2010 QCCA 868, 2010 QCCA 868

Pappas c. R. 2010 QCCA 868 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-004365-092 ( 500-36-004725-084, 745 057 865 M.C.

M) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: April 30, 2010 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. APPELLANT(

S) ATTORNEY(

S) NICK PAPPAS IN PERSON RESPONDENT(

S) ATTORNEY(

S) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Mtre Patrice G. Crevier TOWN OF MONTREAL, PENAL AND CRIMINAL AFFAIRS ATTORNEY(

S) On appeal from a judgment rendered on March 24, 2009 by the Honourable Mr. Justice Guy Cournoyer of the Superior Court, District of Montreal NATURE OF THE APPEAL : CONVICTION – ROAD SAFETY Clerk: MARC LEBLANC Court Room: PIERRE-B.-MIGNAULT HEARING File continued from April 27 to April 30, 2010. Judgment rendered – see page 3. Marc Leblanc Clerk BY THE COURT JUDGMENT

[ 1 ] On February 7, 2008, the appellant Nick Pappas underwent his trial in the Municipal Court of Montreal for having, on November 18, 2006 at 1:25pm, violated

section 359 of the Highway Safety Code [1] in that, being a driver of a road vehicle facing a red light, failed to stop the vehicle before a pedestrian crosswalk, the stop-line or the near-side of the roadway at the intersection of Guizot and St. Laurent. [ 2 ]

Section 359 of the Code reads as follows, in both official languages: Unless otherwise directed by a sign or signal, when facing a red light, the driver of a road vehicle or any person riding a bicycle must stop his vehicle before the pedestrian crosswalk or stop-line or, if none, at the near side of the roadway he is about to cross or enter, and may proceed only when a signal shows he may do so. * * * * * À moins d'une signalisation contraire, face à un feu rouge, le conducteur d'un véhicule routier ou d'une bicyclette doit immobiliser son véhicule avant le passage pour piétons ou la ligne d'arrêt ou, s'il n'y en a pas, avant la ligne latérale de la chaussée qu'il s'apprête à croiser.

Il ne peut poursuivre sa route que lorsqu'un signal lui permettant d'avancer apparaît. [ 3 ] After hearing testimony from the police officer who had issued Mr. Pappas the statement of offence at the scene of the alleged infraction, as well as Mr. Pappas, the trial judge (the Honourable Judge Sophie Beauchemin) concluded that the offence as charged had not been made out, since the position of the officer’s police car did not allow him to observe the colour of the traffic light when Mr. Pappas braked and ended up in the middle of the intersection.

In short, the trial judge could not conclude that the light was red when Mr. Pappas’ car crossed the line. [ 4 ] Nevertheless, the trial judge was convinced that Mr. Pappas had crossed the intersection when the light was yellow. She therefore convicted him of what she described as the included offence of crossing on a yellow light, which she considered as being to his advantage. [ 5 ] The offence for which Mr. Pappas was thus convicted is contained in

section 361 of the Code , and it reads as follows, in both official languages: Unless otherwise directed by a sign or signal, when facing an amber light, the driver of a road vehicle or any person riding a bicycle must stop his vehicle before the pedestrian crosswalk or stop-line or, if none, before the near side of the roadway he is about to cross, unless he has entered it or is so close to it that he could not stop in safety; he may proceed only when a signal shows he may do so. * * * * * À moins d'une signalisation contraire, face à un feu jaune, le conducteur d'un véhicule routier ou d'une bicyclette doit immobiliser son véhicule avant le passage pour piétons ou la ligne d'arrêt ou, s'il n'y en a pas, avant la ligne latérale de la chaussée qu'il s'apprête à croiser, à moins qu'il n'y soit engagé ou en soit si près qu'il lui serait impossible d'immobiliser son véhicule sans danger.

Il ne peut poursuivre sa route que lorsqu'un signal lui permettant d'avancer apparaît. [ 6 ] Whether or not the trial judge was correct in convicting Mr. Pappas of the offence in

section 361 of the Code as an included offence in

section 359 depends upon the application of

section 221 of the Code of Penal Procedure [2] , which reads as follows in both official languages: Where a judge acquits a defendant of an offence, he may nevertheless convict him of a lesser offence established by the evidence and included in the offence of which the defendant was acquitted. * * * * * Le juge qui acquitte le défendeur d'une infraction peut cependant le déclarer coupable d'une infraction de moindre gravité établie par la preuve et qui est incluse dans l'infraction pour laquelle le défendeur a été acquitté. [ 7 ] It is not disputed that the offence for which Mr.

