2021 QCCQ 5308, 2021 QCCQ 5308
Opinion
R. c. J.M. 2021 QCCQ 5308 The indictment, unreasonable delays, Robotham motion, A-G mise-en-cause, jurisdiction of SQ on Aboriginal citizens, allegation of summons and indictment ab initio, reopening of the defence. COURT OF QUEBEC Criminal and Penal Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF ABITIBI WASKAGANISH N° : 614-01-001865-175 DATE : April 8, 2021 PRESIDED BY THE HONOURABLE LOUIS A. LEGAULT, J.C.Q. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecution v. J. M. Defence and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC Mise-en-cause JUDGMENT ON MOTION TO QUASH (written version) [ 1 ] A publication ban of the name of the complainants or of every detail permitting to identify them is ordered in virtue of
section 486.4 of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] The accused has presented a motion to quash and, in the end, order a stay of the proceedings in view of their alleged fundamental procedural flaws and in view of the unreasonable delays.
He also has presented quite informally a Robotham motion and a motion to reopen the defence so as to re-examine Officer Ayotte who did the investigation. [ 3 ] The accused is being pursued on several counts of sexual offences and physical assault on the persons of some of his children for which a trial has been going on since January 20, 2020 and for which there was a preliminary enquiry. [ 4 ] J. M. motions the Court to quash proceedings alleging several flaws that he says are fatal. This is a very late application that is, for a major part, represented anew during the time reserved for representations.
The motion is based on the facts disclosed during the hearing. It represents also pleadings and has the purpose to end up proceedings. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC IMPLEADED [ 5 ] The accused has joined the Attorney-general of Quebec as mise-en-cause but truly there is no reason implicate the Attorney General of Quebec. [ 6 ] Way above the fact that never was there a proper notice given to that party or a date of presentation, there is no reason whatsoever in law to implicate the state. No question of constitutionality or of the validity of a provision of
an Act of the Parliaments of
Quebec or Canada or of their regulations is being raised.
There are no such reasons invoked in the debate. [ 7 ] The question of unreasonable delays in the case being heard does not justify impleading the Attorney General of Quebec [1] . [ 8 ] As a matter of fact, the accused has no right whatsoever procedurally or in law to implicate the Attorney General of Quebec and there was no reason justifying any such impleading. [ 9 ] If it is a matter of fact that the proceedings of the accused have not respected the required formalities of the law in his last minute motions since July 2020 and even December 2020 and that apart from this new question of unreasonable delays formulated and presented on January 27 2021 and pleaded on February 26, 2021, the accused has been quite repetitive throughout on his procedural claims and demands again putting in his representations the question of nullity of the whole proceedings, summons and indictment and speaking to other issues.
I have received throughout oral comments on the Robotham issue. [ 10 ] Furthermore, there are no valid reasons to raise any question of the legitimacy and legality of the work of the Sûreté du Québec as the Supreme Court has pronounced itself on that question as it will be referred to in this decision.
UNREASONABLE DELAYS [ 11 ] It was then felt that as a first instance judge facing this new issue of unreasonable delays, I had a moral obligation notwithstanding the informality of the demand, to hear the debate and I invited the Prosecution Attorney’s collaboration in doing the much needed work that was the Defence first task, in preparing in detail an account of delays gone through in these present proceedings.
I appreciate this collaboration. [ 12 ] The accused pleaded that any and all delays could not be his responsibility because he felt that the proceedings were complex, that it was inherent to his understanding that these being complex matters his motions were truly part of the running delays inherently and constitutionally not his responsibility.
He strongly believes that the days and months that went by as he presented a number of three motions should be considered as being institutional delays. [ 13 ] He certainly has raised several questions of law that were unusual and he has showed a real concern and interest on procedural and jurisdiction matters.
Whether he rightly or not raised questions for which his motions were dismissed, the fact is that when he did undertake to produce pleadings in writing, he came up with motions or request that were not greeted save to declare that he could not be found guilty of alleged infractions committed outside the Province of Quebec. [ 14 ] Indeed from the time of pleadings, the accused has multiplied questions in the form of so-called motions.
