R. v. Dare, 2023 MBPC 18

CITATION: R. v. Dare , 2023 MBPC 18 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA BETWEEN His Majesty the King ) T. Cannon ) ) for the Crown – and – ) ) ) Laurance Luksing Dare ) ) H. Allardyce and P. Neil for the Accused ) ) ) Reasons for Voir Dire Decision ) Delivered: April 14, 2023 M.P. Thompson, P.J. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] Laurance Dare (“Dare”) is charged with firearms offences and related breach charges under the Criminal Code (“ Code ”). [ 2 ] On December 13, 2021, police responded to a 911 call about a threat made by the accused, to shoot his neighbour.

The neighbour was concerned because while he was not at home, his girlfriend was. The caller also provided information that the accused had a shotgun in his home and seemed to be under the influence of substances. [ 3 ] Police entered the residence, detained Dare and searched the basement suite, finding a shotgun after he made a comment about having to go down to the basement. Some time later at the police station, when given an updated notice of arrest listing all the charges he was facing, Dare made incriminating comments about the gun.

Those comments took place prior to his call to counsel, which police delayed while they continued the investigation. [ 4 ] Identity, date and jurisdiction are not disputed. It is admitted the shotgun seized is a working firearm, that Dare was bound by a firearm prohibition as well as an undertaking forbidding him to possess firearms and that the firearm in question was not properly stored. Where they had an election, the Crown proceeded summarily. [ 5 ] Possession is the sole issue at trial.

The Crown must prove the accused had both knowledge and control of the firearm. [ 6 ] The trial of these matters commenced with a blended voir dire as to the admissibility of the shotgun found during a police search at the accused’s home and comments he made to police. [ 7 ] The Defence filed an application seeking to exclude that evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“ Charter ” ) alleging police violated the accused’s

section 8 and 10(

b) Charter rights, during the entry and search of his residence. The search was warrantless and is presumptively unreasonable. Police detained him at 13:51 hrs but did not inform him of his right to counsel without delay. The accused invoked his right to counsel as soon as it was read to him at 14:25, but he was not provided an opportunity to call a lawyer until 15:48. By that time, he had already made incriminating comments. [ 8 ] The Applicant did not call any evidence on the voir dire . In particular, Mr. Dare did not testify.

In order to meet his evidentiary burden, the Applicant relies on the testimony of the police officers and the Agreed Statement of Facts. The Crown advised their entire case has been called on the voir dire and the Defence advised it would not be calling evidence in the trial proper. [ 9 ] The Crown takes the position that the search was lawful pursuant to

section 529.3(

a) of the Code and due to exigent circumstances . They concede a

section 10(

b) violation as the accused was detained for 34 minutes before being informed of his right to counsel. The Crown argues once he invoked his right to counsel, it was not practicable to facilitate a call to counsel from the police cruiser due to a lack of privacy, the delay from his arrest until his counsel call was reasonable and, in any event, he volunteered the incriminating comments.

[ 10 ] These are my findings of fact and decision on the voir dire as to the admissibility of evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT/ANALYSIS [ 11 ] The first issue on the voir dire is the lawfulness of the WPS entry and search of the residence. [ 12 ] The Crown concedes the accused has standing to argue a privacy interest under

section 8, as he lived in the residence in question. [ 13 ] The Crown does not argue that police gained entry to the residence with consent of the accused; rather it relies solely on exigent circumstances. [ 14 ] Specifically, the Crown relies on

section 529.3(2) (

a) of the Code , which authorizes peace officers to enter a dwelling house without warrant to effect an arrest if the conditions for obtaining a warrant exist, but by reason of exigent circumstances it would be impractical to obtain a warrant. [ 15 ]

Section 529.3(2)(

a) specifies exigent circumstances include where the peace officer: (

a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that entry into the dwelling-house i s necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm or death to any person; ( emphasis added ) [ 16 ] The Crown does not argue that part (

b) of that

section is applicable in this case, as there was no danger the evidence in the residence would be lost or destroyed once the accused was in police custody. Did Police have Reasonable Grounds to Suspect that Entry into Dare’s Residence was Necessary to Prevent Imminent Harm or Death to any Person? [ 17 ] Constable Malec and Constable Dreger were the first officers to arrive on scene. They are members of the TAC unit, a high- risk tactical support team. Their primary function is to respond to high-risk incidents, usually involving guns, knives and weapons.

