2017 NBCA 56, 2017 NBCA 56

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 48-17-CA J. SHAWN O’TOOLE APPELLANT J. SHAWN O’TOOLE APPELANT - and - - et - LAW SOCIETY OF NEW BRUNSWICK RESPONDENT BARREAU DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK INTIMÉ O’Toole v. Law Society of New Brunswick, 2017 NBCA 56 O’Toole c.

Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2017 NBCA 56 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Green Discipline Committee of the Law Society of New Brunswick : March 31, 2017 Comité de discipline du Barreau du Nouveau- Brunswick : le 31 mars 2017 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: September 13, 2017 Appel entendu : le 13 septembre 2017 Judgment rendered: September 13, 2017 Jugement rendu : le 13 septembre 2017

Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Frederick C. McElman, Q.C. and Chad M. Sullivan For the respondent: Joël Michaud Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Frederick C. McElman, c.r., et Chad M. Sullivan Pour l’intimé : Joël Michaud THE COURT The appeal is allowed, on terms, with reasons to follow. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli, sous conditions, avec motifs à suivre. COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 48-17-CA J. SHAWN O’TOOLE APPELLANT J. SHAWN O’TOOLE APPELANT - and - - et - LAW SOCIETY OF NEW BRUNSWICK RESPONDENT BARREAU DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK INTIMÉ O’Toole v.

Law Society of New Brunswick, 2017 NBCA 56 O’Toole c. Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2017 NBCA 56 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Green CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Drapeau l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Green

Discipline Committee of the Law Society of New Brunswick : March 31, 2017 Comité de discipline du Barreau du Nouveau- Brunswick : le 31 mars 2017 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o. Appeal heard and judgment rendered: September 13, 2017 Appel entendu et jugement rendu : le 13 septembre 2017 Reasons delivered: February 15, 2018 Motifs déposés : le 15 février 2018 Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Frederick C. McElman, Q.C. and Chad M.

Sullivan For the respondent: Joël Michaud Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Frederick C. McElman, c.r., et Chad M. Sullivan Pour l’intimé : Joël Michaud

THE COURT On September 13, 2017, the Court allowed the within appeal, on terms. At that time, we advised reasons would follow. Those reasons are set out in the text that follows. In brief, the dismissal by a Discipline Committee Panel of the appellant’s application for an order of costs against the Law Society in relation to the charge of misconduct for which he was found not guilty flows from an impermissible, and therefore unreasonable,

interpretation of s. 60(3) of the Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89 . A referral of that application to a differently constituted panel of the Discipline Committee is ordered. However, and despite the Panel’s unreasonable

interpretation of s. 60(3), its disposition of the application for costs in connection with the three other charges is not reversible. The Panel was without jurisdiction to award the appellant any costs in respect of those charges as their prosecution was brought to an end without a finding of not guilty, the sole condition precedent to an order under s. 60(3). LA COUR Le 13 septembre 2017, la Cour a accueilli le présent appel, sous réserve de conditions. Nous avions alors indiqué que les motifs suivraient. Le texte qui suit expose ces motifs.

En bref, le rejet par le sous-comité de discipline de la demande faite par l’appelant en vue d’obtenir une ordonnance de dépens contre le Barreau relativement à une accusation de faute professionnelle dont il a été reconnu non coupable découle d’une interprétation non permise, et donc déraisonnable, du par. 60(3) de la Loi de 1996 sur le Barreau , L.N.-B. 1996, ch. 89. Nous ordonnons le renvoi de cette demande à un sous-comité de discipline formé de membres différents.

Toutefois, malgré l’interprétation déraisonnable donnée au par. 60(3) par le sous-comité, sa décision sur la demande de dépens relativement aux trois autres accusations ne peut pas être infirmée. Le sous- comité n’avait pas la compétence requise pour accorder des dépens à l’appelant relativement à ces accusations, car leur poursuite s’est terminée sans déclaration de non-culpabilité, seule condition préalable à une ordonnance rendue en vertu du par. 60(3). The following is the judgment delivered by THE COURT I.

Introduction [ 1 ] Where a member charged with conduct deserving sanction has been found not guilty by a panel of the Discipline Committee, it may order the Law Society pay costs to the member: s. 60(3) of the Law Society Act, 1996 , S.N.B. 1996, c. 89 . In the case at hand, four charges of misconduct were brought against the appellant. The Panel of the Discipline Committee tasked with the inquiry ruled it lacked jurisdiction to proceed on three charges and, after a full hearing, found the appellant not guilty of the other.

The appellant then applied for an order under s. 60(3) in respect of the four charges. [ 2 ] After hearing the parties and considering the record, the Panel determined it lacked jurisdiction to award costs against the Law Society in respect of three charges, including the one for which the appellant had been found not guilty. That was so because, on the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3), costs could only be ordered against the Law Society where the successful member established his or her “prosecution should not have occurred”. Overlooking its finding of lack of jurisdiction over the remaining charge, the Panel awarded costs of $2,500 against the Law Society. The appellant takes issue with the quantum of that award, arguing it is unreasonably low.

For its part, the Law Society has not appealed or cross-appealed against the award, contending it should stand unaltered. [ 3 ] The appellant argues the Panel erred in restricting s. 60(3)’s ambit to cases where “the prosecution should not have occurred”. In his submission, s. 60(3), correctly interpreted, prescribes only one condition precedent to the exercise of a panel’s discretion to order the Law Society pay costs: a finding of not guilty of conduct deserving sanction. We

unhesitatingly agree. [ 4 ] However, the first issue for determination by this Court is whether the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3) is not only wrong, but unreasonable. In our respectful view, it is. [ 5 ] The second issue is whether that unreasonable

interpretation commands reversal of every costs disposition made by the Panel. As is well established, appeals are from dispositions, not the underlying reasons: Veno v. United General Insurance Corporation , 2008 NBCA 39 , 330 N.B.R. (2d) 237. [ 6 ] All things considered, we allow the appeal from the dismissal of the application for costs in relation to the charge for which the appellant was found not guilty.

Justice would be best served by a referral of the determination of that question to a differently constituted panel of the Discipline Committee in accordance with the directions that follow. [ 7 ] However, in our view, the Panel’s interpretative unreasonableness is of no moment in respect of the remaining three charges. In each case, the dismissal did not follow a finding of not guilty of conduct deserving sanction; they were all dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Consequently, the Panel lacked jurisdiction to make an order of costs against the Law Society pursuant to s. 60(3) in respect of those charges, including the one for which it did make an award of $2,500. As noted, and for reasons that remain unclear, the Law Society is content to leave that award untouched. In the result, while the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3) is unsustainable, there is no basis for interference with its disposition of the application for costs in respect of the three charges that were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. II. The Context [ 8 ] The appellant was admitted to the Law Society on February 15, 1983. He retired on June 30, 2014. [ 9 ] There is evidence that, in 2008, B.M.F. and her husband, D.R.F., both residents of St. Stephen, New Brunswick, executed a Transfer of their marital home into D.R.F.’s name only, as well as a Mortgage.

The appellant acted as their lawyer and signed both documents attesting he had witnessed their signatures in Fredericton. [ 10 ] Subsequently, D.R.F. and B.M.F. separated. On January 17, 2011, B.M.F.’s lawyer sent an email to the Law Society advising, inter alia , that her client had no recollection of signing the Transfer or the Mortgage, or of attending at the appellant’s office in Fredericton to sign those documents.

The lawyer repeated his client’s allegation in a February 24, 2011 letter to the Law Society, a copy of which was forwarded by the Registrar to the appellant as a “complaint” for the purposes of the Law Society Act . [ 11 ] On March 4, 2011, the appellant responded, contesting B.M.F.’s assertion that she had not signed the Transfer and the Mortgage, and had not attended his office to sign those documents: I must say that I was quite surprised to receive this complaint from [the Solicitor] regarding my client.

In August 2008, I represented DRF and BMF with regards to placing a Mortgage on their property at 73 Queen Street West, St. Stephen, New Brunswick. In order to finalize the transaction, it was necessary for D and B to convey the property from themselves as Transferor to DRF as Transferee. This was necessary because the Mortgage was only approved in the name of DRF. To complete this process, BMF signed a Transfer; a Marital Property Affidavit and a Mortgage. These were signed by her and the documents were registered in the appropriate Registry Office.

I am enclosing a copy of the Transfer including the Marital Property Affidavit and a copy of the Mortgage that Ms. F signed. I also

enclose a copy of the Mortgage Commitment that she signed with FirstLine Mortgages. Ms. Fs’ assertion that she did not sign these documents is incorrect. Her additional assertion that she did not come to Fredericton to sign is also incorrect according to my file notes.