Furthermore, he felt that any motion he presented and that brought forward more delays, were to be considered as naturally not being of his responsibility but simply the ones inherent to the present proceedings.
The motions he presented did indeed add to the length of the proceedings and were generally served last minute. [ 15 ] The total length of the proceedings from the date of the signing of the summons to the time of hearing the representations of the accused on his motion for unreasonable delays on March 25, 2021 is of 40 months and 26 days, which means 1,242 days. [ 16 ] Prosecution claims that as of March 25, 2021, there are 553 days to be attributable to Prosecution and there are 502 days clearly institutional delays for a total of 502 days. [ 17 ] Here is the analysis of Prosecution: - Summon signed on: October 31, 2017; - Date of the next hearing: March 25, 2021; - Option in the file: Judge alone with preliminary inquiry; - Total delay: 1,242 days (40 months and 26 days); - Non arguable delays of defence according to the prosecution : 553 days (*) Arguable delays of the defence according to the prosecution : 112 days; - Non arguable institutional delays according to the prosecution: 502 days (*); - Arguable institutional delays according to the prosecution : 75 days;
- Delay attributable to the accused: 665 days (according to the prosecution) or 553 days (without Def.(*)); - Other delays: 577 days (according to the prosecution) or 689 days (with Def.(*)). [ 18 ] Taking into account the verdict to be pronounced on April 8, 2021, the total number of days that the instance took was 1,257 days, 14 days being added as institutional. [ 19 ] The accused alleges that all of the delays or almost are the responsibility of Prosecution or are inherent or institutional responsibilities as the whole system defaulted on providing him an attorney, as this is not his personal responsibility. [ 20 ] Between October 31 2017 and January 18, 2018, the delays that run from the issuance of the information being sworn to the first appearance are institutional.
These 79 days are institutional delays. [ 21 ] The delays that run from January 18 to May 3 2018 are hereafter explained. - namely from January 18, 2018 to March 8, 2028 as the accused is absent, as Me Heang is in a conflict of interest, postponement ordered; - then from March 8, 2018 to April12, 2018, as Me Egervary decided not to enter the file and the case was postponed in the accused absence; - then from April 12 th to August 9 2018 as the accused needed a postponement in view of his difficulty to appoint an attorney, at which time he was made aware of the Jordan stay on delays and of the necessity of advancing the course of proceedings, there being a postponement by consent; - then from August 9 2018 to September 17, 2018, the accused taking steps with the “Commission des services juridiques” as Me Beaudet will not represent him, as Me Massé of the Legal Aid is assessing the file of the accused regarding representations and as there are discussions for a possible Robotham that is mentioned by the sitting judge as a possibility and there follows a postponement by consent; - then from September 17, 2018 to October 15, 2018 as the accused not being admissible to legal aid, there are references made to a Robotham motion and as the accused is invited to make the file progress and again the case is postponed by consent; - then from October 15, 2018 to November 26, 2018, as the case is again postponed as the accused progresses in his attempt to retain an attorney, as Me Marie-Christine Latour has been approached and the accused asks a postponement but prosecution is unable to communicate with Me Latour; - then from November 26 to November 27, for the purpose of verification of Me Latour entering the file, the accused being absent; - then from November 27 to January 22, 2019, it is postponed at the request of defence as Me Latour is engaged in taking steps before the Review Board; Prosecution speaks her concerns regarding delays accumulating as they have been ready to proceed in the file since the first day; the sitting judge then noted that this case is not advancing; the accused is expecting a decision from the Review Board; - then from January 22, 2019 to March 5, 2019, the case is again postponed at the accused request as Me Latour is preparing a motion after receiving the final decision of the Review Board and she discusses of the orientation of the file to take position at the next hearing date; - then from March 5, 2019 to April 2 2019, as a Robotham motion has been received on the eve of March 5, the judge offers April 2 to proceed and July 23, but defence attorney is not available, prosecution speaking to the fact that this file could proceed elsewhere and before as delays are important and as there is a need to advance, the sitting judge undertaking to address with the Administrative judge the question, Me Rochette speaking to her need of the accused sending her his documents, all of these postponements being clearly the responsibility of Defence. [ 22 ] These postponements from January 18 2018 to April 2 2019 are the responsibility of defence and amount to a period of 439 days.