In addition, they execute all search warrants in the city of Winnipeg. [ 18 ] Constable Malec testified. He was the “jumper”. He was not deployed to the scene in his capacity as an investigative officer. This situation did not involve any use of force and he did not seize any evidence; consequently, he took no notes.

At the request of the Crown, he generated a narrative six months after the incident using the time stamp call history to aid him in generating that narrative. [ 19 ] His partner, Constable Jordan Dreger, was the driver and did not testify. [ 20 ] This is what Constable Malec understood from dispatch: This was a gun type call. Accordingly, the TAC Unit was dispatched. The call history indicated the firearm was possibly in the basement. A male, Laurance Dare, approximately 35 years old, was on scene. He was possibly high on some drugs, however that was unknown.

He made threats to shoot the complainant, who was not on scene. The complainant was believed to be calling from work. The caller had indicated a pregnant woman was hiding in the closet. [ 21 ] Constable Malec assessed the risk as high. It was a gun call and upon arrival, he saw two CFS workers, a 2-year-old child, a pregnant woman and a handful of family members or acquaintances. The fact that CFS was on scene heightened his concern, as that can be a very volatile situation.

Constable Malec testified his primary focus was to ensure the safety of everyone in the residence, that no one was armed with a firearm or had access to one. [ 22 ] He described the residence as a bungalow. It was open concept with a living room into the kitchen and entry through a porch. The rear door was off the kitchen with stairs going down to the basement.

Everyone, except the person who granted him access, was located in the kitchen and was in very close proximity to the back door and basement stairs. [ 23 ] Defence and Crown agree that Constable Malec wrote an email to the Crown in preparation for the trial stating the following: Upon entering the residence, CFS was talking to the male in question as well as family members on scene. It was evident CFS would be apprehending some children from the residence.

Things appeared to be very calm until Dare realized our police presence. [ 24 ] Constable Malec testified as to his objective: A Our purpose and my number one concern was that firearm mentioned in the call history. That's why we were dispatched and that would be my number one priority. I wanted to ensure that the -- Mr. Dare couldn't go into that basement where the call history indicated the firearm was possibly. That was a priority of mine. I wanted to successfully and safely remove him as far away from there as possible.

I also didn't want a use of force struggle to occur given how many occupants were in that residence at that time in very close confined proximity, as well as children and a pregnant woman. [ 25 ] He described what happened next: A Upon seeing our presence in the residence, he became immediately confrontational. He began shouting at my partner and I, demanding us to leave the residence. There was swearing, he was being physically aggressive, advancing towards us, so much so that even one of the CFS workers felt compelled to intervene so it wouldn't escalate to a physical altercation.

When that occurred, it became readily apparent to me that the CFS worker was unaware of the firearms info because that would not be standard procedure for any CFS worker or social worker. Q Okay.

A So when things kind of -- I conveyed to Dare that if he continued to escalate and be confrontational that I would arrest him infront of his child and in my experience that, just the very mention of that, can be deescalating and it was. It bought me time to convey tothe CFS worker discreetly that there was a firearm mentioned in the call history and that's why police were present. And as I suspectedthe CFS worker was taken back and very surprised. Q Okay. And so was anything done then with Mr. Dare now that he was more deescalated?

A So if I recall, I believe he was permitted the opportunity to say bye to his child. That two-year-old child was -- was being takenfrom him. For what reason I was unaware but CFS was there to -- to take that child into custody. At some point shortly thereafter heindicated he was going to have to go into the basement, I believe to retrieve items at which point I demanded that he not go down in thebasement and he needed to speak to myself and my partner at the front porch. So we permitted him to say goodbye to his child and nowwe had to -- this incident had to move forward kind of thing.

