2019 QCCA 979, 2019 QCCA 979

Procureur général du Canada c. Union of Canadian Correctional Officers — Syndicat des agents correctionnels du Canada - CSN (UCCO-SACC- CSN) 2019 QCCA 979 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-027667-187 (500-17-061217-108) DATE: June 5, 2019 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. MARIE-JOSÉE HOGUE, J.A. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA APPELLANT – Defendant v.

UNION OF CANADIAN CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS – SYNDICAT DES AGENTS CORRECTIONNELS DU CANADA – CSN (UCCO-SACC-CSN) and PIERRE MALETTE RESPONDENTS – Plaintiffs and PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA INTERVENER – Intervener JUDGMENT * [ 1 ] The appellant appeals a judgment of the Superior Court that declared paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of constitutional invalidity and the effects of the judgment for a period of 12 months. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Chief Justice Nicole Duval Hesler, with which Morissette and Hogue, JJ.A. concur, THE COURT: [ 3 ] ALLOWS the appeal; [ 4 ] REVERSES the judgment at trial; [ 5 ] DECLARES that the infringement on freedom of association resulting from paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act is justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [ 6 ] THE WHOLE with legal costs against respondents. NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. MARIE-JOSÉE HOGUE, J.A. Mtre Alexander Pless Mtre Benoît De Champlain DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA For appellant

Mtre Benoît Laurin Mtre Mathilde Baril-Jannard LAROCHE MARTIN (SERVICE JURIDIQUE CSN) For respondents Mtre Andrew Astritis RAVEN CAMERON BALLANTYNE & YAZBECH For the intervener Date of hearing: January 28, 2019 REASONS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE * [ 7 ] The appellant appeals a judgment of the Superior Court that declared paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act [1] unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of constitutional invalidity and the effects of the judgment for a period of 12 months. The judgment’s conclusions are as follows: ( translation ) [236] DECLARES that paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act is unconstitutional and of no force or effect, except for the prohibition with respect to collective bargaining of a term or condition of employment that has been or may be established under the Government Employees Compensation Act , because the paragraph is inconsistent with the freedom of association guaranteed under

section 2(

d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ; [237] DECLARES that paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act is unconstitutional and not justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter [sic] of Rights and Freedoms, except for the prohibition with respect to collective bargaining of a term or condition of employment that has been or may be established under the Government Employees Compensation Act . [2] [ 8 ] I would allow the appeal. Although I agree with the trial judge’s opinion that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act substantially interferes with the respondents’ freedom of association, and although I agree with his analysis of the issue, an analysis which, I must add, is very thorough, I am of the opinion, however, that the paragraph is justifiable because it satisfies the requirements of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . [3] It is worth repeating that the Canadian Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by the legislators as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

THE FACTS [ 9 ] The respondent union has been certified since March 13, 2001 as the bargaining agent representing the 6,500 correctional officers in 58 penitentiaries across Canada.

The terms and conditions of employment of this group are negotiated with the Treasury Board of Canada, the employer of Canada’s public service employees. [ 10 ] In 2002, the members informed the respondent union that they wished to negotiate staffing (including the filling of positions), hours of work, seniority, the pension plan, and occupational health and safety. [ 11 ] Due to the legislative framework, however, neither staffing nor the pension plan can be dealt with in a collective agreement. [ 12 ] In that regard, paragraph 113(

b) of the Act reads as follows: 113. A collective agreement that applies to a bargaining unit — other than a bargaining unit determined under

section 238.14 — must not, directly or indirectly, alter or eliminate any existing term or condition of employment or establish any new term or condition of employment if 113. La convention collective qui régit une unité de négociation qui n’est pas définie à l’article 238.14 ne peut pas avoir pour effet direct ou indirect de modifier, de supprimer ou d’établir : (

a) doing so would require the enactment or amendment of any legislation by Parliament, except for the purpose of appropriating money required for the implementation of the term or condition; or

a) une condition d’emploi de manière que cela nécessiterait l’adoption ou la modification d’une loi fédérale, exception faite des lois affectant les crédits nécessaires à son application;

(

b) the term or condition is one that has been or may be established un​der the Public Service Employment Act , the Public Service Superannua​tion Act or the Government Employ​ees Compensation Act .

b) une condition d’emploi qui a été ou pourrait être établie sous le régime de la Loi sur l’emploi dans la fonction publique , la Loi sur la pension de la fonction publique ou la

Loi sur l’indemnisation des agents de l’État . [ 13 ] In 2005, the respondent union and the Correctional Service of Canada began parallel discussions in order to negotiate deployments, the creation of a health and safety committee and a work description committee, acting appointments, and staffing, all without involving the Treasury Board. On June 26, 2006, the parties signed an agreement (the “global agreement“) which did not form part of the collective agreement.

Among other topics, this agreement dealt with leaves, deployment at an employee’s request, acting appointments, health and safety, disciplinary measures, the creation of joint labour management committees, and a mediated dispute resolution process. [ 14 ] On May 24, 2006, the Treasury Board and the respondent union signed a memorandum of understanding in which the Treasury Board agreed to try to have the pension legislation amended. [ 15 ] On June 26, 2006, the Treasury Board and the respondent union signed the collective agreement.

The collective agreement, however, did not address deployments, appointments or the pension plan. [ 16 ] In 2010, the respondent union expressed its desire to negotiate staffing and the pension plan. [ 17 ] Invoking the same legislative provision, the Treasury Board refused to hold any negotiations to that end. [ 18 ] On October 5, 2010, the respondents filed a motion to institute proceedings seeking to have paragraph 113(

b) of the Act declared unconstitutional and of no force or effect. [ 19 ] On November 5, 2013, the Treasury Board and the respondent union signed a new collective agreement, which did not contain any provisions on staffing or the pension plan. The global agreement with the Correctional Service of Canada was also renewed. THE JUDGMENT A QUO [ 20 ] After finding that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act substantially interferes with the respondents’ freedom of association, a finding with which I agree, as stated above, the judge considered whether the paragraph can be justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter . Based on an examination of the applicable tests, he first found that the government’s objective is pressing and substantial both as regards the pension plan and staffing. I will revert to this issue. He then examined the rational connection between the means used and those objectives.

Although he found the connection to be tenuous, he also found that the appellant’s position is at least logical and reasonable and he therefore turned to the minimal impairment test.

