delaying my start date until after New Year due to COVID.Tensions grew and I was kicked out of [the Applicant’s] house. I had no place to go and no income as my job was delayed so I resorted toa women’s shelter. I was accepted into second stage housing for domestic violence and that is where I resided my entire time in BC. [16] The Respondent does not state how long she lived in the Applicant’s home before moving into the shelter.

The Applicant says inhis affidavit that the Respondent lived in his home “for approximately a month.” I should add that the affidavits contain a significantamount of contradictory statements. In determining this matter, I am seeking to rely on those facts which do not seem to be contradicted.I am disregarding those portions in the affidavits in which each party purports to speak for the other, unless the other party has admittedas much. [17] The Applicant argues that the child has most recently resided with both parents in British Columbia. The Respondent argues that

this does not settle the issue. The child is now residing in Saskatchewan. Up until the Respondent moved to British Columbia lastDecember, both parties were clearly consenting to having the child remain in Saskatchewan. After the parties separated in the winter of2018, the Respondent says that the Applicant began working in British Columbia, though he maintained a residence in Saskatchewan.She says that the Applicant returned to Saskatchewan in 2019 to move his belongings to British Columbia. The Applicant does notdispute this in his affidavit.

It is also not in dispute that from then on, the child lived in Regina with the Respondent. The Applicant saysthat from the time he began working in British Columbia until the Respondent moved the child to Cranbrook, he “took every availableopportunity to spend time with” the child, but does not elaborate on how frequent that was.

The Respondent says that the Applicant sawthe child “for 2-3 days every 2-3 months.” [18] To summarize then, from sometime shortly after the parties separated until December of 2021, the child was habitually residentin Saskatchewan, with the agreement of, or at least with the implied consent of the Applicant.

What is unclear is whether or not the timethat the child spent in British Columbia from late December of 2021 to late May of 2022 constitutes the child acquiring habitualresidence in British Columbia. [19] It is clear from the evidence that the child’s return to Saskatchewan in May of this year was not done with the consent of theApplicant. He did not even know that the Respondent was taking the child there until the move was complete.

Section 72(3) of theFamily Law Act provides: (3)The removal or withholding of a child without the consent of a guardian does not affect the child's habitual residence unless theguardian from whom the child is being removed or withheld acquiesces or delays in applying for an order of a court or an extraprovincialtribunal. [20] I have no hesitation in concluding that the Respondent took the child back to Saskatchewan in May of 2022 without theRespondent’s consent, and therefore this does not mean that the child is now habitually resident in Saskatchewan.

I agree with counselfor the Applicant that he has not acquiesced to the move, nor has he been guilty of any delay in bringing his application. [21] The question to be decided is whether or not the child has become habitually resident in British Columbia by virtue of the timespent from December of 2021 to May of 2022. As Justice Boyd of the British Columbia Supreme Court stated in White-Fourgere v.Holman 2006 BCSC 1606 , 2006 B.C.S.C. 1606 at paragraph [25]: In my view, this matter cannot be resolved on a simple counting of the number of days which [the child] spent in either jurisdiction.

Rather the determination of one’s habitual residence is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of the case. A habitual residence is established by residing in a place for an appreciable period of time, with a “settled intention”. A child’s “habitualresidence” will be tied to the habitual residence of his or her custodian (R.A.M. v. Y.Y.M. [2005] B.C.J. No. 1507). [22] In Chan v. Chow 2001 BCCA 276 , 2001 B.C.C.A. 276, to paraphrase paragraph [32], the court summarized howhabitual residence is determined as follows: 1.

This is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all of the circumstances of the case. 2. It is established by residing in a place for an appreciable period of time with a “settled intention.” 3. A child’s habitual residence is tied to that of his or her guardians. [23] In Fasiang v.

Fasiangova 2008 BCSC 1339 , 2008 B.C.S.C. 1339, Justice Martinson reiterated these principles andwent on to offer the following guidance in determining what a settled intention was: [60] A settled intention or purpose requires that “the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properlydescribed as settled.” But all that is required is that there is a settled purpose. There is no requirement that there be an intention to settleindefinitely: R v.

Barnet London Borough Council (1982), [1983] 2 A.C. 309 at 344 (H.L.), cited in Chan at para. 33. [61] Further, a settled intention or purpose describes one’s purpose for living where one does and it can be for a limited period.