Q And what was the purpose of you wanting to speak to him on the front porch? A Mainly to get him away from that basement. Q Okay. A My number one concern was him going down into that basement, possibly accessing that firearm. He was -- has displayed, in myopinion, the ability to be confrontational. He was very confrontational. He was irrational. He was -- he was willing, based on our initialinteraction, prepared to have a physical confrontation. I wanted to avoid that at all circumstances. So my purpose was strictly to get himaway from accessing that basement where the firearm was believed to be at the time.

Q Was Mr. Dare under detention or arrest? A I didn't verbalize he was being detained, however if he made an attempt to go into that basement, some sort of physicalintervention would have occurred or if -- I thought it was impossible to intervene before he went into that basement because of size of thekitchen and his close proximity and how many people were present so I would -- in my head if he had gone down in that basement andthere was no knowledge of other persons in that basement, I would consider that an armed and barricaded at that point.

I would evacuate,egress all occupants in there and take a position of cover. Q Okay. But you were with him on the porch. A Correct. Q Okay. A He reluctantly came to the porch with us. Q Okay. So when you're on the porch are you having any conversation with him?

A As soon as we got to, I'd say the threshold of the living room and porch area, he became very agitated again at which point I waslike okay, he's away from that basement, like now's the time to effect that detention so I advised him he was being detained for a firearmsinvestigation and we put him in handcuffs and this occurring right in front of that storm door off that porch leading outside. On the otherside of that storm door I could physically see Delta 204 about to enter the residence.

Q So just to confirm, did you continue on with any right to counsel as a result of his detention, any other rights at that point? A That's a negative. He was immediately turned over to Delta 204 on the other side of that storm door. Q All right. A They took immediate custody of him. Q And does that mean he physically was removed from the residence? A That's correct. [26] Defence argues the situation Constable Malec faced is comparable to the case of R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15 , [2017]1 SCR 202.

That case involved a “no case” seizure under section 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”) inside anaccused’s home. Police had background information Paterson owned a gun, but it was not the primary reason they were attending. It wasa concern about domestic violence. When police arrived, the accused was alone in the home and the complainant had already gone. Theysmelled marijuana and upon the accused admitting he had three roaches, police agreed to seize them and not charge him for possession.The only immediate safety concern related to the officer who entered the home to seize the drugs.

In that case, the Court ruled that theofficers created the safety concern by entering. As a result, the firearm located in the subsequent warrantless search was excluded. [27] The Paterson case can be distinguished because when police arrived, aside from the accused, no other person remained in thehome. The complainant had gone to hospital. [28] In Dare’s case, the home was not empty: a young child, a pregnant woman and two CFS workers were among those present.Constable Malec’s concern was based on a firearm call that included a threat to shoot the caller and information that the accused mightbe high on drugs.

It was reasonable to suspect that persons in the house were at risk. [29] Recall the requisite grounds to enter a dwelling without a warrant under

section 529.3(2)(

a) are reasonable grounds to suspect

that entry into the dwelling-house is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm or death. [30] I find Constable Malec’s entry was justified. He was faced with exigent circumstances where obtaining a warrant before entrywould be impracticable. He needed to act without delay. Was the Warrantless Search Justified? [31] A search will be reasonable where it is authorized by law, the law itself is reasonable and the manner in which the search iscarried out is reasonable. As this was a warrantless search of a residence, it is prima facie unreasonable and the onus is on the Crown toprove that it was reasonable.

The standard to be met by the Crown is on a balance of probabilities. (R. v. Collins, (SCC),[1987] 1 SCR 265 and Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 145 at para 30) [32] As discussed,

section 529.3(2)(

a) of the Code authorizes entry without a warrant for the purpose of arrest or apprehending aperson without a warrant. [33] The Crown’s brief, filed in advance of the voir dire, initially relied on exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless searchunder

section 529.3(2)(b). After the testimony of the police officers, the Crown abandoned its reliance on that section, as it was clearthere was no danger of evidence being lost or destroyed, with the accused in police custody. [34] The Crown relied on Constable Hebert’s testimony that CFS had not made their final determination about the apprehension ofthe accused’s child and that it was possible she would have remained in the home. He made it clear he was concerned about potentialaccess for this young child to a firearm or drugs.