It is at this last step that he concluded that the appellant had not met this test, having failed to examine and show whether ( translation) “the desired objectives could be achieved through less intrusive measures” [4] than a complete prohibition on negotiating staffing and pension plans. [ 21 ] In my opinion, that portion of the judgment is flawed. [ 22 ] The fundamental issue in this appeal, therefore, is whether, assuming there is an infringement of the freedom to associate, as the trial judge found, such infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter , more specifically at the minimal impairment stage. [ 23 ] Before delving further into the analysis, certain clarifications are in order. [ 24 ] In the Dictionnaire canadien des relations du travail , the expression “ dotation en personnel ” (staffing) is defined as follows: ( translation ) “Staffing”: Process comprising all the administrative steps taken to fill a vacancy in an administrative unit.

Staffing includes certain activities involving human resources management, such as the selection, placement, training and mobility of employees. [5] [ 25 ] Before moving on to the principal issue in the appeal, it would be useful to review certain basic principles governing the notion of infringement of the freedom to associate. [ 26 ] Since the 2007 ruling in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v.

British Columbia , freedom of association has included a procedural right to collective bargaining, that is, “the collective right to good faith negotiations and consultation”. [6] In that case, the government of British Columbia had enacted a statute in order to address a “crisis of sustainability” in the health care system. The statute dealt with employment security, contracting out, layoffs and bumping.

The government had chosen to invalidate clauses in the collective agreements that were inconsistent with its new statute, all in order to give employers in the health sector greater flexibility to organize their relations with their employees. The various unions had only been consulted minimally before the bill was passed.

The Supreme Court had to determine whether freedom of association protected the right to collective bargaining, namely, “the right of employees to join together in a union to negotiate with employers on workplace issues or terms of employment”. [7] [ 27 ] In answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court described the protected activity as follows:

89. (…) [T]he constitutional right to collective bargaining concerns the protection of the ability of workers to engage in associational activities, and their capacity to act in common to reach shared goals related to workplace issues and terms of employment. In brief, the protected activity might be described as employees banding together to achieve particular work- related objectives.

Section 2 (

d) does not guarantee the particular objectives sought through this associational activity. However, it guarantees the process through which those goals are pursued . It means that employees have the right to unite, to present demands to health sector employers collectively and to engage in discussions in an attempt to achieve workplace- related goals.

Section 2 (

d) imposes corresponding duties on government employers to agree to meet and discuss with them. It also puts constraints on the exercise of legislative powers in respect of the right to collective bargaining. [8] (Emphasis added) 89. […] [L]e droit constitutionnel de négocier collectivement vise à protéger la capacité des travailleurs de participer à des activités associatives et leur capacité d’agir collectivement pour réaliser des objectifs communs concernant des questions liées au milieu de travail et leurs conditions de travail.

En bref, on pourrait décrire l’activité protégée comme l’union des efforts des employés pour réaliser des objectifs particuliers liés au travail. L’ alinéa 2d) ne protège pas les objectifs particuliers que les employés cherchent à atteindre par cette activité associative. Il protège toutefois le processus de réalisation de ces objectifs. Cela signifie que les employés ont le droit de s’unir, de présenter collectivement des demandes à leurs employeurs du secteur de la santé et de participer à des discussions en vue d’atteindre des objectifs liés au milieu de travail.

L’ alinéa 2d) impose aux employeurs du secteur public des obligations correspondantes d’accepter de rencontrer les employés pour discuter avec eux.

Il restreint aussi le pouvoir de légiférer en matière de négociation collective, question que nous examinerons plus loin […]. [Soulignements ajoutés] [ 28 ] The Supreme Court was careful, however, to specify that freedom of association protects only against “substantial interference” with the associational activity. [9] Thus, the “right to collective bargaining (...) is a limited right” in that “it does not guarantee a certain substantive or economic outcome” or the right “to a particular model of labour relations nor to a specific bargaining method.” [10] [ 29 ] The Supreme Court proposed the following analysis for determining whether the provisions of the statute or the system it implemented interfered with meaningful collective bargaining:

111. The question before us is whether particular provisions of the Act violate the procedural right to collective bargaining by significantly interfering with meaningful collective bargaining. In this context, examples of acts that may have such an impact are : failure to consult, refusal to bargain in good faith, taking important matters off the table and unilaterally nullifying negotiated terms. 112. On the analysis proposed above, two questions suggest themselves. First , does the measure interfere with collective bargaining, in purpose or effect?

Secondly , if the measure interferes with collective bargaining, is the impact, evaluated in terms of the matters affected and the process by which the measure was implemented, significant enough to substantially interfere with the associational right of collective bargaining, so as to breach the s. 2 (

d) right of freedom of association? [11] (Emphasis added) 111. Il s’agit de décider si certaines dispositions de la Loi violent le droit procédural de négociation collective en entravant de manière significative la tenue de véritables négociations collectives. Dans ce contexte, on retiendra comme exemples d’actions susceptibles d’avoir cet effet des gestes comme les suivants : l’omission de consulter, le refus de négocier de bonne foi, le retrait d’importants sujets de négociation et l’annulation unilatérale de conditions négociées. 112. L’analyse proposée ci-dessus commande l’examen de deux questions.

Premièrement , la mesure entrave-t-elle — par son effet ou par son objet — l’exercice du droit à un processus de négociation collective?

Deuxièmement , dans l’affirmative, compte tenu de l’importance de ses répercussions, évaluées en fonction des sujets visés et de son application, l’atteinte au droit d’association lié à la négociation collective est-elle substantielle et constitue-t-elle donc une atteinte au droit à la liberté d’association garantie par l’ al. 2d) ? [Soulignements ajoutés] [ 30 ] As the preceding excerpts show, the importance of the matters excluded from the collective agreement is a relevant factor for determining whether the government measure substantially interferes with freedom of association. [ 31 ] When applying the test developed in Health Services to the facts in the case at bar, it is important to point out that the complete prohibition on negotiating staffing and the pension plan has existed since 1967, well before the Canadian Charter was enacted.