I also have taken the liberty to enclose a copy of the prior Mortgage that BF signed back in October 2006 when the property was mortgaged to Wells Fargo Financial. [ 12 ] In late June 2011, the Registrar referred the complaint to the Complaints Committee. [ 13 ] A few days later, D.R.F. executed a sworn declaration confirming he and his wife had indeed signed the Transfer and the Mortgage in the appellant’s presence at his office in Fredericton. [ 14 ] On July 7, 2011, the Complaints Committee referred the complaint to the Discipline Committee.

Four charges of conduct deserving sanction were eventually brought against the appellant. [ 15 ] The first, Charge a), reflects B.M.F.’s complaint, at least in part, in that it alleges the appellant signed the Transfer and the Mortgage as a witness to her signature and that of her husband’s when, in fact, he had not been present when they signed those documents. [ 16 ] The second and third, Charges

b) and c), arise from the execution of the documents in question, but allege misconduct the Law Society had not previously brought to the appellant’s attention for response. [ 17 ] The fourth, Charge d), is unrelated to the execution of the Transfer and the Mortgage but, like Charges

b) and c), features an allegation of misconduct that had not been previously put to the appellant for response. [ 18 ] The four charges are particularized in a Notice of Complaint dated April 19, 2012, and are described as follows in the Panel’s February 21, 2016 decision on the merits: [Charge a)] In or about August 2008 you represented DF and BF in placing a Mortgage on their property located at 73 Queen Street West in St. Stephen, New Brunswick (the “Property”).You prepared a Transfer and Mortgage documents for your clients, DF and BF, which were dated August 14, 2008.

You placed your signature as a witness to the signatures of DF and BF as well as affixing your signature as a Commissioner of Oaths and as a Notary Public to the documents, when you were not present when DF and BF placed their signatures on the Transfer and Mortgage documents this being contrary to

Chapter 1 (Integrity),

Chapter 19 (The Profession),

Chapter 20 (The Administration of Justice) and

Chapter 23 (Avoiding Questionable Conduct) of the Law Society of New Brunswick Code of Professional Conduct; [Charge b)] In or about August 2008 you represented DF and BF in preparing a Transfer with respect to their property located at 73 Queen Street West in St. Stephen, New Brunswick (the “Property”). The Property was transferred from BF and DF to DF on August 14, 2008. Your client, BF, was unaware of the Transfer or the nature and consequences of the transfer as you failed to advise her as to the nature and consequences of the transaction; this being contrary to

Chapter 1 (Integrity),

Chapter 2 (Competence),

Chapter 3 (Quality of Service),

Chapter 4 (Advising Clients),

Chapter 19 (The Profession),

Chapter 20 (The Administration of Justice) and

Chapter 23 (Avoiding Questionable Conduct) of the Law Society of New Brunswick Code of Professional Conduct; [Charge c)] In or about August 2008 you represented DF and BF in preparing a Mortgage and Transfer with respect to their property located at 73 Queen Street West in St. Stephen, New Brunswick (the “Property”). The Property was transferred from BF and DF to DF on August 14, 2008. Your client, BF was unaware of the Transfer or the nature and consequences of the Transfer as you failed to advise her to seek independent legal advice with respect to the transaction, thereby placing yourself in a conflict of interest, contrary to

Chapter 1 (Integrity),

Chapter 4 (Advising Clients) and

Chapter 6 and (Conflict of Interest Between Clients) of the Law Society of New Brunswick Code of Professional Conduct;

[Charge d)] On September 30, 2008, you provided an invoice to your clients, DF and BF in the amount of $450.00 for fees relating tothe preparation, execution and completion of a Last Will and Testament for your clients, and you failed to prepare a Last Will andTestament for DF or BF, contrary to

Chapter 1 (Integrity),

Chapter 2 (Competence),

Chapter 3 (Quality of Service),

Chapter 4 (AdvisingClients),

Chapter 9 (Fees),

Chapter 19 (The Profession),

Chapter 20 (The Administration of Justice),

Chapter 23 (Avoiding QuestionableConduct) of the Law Society of New Brunswick Code of Professional Conduct and Rule 4(2)(

a) and (

c) of the Uniform Trust AccountRules under the Law Society Act, 1996. [para. 14] [19] On August 28, 2012, the appellant applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for an order quashingthe Registrar’s referral of the complaint to the Complaints Committee and the latter’s decision to, in turn, refer the complaint to theDiscipline Committee.

The grounds invoked included reasonable apprehension of bias on the Registrar’s part and loss or excess ofjurisdiction by the Complaints Committee in referring “the issues against the Applicant to the Discipline Committee without a complaintand without providing to the Applicant elementary principles of natural justice and procedural fairness”. [20] In his decision dismissing the application for judicial review, which is reported at 2012 NBQB336, 395 N.B.R. (2d) 391, the judge made the following observations and findings: The authorities indicate that absent exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, judicial review of an interlocutory or interim decisionshould not be taken.

This is the case even where the allegation is one of reasonable apprehension of bias. This legal principle wassummarized by Justice Wilson of the Ontario Court of Justice in Landry v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2011), (ON SCDC), 106 O.R. (3d) 728, at para. 15 as follows: “It is a well settled rule of this court that it will not exercise its right of judicial review in respect of an interlocutory matter, unless thecircumstances are exceptional or extraordinary.

In general, the court discourages the interruption and fragmentation of an administrativeproceeding that results from judicial review of interlocutory matters before the conclusion of the proceeding.” In my view any issues about procedural unfairness during the investigative steps or lack of a full and appropriate compliance with thespirit of the Law Society Act can and should be addressed before the Discipline Committee. It has sufficient authority to grant any“adequate alternative remedy” or “effective” remedy to such issues.

On the material before the Court I am not satisfied that this Courtshould interfere with the statutory process under the Law Society Act. With regard to the vague allegations of bias, I see no basis on which to allow any relief because of alleged reasonable apprehension ofbias. Decisions that have taken that same view include Sztern v. Canada (Superintendent of Bankruptcy), [2008] F.C.J. No. 351 (F.C.);Gollogly v. Ontario (Securities Commission), [2007] O.J. No. 5110 (Ont. S.C.J.); Ontario College of Art v. Ontario (Human RightsCommission), (ON SCDC), [1993] O.J. No. 61 (Ont.

H.C.J.). [paras. 33-35] [21] An appeal to this Court and a related application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court ofCanada failed (2013 NBCA 67, 412 N.B.R. (2d) 378; [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 30).

This Court’s reasons for decision bear repeating, if onlyfor contextualization purposes: This is an appeal, with leave, from a refusal to judicially review: (1) the decision of the Registrar of Complaints under the Law SocietyAct, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, to “refer issues regarding the [appellant] to the Complaints Committee”; and (2) the latter’s decision “torefer issues regarding the [appellant] to the Discipline Committee” for a hearing.

The application judge declined to engage in the sought-after review of those pre-hearing decisions on the grounds that: (1) the record did not reveal the requisite “exceptional or extraordinarycircumstances”; and (2) the Discipline Committee has sufficient authority to grant any “adequate alternative” or “effective” remedy forany “procedural unfairness during the investigative steps” or for any “lack of a full and appropriate compliance” with the Law SocietyAct (see O’Toole v.

Law Society of New Brunswick, 2012 NBQB 336, 395 N.B.R. (2d) 391, at para. 34). […] In exercising his discretion to refuse judicial review of the pre-hearing decisions in question, the application judge applied the correctlegal test, ultimately concluding he was “not satisfied that this Court should interfere with the statutory process under the Law SocietyAct” (para. 34). Moreover, and contrary to the appellant’s submission, the judge did not take extraneous circumstances into account inthe actual exercise of his discretion.

That said, some of the judge’s objectionable obiter comments are addressed later in these reasons.

Finally, and once again contrary to the appellant’s contention, the judge did not determine what duty of fairness, if any, was owed the appellant at the investigatory stage. Simply put, the case for reversal has not been made. […] Additional observations are nonetheless required in the interests of justice. The application judge made a number of comments, which might be construed as casting doubt on the reasonableness or plausibility of the appellant’s account of the events that gave rise to the “issues” referred to the Discipline Committee for a hearing.