[ 23 ] From April 2 2019 to May 3 2019 , the case is postponed by consent; Me Latour is not available and she had received on the late eve of April 2 2019 the documents that it took a long time to the accused to forward to his attorney. A list of the documents already disclosed was sent to defence by prosecution. These documents would simply be a list of documents and not a new disclosure of evidence made available to the accused.
That responsibility of that postponement is again the responsibility of Defence. [ 24 ] This delay of 31 days is the responsibility of Defence . [ 25 ] Regarding the period of May 3 2019 to June 26, 2020: - On June 25 2019 , Judge Potvin acts in case management, that all of the documents had been received by prosecution on April 26, 2019.
Prosecution intended to contest the motion and the date of the hearing was set on June 15, 2019; - On September 19, 2019, the motion of defence for a Robotham is dismissed as the judge has no jurisdiction, prosecution dispensing defence to produce a motion, Me Latour is appointed attorney to cross-examine complainants and the preliminary motion is fixed on September 19 and 20, Me Latour, not being available on July 22, 2019; - From September 19, 2019 to October 21, 2019, preliminary enquiry is held, the accused is ordered to stand trial and a case management is fixed for October 21, 2019; - From October 21, 2019 to October 28, 2019, the accused is very well aware that if he wishes to present a Robotham motion, it has to be presented rapidly.
The accused says he does not intend to present a motion on delays and that if the trial is held in Waskaganish and that there will be no Robotham motion; the accused will communicate a request for disclosure and the case is set on October 28 2019 to proceed at trial on January 21 2020 and January 22, 2020; - On January 21, 2020 and on January 22, 2020, the trial proceeds and complainants testify; - On January 22, 2020, the case is postponed to January 28, 2020 to set dates for the continuation of the trial; - On January 28 2020, the case is set to proceed on April 6 2020 and April 7 2020; - On April 6 2020 and on April 7 2020, the trial continues; - On April 7 2020, the case is postponed to June 9, 2020 for continuation and Defence is closed on that date; - The transcript is ordered and the accused convenes that he will produce a written argument within two weeks of the reception of the transcript, Prosecution having to produce their written representations within the following next two weeks; - The transcripts having been received the week preceding June 9, 2020, the accused had until June 26 to produce his written pleadings as the accused stated he was about to finish his written pleadings; - Prosecution had two weeks to produce its written representations from the expected date of receipt of the accused written representations; - Prosecution had until July 10 th to produce their written representations; - August 17 2020 was set for complementary verbal representations and the case would have been fixed for final judgment. [ 26 ] Therefore, the delays from May 2 2019 to June 26, 2020 are clearly those delays within which the accused had to have completed his pleadings.
These delays are institutional and they represent 422 days.
[ 27 ] On August 17, the accused presented a request for advice and instructions. He requested permission from the Court to delay the trial as long as it would take for a quasi-judicial body to decide on the breach of ethics of Officer Ayotte. That was rejected. The accused also asked the permission to reopen his defence to cross-examine Officer Ayotte on allegations of collusion between police and X and with the leaders of the community. [ 28 ] A written version of that judgment on the motion was deposited in the court record and sent to the parties on or around September 15, 2020.
The accused request and verbal motions were dismissed. Prosecution contested any postponement and spoke to delays being the responsibility of the accused. [ 29 ] The accused presented on August 17 2020 a verbal motion for a Robotham. The main reason had to do with the accused wanting an attorney to re-examine Officer Ayotte and the accused was advised that he needed a written motion respecting all steps of the process necessary for it to be considered.
He again reiterated his general views that the proceedings were null ab initio, the summons as well as the indictment, that he was the victim of collusion. [ 30 ] The case was postponed to September 30, 2020, the question of delays being once again reiterated to the accused namely by prosecution. [ 31 ] On September 30, 2020, the Court had received no motion. He was then speaking of there being a mistrial. The case was postponed to December 9, 2020, and if the accused wished to provide written pleadings, he could do so by November 11, 2020 and prosecution could plead in writing by December 2, 2020.