Indeed, “Parliament has always limited the scope of matters that may be collectively bargained, or that could be the subject of conciliation or arbitration in the federal public service”, [12] in order to follow the recommendations in the Heeney Report. [13] This restriction “reflects a basic constitutional reality that the Treasury Board, as employer, cannot amend a statute of Parliament through a collective agreement” [14] (Emphasis added). [ 32 ] Like the trial judge, I consider that by completely excluding important labour relations matters, such as staffing and the pension plan, from collective bargaining, paragraph 113(

b) of the Act interferes with the collective bargaining process and, given the importance of the prohibited matters and the impact of the prohibition on the collective right to good faith negotiations and consultation, the interference is substantial. [ 33 ] In any event, the parties did not call into question the trial judge’s findings of fact.

I therefore accept the truth of his finding that staffing and the pension plan are subjects of vital importance in labour relations matters and that their removal from the collective agreement substantially interferes with freedom of association. [ 34 ] The impact of the restrictive measure on good faith consultation and negotiation is equally drastic.

For example, the letter from Daniel Langevin, the negotiator for the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, clearly states that the pension plan is not negotiable: (translation ) In the federal public service, the pension plan prescribed by law is not negotiable, whether at the bargaining table or in any other forum. (…). [15] [ 35 ] It also appears that no collectively negotiated change regarding such matters could be implemented without political pressure, given that the statutes identified in paragraph 113(

b) of the Act would have to be amended and the Treasury Board is not willing to discuss the union’s demands [16] regarding such matters. [ 36 ] This explains why the global agreement signed between the Correctional Service of Canada and the respondent union on the sidelines of the collective agreement is ( translation ) “intended to clarify the application of certain provisions of the Correctional Officers (CX) Collective Agreement”. [17] However, ( translation ) “the provisions contained in this global agreement are not subject to grievances” [18] nor are they part of the collective agreement. [19] The global agreement was not entered into with the Treasury Board, which, after all, is the employer of the correctional officers, but with the Correctional Service of Canada, which is the deputy head forming part of the human resources management portion of the core public administration. [20] It should be noted that the global

agreement signed in 2006 did not result from the application of

section 110 of the Act , because the ( translation) “Treasury Board never signed an agreement to that effect with the Plaintiff Union and the Correctional Service of Canada and, in any event, this new provision of the act did not apply to the ongoing negotiations with the Plaintiff Union”. [21] [ 37 ] The global agreement, therefore, did not genuinely result from collective bargaining, because it was entered into by “permission” [22] of the employer, the Treasury Board, and is not part of the collective agreement, given that the Treasury Board is not a party thereto.

It appears from the evidence that ( translation ) “the employer’s negotiator refused to consider the draft renewal of the global agreement (in 2010), stating that he had no mandate to do so”. [23] [ 38 ] It was only at the beginning of 2011 that the Treasury Board expressed a certain willingness to allow certain matters to be negotiated directly with the Correctional Service of Canada. Thus, it is the Treasury Board that decides unilaterally whether or not the respondents can negotiate a global agreement.

This, in addition to other elements noted by the trial judge, clearly shows the unequal bargaining forces between the employer and the union. [ 39 ] Having completed a review of certain basic principles, I now turn to the key question, that is, the justification of the impugned provision under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter , more specifically the minimal impairment test. ANALYSIS OF THE JUSTIFICATION UNDER

SECTION 1 [ 40 ] The appellant’s position is that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act impairs freedom of association minimally rather than substantially. It argues that the judge erred by imposing an excessive burden on it and by failing to consider the evidence establishing that negotiation of the pension plan within the scope of a collective agreement would jeopardize the plan’s sustainability. With respect to staffing, the appellant argues that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act does not prevent parties from entering into agreements dealing with this matter, but is intended to preserve the Public Service Commission’s independence and the merit system. Lastly, the appellant submits that the salutary effects of paragraph 113(

b) of the Act outweigh the deleterious effects of the infringement of freedom of association. [ 41 ] For their part, the respondents contend that the minimal impairment test has not been met as regards the pension plan or staffing. They point out that the evidence shows the existence of other pension plans to which adjustments have been made, notably for air traffic controllers and correctional officers. According to the respondents, the appellant has not presented any evidence indicating that the prohibition on negotiating is only minimally impairing.

With respect to staffing, the respondents argue that the role of the Public Service Commission has been tempered over time, such that hiring is handled by the immediate supervisor, creating room for arbitrariness. [ 42 ] The Supreme Court has described the Canadian Charter ’s s. 1 test as follows:

69. (…) It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently important. 70. Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test ”: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. , supra , at p. 352.

Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First , the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective.

Second , the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. , supra , at p. 352.

Third , there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”. [24] (Emphasis added) 69. […] Il faut à tout le moins qu’un objectif se rapporte à des préoccupations urgentes et réelles dans une société libre et démocratique, pour qu’on puisse le qualifier de suffisamment important. 70. En deuxième lieu, dès qu’il est reconnu qu’un objectif est suffisamment important, la

partie qui invoque l’article premier doit alors démontrer que les moyens choisis sont raisonnables et que leur justification peut se démontrer. Cela nécessite l’application d’« une sorte de critère de proportionnalité »: R. c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. , précité, à la p. 352. Même si la nature du critère de proportionnalité pourra varier selon les circonstances, les tribunaux devront, dans chaque cas, soupeser les intérêts de la société et ceux de particuliers et de groupes. À mon avis, un critère de proportionnalité comporte trois éléments importants.

Premièrement , les mesures adoptées doivent être soigneusement conçues pour atteindre l’objectif en question. Elles ne doivent être ni arbitraires, ni inéquitables, ni fondées sur des considérations irrationnelles. Bref, elles doivent avoir un lien rationnel avec l’objectif en question. Deuxièmement , même à supposer qu’il y ait un tel lien rationnel, le moyen choisi doit être de nature à porter « le moins possible » atteinte au droit ou à la liberté en question: R. c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. , précité, à la p. 352.

Troisièmement , il doit y avoir proportionnalité entre les effets des mesures restreignant un droit ou une liberté garantis par la Charte et l’objectif reconnu comme « suffisamment important ». [Soulignements ajoutés] A pressing and substantial objective [ 43 ] In RJR-MacDonald Inc. v.