In making those comments, the judge overstepped his authority. The appellant is entitled to an unbiased hearing by the Discipline Committee and a determination by that body of the facts based upon the materials submitted for its consideration. [paras. 1, 3-4 and 6-7] [Underlining in original.] [ 22 ] In a decision dated February 21, 2016, the Panel tasked with the inquiry allowed the appellant’s pre-hearing motion for an order dismissing Charges b),

c) and

d) for want of jurisdiction. In the Panel’s view, the Discipline Committee’s jurisdiction to inquire into any charge is engaged only after these steps have been taken sequentially: (1) a copy of the underlying complaint has been provided to the concerned member; (2) he or she has been afforded an opportunity to respond; (3) the Registrar has forwarded the complaint to the Complaints Committee; and (4) the Complaints Committee has referred the complaint to the Discipline Committee. In the case at bar, steps (1) and (2) were not taken for Charges b),

c) and d), thus depriving the Discipline Committee of jurisdiction over those Charges: The Act provides that complaints against members can occur in one of two ways: 1) as the result of a third-party complaint in writing [ Act , subsection 41(1)], or 2) as the result of an investigation by the Registrar whether or not there has been a third-party complaint [ Act ,

section 42]. In either case, the Act provides that the member must be provided with a copy of the complaint, whether it is from a third party or by the Registrar, and given a deadline by which the member must respond [ Act , subsection 41(3)]. The purpose of this process is for the member to know what the accusation is and to have an opportunity to respond. Once the deadline has passed, whether the member has responded, the Registrar has certain options, including forwarding the complaint to the Complaints Committee [ Act , subsection 41(4)].

That committee then has various options, including referring “ the whole or part of the complaint to the Discipline Committee ” [ Act , subsection 51(1)( e )]. The view of the Panel is that until and unless all of the above steps are followed, the Discipline Committee has no jurisdiction to proceed [see 2010 decision in LSNB v. Joyce Richardson ]. To paraphrase the complaint, Mr.

O’Toole was asked to respond to the allegation that “ he registered a transfer and a mortgage purporting to have witnessed the signature of the wife who says she has never met him and therefore he could not have taken her signature. ” Mr. O’Toole responded to that allegation. He did not respond to, nor was it put to him that he failed to make his client aware of the nature and consequences of the Transfer or failed to advise her to seek independent legal advice with respect to the transaction. Mr.

O’Toole also was not given the opportunity to respond to anything concerning an invoice to clients for fees relating to the preparation, execution and completion of a Last Will and Testament that he would have failed to prepare. […] The Registrar does not have the authority to fashion a charge without the allegation having been put to the member, and the member having had an opportunity to respond. [paras. 21-25 and 28]

That understanding of the Law Society Act and the jurisdiction of the Discipline Committee is not contested on appeal. [23] As to Charge a), the Panel found it had not been established on a balance of probabilities by“clear and convincing proof based on cogent evidence”. Dismissal ensued: The Panel reprised the hearing on July 22, 2015. The Law Society called the Solicitor and the wife (BF) as witnesses and then theRegistrar in rebuttal. Mr. O’Toole testified and also called the husband (DF).

The Solicitor’s evidence confirmed her actions above. […] We are asked to decide on who is the more credible of the witnesses. The Panel has difficulty in assigning credibility to any of thewitnesses who were participants in the events in 2008. […] There is no question that there are inconsistencies and that these circumstances are suspicious. But suspicion is insufficient to dischargethe Law Society’s burden of “clear and convincing proof based on cogent evidence” [Law Society of Upper Canada v. Evans, 2008CarswellOnt 4043; Law Society of Alberta v. Ouellette, 2012 ABLS 4].

In the end, we do not know whom to believe. We cannot take aguess. As stated in Hanna v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Saskatchewan)[ (SK Q.B.)] [...] there is no onus on [the member] to disprove the charge brought against him. Cogent and convincing evidence is required to sustaina conviction for a serious disciplinary offence that can result in a suspension from [...] practice. The evidence tendered respecting thisparticular count falls short of that requirement ... [paras. 31, 76 and 81] [Emphasis added.] As can be seen, the Panel dismissed Charge

a) because it did not know who to believe among the parties involved in the execution of theTransfer and the Mortgage in 2008. However, and as suggested at the hearing on appeal, the Panel did not articulate an unequivocal andunambiguous finding that the appellant was not guilty of the underlying misconduct, a condition precedent to the application of the costs-related discretion contemplated under s. 60(3).

However, the case has been argued on the basis that the Panel did make, at least byimplication, such a finding, and we propose to dispose of the appeal on that footing. [24] At any rate, the appellant made an application to the Panel for an order directing the LawSociety pay solicitor-client costs of $176,427.08 in connection with the proceedings before the Panel (excluding the application forcosts), the Court of Queen’s Bench (application for judicial review), this Court (appeal from the dismissal in Queen’s Bench of theapplication for judicial review) and the Supreme Court of Canada (application for leave to appeal our Court’s dismissal of the appeal). [25] The appellant’s application for an award of costs brought s. 60(3) into play.

It provides asfollows: 60(3) Where the respondent is found notguilty of conduct deserving sanction by apanel of the Discipline Committee, it mayorder that the Society pay costs to therespondent in an amount fixed by the panel. 60(3) Le sous-comité dc discipline quireconnaît l’intimé non coupable de conduiterépréhensible peut ordonner au Barreau depayer à l’intimé les dépens qu’il fixe.

As can readily be seen, the discretion to order costs against the Law Society is activated upon the occurrence of one event: a finding ofnot guilty of conduct deserving sanction. [26] In its decision on costs, which is dated March 31, 2017, the Panel listed the factors, which, inthe appellant’s submission, should prompt the exercise of the Panel’s discretion in favour of an award of solicitor-client costs against theLaw Society:

Mr. O’Toole asks that the Panel award him costs on a solicitor-client basis against the Law Society. His counsel cites the following factors:

a) Mr. O’Toole maintained throughout this matter that the Law Society did not have jurisdiction to proceed with three (3) of the four (4) charges. The Law Society ignored its obligations:

b) The charge that he was not present to witness the wife’s signature was supported only by suspicion, and was contrary to the clear evidence in the possession of the Law Society.

c) The Law Society failed in its duty to fairly assess the charges and evidence throughout. The Law Society’s duty is to assess the evidence. It is not to win. Prosecutions cannot be adversarial.

d) Mr. O’Toole offered to settle, on numerous occasions, on terms more favourable to the Law Society than ordered by this Panel.

e) While there are no reported cases relating to the award of costs against the Law Society, the Discipline Committee does not hesitate to award full costs of the prosecution where a member is found guilty. The inverse should also be true.

f) The manner in which the Law Society prosecuted this matter was unwarranted in that it was excessively adversarial. Notwithstanding his pleas that there was no jurisdiction, which were ultimately accepted by this Panel, the Law Society used the three charges as bargaining chips. The Law Society had what Mr. O’Toole described as “a single-minded punitive tone and approach” and would “settle for nothing less than a guilty plea and disbarment”. Mr.

O’Toole, and his counsel, from the day after the matter was referred to the Complaints Committee and throughout, have suggested that he was being aggressively prosecuted due to “guilt by reputation” as he had been disciplined some years before. From the beginning, they have said that BF was “confused and uncertain”. Further, the Law Society is criticized for not having called the husband, DF, who corroborated Mr. O’Toole’s version of events. According to counsel, the mere fact of a finding that the member is not guilty triggers cost consequences for the Law Society.

He points to two decisions where the Law Society’s costs were reduced due to one of two charges being withdrawn or dismissed as fodder for the proposition that the Law Society should be held accountable for having brought unsuccessful charges against a member. He cites 20 decisions rendered by various panels of this Discipline Committee where members were ordered to pay the full costs of the inquiry, that is 100%, or close to 100%, of the Law Society’s fees and disbursements, some substantial. His reasoning is that had Mr.

O’Toole been found guilty of all four charges, he would likely have been ordered to pay 100% of the Law Society’s costs. The inverse should now apply. Mr. O’Toole argues that certainly [C]harges b),

c) and

d) were unwarranted and that the Law Society was intransigent in its pursuit of those four charges in spite of the Application Judge’s admonitions on Judicial Review, using them as bargaining chips. He points to the fact that he objected from the beginning to [C]harges b),

c) and

d) and that he made offers to settle that were better than the results obtained by the Law Society. He highlights that he cooperated throughout with the Law Society despite his concerns about the manner it was proceeding, and the breaches of its own Act . He reminds the Panel of the fact that he tried to resolve the issues at the Complaints Committee level, to no avail. Mr. O’Toole’s counsel submits that his efforts to bring forth the lack of credibility of BF were ignored by the Law Society as were the judicial efforts he deployed.