Pappas was convicted is a lesser one than the one with which he was charged inasmuch as the sanction upon conviction for the latter is greater than the former and carries other potential consequences. Rather, the issue is whether the lesser offence is also an included offence for the purpose of

section 221 C.P.P . [ 8 ] In her oral reasons rendered at the conclusion of the evidence and argument, the trial judge proceeded on the assumption that she was indeed convicting Mr. Pappas in accordance with the discretion given to her by

section 221 C.C.P. [ 9 ] The Superior Court judge who heard Mr. Pappas’ appeal (the Honourable Mr. Justice Guy Cournoyer) did specifically address the issue in his judgment dismissing the appeal. Amongst other submissions, Mr. Pappas had urged the Superior Court to approach the matter in light of the recent majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. G.R. , [3] a case in which it was held that the offences of sexual assault and sexual interference were not included offences of incest.

He also referred the Court to a judgment of an Ontario justice of the peace who had rendered judgment on an issue involving a similar traffic offence involving the crossing of red and amber lights. [4] [ 10 ] While holding that Mr. Pappas’ submissions were ‘’not without intellectual merit’’, the Superior Court judge nevertheless observed that his arguments had been rejected in two earlier judgments of that Court in Longueuil v. Paiva [5] and Municipalité du Canton de Granby c. Couture [6] . He therefore felt that since these

interpretations had stood for 15 years, certainty in the law remained

an important consideration, and that only compelling circumstances would justify a departure from those prior decisions. [ 11 ] Finally, with respect to the Supreme Court judgment in R. v. G.R . , the Superior Court judge felt no need to ponder its application and said this: 23. Finally, whether the analysis of the Supreme Court in G.(R.) requires the issue to be revisited will have to wait another case, the precise findings of fact by the trial judge establish that no miscarriage of justice occurred here. Mr. Pappas testimony was a substantive answer to both offences.

He knew the extent of his jeopardy and was, in the circumstances of this case, under a fair notice of the charge against him. [ 12 ] Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, but inasmuch as this Court had never considered the question of law raised by the circumstances of the case, and some earlier judgments of municipal courts [7] ran contrary to those of the Superior Court on which Cournoyer, J. had relied, leave to this Court was granted. [ 13 ] In Paiva , Barrette-Joncas, J. relied in part on the reasons of Bellavance, J. in Couture.

Part of the considerations of Bellavance, J. to hold that traversing an amber light was included in that of traversing a red light were to the following effect: - celui qui passe sur un feu rouge a vu ou pouvait voir avant, de près ou de loin, un feu jaune qu'il a ignoré.

Aussi, l'infraction alléguée (feu rouge) ne pouvait se commettre sans que l'automobiliste n'ait aussi raté l'obligation de s'immobiliser au feu jaune (référence omise) [ 14 ] A different view was taken by Judge Laliberté of the Municipal Court of Montreal in Dorais . [8] In answer to the contention that one cannot commit the offence of having crossed a red light without having failed to stop at a yellow light, he said this: La Cour est d'avis que l'infraction de "passer sur feu jaune" n'est pas incluse dans celle de "passer sur feu rouge".

Non seulement cette dernière peut être commise sans nécessairement commettre la première, mais également, il est impossible juridiquement de commettre les deux infractions en même temps. En effet, avant le passage pour piétons ou la ligne d'arrêt ou s'il n'y en a pas, avant la ligne latérale de la chaussée qu'il s'apprête à croiser, ou bien le défendeur fait face à un feu rouge ou bien il fait face à un feu jaune. Chose certaine, il est impossible qu'il soit face aux deux en même temps. La couleur du feu après la ligne d'arrêt n'est d'aucune pertinence.

L'obligation s'évalue alors que le conducteur se trouve avant la ligne d'arrêt. L'obligation est la même dans les deux cas. Le conducteur doit immobiliser son véhicule. Une seule distinction entre les deux infractions, face au feu rouge il y a obligation absolue d'arrêter ce qui n'est pas le cas face au feu jaune. Dans ce dernier cas, la loi permet de franchir la ligne d'arrêt ou la ligne latérale de la chaussée ou le passage pour piétons, si on y est engagé ou si près qu'il soit impossible d'immobiliser son véhicule sans danger.