Canada (Attorney General) , the Supreme Court described the pressing and substantial objective test as “whether the objective of the infringing measure is sufficiently important to be capable in principle of justifying a limitation on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution”. [25] [ 44 ] The objective of excluding the pension plan from collective bargaining is ( translation ) “to promote the mobility of employees from one sector of the public service to another”, ensure pension predictability and maintain control over the government’s financial obligations, given that it has to draw on public monies in order to fund the plan. [26] With respect to staffing, the objective is to ensure the survival of the merit system, thereby ensuring that positions are attributed to qualified individuals based on merit rather than other criteria. [ 45 ] The trial judge concluded that ( translation ) “the AGC has shown that the objective of the restrictions imposed by paragraph 113(

b) of the FPLSRA (…) is pressing and substantial”. [27] Since the respondents did not challenge this conclusion, [28] which is indeed supported by the evidence, this test has been met. A rational connection [ 46 ] In Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony , the Supreme Court analyzed the rational connection component of the Canadian Charter ’s s. 1 test. At this stage, a cause and effect relationship or scientific or empirical evidence is not necessary.

Evidence based on reason or logic is sufficient. [29] In fact, “[t]he government must show that it is reasonable to suppose that the limit may further the goal, not that it will do so.” [30] This test “is not particularly onerous” [31] and the evidence need not “conclusively establish that the means adopted by the Act achieve the government’s objectives”. [32] It is sufficient if the conclusion is logical and reasonable. [ 47 ] Although the judge found that ( translation ) “the AGC’s evidence does not conclusively show a need for the prohibition on collective bargaining”, [33] he nevertheless concluded, as mentioned earlier, that the government’s position ( translation ) “is at least

logical and reasonable”, [34] and he then turned to the next step of the test. Minimal impairment [ 48 ] The Supreme Court has established that in order to satisfy the minimal impairment component, the restriction must be minimal and the impairment must not go beyond what is necessary: 160. As the second step in the proportionality analysis, the government must show that the measures at issue impair the right of free expression as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective.

The impairment must be “minimal”, that is, the law must be carefully tailored so that rights are impaired no more than necessary. The tailoring process seldom admits of perfection and the courts must accord some leeway to the legislator. If the law falls within a range of reasonable alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to infringement : [Citations omitted].

On the other hand, if the government fails to explain why a significantly less intrusive and equally effective measure was not chosen, the law may fail. [35] (Emphasis added) 160. À la deuxième étape de l’analyse de la proportionnalité, le gouvernement doit établir que les mesures en cause restreignent le droit à la liberté d’expression aussi peu que cela est raisonnablement possible aux fins de la réalisation de l’objectif législatif. La restriction doit être «minimale», c’est-à-dire que la loi doit être soigneusement adaptée de façon à ce que l’atteinte aux droits ne dépasse pas ce qui est nécessaire.

Le processus d’adaptation est rarement parfait et les tribunaux doivent accorder une certaine latitude au législateur.

Si la loi se situe à l’intérieur d’une gamme de mesures raisonnables, les tribunaux ne concluront pas qu’elle a une portée trop générale simplement parce qu’ils peuvent envisager une solution de rechange qui pourrait être mieux adaptée à l’objectif et à la violation; [références omises] Par contre, si le gouvernement omet d’expliquer pourquoi il n’a pas choisi une mesure beaucoup moins attentatoire et tout aussi efficace, la loi peut être déclarée non valide . [Soulignements ajoutés] [ 49 ] However, “[t]he government is not required to pursue the least drastic means of achieving its objective, but it must adopt a measure that falls within a range of reasonable alternatives”. [36] In fact, according to the Supreme Court, “[p]rovided the option chosen is one within a range of reasonably supportable alternatives, the minimal impairment test will be met”. [37] [ 50 ] In Alberta v.

Hutterian Brethren , the Supreme Court stated the following regarding the existence of other less intrusive means for achieving the government’s objective:

55. I hasten to add that in considering whether the government’s objective could be achieved by other less drastic means, the court need not be satisfied that the alternative would satisfy the objective to exactly the same extent or degree as the impugned measure. In other words, the court should not accept an unrealistically exacting or precise formulation of the government’s objective which would effectively immunize the law from scrutiny at the minimal impairment stage.

The requirement for an “equally effective” alternative measure in the passage from RJR-MacDonald , quoted above, should not be taken to an impractical extreme. It includes alternative measures that give sufficient protection, in all the circumstances, to the government’s goal : Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 SCC 9 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350. While the government is entitled to deference in formulating its objective, that deference is not blind or absolute.

The test at the minimum impairment stage is whether there is an alternative, less drastic means of achieving the objective in a real and substantial manner . As I will explain, in my view the record in this case discloses no such alternative. [38] (Emphasis added) 55. Je m’empresse de préciser que, pour déterminer s’il existe des moyens moins radicaux d’atteindre l’objectif gouvernemental, le tribunal n’a pas à être convaincu que la solution de rechange permettrait d’atteindre l’objectif exactement dans la même mesure que la mesure contestée.

En d’autres mots, le tribunal ne doit pas accepter une formulation de l’objectif gouvernemental d’une rigueur ou d’une précision irréalistes qui soustrairait en fait la mesure législative à tout examen à l’étape de l’atteinte minimale. L’obligation de choisir une mesure « tout aussi efficace » mentionnée dans le passage précité de RJR-MacDonald ne doit pas être poussée à l’extrême jusqu’à devenir irréalisable. Ce type de mesure inclut les solutions de rechange qui protègent suffisamment l’objectif du gouvernement, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances : Charkaoui c.

Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration) , 2007 CSC 9 , [2007] 1 R.C.S. 350. Bien que le gouvernement ait droit à une certaine déférence à l’égard de la for​mulation de son objectif, cette déférence n’est ni aveugle ni absolue. Le critère de l’atteinte minimale consiste à se demander s’il existe un autre moyen moins attentatoire d’atteindre l’objectif de façon réelle et substantielle .

Comme je l’explique plus loin, j’estime que le dossier en l’espèce ne présente aucune solution de rechange de cette nature. [Soulignements ajoutés] [ 51 ] In social, economic, political and public interest matters or matters that impact public finances, the courts generally accord some leeway to the legislator [39] and show deference to the legislator’s choices, as evidenced by the following excerpts from the Supreme Court judgments in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General) and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) :

59. This Court has already pointed out on anumber of occasions that in the social, economicand political spheres, where the legislature mustreconcile competing interests in choosing onepolicy among several that might be acceptable,the courts must accord great deference to thelegislature’s choice because it is in the bestposition to make such a choice.

On the otherhand, the courts will judge the legislature’schoices more harshly in areas where thegovernment plays the role of the “singularantagonist of the individual” — primarily incriminal matters — owing to their expertise inthese areas (citations omitted).[40] *** 95. In short, a court must show deference wherethe evidence establishes that the government hasassigned proper weight to each of the competinginterests.