There was a discussion between the officers on scene and CFS who made it known theywere not willing to search or comfortable in handling a firearm. [35] This was Constable Malec’s evidence: Q Was there any discussion about getting a search warrant prior to entering back in? A There was no discussion regarding that. We deemed it exigent.

It -- it would be very troublesome if that two-year-old, you know,accessed that firearm by accident and we know children are very curious by nature, so we wanted to avoid that. [36] Constable Hebert echoed this evidence, testifying that the search was done for the safety of the child in the home: Q Okay. Was there any thought as to getting a search warrant prior to you attending down yourselves? A No, I mean we were -- we were not looking for evidence of a crime at this point.

We were just strictly there to ensure that thischild had a safe environment, that they were not going to be harmed by us leaving something unsafe down there. [37] Constable Hebert testified there was no discussion about obtaining a search warrant. He was mistakenly of the view police didnot have grounds to obtain a warrant even though they had a complaint of a threat to shoot the caller as no one could say for sure whetherthere was a firearm in the basement.

He also confirmed he had no information to believe that any person was in the basement. [38] Constable Malec was asked to describe the search: Q So can you tell us about the search of the home for the firearm? A Yes. So we went down those basement stairs as I described off that kitchen. I believe it was -- it wasn't a very big basement suite.I can't recall if there was a door to access that suite but it was, I guess, open concept. I don't recall like rooms off rooms in that bedroom. Ibelieve it was just one bedroom kind of thing.

We just scattered out and we're looking for -- I described it as a cursory search so we're notopening walls or anything like that. We're looking in plain view for items that look like a firearm, specifically a shotgun. [39] During the search, Constable Hebert observed one bed in the open basement with a blanket on top covering somethingrectangular. He noted there was “kid’s stuff” in the area of the bed as well as adult things.

When he pulled back the blanket, hediscovered a factory labelled gun box with the unloaded shotgun inside. [40] The Defence brief anticipated other possible rationales by the Crown to justify the search: a potential Godoy 911 sweep searchand a consent entry. Ultimately, the Crown relied solely on exigency to justify the warrantless search. [41] The Crown did not file any case law on exigency. The Crown’s legal arguments mainly focussed on the 24(2) analysis in theevent the Court found a

section 8 breach and that the firearm would have been discoverable in the event a warrant was obtained. [42] Given that the search was not authorized by statute and the Crown has not articulated a basis in common law for it, I find theCrown has not met the burden on it to establish the warrantless search of the accused’s residence was justified. Accordingly, there is asection 8 violation. Right to Counsel

Section 10(b) [43] The accused’s first oral statement to Constable Malec was about wanting to go to the basement. He volunteered that commentprior to his detention. As a result, there is no

section 10(

b) breach and the comment is admissible evidence. [44] The accused made a second oral statement to Constable Hebert later at the police station. [45] The Crown concedes a

section 10(

b) breach as police did not inform Dare of his right to counsel upon his detention at 13:51,when he was handcuffed and placed in the back of the police cruiser. He was not advised of any rights until 14:25 when ConstableHebert gave him his notice of arrest, police caution and right to counsel in the back of the cruiser, a delay of approximately 34 minutes.

[46] The accused advised police he wished to call a lawyer at that time. [47] The Applicant argues a second

section 10(

b) breach arose from the delay in police implementing his phone call to counsel. Itdid not take place for 1 hour and 23 minutes after he was given his arrest notice and right to counsel, with nearly an hour of that timeoccurring after he arrived at the police detachment. [48] The following is a timeline of what occurred. The accused was provided his notice of arrest at 14:25 and he asked to call alawyer. From 14:32 to 14:50, he was driven to the police station. Upon arrival, he was viewed-in by the Sergeant.

Constable Hebertcompleted the prisoner login sheet by recording the accused’s answers to a list of questions. The accused was searched, his propertylogged and he was placed in a holding room 10 to 15 minutes after arrival, at approximately 15:05. He was given an updated notice ofarrest at 15:42 and his lawyer call was facilitated at 15:48. [49] During the 37 minutes from 15:05 to 15:42, while the accused was alone in the holding room, Constable Hebert attended toseveral case related tasks.