He qualifies this as intransigence by the Law Society that caused significant additional expense and unwarranted hardship to Mr. O’Toole’s finances and his ability to earn a living, his reputation and his family. He argues that had the Law Society tested BF’s version of events even slightly, the equivocal nature of her evidence should have led to the Law Society not putting him through this arduous process. The Law Society has the obligation to protect all persons, including members accused of

professional misconduct, he says. He adds that the Law Society ignored the affidavit of DF, deeming it false testimony because it did not “serve its adversarial objectives”. He reproaches the Law Society for refusing to call DF as a witness, forcing Mr. O’Toole to call him. The Law Society has an obligation to fairly present the case. He argues that the Law Society and its counsel needed to be convinced that they had “clear, cogent and compelling evidence” before proceeding. Finally, counsel to Mr.

O’Toole makes the point that the Law Society had “ample time and opportunity to consider” the offers to settle that he made which would have served the regulatory and public protection interests the Law Society is required to protect. [paras. 25- 34] [ 27 ] The Panel’s decision on costs goes on to set out, with equal detail, the Law Society’s submission against any award of costs: The Law Society advances that the criteria for awarding costs are laid out in Re Speciale [ Law Society of Upper Canada v. Speciale [1994] L.S.D.D. No. 222 (QL)]:

a) The onus of establishing entitlement to costs rests upon the member seeking them. Thus, the member must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the disciplinary proceedings were unwarranted and that the Panel should exercise its discretion to award him costs.

b) The use of the word “unwarranted” means without reasonable justification, patently unreasonable, malicious, taken in bad faith, or for a collateral purpose.

c) The mere dismissal of a conduct application does not mean that the proceedings were unwarranted. Re Speciale makes the point that while perfection from those involved in the discipline process is sought, it will not always be achieved.

Before awarding costs, all factors must be looked at, “ including the extent of the solicitor’s co-operation with the Society, the efforts made by the solicitor or his or her counsel to bring home to the Society the unwarranted nature of the discipline proceedings, the degree of hardship the solicitor suffered, the opinion or opinions obtained by the society, and the manner in which the discipline hearing was conducted ”. A prosecution of the member of a profession concerns not only the regulator and the member, but also the public and the other members of the profession.

The regulator must vigilantly fulfil its role and should not be deterred from prosecuting cases due to the risk of costs. While he was ultimately relieved of all charges, the alleged misconduct, if true, was serious. A complaint, if believable but subject to findings of credibility, should proceed to a hearing. It is not up to staff or counsel to the regulator to assess credibility of witnesses. Contrary to civil litigation that generally concerns only the litigants, the dismissal of charges in an administrative proceeding does not necessarily mean that costs will be awarded against the litigator.

Regulators are mandated by statute to protect the public. “The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price.” An award of costs against the Law Society here will have a “chilling effect” on the Law Society’s discipline process. [paras. 35-40] [ 28 ] In its reasons for disposing of the application for costs as it did, the Panel made a critical

determination: the charges were to be considered separately, except for Charges

b) and c). This determination, which has not been challenged, prevented Charges b),

c) and

d) from piggybacking on the finding of not guilty for Charge a), assuming, without deciding, that this process is permissible under s. 60(3). It follows that the threshold requirement set by s. 60(3) has not been met for Charges b),

c) and d). Recall that for each of those charges, dismissal was ordered without a “not guilty” finding. In the result, the Panel lacked jurisdiction to award costs against the Law Society in connection with Charges b),

c) and d). [ 29 ] The Panel interpreted s. 60(3) as predicating its jurisdiction to award costs against the Law Society on a showing by the successful member “that the prosecution should not have occurred”. In other words, costs could be awarded under s. 60(3) if, and only if, the member demonstrated the Law Society should have declined to press charges before the Discipline Committee. In the Panel’s view, the appellant failed to discharge that burden with respect to all but one of the charges, specifically Charge d).

As mentioned, it ordered the Law Society pay costs of $2,500 in connection with that charge. [ 30 ] The Panel rejected the application for solicitor-client costs with respect to Charge

a) even though it had previously found the appellant not guilty of the “conduct deserving sanction” alleged therein. It did so because the appellant had failed to establish that the prosecution of Charge

a) should not have occurred: This is the only charge that went to a full hearing. The Panel decided that while Mr. O’Toole’s actions were suspicious, the evidentiary burden was not met. “Not guilty” does not equate “innocent”. There is a reason why the Panel referred to Mr. O’Toole’s “‘high-volume, deep-discount’ real estate transactions practise where [he] trust[ed], and thrust[ed], a great deal of the work to [his] support staff”.

He acknowledged that the August 13 mortgage execution instruction letter signed by his assistant, on his behalf without his review, implied that he was asking the client to sign documentation he would later witness without her being present. There are cases that taken on an objective examination of uncontested facts, the Registrar will sometimes be able to determine that there is no “complaint” that justifies proceeding against a member.

But where the scenario is a “he said-she said”, and if true the behaviour complained of is serious, it is not within the authority of neither the Registrar nor her counsel nor the Complaints Committee to decide on issues of credibility. That is only for the Discipline Committee to determine after a hearing where all concerned have testified and been cross-examined. BF’s version of events did not withstand the able cross-examination of Mr. O’Toole’s counsel, which led to the dismissal of the charge. But that does not mean the Law Society should not have proceeded against Mr. O’Toole on this charge. Mr.

O’Toole has not shown that the prosecution on [C]harge

a) should not have occurred. [paras. 54-57] [ 31 ] Inexplicably, the Panel considered the application for solicitor-client costs in connection with Charges b),

c) and

d) despite having previously found it had no jurisdiction over those charges. [ 32 ] The Panel dismissed the application with respect to Charges

b) and

c) on the following grounds: In his decision on the Application for Judicial review, the learned Justice wrote, in obiter : [25] ... In my view the complaint in paragraph 2(

b) and 2(c) [Charges

b) and c)] is not inconsistent with the original complaint that was informally expressed by a lawyer to the Registrar and then investigated by the Registrar. Those paragraphs 2(a), (

b) and (c) [Charges a),

b) and c)] relate to the original statement of the complainant: “ My client is adamant that she did not sign a deed over to her husband alone, nor did she sign a mortgage as “spouse of” ...” While the Panel ultimately disagreed with the learned Justice, the Law Society could take some comfort in these words that it was right to pursue those charges. Mr. O’Toole has not shown that the prosecution on [Charges

b) and c)] should not have occurred. [paras. 58-59] [ 33 ] The Panel allowed the application for costs with respect to Charge

d) on the grounds that the appellant had established its prosecution should not have occurred:

On the Application for Judicial review, the learned Justice wrote, in obiter: [26] The fourth aspect of the formal notice of complaint in paragraph 2(

d) is with respect to a transaction with regard to wills. Therewas never any notice or warning to Mr. O’Toole with regard to a transaction involving wills or that there was an investigation,complaint or concern about wills for these people. The detail that there were wills prepared for them came up quite late in the exchangeof communication between the Registrar and Mr. O’Toole. It arose as a result of documentation disclosed by Mr. O’Toole during theRegistrar’s investigation. With respect, the Law Society should have been alive to the issue that it perhaps had not followed the process on this charge.

One of therequirements imposed on the Law Society is that is must strictly follow the procedures set out in its legislation. As stated by Duff, C.J.C.in Harris v. Law Society (Alberta) [(1936) (SCC), 1 D.L.R. 401 at 402 (S.C.C.)] “The rule of law is correctly stated. I think, in Craies’ Statute Law at p. 355, in this sentence: ‘… when a statute confers jurisdictionupon a tribunal of limited authority and statutory origin, the conditions and qualifications annexed to the grant must be strictly compliedwith.’” This Panel ruled that the process was not followed.

It would have been easy for the charge to be withdrawn and the proper processengaged by a Registrar’s complaint. In the end the Panel is of the view that Mr. O’Toole has shown that the prosecution on [C]harge [d)] should not have occurred as themandatory process laid out in the Act was not observed. He is entitled to costs for his defense of this charge. [paras. 60-63] [34] It is the appellant’s central contention on appeal that the Panel committed reversible error in“creating and applying the test it used” to decide whether costs could be ordered against the Law Society.

As noted, the test in questionposits the threshold for a panel’s exercise of discretion against the Law Society is a finding “that the prosecution should not haveoccurred”. We agree the Panel committed reversible error in interpreting s. 60(3) in that fashion. [35] On September 13, 2017, the Court allowed the appeal, on terms, with reasons to follow. Hereare those reasons. III. Analysis and Decision A.