Certain factors favour greaterdeference, such as the prospective nature of thedecision, the impact on public finances, themultiplicity of competing interests, thedifficulty of presenting scientific evidence andthe limited time available to the state. This list iscertainly not exhaustive. It serves primarily tohighlight the facts [sic] that it is up to thegovernment to choose the measure, that thedecision is often complex and difficult, and thatthe government must have the necessary timeand resources to respond. However, asMcLachlin J. (as she then was) said in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v.

Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, atpara. 136, “. . . care must be taken not to extendthe notion of deference too far”.[41] 59. Notre Cour a déjà souligné à plusieursreprises que, dans les domaines sociaux,économiques ou politiques où le législateur doitconcilier des intérêts différents afin de choisirune politique parmi plusieurs qui pourraient êtreacceptables, les tribunaux doivent faire preuved’une grande retenue face aux choix dulégislateur en raison de sa position privilégiéepour faire ces choix.

À l’opposé, les tribunauxseront plus sévères face aux choix du législateurdans les domaines où l’État joue le rôled’« adversaire singulier de l’individu » --principalement en matière criminelle -- en raisonde leur expertise dans ces domaines [référencesomises]. *** 95. En somme, le tribunal doit faire montre dedéférence lorsque la preuve démontre que legouvernement a accordé son juste poids àchaque intérêt en jeu.

Certains facteurs militenten faveur d’une plus grande déférence, telsl’aspect prospectif de la décision, l’incidencesur les finances publiques, la multiplicité desintérêts divergents, la difficulté d’apporter unepreuve scientifique et le court délai dont abénéficié l’État. Cette énumération n’estévidemment pas exhaustive. Elle sert surtout àmettre en relief le fait que le choix de la mesurerevient au gouvernement, que la décision estsouvent complexe et difficile et qu’il doitdisposer des moyens et du temps nécessairespour réagir.

Mais, comme le disait la jugeMcLachlin (maintenant Juge en chef)dans RJR-MacDonald Inc. c.

Canada(Procureur général), (SCC),[1995] 3 R.C.S. 199, par. 136, « . . . il fautprendre soin de ne pas pousser trop loin lanotion du respect ». [52] Moreover, the question the courts must ask themselves “at the minimum impairment stage is whether the limit imposed by thelaw goes too far in relation to the goal the legislature seeks to achieve.”[42] [53] The evidence the appellant presented to satisfy the minimal impairment test relies primarily on the reports and testimony ofexperts Roy Stuart and Luc Juillet. [54] Roy Stuart, an expert on pension plans, set out the reasons why the pension plan must be completely excluded from collectivebargaining: 27.

Public sector pension plans are generous, require high levels of contributions and over time build up very large liabilities and assetpools. […] The concern is that the collective bargaining of pensions would likely lead to the eventual fragmentation of the existingframework, making it more difficult or even impossible to maintain the current plans without undue cost and risk. 30. The uniform plan strategy can provide benefits for plan members, too.

Having a single uniform plan supports employee mobilityand career planning in the public service by preventing the development of differences in plan provisions that could present barriers tomovement between jobs or career streams. A single plan also provides advantages of large scale, including lower per unit costs, andsimplified administration. 32. […] A future generation of plan members and taxpayers may be forced to bear the brunt of commitments made many yearspreviously.

Such extended time horizons do not synchronize well with the more immediate focus that is typical of collective bargaining. 42. […] The potential disadvantage of this approach, as already stated, is the risk that the pressures and modalities of collectivebargaining will lead to results that are not sustainable and may be hard or impossible to correct, particularly in a situation where there aremultiple bargaining agents and a complex plan. […] 60.

The separation of pension provisions along collective bargaining unit lines would likely make it much harder to achieve the publicpolicy objective of providing equitable pension benefits at a reasonable cost to taxpayers. One of the key reasons large pension plans canoffer attractive design features – such as early retirement – is because the cost of such features is spread over a large and diversemembership, some of whom will choose not to or will be unable to take advantage of that design feature. […]

63. There could also be negative consequences for plan members pursuing their public service career paths.

Were there to develop multiple, occupation-specific pension rule sets, occupational groups could become ‘siloed’ with pension plan differences creating friction on movement between occupational groups , such as between bargaining units or from included to excluded employment […]. [43] (Emphasis added) [ 55 ] I agree with the appellant’s position that the trial judge , while acknowledging all the progress made with a view to modifying the pension plan, did not consider the evidence indicating that negotiation of the pension plan, within the scope of arriving at a collective agreement, would be less than optimal and would jeopardize the plan’s sustainability, particularly due to the risk of fragmenting the plan .

According to the appellant, the expert testimony of Roy Stuart provided a detailed explanation of the alternatives available to the government as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the other options pertaining to the pension plan. [ 56 ] The evidence shows that the pension plan was indeed amended, notably with respect to correctional officers (possibility of retiring at age 50, without penalty, after 25 years of service), [44] without requiring changes in risk participation.

Moreover, sections 24.1 to 24.6 of the Public Service Superannuation Act [45] apply exclusively to the Correctional Service of Canada. Other provisions of this statute apply only to air traffic controllers. In addition, sections 53 to 58 of the Public Service Superannuation Regulations [46] apply solely to the Correctional Service of Canada. Thus, although paragraph 113(

b) of the Act prohibits collective bargaining with respect to the pension plan, it is important to note that this prohibition does not prevent federal public servants from asserting their interests, proposing changes and, in certain instances, having those changes taken into account.

In the case at bar, the prohibition on negotiating the pension plan forms part of the reasonable solutions available to the legislator, due, in particular, to public interest considerations, to the fact that public finances are involved and to the fact that the solution serves to achieve the government’s objective in a real and substantial manner. [ 57 ] It should also be noted that it is not the role of the courts to take the place of the legislators. [ 58 ] As regards staffing, the appellant argues that requiring it to negotiate would jeopardize the independence of the Public Service Commission and could introduce factors alien to the merit system.