That was to no avail. [ 32 ] A date for verbal pleadings was set to December 9, 2020. [ 33 ] On December 9, 2020, the accused was absent. He had not send any form of written pleadings. Through a November 17, 2020 E- mail, the accused invoked a hand handicap as he says he was about to finish his draft written representations. [ 34 ] The delays between June 26 2020 and December 9 2020 are the sole responsibility of the accused as he delayed proceedings as and he presented an unfounded motion and as he was looking forward to delaying indefinitely the process.
The delays since the accused was to produce written pleadings by June 26 2020 are totally his responsibility. These166 days are the sole responsibility of the accused. [ 35 ] Between December 9, 2020 and December 21, 2020 , the delays of 12 days are inherent or institutional as verbal pleadings were then fixed. [ 36 ] On December 21, 2020 the case was postponed to February 26 2020 for verbal pleadings. The accused had produced a Motion to quash or amend the indictment, invoking that the proceedings were null ab initio and joining also a short
summary of his findings on the counts and of short
summary of facts some of which were in evidence before the Court. There were pleadings on the motion to quash or amend the indictment received a few days prior. The pleadings took the whole day.
The accused was invoking the nullity of the proceedings, the absence of jurisdiction of the Court to correct the alleged procedural defects, the illegality of the investigation by the SQ, their absence of jurisdiction that a new investigation ordered. [ 37 ] The accused in his motion to quash or amend was invoking that the indictment arose out of a conspiracy, was complaining of the violation of his right to have an attorney represent him as he had been unable to retain the services of one, he was once again referring to the absence of jurisdiction of the Quebec Court to hearing criminal matters for infractions that were committed outside the territory.
I had stated in the past that I had no jurisdiction to judge of infractions committed elsewhere in Canada outside Quebec. But he again made the point. He was once again invoking the absence of jurisdiction of the SQ regarding infractions committed in the James Bay area and was invoking the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement as well as the absence of right of the SQ to investigate any other infractions but the major crimes.
And indeed clearly the offences in the indictment are not part of the major crimes that are the sole responsibility of the SQ. [ 38 ] The accused again pleaded to the defective investigation that was ruled out on August 17, 2020 judgment as was also denied the right to reopen defence and the right to have an attorney retained through the Robotham process. [ 39 ] The case was postponed for judgment on February 26 2021.On February 26, 2021, the accused is present.
The Court was ready to render judgment on the verdict but a new motion was served on the February 24, 2021, namely debating the same questions, adding the Attorney General of Quebec as mise en cause and adding a debate on unreasonable delays. [ 40 ] Between December 21, 2020 and February 26, 2021 , the delay of 67 days is institutional. [ 41 ] On February 24 2021, the accused presented a third motion. The hearing of verbal representations on February 26, 2021 was delayed as that third motion was to be heard. The accused invoked unreasonable delays and other grounds.
Prosecution was invited to submit a detailed timetable with details that Defence never produced as it was clearly a last minute attempt, unprepared and undetailed and looking rather dilatory. Again that motion was rather comprehensive of other motions and included a motion for unreasonable delays and the accused impleaded the Attorney-general of Quebec. [ 42 ] The hearing was reported to March 25, 2021. The accused and prosecution made their representations and this is the judgment on the motion as pleaded by the accused. The accused motion will be dismissed.
In my assessment, defence is short of over 400 days to enter the pleadings on whether the delays in this case are unreasonable. It was once again a last minute motion that does not stand any test of reasonability in the circumstances notwithstanding the accused right to submit motions for his defence. The other aspects of the motion that were pleaded were also not funded in facts and in law. This judgment analyses and dismisses the accused pretences. [ 43 ] The delays between February 26, 2021 and March 25 are the sole responsibility of the accused.
These delays represent 27 days that are the accused responsibility .