The standard of review [36] A member affected by a decision, determination or order of the Discipline Committee mayappeal on “a question of law or fact” and in the exercise of its jurisdiction this Court “may make such order as may be just”: ss. 66(1) and68 of the Law Society Act. The Law Society submits that, notwithstanding those broadly worded provisions, the Panel’s

interpretation ofs. 60(3), even if incorrect, must stand if it passes muster on a reasonableness standard. We agree. [37] Jurisprudence out of the Supreme Court of Canada establishes there is a presumption, albeitrebuttable, that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review on appeal from an administrative tribunal’s

interpretation of itsenabling statute: Barreau du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2017 SCC 56, [2017] S.C.J. No. 56 (QL), at para. 15 and Dykstra v.New Brunswick Cattle Producers, a body corporate under the Natural Products Act, S.N.B. 1999, c. N-1.2, 2018 NBCA 5, at para. 23,per Quigg, J.A. for the Court. There are exceptions, some rooted in the wording of the enabling statute, that compel the application of acorrectness standard to its

interpretation (see, for example, the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act, S.N.B. 1994, c. W-14, s. 21(9)(a), which explicitly requires decisions “based on the real merits andjustice of the case”, Gallant v. Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission (N.B.) (2000), (NB CA),228 N.B.R. (2d) 98, [2000] N.B.J. No. 320 (C.A.) (QL) and VSL Canada Ltd. v. Workplace Health Safety and CompensationCommission and Duguay et al., 2011 NBCA 76, 376 N.B.R. (2d) 292, at paras. 24-29).

Be that as it may, the burden of establishingunreasonableness lies with the asserting party: Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247.

[38] In Allen v. The Law Society of New Brunswick, 2017 NBCA 32, [2017] N.B.J. No. 190 (QL),the Court made the following observations with respect to the review standard on an appeal pursuant to s. 66(1) from an award of costs infavour of the Law Society against a member found guilty of conduct deserving sanction: In Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled this Court should only intervene if the contested paneldecision, determination or order “is shown to be unreasonable”.

A disposition may be labelled “unreasonable” only if “no line of analysiswithin the given reasons [...] could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived. If anyof the reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion are tenable in the sense that they can stand up to a somewhat probingexamination, then the decision will not be unreasonable and a reviewing court must not interfere” (see Ryan, at paras. 42 and 55).

In myview, this unmistakably exacting standard applies to all dispositions, including cost orders, prescribed by panels of the DisciplineCommittee. [para. 32] In our view, that standard applies to a panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3). [39] It follows that, even if we were satisfied the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3) is incorrect, wewould nonetheless be duty bound to abstain from intervening if that

interpretation were a permissible option having regard to settledprinciples of

interpretation. [40] Quite often those principles yield more than one reasonable

interpretation. If the tribunal settleson one of those

interpretations, its decision will withstand judicial review on a standard of reasonableness even if the court would haveopted for another

interpretation: McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895, Moldaver, J.for the majority. [41] However, where those principles, properly applied, point to a single legally permissibleinterpretation, an administrative tribunal’s adoption of a different

interpretation is unreasonable. As McLean makes plain: “In those cases,the ‘range of reasonable outcomes’ (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para. 4) willnecessarily be limited to a single reasonable

interpretation – and the administrative decision maker must adopt it” (para. 38). [42] In our respectful judgment, the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3) does not fall within the range ofpermissible outcomes. It is, therefore, unreasonable. B. The Panel’s unreasonable

interpretation of s. 60(3) [43] It may be timely to reproduce s. 60(3) for ease of reference.

It provides: 60(3) Where the respondent is found notguilty of conduct deserving sanction by apanel of the Discipline Committee, it mayorder that the Society pay costs to therespondent in an amount fixed by the panel. 60(3) Le sous-comité de discipline quireconnaît l’intimé non coupable de conduiterépréhensible peut ordonner au Barreau depayer à l’intimé les dépens qu’il fixe. [44] Section 60(3) has three components: (1) a condition precedent to the panel’s jurisdiction tomake a costs order against the Law Society, i.e. a finding of not guilty of conduct deserving sanction; (2) subject to that conditionprecedent, conferral upon the panel of the discretionary power to make such a costs order.

The use of the word “may” confirms the panelis entitled, but not obliged, to order the Law Society pay costs to the successful member. Costs do not necessarily “follow the event”, asis almost invariably the case in judicial proceedings; and (3) the panel’s discretion regarding the quantum of any award of costs. [45] As is well known, “the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in theirgrammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament”: E.A.Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87. Of course, that approach stands to be applied toenactments by both Parliament and Provincial Legislatures (see Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R.27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2 (QL)). Needless to say, s. 60(3) must be interpreted by resorting to that approach. The Panel failed to do so.

[46] In coming to its interpretative determination that costs were not recoverable against the LawSociety unless the affected respondent member established the prosecution should not have occurred, the Panel did not “read” the wordsof s. 60(3), textually or contextually. That failure to “read” is evident from the Panel’s disregard for s. 60(3)’s opening phrase, namely“[w]here the respondent is found not guilty of conduct deserving sanction”. The Panel’s interpretative obligation was to “read” all of thecomponents of s. 60(3); it had no authority to ignore its opening phrase (see Pelletier v.

Law Society of New Brunswick (1989), (NB CA), 92 N.B.R. (2d) 271, [1989] N.B.J. No. 34 (C.A.) (QL). [47] The words of s. 60(3) are not ambiguous. One event opens the door to the possible exercise by apanel of its discretionary power to order the Law Society pay costs to a successful respondent member, and it is a finding of “not guiltyof conduct deserving sanction”. In effect, the Panel’s

interpretation amends s. 60(3) by prescribing a much more onerous thresholdrequirement for the exercise of the statutorily-recognized discretion. Under the Panel’s

interpretation, s. 60(3) would effectively read asfollows: Where the respondent is found not guilty of conduct deserving sanction by a Panel of the Discipline Committee and the respondentestablishes the prosecution should not have occurred, the Panel may order that the Society pay costs to the respondent in an amount fixedby the Panel.

Broadly speaking, where a statutory provision identifies a triggering event for the activation of a discretionary power, without specifyingfactors which may inform the exercise of that power, it is impermissible and therefore unreasonable to interpret that provision asimposing a more exacting triggering event under the guise of defining those factors. That is fundamentally what the Panel has done. [48] As mentioned, the Panel rightly observed the Law Society “must strictly follow the proceduresset out in its legislation” (para. 61). That principle applies to panels of the Discipline Committee.

On any reasonable understanding of theLaw Society Act, it does not allow a panel to amend its provisions. [49] Section 60(3) was adopted with the enactment of the Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89,which took effect on January 1, 1997. The Law Society Act, 1996 replaced the Barristers’ Society Act, 22 Eliz. II, 1973, c. 80. The latterdid not confer on a Committee of Inquiry jurisdiction to order costs against the Law Society under any circumstances.

However, andsignificantly for contextual purposes, the Council could order any deposit demanded of a complainant be applied toward the costs of themember whose conduct was inquired into if the Council found “the inquiry was unwarranted”. Section 27(1) of the Barristers’ SocietyAct was on point and read as follows: 27.

(1) If after an inquiry by the Council or aCommittee of Inquiry the Council finds thatthe inquiry was unwarranted, the Councilmay order that any deposit demanded undersection 20 with respect to the inquiry beapplied towards costs of the inquiry in wholeor in part, including the costs of the barristeror solicitor whose conduct was inquired into. 27.

(1) Si le Conseil à la suite d’une enquêtequ’il a menée ou qu’a menée un comitéd’enquête, conclut que l’enquête étaitinjustifiée, il peut ordonner que le dépôtexigé en application de l’article 20 pourl’enquête serve à couvrir les frais d’enquêteen entier ou en partie, y compris les frais del’avocat ou du solicitor dont la conduite a faitl’objet de l’enquête [50] Furthermore, at the time s. 60(3) was adopted, s. 41 of The Law Society Act of Ontario underconsideration in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Speciale, [1994] L.S.D.D.

No. 222 (L.S.U.C.) (QL), provided costs could be awardedagainst the Law Society in favour of the member whose conduct was in issue if the proceedings were “unwarranted”. The word“unwarranted” has been defined as follows in the context of s. 41 of the Law Society Act of Ontario: “without reasonable justification,patently unreasonable, malicious, taken in bad faith or for a collateral purpose” (see Speciale, at para. 84).