If there isa settled intention or purpose “it will stand out clearly as a matter of general impression”: Cheshire and North’s Private InternationalLaw, 13th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1999) at 166-167, cited in Chan at para. 34. [62] A settled intention or purpose is “an intent to stay in a place whether temporarily or permanently for a particular purpose, such asemployment, family, etc.”: Korutowska-Wooff v.

Wooff (2004), (ON CA), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (B.C.C.A.) at para.8, 188 O.A.C. 376. [63] Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein listed the following factors that may be considered in determining settled intention at para. 36 inPetnehazi v. Kresz, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1238 (C.A.) (QL), this list is not exhaustive: 1. Both parties have relocated to the new state; 2. The custodial parent is employed in the new state; 3. The custodial parent had taken steps to satisfy the immigration requirements of the new state; 4. The children were enrolled in school in the new state; 5.

The parents had purchased one-way tickets to the new state; and 6. Accommodation has been arranged in the new state. [64] Settled intent to change habitual residence is determined just prior to the physical move to the new habitual residence: deHaan v.

Gracia (2004), 351 A.R. 354 at para. 32, 2004 ABQB 74. [24] Justice Martinson went on to state, at paragraph [66], that “if one parent decides that the move is not really what she wanted, shecannot ‘simply and unilaterally’ remove the children from their new habitual residence. [25] In her affidavit, the Respondent describes what she did as a “move” to Cranbrook.

She qualifies this by saying that it was “on atrial basis,” adding that she kept an apartment in Regina “in case things didn’t work out.” But even after “things didn’t work out,” theApplicant kept the child in British Columbia, even after it was clear that she was not going to get the job she thought she was getting. Shefound alternate employment at a tanning salon, but that also did not work out for her.

She remained in Cranbrook, collecting EmploymentInsurance. [26] On the facts of this case, I am satisfied that from December of 2021 until May of 2022, the Respondent had formed a settledintention to reside in British Columbia and that this province was her child’s habitual residence. I reach this conclusion for severalreasons: 1. The Applicant stated in her affidavit that she came to British Columbia with the intention of making this province her residence. Herplan of returning to Saskatchewan was only a contingency in the event that “things didn’t work out.” 2.

Her text message that living in Regina was “terrible” is further evidence of an intention and a desire to want to leave Saskatchewan. 3. Even after things did not work out for the Respondent, she remained in British Columbia and sought other employment. 4. The child was registered in a Cranbrook school, and the Respondent kept the child enrolled in that school even after her initialemployment plans failed to pan out. 5. The period of residency in British Columbia of five months is not an insignificant amount of time. It was more than just a vacation ora short stay. 6. As the court stated in Fasiang v.

Fasiangova at paragraph [66], the act of changing one’s plans or deciding that the move isn’tworking out, does not change the character of the original decision. [27] A finding that the child was habitually resident in British Columbia confers this Court with jurisdiction to make an order underthe Family Law Act. But this does not mean that an order must be made. Section 74(3) of the Act gives the Court the discretion to refuseto make an order “if the court considers that it is more appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised outside British Columbia”.

Counsel forthe Respondent asks that, upon a finding of habitual residence being made, this Court should decline to make an order and leave it to theCourts in Saskatchewan to settle the matter. Counsel argues that there are a number of reasons for doing so. These include the following: 1. The child has lived almost all of her life in Saskatchewan. Of the child’s [omitted for publication], she has lived all of it inSaskatchewan except for the five months she was in British Columbia. 2.

Until the Respondent’s ill-fated decision to try to live in British Columbia, the Applicant was content for the child to live primarilywith the Respondent. He made no efforts to change the child’s living situation when the child was residing in Regina. 3. All previous matters pertaining to parenting arrangements have been decided in Saskatchewan. The parties arrived at a mediatedsettlement there and the only Court Order concerning parenting arrangements is an order of a Saskatchewan court. 4. The child has a greater support network in Saskatchewan, including a paternal grandmother. 5.

The Applicant has more substantial financial means that the Respondent, and this problem is exacerbated by the fact that theRespondent has never paid child support to the Applicant. The disparity in economic power is a factor that should be taken into accountin the Respondent’s favor in finding Saskatchewan to be the preferred forum. [28] Counsel for the Applicant argues that this Court should not decline to make an order, and directs this Court’s attention to theprovisions of

section 11 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, something that was considered by the British ColumbiaSupreme Court in Melich v. Patel and in C.L.Z. v. G.C.Z. 2018 BCSC 2172 , 2018 B.C.S.C.