He briefed their Sergeant who advised him to contact the firearm investigative analysis unit as it specialized infirearm related charges. Constable Hebert consulted and was provided a list of charges that should be laid. [50] Constable Hebert testified that prior to facilitating the lawyer call, he wanted to determine exactly what charges the accusedwas facing and whether he was to be released or detained. According to him, the lawyer would want to know this information. He didtestify that his Sergeant determined right away that they would be keeping the accused in custody.

He had already arrested Dare at thatpoint for uttering threats. [51] Constable Hebert also performed routine checks, including a CPIC record check on the accused and spoke to the initialcaller/complainant to confirm they wished to proceed with an uttering threats charge. [52] At 15:42, Constable Hebert went back into the holding room and provided the accused with his updated notice of arrest with allof the charges he would be facing. This was the officer’s testimony as to what happened: Q Okay. And can you -- did you -- did you record what you said to him? A Yeah.

I told him, Laurance, you're arrest for utter threats, fail to comply with probation for doing cocaine, storage of firearmcontrary to regulations, possess firearm knowing its possession is unauthorized and possess firearm contrary to an order times three. Doyou understand? He told me that he felt that unsafe storage is bullshit. He put it on the bed just so we would find it but it told me he understood thecharges. Q Okay. And then again, did he want to speak to counsel? A He did, yes.

So we made that call for him. [53] That call took place from 15:48 to 15:54. [54] Constable Hebert did not articulate what his partner was doing during the 37 minutes that Dare waited in the holding cell forhis lawyer call. [55] Defence bears the onus of proof, on a balance of probabilities, to establish any Charter violations. [56]

Section 10(

b) of the Charter reads: 10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention: b. to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; [56] The meaning of “without delay” has been described by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) as meaning “immediately” for thepurposes of

section 10. An individual is entitled to speak to counsel immediately upon request.

Section 10(

b) was designed to protectagainst concerns surrounding self-incrimination and interference with liberty, which begin immediately upon a detention or arrest. (R. v.Suberu, 2009 SCC 33 , [2009] 2 SCR 460 at paras 2, 41 and 42) [57] In this case, Dare’s right to implement his right to counsel was delayed. The police prioritized other matters that, whilenecessary, cannot be characterized as urgent.

A determination had already been made that Dare would be kept in custody on firearmrelated charges. [58] In Suberu, the Supreme Court directed that an opportunity to consult with counsel must be afforded immediately and withoutdelay, articulating, “the concept of immediacy leaves little room for misunderstanding”. In R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50 , [2014] 2SCR 495, the Court qualified the immediacy requirement to mean as soon as practicable, to reduce the possibility of accidental self-incrimination. I find that Defence counsel has met the burden on a balance of probabilities to show that Dare’s

section 10(

b) rights wereviolated by this delay. Should any Evidence be Excluded Pursuant to Section 24(2) of the Charter? [59] Section 24(1) and (2) of the Charter reads as follows: 24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competentjurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.

(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied anyrights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all thecircumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [60] The purpose of section 24(2) is to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. [61] In R. v.

Grant, 2009 SCC 32 , [2009] 2 SCR 353, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a test for the admission ofevidence obtained under a Charter breach, per section 24(2). There are three factors which must be analyzed: 1. The seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct - requires an assessment of whether the admission of the evidence would tendto bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and focuses on the severity of the state conduct that led to the Charter breach (whichincludes an analysis of whether the breach was deliberate or willful, and whether the officers were acting in good faith); 2.

The impact on the Charter-protected interests of the accused - focuses on how the accused person was affected by the state conduct(which includes an analysis of the intrusiveness into the person's privacy, the direct impact on the right not to be forced to self-incriminate, and the effect on the person's human dignity); and 3.

Society's interest in an adjudication of the case on its merits - focuses on how reliable the evidence is in light of the nature of theCharter breach. [62] In Grant, the Supreme Court set out the following: [72] The first line of inquiry relevant to the s. 24(2) analysis requires a court to assess whether the admission of the evidence wouldbring the administration of justice into disrepute by sending a message to the public that the courts, as institutions responsible for theadministration of justice, effectively condone state deviation from the rule of law by failing to dissociate themselves from the fruits ofthat unlawful conduct.