Malgré la différence quant au degré de l'obligation, il demeure que cette obligation d'immobiliser le véhicule sera impartie au conducteur dans deux situations: il fait face à un feu rouge ou il fait face à un feu jaune. Il s'agit de deux situations bien distinctes et exclusives. La controverse pourrait provenir de la prétention que dans certains cas, avant de faire face à un feu rouge, le conducteur a d'abord fait face à un feu jaune et que ce faisant, il a commis les deux infractions.

Ce point de vue ne peut tenir après examen pour les raisons suivantes: D'abord, si le conducteur fait face à un feu jaune lorsque le véhicule traverse la ligne d'arrêt, le passage pour piétons ou la ligne latérale, il commet l'infraction de "passer sur feu jaune" à moins qu'il ne bénéficie de l'exemption prévue à l'article 361 C.S.R. à savoir qu'il peut poursuivre sa route face à un feu jaune s'il est si près de l'intersection qu'il ne peut immobiliser son véhicule sans danger.

Par ailleurs, si le conducteur fait face à un feu rouge lorsque le véhicule traverse la ligne d'arrêt, le passage pour piétons ou la ligne latérale, il commet l'infraction de "passer sur feu rouge" et non celle de "passer sur feu jaune". Donc il est évident qu'un conducteur qui traverse sur un feu rouge ne peut jamais lors du même incident avoir d'abord traversé sur un feu jaune. Il s'agit là d'une impossibilité tant factuelle que juridique.

Ensuite, même s'il s'avérait possible dans certaines circonstances de commettre les deux infractions, ce qui n'est pas l'avis de la Cour, cela ne peut avoir pour effet de rendre l'infraction de "passer sur feu jaune" incluse à celle de "passer sur feu rouge". Ce n'est pas là le bon test. Il faut se souvenir du test applicable en l'espèce: est-ce que l'infraction de "passer sur feu rouge" peut se commettre sans commettre celle de "passer sur feu jaune"? Bien sûr que oui.

La Cour est donc d'avis que l'infraction prévue à l'article 361 C.S.R. n'est pas incluse à celle prévue à l'article 359 du même code. [9] [ 15 ] In this Court, counsel for the City of Montreal agrees that whether or not an offence is an included one with another must be assessed as a matter of law and without reference to the evidence. He also concedes, contrary to the basis on which the Superior Court judgments have proceeded, that it is possible as a matter of law for someone to have committed the offence mentioned in

section 359 of the Code without having committed the offence in

section 361. [ 16 ] While that concession does not of course bind this Court, it is nevertheless wholly consistent with the analysis of Judge Laliberté in Dorais , and entirely compatible with the fact that a driver could well decide to traverse a red light well after the amber light has turned red, or even after having stopped at an amber light. As a result, the Court has no hesitation in concluding that the offence in

section 361 of the Code is not an included one with the offence in

section 359 of the Code. [ 17 ] It follows that the trial judge improperly convicted Mr. Pappas of the offence in

section 361 of the Code , despite her entirely

reasonable factual conclusion that he crossed the amber light without stopping, as he should have. That Mr. Pappas did so, as she found, is the only plausible explanation to be drawn from his testimony as to how he wound up in the middle of the intersection, on the assumption he did not traverse a red light. [ 18 ] The trial judge could not, however, convict Mr. Pappas of the offence in

section 361 of the Code, since it is not the offence with which he was charged. His appeal will therefore be allowed. [ 19 ] With respect to Mr. Pappas' claim that he be awarded costs, the Court is of the view that he has not established that the prosecution was abusive or clearly unfounded, as subsection 223(2) C.P.P. requires before a court can impose costs on the prosecutor. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT : [ 20 ] ALLOWS the appeal, without costs; [ 21 ] SETS ASIDE the judgment of the Municipal Court of Montreal convicting the appellant of an offence contrary to

section 361 of the Highway Safety Code and the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the appellant's appeal; [ 22 ] ACQUITS the appellant of the offence for which he was convicted by the judgment of the Municipal Court, without costs. PIERRE J. DALPHOND, J.A. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.