[44] Between March 25, 2021 and April 8 2021, the delay of 14 days is institutional. [45] Altogether, from the issuance of the summons until the judgement that will be rendered on April 8, 2020, 1257 days will haveelapsed. Out of these 1257 days, 663 days are the responsibility of Defence and 594 are the other delays are inherent or institutional. Weare fare indeed from a situation that is borderline or close to the 900 days that would justify other debates or would permit to presumethat the delays would have been unreasonable. This is not the case. [46] The motion invoking unreasonable details is dismissed.
INDICTMENT [47] It is useful to remind all that the indictment deposited by Prosecution represents an instance of its own and did start theproceedings on that basis (Martin Vauclair et Tristan Desjardins, Traité général de preuve et de procédures pénales, 27e édition,Cowansville. Éditions Yvon Blais, 2020, Number 24.1, p. 777; St-Charles c R, 2008 QCCQ 13535, par 7; R c Chabot,(SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 985). REFERENCE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR QUEBEC AS IMPLEADED PARTY [48] Impleading the Attorney-general for Quebec is useless as there is no debate that justifies his intervention.
This is irrespective ofthe fact that the motion was deposited on the morning of February 26 where I was ready to render judgment and of the fact that no noticeof presentation was ever given neither was the minimum delay for doing so respected. Furthermore, the question of the right of the SQ toinvestigate and recommend to the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions has been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada and, ascan be read in this judgment, the accused pretences are of no value.
INVESTIGATING AND CHARGING THE ACCUSED BEING THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EEFP [49] The accused contested the power of the SQ to investigate matters involving Cree citizens. He pleaded the exclusive right of theEeyou Eenou Police Force to lead the investigation and pursue the criminal offenses in Cree territory. There is no doubt that theseoffences are also part of the jurisdiction of the Eeyou Eenou Police Force. [50] The accused argument does not resist a thorough examination.
There is no doubt in law not only that the Director of Criminal andpenal prosecutions had all the jurisdiction to authorize that an information be laid starting a criminal pursuit, but furthermore that theSûreté du Québec had the power to investigate complaints of Cree citizens against other citizens of their Cree community regardingsexual or physical assault complaints.
The Sûreté du Québec had the overall jurisdiction to investigate any offense committed in theProvince of Québec against Cree citizens whether they lived inside or outside their national territory. [51] Those powers granted to the EEFP police task force does not in any manner remove from the SQ the powers they had toinvestigate, neither was it meant to withdraw from SQ police officers the right to investigate and develop reasonable beliefs that a citizenliving in a Cree territory had committed sexual offences and assaults on his children. [52] The power granted to The EEFP to enquire into the class of offences that are here being pursued does not truly directly orindirectly withdraw from the Sûreté du Québec the right they have to investigate on criminal offences.
It does not deprive the SQ of theirright of investigation, neither the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions of their power to authorize pursuits on the whole territoryof Quebec. [53] The case law affirmed the principle[2] of the overall power of the SQ to enforce namely the laws on the territory of the Provinceof Quebec.
Conferring upon the Cree Nation government the power to establish and maintain a regional police force and granting thesepolice the jurisdiction over the land and over the infractions here pursued and even on higher level infractions upon authorization of theMinister of Public Security did not set aside the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sûreté du Québec on all infractions committed in theterritory of the Province of Québec.
The Sûreté du Québec has a duty to provide level 6 services, thus bearing on all of the infractionsthat include those police services rendered in municipalities, including namely the Cree entities benefiting of the Eeyou Eenou PoliceForce. [54] What is a characteristic of that overall power of the Sûreté du Québec to enforce the laws throughout Québec has indeed somelimits. When the Sûreté du Québec is not the police task force of a municipality, then they do not have that municipality delegated powerto enforce namely their by-laws.
So affirms the ruling of Picard c Canada (Procureur général) 2018 CF 747, paragraph 47, of which theappeal to the CAF was dismissed and of which the leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada was refused on November 26,2020: N. 39210. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for leave to appeal and there is no debate in law that canpersist on that specific question of the absence of authority of the Sûreté du Québec officer to investigate criminal offences committed bya Cree citizen on their territory. [3] [55] The case law cannot be any clearer.