Section 11 reads as follows: 11(1) After considering the interests of the parties to a proceeding and the ends of justice, a court may decline to exercise its territorialcompetence in the proceeding on the ground that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum in which to hear the proceeding.

(2) A court, in deciding the question of whether it or a court outside British Columbia is the more appropriate forum in which to hear aproceeding, must consider the circumstances relevant to the proceeding, including (

a) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in anyalternative forum, (

b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, (

c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings, (

d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, (

e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, and (

f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.

[29] Whereas the burden of establishing that the child’s habitual residence was in British Columbia rested with the Applicant, theburden of proving that Saskatchewan is the more appropriate forum in this case and that this Court should decline jurisdiction rests withthe Respondent. (Melich v. Patel, paragraph [53]; JTG Management Services Ltd. v. Bank of Nanjing Co.

Ltd., 2015 BCCA 200, 2015 B.C.C.A. 200 at paragraph [45].) [30] On an analysis of the comparative convenience and expense to the parties in this matter, someone will be required to travel tolitigate this matter, whether it is the Applicant going to Saskatchewan, or the Respondent returning to British Columbia. According tothe evidence, the Applicant is in a better position financially.

The Respondent is not only less well off than the Applicant, but accordingto the affidavit evidence, she is also not receiving any child support from the Respondent despite the fact that for almost three years afterthe separation, she had the child primarily in her care. [31] Some witnesses at a trial to decide ongoing parenting arrangements will be required to give evidence in another province. Thiscan be alleviated to a great extent, given modern technology that allows witnesses to testify remotely through computer platforms such asMS Teams, Zoom or Skype.

In this case I would imagine that the bulk of the evidence concerning the child’s best interests would comefrom Saskatchewan, given that this is where the child has lived for 95% of her life, but this should not be assumed or be determinative ofthis matter. [32] Both counsel concede that there is little difference in the law to be applied to this case if the matter is tried in either BritishColumbia or Saskatchewan.

While the statute names and sections may differ, both are common law jurisdictions and both will look tomake a decision that is in the best interests of the child. [33] The desirability of avoiding multiple legal proceedings is not really a factor in this case. There is a court file in existence in bothprovinces, though the one in Saskatchewan was commended in a Superior Court, removing one level of appeal if a party is unsatisfiedwith the result. I would also note that the Saskatchewan Court of King’s Bench has a Family Law Division, while the Provincial Court ofBritish Columbia does not.

I would also note the difficulty in scheduling family court hearings in Cranbrook, where the Judicial CaseManager has been directed to quadruple book matters because of the collapse rate.

Family cases often take a back seat to criminal cases,and the trial of this matter may have a better chance of being heard sooner in Saskatchewan. [34] Presuming that the Courts of each province will make the best interests of the child paramount, it is unlikely that the potential forconflicting judgements is any more of a concern than it would be if decisions were made by different judges of the same court.Enforcement of any order as things now stand would be easier in Saskatchewan, since that is where the child is presently, but this couldbe alleviated by an order for the child to return to this province. [35] In my view the primary consideration in determining which jurisdiction is more appropriate for this case is the child herself.

Sheis not a ping-pong ball, she is a small child. Forcing her to travel back and force across western Canada while her ultimate fate is decidedby a court is something that no one should desire. The Applicant is asking this Court to order her to be brought back to British Columbiaimmediately, at the expense of a parent who he is not paying child support to. It should not be lost on anyone that the decision to putdistance in the child’s life between her two parents is the result of his decision.

In 2018 or 2019, given the choice of staying inSaskatchewan, close to his child, or moving to British Columbia for better employment, he chose the latter. For several years, heappeared to be content with visiting the child sporadically, as his employment allowed, and did not petition the court for enhancedparenting time. This would likely still be the case, were it not for an impulsive and poorly-considered decision by the Respondent. [36] The Respondent was clearly in the wrong in the underhanded method that she used to take the child back to Saskatchewanwithout any warning to the Applicant.

If it was simply a matter of punishing the Respondent for her dishonesty, it would be just that, asimple matter. The problem is that punishing the Respondent also punishes the child. [37] The affidavit material discloses a great deal of animosity and acrimony between the parties. This is not unusual in familyproceedings. Parents who are separated have a hard time letting go of past grievances. Sometimes new partners justify this resentmentand animosity. These parties’ affidavits sling mud at one another and in some cases use the child as a prop for justifying their resentmenttowards one another.