There is no meaningfuldifference between the “unwarranted” standard and the “prosecution should not have occurred” standard. [51] Clearly, the drafters of s. 60(3) knew full well there were different options for the thresholdrequirement to the activation of a panel’s jurisdiction to order costs against the Law Society: the more exacting “unwarranted” standardor an equivalent such as “the prosecution should not have occurred”, or the more member-friendly “not guilty of conduct deservingsanction”. The drafters settled on the last-mentioned option.

So did the Law Society members who voted in favour of s. 60(3) as itcurrently reads. [52] Moreover, the Panel is indisputably correct that s. 60(3) “means something and cannot be

interpreted in a way that will see that costs are never awarded” (para. 51). As the Panel acknowledged, that interpretative approach has been applied elsewhere (see, for example, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Sharon Ellen Shore , 2008 ONLSAP 6 , [2008] L.S.D.D. No. 41 (L.S.U.C.) (QL). However, the Panel failed to appreciate its

interpretation has that excluding effect for virtually all cases that bring s. 60(3) into play. [ 53 ] Indeed, and as suggested at the hearing on appeal, it stands to reason that the outcome in the vast majority of charges prosecuted before a panel of the Discipline Committee turns on credibility. Typically, the charge is rooted in a complaint whose credibility is impugned by the respondent member.

The Panel described that common occurrence as a “he said – she said” scenario. [ 54 ] Significantly, the Panel determined any such scenario was “within the authority of neither the Registrar nor her counsel nor the Complaints Committee”. In the Panel’s view, controversies of that nature could only be determined by the Discipline Committee after a hearing “where all concerned have testified and been cross-examined”.

By that understanding of the complaint-resolution process under the Law Society Act , only the Discipline Committee would have jurisdiction to dispose of a charge whose sustainability depended upon the credibility of the key actors. [ 55 ] If that is so, the door to a panel’s exercise of discretion under s. 60(3) would be closed in virtually all cases if the threshold requirement were “the prosecution should not have occurred”.

If all “he said – she said” controversies require a hearing by a panel of the Discipline Committee, a successful respondent member could not make the case that he or she should not have been prosecuted. [ 56 ] In our respectful view, the Panel’s

interpretation of s. 60(3) is not only erroneous, but also impermissible and, correlatively, unreasonable, having regard to settled principles of statutory

interpretation. For that reason, it cannot be confirmed, which brings us to the effect of the Panel’s unreasonable

interpretation on the sustainability of its dismissal of the application for solicitor-client costs for Charges a),

b) and

c) and its award of $2,500 for costs in relation to Charge d). C. The impact of the Panel’s unreasonable

interpretation of s. 60(3) on the outcome

(1) For the three charges dismissed for want of jurisdiction: Charges b),

c) and d) [ 57 ] The Panel was without jurisdiction to make an award of costs against the Law Society in relation to those charges because in each instance the panel had not made a finding of not guilty of conduct deserving sanction. Thus, even if the Panel had correctly identified the discretion-activating threshold under s. 60(3), it would have been duty bound to dismiss the application for costs in respect of Charges b),

c) and d). It follows that the Panel’s interpretative error does not give rise to disposition reversibility. We note, in passing, that Rule 59.05 of the Rules of Court was adopted to explicitly vest in the court jurisdiction over the costs of a proceeding that was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Law Society Act does not confer that jurisdiction on a panel tasked with determining an application for costs in relation to a charge dismissed for want of jurisdiction. [ 58 ] The appeal against the Panel’s disposition of the application for costs in connection with Charges b),

c) and

d) is dismissed.

(2) For Charge a), the charge in respect of which the appellant was found not guilty [ 59 ] The s. 60(3) threshold has been met for Charge a): the appellant was found not guilty of the underlying misconduct. The Panel’s erroneous and unreasonable

interpretation of s. 60(3) foreclosed the appellant’s opportunity to secure a favourable exercise of discretion by the Panel. As a result, the Panel’s interpretative error is significant and commands reversal of its dismissal of the application for costs pertaining to Charge a). We allow the appeal against that dismissal and refer the determination of the application to a differently constituted panel of the Discipline Committee. The referral is made with the following directions. [ 60 ] First, costs do not necessarily follow a finding of not guilty of conduct deserving sanction.

The applicant member bears the burden of persuading the Panel it should exercise its discretion in his or her favour.

[ 61 ] Second, and it should go without saying, that discretion must be exercised in good faith and reasonably: Attorney General of New Brunswick v. The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company , 2010 NBCA 82 , 366 N.B.R. (2d) 105, at para. 9 . [ 62 ] Third, we endorse the following observations in the Panel’s March 31, 2017 decision on costs regarding the important role of the Law Society, the various interests at stake in disciplinary proceedings and the appropriateness of members seeking costs where “regulators do not get it right”.

That said, whether costs should be awarded is a matter of discretion influenced by manifold factors relating primarily to the conduct of the parties and the proceedings: In Canada, the delegation from governments of the power to regulate lawyers to law societies predates confederation. This power to self- govern gives the law societies two important roles: the authority to license and the authority to discipline. From the time of the McRuer Report, it has been accepted that those roles must be exercised primarily in the interest of the protection of the public.

The Supreme Court of Canada has underlined that the importance in our society of the proper regulation of professionals cannot be overstated, adding that: “The privilege of professional self-regulation therefore places the individuals responsible for enforcing professional discipline under an onerous obligation. The delegation of powers by the state comes with the responsibility for providing adequate protection for the public.

Finner confirms the importance of properly discharging this obligation and the seriousness of the consequences of failing to do so.” Those charged with this process must consider not only the Law Society’s interest, but also the interests of the client, the impact on the other members of the profession and the protection of the public at large. In that sense, it is not a purely adversarial process as the interests of non-parties must be considered. It follows that contrary to civil litigation where costs normally follow the result, in administrative matters that principle does not apply.

A professional misconduct hearing involves not only the individual and all the factors that relate to that individual, both favourably and unfavourably, but also the effect of the individual’s misconduct on both the individual client and generally on the profession in question. This public dimension is of critical significance in the mandate of professional disciplinary bodies. On the other hand, however, the interests of the member who is the subject of the complaint must also be considered.

Disciplinary proceedings have the potential of destroying professional lives, affecting families and sometimes ending careers. Disciplinary proceedings expose a member of the Society to a range of punishments which include suspension of the right to practise and even disbarment. In addition, irrespective of their income, the very nature of the proceedings can have a devastating effect on a member’s reputation, the single most valuable asset which any professional can possess.

This is why regulators must use their powers carefully, even when dealing with a member who has had issues in the past and may be perceived to be a “bad apple”. Sometimes, regulators do not get it right. In those instances, the member is right to ask the disciplinary body to consider the award of costs in the member’s favour. [opening statement under “Analysis” and paras. 41-45] [Footnotes omitted.] [ 63 ] Fourth, we agree with the Panel’s view that the costs incurred by the appellant in judicial review and appeal proceedings are not recoverable under s. 60(3).

Those costs have been judicially determined: […] we conclude that any costs that were incurred in pursuing Judicial Review are not recoverable. Mr. O’Toole was not successful in that endeavour and was ordered to pay costs in three of the four instances. It would be an error for the Panel to now order costs against the Law Society when it was essentially successful in its argument that the issue of jurisdiction was properly determinable by the Discipline Committee. Costs were also dealt with at the judicial level. [para. 65]

[64] Fifth, the new Panel would be well advised to take a multi-factorial approach to the exercise ofits discretion regarding whether an order of costs against the Law Society should issue.

The factors that might inform the panel’sexercise of discretion could include the member’s cooperation with the Law Society; the hardship suffered by the member; the manner inwhich the discipline hearing was conducted; the nature and the number of the charges brought against the member; the complexity of theproceeding; the importance of the issues; the conduct of any party which tended to unnecessarily lengthen the duration of the proceeding;any step in the proceedings which was improper, vexatious, prolix or unnecessary, or taken through over-caution, negligence or mistake;the neglect or refusal of any party to make an admission which should have been made; and any other matter relevant to the question ofcosts in judicial proceedings (see Rule 59.02 of the Rules of Court). [65] The appellant sought solicitor-client costs against the Law Society.

He filed documents with thePanel indicating those costs amounted to $176,427.08. Unlike the Rules of Court, the Law Society Act makes no provision for a tariff tohelp quantify party-party costs. Section 60(3) refers to “costs”; there is no mention of “party-party” costs or “solicitor-client” costs. Themeaning of “costs” under s. 60(3) is an issue for consideration by the next panel of the Discipline Committee. If s. 60(3) were interpretedas covering only solicitor-client costs, the Panel might consider applying the standard for such an award in the context of judicialproceedings.