A police officer has the right to enforce even on Cree territory the Criminal Code when thereare reasonable grounds to believe that a citizen, even an aboriginal citizen, a Cree citizen has committed a criminal offence. This is so invirtue of
section 50 of the Police Act that enacts the overriding power of the SQ: «The Sûreté du Québec, the national police force, shallact under the authority of the Minister of Public Security and shall have jurisdiction to enforce laws throughout Québec». [56] Whatever powers were granted the Cree «municipalities» does not remove from the Sûreté du Québec their rights to enforce theQuebec laws. [57] Judge Robert Dufresne of the Superior Court in the case of Takuhikan c Procureur général du Québec et Le procureur général duCanada, 2019 QCCS 5699, reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the Sûreté du Québec over all of the Quebec territory, including the aboriginalentities.» [11] La Sûreté du Québec est le corps de police national du Québec.
À ce titre, elle a compétence sur tout le territoire duQuébec lequel inclut le territoire des réserves autochtones aux fins de l’application des lois.»
[ 58 ] Therefore, there is no open debate on the question of the territorial jurisdiction of the Sûreté du Québec and there is certainly no doubt whatsoever that the SQ had the right to investigate the complaints of Cree citizens living outside their communities as well as to advise the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions of their reasonable belief that the accused had committed criminal infractions. [ 59 ] Needless to say that the debate proposed by the accused regarding the lack of jurisdiction of the Sûreté du Québec was unfounded and settled in law by the Supreme Court and other courts and that furthermore the motion in its entirety was flawed, and unfounded in facts and in law. [ 60 ] Furthermore, in another judgment dated August 17, 2020 in the present proceedings, I concluded that notwithstanding the accused affirmation and dissatisfaction as to how the investigation was completed, there was no place for any doubt as to the investigation conducted and as to the sufficiency of the grounds supporting a reasonable belief that the offences alleged had been committed. [ 61 ] Therefore, there was no evidence of any complacency or collusion that can be said to have corrupted or coloured the intervention of the SQ officer taking the statements and interviewing the accused.
The statements of complainants justified the reasonable beliefs of Sergeant Detective Ayotte criminal pursuits who recommended that criminal pursuits be taken, whose investigation led the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions to initiate criminal proceedings in Waskaganish. A written version of a judgement as to the sufficiency of the investigation conducted by Officer Ayotte has been deposited in the Court record. [4] The evidence gathered in that investigation satisfied the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions that there were reasonable grounds to pursue criminally the accused.
Furthermore, the accused on the evidence heard at preliminary enquiry was ordered to stand trial. If the accused has ethical grounds to put before the quasi-judicial body hearing police discipline matters, he can do so.
Nothing in the evidence questioned the decision of Officer Ayotte to recommend criminal pursuits against the accused. [ 62 ] ALLEGATION OF SUMMONS AND INDICTMENT BEING NULL AB INITIO – There is no question that the indictment is the start of a criminal litigation that is per se a proceeding of its own that owes its judicial life to the decision made by the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions to engage in a criminal trial.
That alone suffices to declare the current trial initiated lawfully and validly through the indictment having been deposited. [ 63 ] Furthermore, the file shows that the information was duly sworn and that the Prosecution attorney who authorized and deposited the indictment acted in law. This new process of indictment is legitimate. There is no flaw of any kind in the decisions made throughout to initiate proceedings as well as to indict the accused.
That was the decision of the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions. [ 64 ] ISSUE REGARDING THE SSQ INVESTIGATOR’S BEING IN A CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGARDING THE INVESTIGATION OR CONDUCTING AN INCOMPLETE AND PARTIAL THE INVESTIGATION – The accused alleged that a conflict of interest or a conduct of collusion between officer Ayotte and complainant X and the leaders of the Cree Nation burdened and even corrupted the investigation led by that police officer, that officer Ayotte was not and could not be perceived as impartial, independent or at arm’s length in the execution of his investigation duties, that he was zealous in speeding up the investigation and that it vitiated the whole criminal proceedings .