The geographical separation of the parties for the time being may be a good thing for the child. It could not havebeen pleasant for her when both of her parents were in the same community and she was being shuffled back and forth between the twowarring homes more frequently. [38] On a consideration of whether or not this Court should exercise jurisdiction or whether jurisdiction in this matter should be cededto the Court in Saskatchewan, I find the latter to be the preferable, and in the best interests of this child. I reach this conclusion for thefollowing reasons: 1.

The Applicant is in a stronger financial position to bear the comparative cost and expense of litigation. For the period from late 2018or early 2019 to December of 2021, he was used to making trips back and forth to Saskatchewan. Conversely, the Respondent wouldhave to bear the cost of litigating in British Columbia with a lower income, and without any child support to offset the income disparitybetween the parties. 2. Proceeding in Saskatchewan returns the parties to the status quo prior to the Respondent’s decision to try to find employment inBritish Columbia.

The Applicant has a history of sacrificing parenting time for employment and did so for almost three years. Litigatingthis matter in Saskatchewan is less of a change for him than it would be for the Respondent to litigate in British Columbia. 3. Returning the matter to British Columbia means further disruption in the child’s life and in her schooling. 4. The bulk of the evidence pertaining to the child’s best interest appears to be in Saskatchewan, given the far greater portion of her lifethat she has spent there and the existence of the previous court file. 5.

Since separation, the child has been primarily in the Respondent’s care, notwithstanding the intent of the existing court order. Thishas occurred, up to December of 2021, with the Applicant’s implicit consent. The Applicant is seeking to bring about significant changein the child’s life. Prior to establishing this, the Applicant rather than the child should be the one to bear the burden of any inconvenience

arising from this decision. [ 39 ] On a consideration of these factors, I find that it is more appropriate for jurisdiction over this child to be exercised outside of British Columbia by a Saskatchewan Court, and accordingly, this Court will decline to make an Order in this case under Division 7 of

Part 4 of the Family Law Act, pursuant to section 74 (3) of that Act. The facts in this case seem to be a textbook example of what this

section was intended for, one where a parent has briefly come to British Columbia and stayed long enough for the court to be able to take jurisdiction, but brief enough that it is clear that the child has a much stronger connection to another province. [ 40 ] Prior to late December of 2021, these parties operated under a Saskatchewan Court Order that was largely ignored. Although the order called for shared parenting time on a rotating weekly basis, the reality was that this child was primarily cared for by the Respondent. The parties were apparently content to proceed on this basis, trusting one another.

That trust likely no longer exists, and the parties will have to turn their mind to a parenting time schedule. The Respondent has represented to this Court that it is not her intention to injure or eliminate the parent-child relationship between the Applicant and the child. If this is the case, the parties should agree on to a parenting time

schedule that allows the Applicant to see the child during her school breaks at times compatible with his work schedule, while not imposing onerous travel requirements on the child. The Respondent has also represented that the Applicant is welcome to spend time with the child in Saskatchewan whenever he can get there. It would be a severe injury to the Respondent’s credibility if she was to renege on this representation.

The parties are advised to either negotiate a consent court order setting out how parenting time will operate, or get the matter back before a judge in Saskatchewan to decide the matter for them. [ 41 ] The parties should also either negotiate a child support order or have one made by a Court in Saskatchewan. Child support is the right of the child, not of the parents, and this child is being denied a right of hers while this remains ignored.

Order [ 42 ] For the foregoing reasons it is ordered as follows: Upon the Court being advised that the name and birth date of the child is B.L.M., born [omitted for publication]. This Court finds that this child was habitually resident in British Columbia within the meaning of Division 7 of

Part 4 of the Family Law Act for the purposes of the Application About a Priority Parenting Matter filed by the Applicant T.J.M. on June 17, 2022. Pursuant to section 74 (3) of the Family Law Act, this Court declines to make an Order under Division 7 of

Part 4 of the Act , because the Court considers that it is more appropriate for jurisdiction to be exercised outside of the Provincial Court of British Columbia, in the Province of Saskatchewan. _______________________________ The Honourable Judge K.D. Skilnick Provincial Court of British Columbia