Moreover, it claims that paragraph 113(

b) does not preclude discussions and agreements on staffing. [47] [ 59 ] In his expert report, Luc Juillet pointed out that ( translation ) “the adoption of the merit system for staffing purposes was the essential reason why the [Public Service Commission] was created”. [48] According to him, currently, ( translation) “the merit system and its associated political neutrality are still considered core principles of the public services of these parliamentary democracies”. [49] He therefore considers that staffing must always be excluded from collective bargaining, because ( translation ) “subjecting staffing rules to the vagaries of collective bargaining could jeopardize the public interest due to the interplay of the particular interests of the employer and the employees”. [50] [ 60 ] This position, however, must be tempered.

The Public Service Employment Act [51] modernized staffing when it amended the definition of merit. A report on the 100 years of the Public Service Commission states the following: This new approach to merit also provides the additional flexibility of establishing employment equity objectives as an organizational need.

The employer sets qualification standards and has the power to define a “promotion” and, therefore, the range of positions to which deployments, which are not subject to merit, can be made. [52] [ 61 ] The appellant would like to continue to exclude staffing from collective bargaining in order to preserve the merit system. This system, which is enshrined in

section 30 of the Public Service Employment Act , has moved away from the “concept of ‘best-qualified’ to a values-based approach that allows managers to hire more efficiently and to find the ‘right fit’ for the organization”. [53] Mr. Juillet acknowledged that the merit system has been relaxed so as to provide ( translation ) “managers with greater flexibility, thereby allowing them to exercise greater discretion regarding the needs of their organization”. [54] [ 62 ] For her part, Ms.

Hélène Laurendeau, of the Public Service Commission, indicated that the Commission has the exclusive power to appoint federal public servants, [55] save for five specific agencies, namely ( translation ) “the Canada Revenue Agency, the Parks Canada Agency, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and the National Film Board”. [56] [ 63 ] Notwithstanding the Commission’s exclusive, or quasi-exclusive, role in the appointment of federal public servants, it can delegate this power to the deputy head or chief executive officer, who, in turn, can delegate this power to any manager within the same organization. [57] It is then the responsibility of that person to assess merit.

The Commission, however, can revise, limit or even rescind a delegation of powers if there are serious irregularities, or it can impose conditions on the delegation of powers. [58] Consequently, the Commission maintains control over staffing at all times, but can nevertheless delegate certain powers, such as appointments, without affecting the merit system or political neutrality, which are ( translation ) “key components of the federal public service”. [59] [ 64 ] The evidence indicates that the merit system has been relaxed over time and that the Commission can delegate the power to appoint public servants to deputy heads or immediate superiors.

Nonetheless, the merit system is still important, because it forms part of the Public Service Employment Act . [ 65 ] It must be acknowledged that negotiated staffing could compromise the Public Service Commission’s independence, because negotiations could introduce other factors into the process. It should also be pointed out that certain conditions of employment can be negotiated at two levels, with the employer and with the deputy head, which tempers the prohibition on negotiating such matters.

In short, as with the pension plan, the prohibition on negotiating staffing falls within the range of reasonable solutions available to the legislators. [ 66 ] To summarize, the appellant satisfies the minimal impairment test, because the facts show that the prohibition on negotiating the pension plan and staffing is not absolute, but has been reasonably tailored to contribute to the government’s objectives.

Proportionality between the effects of the measure limiting freedom of association and the pressing and substantial objective [ 67 ] For this last test, “there must be proportionality between the objective and the measures adopted by the law, and more specifically, between the salutary and deleterious effects of the law.” [60] According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hereas the preceding steps of the Oakes test are focused on the measure’s purpose, at this stage the assessment is rooted in a consideration of its effects (…).

This allows a court to determine on a normative basis whether the infringement of the right in question can be justified in a free and democratic society.” [61] [ 68 ] The appellant further argues that ( translation) “the deleterious effects on the respondents’ freedom of association are minimal having regard to the various forums in which they can assert their interests with respect to pension and staffing matters”, not to mention that the pension plan is one of the most generous in the country. [ 69 ] Since the trial judge concluded that the minimal impairment test had not been met, he did not pursue his examination of the Canadian Charter ’s s. 1 test to the very end, nor did the respondents address this aspect. [ 70 ] In my view, balancing all of the elements described above against the seriousness of the infringement of freedom of association, one must conclude that the salutary effects of the prohibition on negotiating staffing and the pension plan outweigh the deleterious effects on freedom of association.

Given that the measures the appellant has implemented are proportional to its objective, it has met the requirements of s. 1 of the Canadian Charter . [ 71 ] My reasoning can be summarized as follows. The trial judge did not err in concluding that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act substantially interferes with freedom of association. Indeed, the evidence shows that the pension plan and staffing are of vital importance to the respondents and the prohibition on including these matters in the collective agreement does not respect their freedom of choice or the notion of balanced bargaining forces between management and the union. [ 72 ] However, the judge erred in concluding that paragraph 113(

b) of the Act cannot be justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter . He required an excessive degree of proof. It bears repeating that in the social, economic and political spheres and when dealing with public interest or public finance matters, courts must show deference to the choice made by the legislators, who are in the best position to make such choices. [ 73 ] In the case at bar, the appellant chose a reasonable and acceptable measure to achieve its objectives in a real and substantial manner.

It has also shown that there is proportionality between the measures adopted and its objectives. [ 74 ] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, reverse the judgment at trial with legal costs and declare that the infringement on freedom of association resulting from paragraph 113(

b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act is justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . NICOLE DUVAL HESLER, C.J.Q. APPENDIX Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act 110.

(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, the employer, the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit and the deputy head for a particular department named in

Schedule I to the Financial Administration Act or for another portion of the federal public administration named in

Schedule IV to that Act may jointly elect to engage in collective bargaining respecting any terms and conditions of employment in respect of any employees in the bargaining unit who are employed in that department or other portion of the federal public administration. 110.

(1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente partie, l’employeur, l’agent négociateur d’une unité de négociation et l’administrateur général responsable d’un ministère figurant à l’annexe I de la

Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques ou d’un autre secteur de l’administration publique fédérale figurant à l’annexe IV de cette loi peuvent décider conjointement d’entamer des négociations collectives sur toutes conditions d’emploi de tout fonctionnaire de l’unité de négociation employé au sein du ministère ou de l’autre secteur.

(2) Collective bargaining under subsection (1) may relate to more than one department or other portion of the federal public administration if each of the deputy heads concerned elects to engage in the collective bargaining.

