2012 QCCA 128, 2012 QCCA 128

Rosenstein c. Kanavaros 2012 QCCA 128 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-020960-100 ( 500-17-049206-090 ) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: January 17, 2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICOLE DUVAL HESLER C.J.Q. PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. LORNE GIROUX, J.A. APPELLANTS (INCIDENTAL RESPONDENT) ATTORNEY(

S) KATHRYN ROSENSTEIN HAGOP ARTINIAN Mtre Julius H. Grey Mtre Isabelle Turgeon GREY & CASGRAIN RESPONDENT (INCIDENTAL APPELLANT) ATTORNEY(

S) MARY KANAVAROS Mtre Martine L. Tremblay KUGLER, KANDESTIN

On appeal from a judgment rendered on July 30, 2010 by the Honourable Madam Justice Danielle Richer of the Superior Court district of Montreal. NATURE OF THE APPEAL : Civil liability Clerk: Marcelle Desmarais Courtroom: Antonio-Lamer HEARING 9 h 37 Submission by Mtre Julius H. Grey. 11 h 00 Suspension. 11 h 30 Resumption. 11 h 30 Submission by Mtre Julius H. Grey. (continuation) 12 h 20 Submission by Mtre Martine L. Tremblay. 12 h 30 Suspension. 14 h 07 Resumption. 14 h 07 Submission by Mtre Martine L. Tremblay. (continuation) 14 h 37 Reply by Mtre Julius H.

Grey. 14 h 51 Ends of arguments. 14 h 51 Suspension. 15 h 39 Resumption. BY THE COURT: Judgment – see page 3. Marcelle Desmarais Clerk BY THE COURT JUDGMENT

[1] The appellants, who were condemned to pay Respondent $234,011.87 in damages for defamatory statements following thesettlement of an action, contend that their statements about Respondent were not defamatory, that Respondent suffered no damages, thatthe damage award is exaggerated and that there was no cause to grant exemplary damages. [2] The statements in question were made to journalists after a settlement was reached on the morning of the trial in a wellpublicised action instituted by Appellants against Respondent, a teacher, and the principal of the school attended by their child, as well asagainst the School Board.

Despite a confidentiality clause contained in the settlement document, Appellants told journalists, in essence,that they had made their point and had received a negligible amount (implying that they had won the argument), that they had institutedtheir proceedings for the sake of the children of the school, who deserved to be treated with respect, that Respondent was a « markedlady » and she would henceforth think twice before doing something unprofessional.

They added that this was a battle between Davidand Goliath, David being "one nine year old boy" who had to "stand up to the teacher and say this is wrong". [3] The sequence of events that gave rise to the first action, by Appellants, began with the teacher asking the child to redo a partof his homework that had clearly been written by the mother, and escalated from there. [4] The trial judge found the parents' statements after the settlement of that action to have been outright lies and made in badfaith. [5] The Supreme Court of Canada decided in Prud'homme that words may be defamatory because of the idea they expresslyconvey, or by the insinuations that may be inferred from them (Prud'homme v.

Prud'homme, 2002 SCC 85 , [2002] 4 S.C.R.663 at par. 34). The Supreme Court made it also clear, in Prud'homme, that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. It must betempered by the right of third parties to the protection of their reputation (par. 43). [6] In successfully initiating settlement discussions on the morning of the trial of the lawsuit they had instituted, Appellants ineffect prevented Respondent from defending her reputation.

It was recognized in the settlement document, as noted by the judge of firstinstance at paragraph 77 of the judgment a quo, that the Appellants acknowledged that the defendants, including the Respondent,admitted no fault and that the amount of $5,000 paid by the insurer of the school authorities was solely made to buy the peace and avoidthe expenses of a trial. Yet Appellants proceeded to imply that they had been right all along, and made statements that were clearlydefamatory and, according to the trial judge, were made in a reckless and wilful manner.

Those statements, in addition to infringing theconfidentiality clause, could only significantly damage Respondent's reputation, personally as well as professionally. [7] The trial judge's findings at paragraphs 100, 123 and 124 are clear in this respect: [100] Le Tribunal est d'avis que nous sommes ici en présence d'une faute délictuelle, malicieuse et de mauvaise foi. On ne peut être à cepoint inconscient : proposer un désistement, accepter les conditions de la

partie adverse (absence de responsabilité des défendeurs etconfidentialité des termes de l'entente) et trahir cet engagement dans les minutes qui suivent, en présence des médias (télévision etjournaux anglophones couvrant le grand Montréal Métropolitain).

L'impression générale qui se dégage de l'ensemble de la preuve est queles défendeurs ont habilement et sciemment profité de la présence des médias pour régler leurs comptes avec la professeure en la jugeantet en la condamnant sur la place publique, après lui avoir enlevé la chance de se défendre. [123] Le tribunal est d'avis qu'en s'adressant aux médias télévisés et écrits, tels « CBC » et le journal «The Gazette » sur un sujet qui faitdéjà l'objet d'articles de journaux trois ans plus tôt lors de l'institution de leurs procédures, les parents ne pouvaient ignorer que leursdéclarations seraient reprises par les médias.