Officer Ayotte conduct of the investigation he led was perceived by the accused as being a fast- track, incomplete, insufficient, biased, influenced, unfair investigation. There is no evidence that questions the strength of the evidence gathered by officer Ayotte. The credibility of Officer Ayotte was in no way relevant or contributory to the assessment of complainant’s credibility. Whether he defaulted in being in a conflict of interest is before a quasi-judicial or administrative ethics board that will decide on that.
This is why the Court refused to delay the hearing of this case until a decision on the ethics of officer Ayotte had ruled on it. [ 65 ] REOPENING OF THE DEFENCE – The request to reopen defence was ill-founded. The additional evidence the accused wanted in was irrelevant and useless as to the representations regarding the verdict to be rendered. The accused believed throughout that the officers of the Sûreté du Québec had not right to investigate any criminal offense alleged to have been made by the accused.
The accused is wrong and has persisted in debating that issue until the end of the pleadings and has multiplied unfounded motions mainly for that purpose. [ 66 ] ISSUE REGARDING A ROBOTHAM MOTION – I was informed that the accused had presented to no avail a ROBOTHAM motion at preliminary hearing. It was never again presented in due form during the trial or at the beginning of the trial as furthermore, he had declared he would not need to present such a motion. He had the right at all steps of the trial to present that same motion.
He was clearly advised it had to be presented in writing and that he needed to satisfy precedent conditions before its hearing. He never did so in due form until he had closed his evidence or until I pronounced the verdict. [ 67 ] On the diverse days he addressed the Court, no written formal and complete motion was ever presented by the accused either during the trial or pending the period for representations or at his presence in Court.
On several occasions, he repeated his need to have a Robotham attorney and namely has expressed that such an attorney would be key in the furtherance of his determination to show the collusion of Officer Ayotte in the conduct of the investigation and consequently he wanted the reopening of the defence. That was done through pleadings or a so-called motion in dated February 24, 2021.
It was in a form that was half pleadings, half a motion without any prior notice of presentation and without the necessary requirements of a Robotham motion being satisfied and without an affidavit. [ 68 ] The accused affirmed that his need of a Robotham attorney was based principally on his willingness to re-examine Officer Ayotte regarding a conflict of interest or a collusion with the governance of the Cree nation or with X. That is totally useless and it is of plain irrelevancy in the context of the recommendation of the Officer to pursue the accused on the base of the statements of complainants.
That question of the ethics of Officer Ayotte is of no use or relevancy in the search of the truth and reopening defence for re-examination of this officer would not have contributed to question the charges as laid and sworn in. That was a question that the accused throughout the trial had on his mind, namely as being a victim of collusion and conspiracy. The cross-examination of X and the accused testimony all spoke to that overriding concern. Reopening the Defence was not justified by any relevant or useful new issue having some possible bearing in this trial.
That motion was pointless, useless and irrelevant, unfounded in facts and in law. I see no ground, no common law or charter motion issue that would justify further questions to assess in the course of this trial the officer’s execution of his work.
[ 69 ] ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION REGARDING OFFENSES COMMITTED ELSEWHERE IN CANADA - This Court has declared clearly that it had no jurisdiction on any events that are alleged to have happened in Timmins or in Winnipeg.
The reference in the counts of indictment to events happening elsewhere in Canada was struck as I have no territorial jurisdiction over infractions committed elsewhere. [ 70 ] SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT – The indictment details quite sufficiently the offences for which the accused stood a trial and the facts as they have been put in evidence are precise and may prove or not the commission of each offence for which the accused is before the Court. [ 71 ] The accused motion is not founded in facts and in law. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES the motion . __________________________________ LOUIS A.
LEGAULT, J.C.Q. Me Joannie Marion Attorney for Prosecution Me Marie-Christine Latour Attorney appointed to cross-examine the victims for Defence J. M. Accused Representing himself Dates of hearing: January 21 and 22, 2021; April 5 and April 6, 2021.
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