Solicitor-client costs are usually allowed only where the party against whom the order is sought has engaged inreprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct: Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112(QL). The appellant’s complaints of wrongdoing arguably rise to that level; whether they do in fact is for the new Panel to decide. IV. Conclusion and Disposition [66] The Panel committed reversible error in its

interpretation of s. 60(3) of the Law Society Act andin dismissing the appellant’s application for costs in connection with Charge

a) for which the appellant had been found not guilty. ThePanel did not have jurisdiction to order the Law Society pay costs to the appellant with respect to the remaining three charges. Thosecharges were dismissed for want of jurisdiction and without the requisite finding of “not guilty”. [67] The appeal against the Panel’s disposition of the application for costs in relation to Charges b),

c) and

d) is dismissed. [68] However, the appeal against the Panel’s disposition of the application for costs in relation toCharge

a) is allowed.

Section 68 provides our Court “may make such order as may be just, including referral to the […] DisciplineCommittee to act in accordance with its directions”. We refer to the Discipline Committee: (1) the determination of the factors that mayinform the exercise of discretion under s. 60(3); (2) the issue of the appellant’s entitlement to costs for Charge

a) following application ofthose factors; and (3) the quantification of the costs, if any. [69] It is for these reasons that we allowed the appeal on the terms specified hereinabove. Successbeing divided more or less evenly, we make no order of costs on appeal. Version française du jugement rendu par LA COUR I. Introduction [1] Lorsqu’un membre accusé d’une conduite répréhensible a été reconnu non coupable par unsous-comité de discipline, celui-ci peut ordonner au Barreau de payer des dépens au membre : voir le par. 60(3) de la Loi de 1996 sur leBarreau, L.N.-B. 1996, ch. 89.

En l’espèce, quatre accusations de faute professionnelle ont été portées contre l’appelant. Le sous-comitéde discipline chargé de l’enquête a déclaré qu’il n’avait pas la compétence requise pour instruire trois accusations et, après une audience

complète, a reconnu l’appelant non coupable de l’autre. L’appelant a alors demandé une ordonnance en vertu du par. 60(3) relativement aux quatre accusations. [2] Après avoir entendu les parties et avoir examiné le dossier, le sous-comité a conclu qu’il n’avait pas la compétence requise pour accorder des dépens contre le Barreau relativement à trois accusations, y compris celle dont l’appelant avait été reconnu non coupable.

La raison en était que, selon l’interprétation donnée au par. 60(3) par le sous-comité, une ordonnance de dépens ne pouvait être rendue contre le Barreau que si le membre qui avait eu gain de cause avait établi que [ TRADUCTION ] « la poursuite n’aurait pas dû être introduite ». Oubliant sa conclusion de non-compétence sur l’accusation qui restait, le sous-comité a accordé des dépens de 2 500 $ contre le Barreau. L’appelant conteste le montant de ces dépens, soutenant qu’il est déraisonnablement faible.

Pour sa part, le Barreau n’a pas interjeté un appel ni un appel reconventionnel au sujet du montant, affirmant qu’il ne devrait pas être modifié. [3] L’appelant soutient que le sous-comité a fait erreur en limitant la portée du par. 60(3) aux cas où [ TRADUCTION ] « la poursuite n’aurait pas dû être introduite ». Selon son assertion, le par. 60(3), s’il est correctement interprété, prescrit une seule condition préalable à l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d’un sous-comité d’ordonner au Barreau de payer des dépens : une reconnaissance que l’intimé n’est pas coupable de conduite répréhensible.

Nous souscrivons sans hésiter à cette assertion. [4] Toutefois, la première question que notre Cour doit trancher est celle de savoir si l’interprétation donnée par le sous-comité au par. 60(3) est non seulement fausse, mais également déraisonnable. Nous estimons respectueusement qu’elle est déraisonnable. [5] La deuxième question consiste à savoir si cette interprétation déraisonnable nous oblige à infirmer toute décision rendue par le sous-comité au sujet des dépens. Il est bien établi que les appels sont interjetés à l’encontre des décisions et non des motifs sous-jacents : voir Veno c.

La United, Corporation d’assurances générales , 2008 NBCA 39 , 330 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 237. [6] Tout compte fait, nous accueillons l’appel à l’encontre du rejet de la demande de dépens relativement à l’accusation dont l’appelant a été reconnu non coupable.

Il serait dans le meilleur intérêt de la justice de renvoyer la décision sur cette question à un sous-comité de discipline formé de membres différents conformément aux directives qui seront données plus loin. [7] Toutefois, à notre avis, le caractère déraisonnable de l’interprétation donnée par le sous-comité est sans importance pour ce qui est des trois autres accusations. Dans chaque cas, le rejet n’a pas fait suite à la reconnaissance que l’intimé était non coupable de conduite répréhensible; toutes les accusations ont été rejetées pour motif de non-compétence.

En conséquence, le sous-comité n’avait pas la compétence requise pour rendre une ordonnance de dépens contre le Barreau en vertu du par. 60(3) relativement à ces accusations, y compris celle pour laquelle il a accordé un montant de 2 500 $. Comme nous l’avons indiqué, et pour des motifs qui ne sont pas clairs, le Barreau estime satisfaisant que le montant ne soit pas modifié.

En conséquence, bien que l’interprétation donnée par le sous-comité au par. 60(3) soit indéfendable, rien ne permet de modifier sa décision concernant la demande de dépens relatifs aux trois accusations qui ont été rejetées pour motif de non-compétence. II. Contexte [8] L’appelant a été admis au Barreau le 15 février 1983. Il a pris sa retraite le 30 juin 2014. [9] Des éléments de preuve indiquent qu’en 2008, B.M.F. et son mari, D.R.F., résidents de St. Stephen, au Nouveau-Brunswick, ont signé un transfert de leur foyer matrimonial au nom de D.R.F. seulement, ainsi qu’une hypothèque.

L’appelant les a représentés en tant qu’avocat et a signé les deux documents, attestant qu’il avait été témoin de leurs signatures à Fredericton. [10] Par la suite, B.M.F. et D.R.F. se sont séparés. Le 17 janvier 2011, l’avocat de B.M.F. a envoyé un courriel au Barreau indiquant entre autres que sa cliente n’avait aucun souvenir d’avoir signé le transfert ni l’hypothèque, ou d’être allée au bureau de l’appelant à Fredericton pour signer ces documents. L’avocat a répété l’allégation de sa cliente dans une lettre au Barreau datée du 24 février 2011, dont une copie a été transmise par la registraire à l’appelant à

titre de « plainte » aux fins de la

Loi sur le Barreau .

[11] Le 4 mars 2011, l’appelant a répondu en contestant l’assertion de B.M.F. voulant qu’elle n’ait pas signé le transfert et l’hypothèque et ne soit pas allée à son bureau pour signer ces documents : [ TRADUCTION ] Je dois admettre que j’étais plutôt surpris de recevoir cette plainte de [l’avocate] concernant ma cliente. En août 2008, j’ai représenté DRF et BMF en vue d’enregistrer une hypothèque sur leur bien situé au 73, rue Queen ouest à St. Stephen, au Nouveau-Brunswick.

Afin de finaliser la transaction, il était nécessaire pour D et B de transporter le bien de DRF et BMF, comme auteurs du transfert, à DRF, comme destinataire du transfert. Il était nécessaire de procéder ainsi parce que l’hypothèque avait seulement été approuvée au nom de DRF. Pour compléter la transaction, BMF a souscrit un acte de transfert, un affidavit relatif à un bien matrimonial et une hypothèque. Elle a signé ces documents, lesquels ont été enregistrés au bureau d’enregistrement approprié.

J’annexe à la présente lettre une copie de l’acte de transfert, y compris l’affidavit relatif à un bien matrimonial, et une copie de l’hypothèque, signés par M me F. J’annexe également une copie de l’engagement de prêt hypothécaire conclu avec FirstLine Mortgages, qu’elle a signé. L’assertion de M me F selon laquelle elle n’a pas signé ces documents est inexacte. Son autre assertion, selon laquelle elle ne s’est pas rendue à Fredericton pour les signer, est également inexacte selon les notes que j’ai consignées au dossier.