La seule présence des médias dans le corridor du palais de justice, à l'étage où devait se tenirle procès, enlève tout doute quant à leur intérêt d'informer la population des résultats du procès.

Pourquoi les parents ont-ils soutenu desaffirmations du type « we made our point », « she's a marked lady » si ce n'est pour qu'ils soient divulgués par les médias au sortir de laCour. [124] Les commentaires des défendeurs insinuent forcément la présence de fautes sans toutefois les préciser, laissant supposer le pire: « we made our point », «She's a marked lady and before she makes any more « unprofessional moves », she'll have to think twice. »

Enraison de la diffusion de ces nouvelles sur le site web, on peut encore, à ce jour, retracer les articles de journaux qui rapportent ladiffamation en inscrivant simplement le nom de Mary Kanavaros sur un moteur de recherche. [8] The trial judge's analysis of the facts put in evidence, as well as of the damages suffered by the Respondent, is thorough. Appellants fail to show any palpable and overriding error in the conclusions of fact contained in the judgment a quo.

It is appropriate toreproduce here paragraphs 217 and 218 of the judgment a quo, where the trial judge sums up her findings concerning causality thus: [217] La demanderesse a repris le cours normal de ses activités professionnelles en septembre 2002 et elle n'était plus médicamentée.

Lademanderesse a démontré une force exceptionnelle malgré l'arrogance incroyable des défendeurs à son endroit, malgré leur lettre du 14octobre 2004 où ils dictent leurs instructions au principal et à la demanderesse (D-15), malgré la mise en demeure des parents de payer50 000 $ (P-27) pour les soit-disant mauvais traitements infligés à leur fils, malgré la poursuite judiciaire de 155 000 $ dirigée contre elleen mai 2004 avec retentissement dans les journaux, et malgré une autre poursuite judiciaire entreprise contre elle par un autre parent,sous la gouverne du même avocat, en novembre 2007.

En effet, la demanderesse a continué de s'acquitter de toutes ses tâchesprofessionnelles d'enseignante jusqu'au 25 mars 2008, et ce, sans prendre de congé de maladie. De plus, elle n'a pas hésité à voir le

médecin en novembre 2007 et à prendre les médicaments prescrits pour l'aider à trouver le sommeil.

Cela ne nous apparaît pasexceptionnel à l'approche du procès et avec la signification d'une nouvelle procédure en novembre 2007, laquelle vient ajoouter unepression additionnelle importante en pleine préparation du procès dirigé contre les défendeurs; il est difficile de croire que la date designification de cette deuxième procédure n'a pas été planifiée en fonction de l'audition qui devait débuter le 25 mars 2008 contre lesdéfendeurs. [218] Le Tribunal est d'avis que la dépression de la demanderesse est une réaction directement reliée à l'attaque malicieuse à saréputation répandue sur les médias à la grandeur du pays et plus particulièrement dans la région montréalaise où la demanderesse exercesa profession d'enseignante.

Aucune preuve médicale ne démontre que le court épisode de congé de maladie de la demanderesse en 2002la prédisposait à une dépression majeure; les faits et circonstances mis en preuve nous convainquent du contraire. [9] Nor have Appellants shown any error in law in the judgment a quo.

The trial judge was right in awarding exemplarydamages, having determined that Appellants' purpose was to destroy Respondent's reputation (par. 96 of the judgment). [10] She was also right in granting compensation on the basis of income before tax as opposed to income after tax, whether past orfuture income, the jurisprudence on this issue being constant. (Cunningham v. Wheeler, (SCC), [1994] 1 R.C.S. 359;Watkins v. Olafson, (SCC), [1989] 2 R.C.S. 750; R. c.

Jennings (SCC), [1966] R.C.S. 532) [11] In short, nothing in this case warrants the Court's intervention. [12] The decision is unanimous except on the issue of the several liability for the condemnation to pay exemplary damages, JudgeGiroux being of the opinion that there is no solidarity between debtors of such damages. [13] As to the cross-appeal regarding Respondent's legal fees, an issue properly disposed of by the trial judge at paragraph 234, wesee no reason to interfere with her decision.

However, the Respondent is right to argue that an amount of $552.00 for psychotherapy wasinadvertently omitted from the amount of damages. The cross-appeal will be allowed to that extent, without costs. [14] FOR THESE REASONS, the appeal is dismissed, with costs, and the cross-appeal is maintained, without costs, for the solepurpose of adding an amount of $552.00 to the amount awarded in first instance. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER C.J.Q. PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. LORNE GIROUX, J.A.