(2) Les négociations visées au paragraphe (1) ne peuvent avoir lieu à l’égard de plus d’un ministère ou un autre secteur de l’administration publique fédérale que si chacun des administrateurs généraux concernés a décidé d’y participer.

(3) The parties who elect to bargain collectively under subsection (1) must, without delay after the election,

(3) Les parties qui ont décidé d’entamer des négociations collectives au

titre du paragraphe (1) doivent sans retard :

(

a) meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain collectively in good faith; and

a) se rencontrer et entamer des négociations collectives de bonne foi ou charger leurs représentants autorisés de le faire en leur nom; (

b) make every reasonable effort to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of employment in question.

b) faire tout effort raisonnable pour s’entendre sur les conditions d’emploi en cause.

Public Service Superannuation Act 24.1 In sections 24.2 to 24.4, operational service means service of a kind designated in the regulations that is carried out in the institution or other premises designated in those regulations in respect of that kind of service, and includes such periods of time spent away from that service as are specified in those regulations. 24.1 Aux articles 24.2 à 24.4, service opérationnel s’entend d’un type de service désigné dans les règlements et effectué dans un établissement ou autre lieu ainsi désigné pour ce type de service; y est assimilée toute période non consacrée à un tel service précisée dans ces règlements. 24.2 Any person who is employed in operational service by the Correctional Service of Canada on or after March 18, 1994 and who was required by subsection 5(1.1) or (1.2), as it read on December 31, 2012, to contribute to the Superannuation Account or the Public Service Pension Fund or is required by subsection 5(2) to contribute to the Public Service Pension Fund is entitled, at his or her option on ceasing to be employed in the public service, in respect of the operational service that is pensionable service to his or her credit, to an immediate annuity or annual allowance calculated in the manner prescribed by the regulations, in the circumstances and subject to the terms and conditions prescribed by those regulations, in lieu of any benefit to which that person is otherwise entitled under subsection 13(1) or 13.001(1) in respect of that service. 24.2 Les personnes qui, le 18 mars 1994 ou après cette date, sont employées dans le service opérationnel du Service correctionnel du Canada et qui étaient tenues par les paragraphes 5(1.1) ou (1.2), dans leur version au 31 décembre 2012, de contribuer au compte de pension de retraite ou à la Caisse de retraite de la fonction publique ou qui sont tenues par le paragraphe 5(2) de contribuer à la Caisse de retraite de la fonction publique peuvent choisir, lors de la cessation de leur emploi dans la fonction publique, à l’égard du service opérationnel qui constitue du service ouvrant droit à pension porté à leur crédit, une pension immédiate ou une allocation annuelle calculée en conformité avec les règlements, dans les circonstances et aux conditions que ceux-ci prévoient, en remplacement des autres prestations auxquelles elles ont droit, en vertu des paragraphes 13(1) ou 13.001(1), au

titre de ce service. 24.3 If a person is entitled to a benefit under subsection 13(1) or 13.001(1), and

section 24.2, the number of years of pensionable service to his or her credit is, for the purpose of computing the benefit to which he or she is entitled under subsection 13(1) or 13.001(1), deemed to be 24.3 Si une personne a droit à une prestation en vertu des paragraphes 13(1) ou 13.001(1) et de l’article 24.2, le nombre d’années de service ouvrant droit à pension porté à son crédit est, pour le calcul de la prestation à laquelle elle a droit en vertu des paragraphes 13(1) ou 13.001(1), réputé égal à la différence entre le nombre d’années de service ouvrant droit à pension porté à son crédit et le nombre d’années de service ouvrant droit à pension pour lequel elle a droit à une prestation en vertu de l’article 24.2. (

a) the number of years of pensionable service to his or her credit minus (

b) the number of years of pensionable service to his or her credit in respect of which he or she is entitled to a benefit under

section 24.2.

24.4

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and 5(6), every person who is employed in operational service by the Correctional Service of Canada on or after March 18, 1994 and who is required by subsection 5(2) to contribute to the Public Service Pension Fund is, except in the circumstances described in subsection 5(3), required to contribute to the Public Service Pension Fund by reservation from salary or otherwise, in addition to any other amount required under this Act, any percentage of his or her salary that is determined by the Treasury Board on the recommendation of the Minister, which recommendation is to be based on actuarial advice. 24.4

(1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et 5(6), la personne qui, le 18 mars 1994 ou après cette date, est employée dans le service opérationnel du Service correctionnel du Canada et qui est tenue par le paragraphe 5(2) de contribuer à la Caisse de retraite de la fonction publique doit, sauf dans les circonstances visées au paragraphe 5(3), y payer, par retenue sur le traitement ou autrement, une contribution s’élevant à un pourcentage de son traitement que le Conseil du Trésor détermine sur recommandation du ministre, laquelle se fonde sur l’avis d’actuaires, en sus de toute autre somme exigée par la présente loi. 24.4 (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any person who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations. 24.4

(2) Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à la personne faisant

partie d’une catégorie de personnes visée aux règlements. 24.5 A reference in subsection 10(6) to a benefit specified at the contributor’s option under

section 13 or 13.001 shall be read as including a reference to an immediate annuity or annual allowance at the contributor’s option under

section 24.2, and a reference in subsection 13(2) or (3) or 13.001(2) or (3) to the immediate annuity, deferred annuity or annual allowance to which the contributor was entitled under subsection 13(1) or 13.001(1) shall be read as including a reference to the contributor’s entitlement to an immediate annuity or annual allowance under

section 24.2. 24.5 La mention au paragraphe 10(6) d’une prestation pour laquelle le contributeur peut exercer un choix en vertu des articles 13 ou 13.001 vaut également mention de la pension immédiate ou de l’allocation annuelle pour laquelle il peut exercer un choix en vertu de l’article 24.2, de même que la mention aux paragraphes 13(2) ou (3) ou 13.001(2) ou (3) à une pension immédiate, à une pension différée ou à une allocation annuelle à laquelle le contributeur avait droit en vertu des paragraphes 13(1) ou 13.001(1) vaut également mention de la pension immédiate ou de l’allocation annuelle à laquelle il a droit en vertu de l’article 24.2. 24.6 If a person who was employed in operational service by the Correctional Service of Canada and who is receiving an annual allowance payable under

section 24.2 is subsequently re-employed in the public service, the amount of any annuity or annual allowance to which he or she may become entitled under this Part on again ceasing to be employed in the public service shall be adjusted in accordance with regulations made under paragraph 42(1)(x.1) to take into account the amount of any annual allowance that he or she has received. 24.6 Lorsqu’une personne qui a été employée dans le service opérationnel du Service correctionnel du Canada et qui reçoit une allocation annuelle payable en vertu de l’article 24.2 est employée à nouveau par la suite dans la fonction publique, le montant de toute pension ou allocation annuelle à laquelle elle peut avoir droit en vertu de la présente

partie en cessant à nouveau d’être employée dans la fonction publique doit être ajusté conformément aux règlements pris en vertu de l’alinéa 42(1)x.1) pour tenir compte du montant de toute allocation annuelle qu’elle a reçue. Public Service Employment Act 30.