The more severe or deliberate the state conduct that led to the Charter violation, the greater the need for thecourts to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evidence linked to that conduct, in order to preserve public confidence inand ensure state adherence to the rule of law. [74] State conduct resulting in Charter violations varies in seriousness. At one end of the spectrum, admission of evidence obtainedthrough inadvertent or minor violations of the Charter may minimally undermine public confidence in the rule of law.

At the other endof the spectrum, admitting evidence obtained through a wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights will inevitably have a negativeeffect on the public confidence in the rule of law, and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. [77] To determine the seriousness of the infringement from this perspective, we look to the interests engaged by the infringed right andexamine the degree to which the violation impacted on those interests.

For example, the interests engaged in the case of a statement tothe authorities obtained in breach of the Charter include the s. 7 right to silence, or to choose whether or not to speak toauthorities (Hebert) — all stemming from the principle against self-incrimination: R. v. White, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R.417, at para. 44. The more serious the incursion on these interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence would bring theadministration of justice into disrepute. Dealing with the Shotgun [63] Firstly, the seriousness of the Charter infringing conduct here is on the midpoint of the scale.

While it involved a warrantlesssearch of the accused’s residence, the context of that Charter violation is important. The initial warrantless entry was lawful undersection 529.3(2)(

a) as police had reasonable grounds to suspect that entry into the dwelling-house was necessary to prevent imminentbodily harm or death. In their subsequent search of the basement, police erred in not obtaining a tele-warrant, mistakenly believing theydid not have the necessary grounds to obtain one. That may not be surprising given this is a much litigated issue. The evidence is clearthis was a search conducted for safety reasons. Other people lived and remained inside the house. CFS advised they were not comfortablein searching for firearms or drugs.

The search itself was described as “cursory” in nature and the gun was found under a blanket on thebed. In my view, the officers were acting in good faith in an effort to resolve a safety issue. [64] Secondly, the impact of the breaches on the Charter protected interests of the accused are not as significant.

The search of theaccused’s residence without a warrant impacted on the Applicant’s privacy interests, yet it is clear the shotgun was discoverableevidence if police had obtained a tele-warrant, which ultimately they did have grounds to obtain. [65] Thirdly, the truth seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by the admission of the evidence, whichis reliable. This favours inclusion. [66] When balancing and assessing the effect of admitting this evidence, I am of the view that its admission would not bring theadministration of justice into disrepute.

The shotgun is admissible evidence in the trial. Dealing with the Accused’s Incriminating Comments at the Police Station [67] Firstly, the seriousness of the breach is towards the higher end of the scale. The evidence in question, the accused’s commentsto police, is linked to multiple Charter breaches of his right to counsel without delay. After he was detained, secured in handcuffs andplaced in the police car, he was not informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel for 34 minutes.

Eventually he was informed of hisarrest and right to counsel and he immediately invoked his right to counsel, however police continued to prioritize their investigationalsteps over the necessity to implement his right to counsel. An accused’s right to counsel is a fundamental right. This involved twoseparate breaches of his

section 10(

b) rights, which demonstrated a pattern of willful or reckless disregard of his right to counsel withoutdelay. This favours exclusion.

[ 68 ] Secondly, the impact of obtaining a comment after not facilitating the first reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, had a significant effect on the accused and trial fairness. Like in Taylor , the delay in his counsel call exposed the accused to the risk of accidental self-incrimination. There was no valid reason to delay the counsel call.

Trial fairness favours exclusion. [ 69 ] Thirdly, the truth seeking function of the trial would be better served by the admission of this evidence, which because it was volunteered is likely reliable. [ 70 ] A consideration of all the circumstances leads me to conclude that admitting the evidence of Dare’s oral comments to police, prior to being afforded his right to counsel, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The main reason being that police did not prioritize his right to counsel on two separate instances. This was a clear violation of the Applicant’s

section 10(

b) rights. Courts need to disassociate themselves from such lax conduct regarding a fundamental right. [ 71 ] Defence counsel’s application to exclude the accused’s incriminating comments is granted. Dare’s oral comments at the police station are inadmissible. “Original signed by:” M.P. Thompson, P.J.