Je me suis également permis de joindre une copie de l’hypothèque précédente, que BF a souscrite en octobre 2006, lorsque le bien a été grevé d’une hypothèque en faveur de Wells Fargo Financial. [12] À la fin juin 2011, la registraire a renvoyé la plainte au comité des plaintes. [13] Quelques jours plus tard, D.R.F. a signé une déclaration sous serment confirmant que son épouse et lui avaient bien signé le transfert et l’hypothèque en présence de l’appelant à son bureau de Fredericton. [14] Le 7 juillet 2011, le comité des plaintes a renvoyé la plainte au comité de discipline.

Quatre accusations de conduite répréhensible ont été portées par la suite contre l’appelant. [15] La première, l’accusation a), correspond, au moins en partie, à la plainte de B.M.F. en ce qu’elle affirme que l’appelant a signé le transfert et l’hypothèque comme témoin de la signature de l’épouse et de celle du mari alors qu’en fait, il n’était pas présent lorsqu’ils ont signé ces documents. [16] La deuxième et la troisième, les accusations

b) et c), découlent de la signature des documents en question, mais elles font état de fautes professionnelles que le Barreau n’avait pas portées auparavant à l’attention de l’appelant pour qu’il y réponde. [17] La quatrième, l’accusation d), n’a aucun rapport avec la signature du transfert et de l’hypothèque, mais, comme les accusations

b) et c), elle soulève une allégation de faute professionnelle qui n’avait pas été signalée auparavant à l’appelant pour qu’il y réponde. [18] Les quatre accusations sont détaillées dans un avis de plainte daté du 19 avril 2012 et sont décrites dans la décision sur le fond du sous-comité, datée du 21 février 2016, ainsi qu’il suit :

[TRADUCTION][Accusation a)] Au mois d’août ou vers le mois d’août 2008, vous avez représenté DF et BF dans l’obtention d’une hypothèque sur leurbien immobilier sis au 73, rue Queen ouest à St. Stephen, au Nouveau-Brunswick (le bien immobilier). Vous avez préparé les documentsde l’hypothèque et du transfert pour vos clients, DF et BF, lesquels documents étaient datés du 14 août 2008. Vous avez apposé votresignature aux documents comme témoin aux signatures de DF et BF et comme commissaire à la prestation des serments et notairepublic, alors que vous n’étiez pas présent lorsque vos clients ont signé les documents de l’hypothèque et du transfert. Vous avez ainsi agien violation du

chapitre 1 (L’intégrité), du

chapitre 19 (La profession), du

chapitre 20 (L’administration de la justice) et du

chapitre 23(Éviter toute conduite douteuse) du Code de déontologie professionnelle du Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick; [Accusation b)] Au mois d’août ou vers le mois d’août 2008, vous avez représenté DF et BF pour la préparation d’un transfertrelativement à leur bien immobilier sis au 73, rue Queen ouest, à St. Stephen, au Nouveau-Brunswick (le bien immobilier). Le bienimmobilier a été transféré de BF et DF à DF le 14 août 2008. Votre client[e], BF, n’était pas au courant du transfert ou de la nature etdes conséquences du transfert parce que vous avez omis de l’informer de la nature et des conséquences de la transaction; vous avez ainsiagi en violation du

chapitre 1 (L’intégrité), du

chapitre 2 (La compétence), du

chapitre 3 (La qualité des services), du

chapitre 4 (Laconsultation), du

chapitre 19 (La profession), du

chapitre 20 (L’administration de la justice) et du

chapitre 23 (Éviter toute conduitedouteuse) du Code de déontologie professionnelle du Barreau du Nouveau-Brunswick; [Accusation c)] Au mois d’août ou vers le mois d’août 2008, vous avez représenté DF et BF dans la préparation d’une hypothèque etd’un transfert relativement à leur bien immobilier sis au 73, rue Queen ouest, à St. Stephen, au Nouveau-Brunswick (le bien immobilier).Le bien immobilier a été transféré de BF et DF à DF le 14 août 2008.

Votre client[e], BF, n’était pas au courant du transfert ou de lanature et des conséquences du transfert, car vous avez omis de lui conseiller d’obtenir un avis juridique indépendant relativement à latransaction. Vous vous êtes ainsi mis dans une situation de conflit d’intérêts, en violation du

chapitre 1 (L’intégrité), du

chapitre 4 (Laconsultation) et du

chapitre 6 (Conflit d’intérêts entre clients) du Code de déontologie professionnelle du Barreau duNouveau-Brunswick; [Accusation d)] Le 30 septembre 2008, vous avez remis une facture de 450 $ à vos clients, DF et BF, pour les honoraires liés à lapréparation, à l’exécution et à l’achèvement d’un testament pour vos clients. Vous avez omis par la suite de préparer un testament pourDF ou BF. Vous avez ainsi agi en violation du

chapitre 1 (L’intégrité), du

chapitre 2 (La compétence), du

chapitre 3 (La qualité desservices), du

chapitre 4 (La consultation), du

chapitre 9 (Les honoraires), du

chapitre 19 (La profession), du

chapitre 20(L’administration de la justice), du

chapitre 23 (Éviter toute conduite douteuse) du Code de déontologie professionnelle du Barreau duNouveau-Brunswick et des règles 4(2)

a) et

c) des Règles uniformes sur les comptes en fiducie prises sous le régime de la Loi de 1996 surle Barreau. [par. 14] [19] Le 28 août 2012, l’appelant a demandé à la Cour du Banc de la Reine une ordonnance annulantle renvoi de la plainte par la registraire au comité des plaintes et la décision de ce dernier de renvoyer ensuite la plainte au comité dediscipline.

Les moyens invoqués incluaient une crainte raisonnable de partialité de la part de la registraire et la perte de compétence oul’excès de pouvoir de la part du comité des plaintes lorsqu’il a renvoyé [TRADUCTION] « les questions soulevées contre le requérant aucomité de discipline sans avoir reçu de plainte et sans traiter le requérant selon les principes élémentaires de la justice naturelle et del’équité procédurale ». [20] Dans sa décision rejetant la requête en révision judiciaire, qui est publiée à 2012 NBBR 336, 395 R.N.-B. (2e) 391, le juge a fait les observations et tiré les conclusions suivantes : [TRADUCTION]La jurisprudence indique qu’en l’absence de circonstances exceptionnelles ou extraordinaires, il ne devrait pas y avoir révision judiciaired’une décision interlocutoire ou provisoire.

Il en est ainsi même s’il y a allégation de crainte raisonnable de partialité. Ce principejuridique a été résumé comme suit par la juge Wilson, de la Cour de justice de l’Ontario, au par. 15 de l’arrêt Landry c. Barreau du Haut-Canada (2011), 2011 ONSC 2947 , 106 O.R. (3d) 741 : C’est une règle bien établie de cette cour qu’elle n’exerce pas le droit de la révision judiciaire quand il s’agit d’une questioninterlocutoire, sauf si les circonstances sont exceptionnelles ou extraordinaires.

En général, la cour décourage les interruptions et lafragmentation d’une instance administrative causées par la révision judiciaire de questions interlocutoires avant la fin de l’instance. À mon avis, toute question relative à l’injustice de la procédure au cours des étapes d’investigation ou au défaut d’une observation

entière et appropriée de l’esprit de la

Loi sur le Barreau peut et devrait être débattue devant le comité de discipline. Celui-ci a lespouvoirs voulus pour accorder [TRADUCTION] « un autre recours suffisant » ou [TRADUCTION] « efficace » à l’égard de tellesquestions. La documentation présentée à la Cour ne me convainc pas que notre Cour devrait intervenir dans le processus légal établi parla

Loi sur le Barreau. Pour ce qui est des vagues allégations de partialité, je ne vois aucune raison d’accorder des mesures réparatoires en raison d’uneprésomption de crainte raisonnable de partialité. Cette opinion a été adoptée, notamment, dans les décisions Sztern c. Canada (Surintendant des faillites), [2008] A.C.F. no 351 (C.F.), Gollogly c. Ontario (Securities Commission), [2007] O.J. No. 5110 (C.S.J.Ont.), et Ontario College of Art c. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), (ON SCDC), [1993] O.J.

No. 61 (H.C.J.Ont.) [par. 33-35] [21] Un appel à notre Cour et une demande connexe d’autorisation d’interjeter appel devant la Cour suprême du Canada ont été rejetés (2013 NBCA 67, 412 R.N.-B. (2e) 378; [2014] C.S.C.R. no 30). Il est utile de reproduire ici les motifsde décision de notre Cour, ne serait-ce que pour situer en contexte le présent appel : Il s’agit d’un appel, interjeté avec autorisation, d’un refus de la Cour du Banc de la Reine de procéder au contrôle

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