(1) Appointments by the Commission to or from within the public service shall be made on the basis of merit and must be free from political influence. 30.

(1) Les nominations — internes ou externes — à la fonction publique faites par la Commission sont fondées sur le mérite et sont indépendantes de toute influence politique.

(2) An appointment is made on the basis of merit when

(2) Une nomination est fondée sur le mérite lorsque les conditions suivantes sont réunies : (

a) the Commission is satisfied that the person to be appointed meets the essential qualifications for the work to be performed, as established by the deputy head, including official language proficiency; and

a) selon la Commission, la personne à nommer possède les qualifications essentielles — notamment la compétence dans les langues officielles — établies par l’administrateur général pour le travail à accomplir; (

b) the Commission has regard to

b) la Commission prend en compte :

(

i) any additional qualifications that the deputy head may consider to be an asset for the work to be performed, or for the organization, currently or in the future, (

i) toute qualification supplémentaire que l’administrateur général considère comme un atout pour le travail à accomplir ou pour l’administration, pour le présent ou l’avenir, (ii) any current or future operational requirements of the organization that may be identified by the deputy head, and (ii) toute exigence opérationnelle actuelle ou future de l’administration précisée par l’administrateur général, (iii) any current or future needs of the organization that may be identified by the deputy head. (iii) tout besoin actuel ou futur de l’administration précisé par l’administrateur général.

(3) The current and future needs of the organization referred to in subparagraph (2) (b)(iii) may include current and future needs of the public service, as identified by the employer, that the deputy head determines to be relevant to the organization.

(3) Les besoins actuels et futurs de l’administration visés au sous-alinéa (2)b) (iii) peuvent comprendre les besoins actuels et futurs de la fonction publique précisés par l’employeur et que l’administrateur général considère comme pertinents pour l’administration.

(4) The Commission is not required to consider more than one person in order for an appointment to be made on the basis of merit.

(4) La Commission n’est pas tenue de prendre en compte plus d’une personne pour faire une nomination fondée sur le mérite. 31.

(1) The employer may establish qualification standards, in relation to education, knowledge, experience, occupational certification, language or other qualifications, that the employer considers necessary or desirable having regard to the nature of the work to be performed and the present and future needs of the public service. 31.

(1) L’employeur peut fixer des normes de qualification, notamment en matière d’instruction, de connaissances, d’expérience, d’attestation professionnelle ou de langue, nécessaires ou souhaitables à son avis du fait de la nature du travail à accomplir et des besoins actuels et futurs de la fonction publique.

(2) The qualifications referred to in paragraph 30(2)(

a) and subparagraph 30(2) (b)(

i) must meet or exceed any applicable qualification standards established by the employer under subsection (1).

(2) Les qualifications mentionnées à l’alinéa 30(2)

a) et au sous-alinéa 30(2)b)(

i) doivent respecter ou dépasser les normes de qualification applicables établies par l’employeur en vertu du paragraphe (1). Public Service Act [62] 70. Public servants are governed by the provisions of the collective agreement applicable to them, or if there are no such provisions in the collective agreement, by the provisions of this Act and the Public Administration Act (

chapter A-6.01 ). However, no provision of a collective agreement may limit the powers of the Commission de la fonction publique or the powers of the chairman of the Conseil du trésor relating to recruitment or promotion qualification processes, qualification, banks of qualified persons or certification of qualification. Moreover, no clause of any collective agreement may limit the powers of a deputy minister, a chief executive officer, the Government or the Conseil du trésor with regard to any of the following matters: 70.

Les fonctionnaires sont régis par les dispositions de la convention collective qui leur sont applicables ou, à défaut de telles dispositions dans une telle convention collective, par les dispositions de la présente loi et de la

Loi sur l’administration publique (chapitre A-6.01 ). Toutefois, aucune disposition d’une convention collective ne peut restreindre ni les pouvoirs de la Commission de la fonction publique, ni ceux du président du Conseil du trésor relativement aux processus de qualification pour le recrutement ou la promotion, à la qualification, aux banques de personnes qualifiées ou à la déclaration d’aptitudes.

En outre, aucune disposition d’une convention collective ne peut restreindre les pouvoirs d’un sous-ministre, d’un dirigeant d’organisme, du gouvernement ou du Conseil du trésor à l’égard de l’une ou l’autre des matières suivantes: (1) the appointment of candidates to the public service or the promotion of public servants; 1° la nomination des candidats à la fonction publique ou la promotion des fonctionnaires; (2) the classification of positions, including the definition of conditions of eligibility and the determination of the level of positions relating to the classification; 2° la classification des emplois y compris la définition des conditions d’admission et la détermination du niveau des emplois en relation avec la classification;

(3) the granting of permanent tenure and the determination of the duration of the probationary period for recruitment or on promotion; 3° l’attribution du statut de fonctionnaire permanent et la détermination de la durée d’un stage probatoire lors du recrutement ou de la promotion; (4) the establishment of standards of ethics and discipline in the public service; 4° l’établissement des normes d’éthique et de discipline dans la fonction publique; (5) the establishment of organization plans and staffing procedures. 5° l’établissement des plans d’organisation et la détermination et la répartition des effectifs.

A decree adopted under the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management in the construction industry (

chapter R-20 ) or under another Act, or a document in lieu thereof or a collective agreement made with a view to such a decree does not apply to the conditions of employment of public servants. Un décret adopté en vertu de la

Loi sur les relations du travail, la formation professionnelle et la gestion de la main- d’oeuvre dans l’industrie de la construction (

chapitre R-20 ) ou d’une autre loi, ou un document qui en tient lieu ou une convention collective conclue en vue d’un tel décret ne s’appliquent pas aux conditions de travail des fonctionnaires.