2013 QCCQ 125, 2013 QCCQ 125

R. c. Czajkowski 2013 QCCQ 125 JL1755 COURT OF QUÉBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL "Criminal Division" N° : 500-01-049636-100 DATE : January 18, 2013 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDED OVER BY: THE HONOURABLE JUDGE DENIS LAVERGNE, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecution v.

MICHAEL CZAJKOWSKI Defendant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC Third Party ______________________________________________________________________ SENTENCE ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] At the end of the trial, the Court finds the defendant guilty of having committed the following offences: - 1.

On or about December 15, 2010, in Montréal, district of Montréal, did possess an unloaded prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition that is capable of being discharged in that firearm without being the holder of an authorization or a licence under which he may possess it in a place to wit: in a car and the registration certificate for this firearm, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by under Section 95

(2) a) of the Criminal Code ; - 2. On or about December 15, 2010, in Montréal, district of Montréal, was an occupant of a motor vehicle in which he knew there was a firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device or prohibited ammunition, to wit: a prohibited firearm, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by Section 94 (1)

(2) a) of Criminal Code ; - 3. On or about December 15, 2010, in Montréal, district of Montréal, did possess a prohibited weapon to wit: a prohibited firearm Para Ordnance model P10.9 without being the holder of a licence under which he may possess it, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by Section 91 (2)

(3) a) of the Criminal Code ; - 4. On or about December 15, 2010, in Montréal, district of Montréal, did transport a prohibited firearm, a prohibited ammunition, to wit: a prohibited firearm Para Ordnance model P10.9 in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for safety of the other persons, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by Section 86 (1)

(3) a) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Applying the rule prohibiting multiple guilty pleas, he orders the conditional stay of proceedings on counts 2, 3 and 4 [1] . I. LEGAL ISSUES [ 3 ] Determination of sentence raises the following three issues:

A) Duration of the sentence as such [ 4 ] According to the terms of Section 95(2) a)(ii) of the Criminal Code [2] (the Code ), the defendant faces a minimum prison sentence of five years.

[ 5 ] In this case, the Prosecution considers that the aggravating circumstances justify a prison sentence of five years, without consideration of the minimum sentence imposed by the Code . [ 6 ] The defendant pleads that a three year sentence would be appropriate, given the absence of evidence of aggravating circumstances linked to the perpetration of the offence and the former sentence of one year imprisonment for a similar offence. [ 7 ] He contests the constitutionality of section 95(2)a)(ii) of the Code . This is the second issue in question.

B) The Unconstitutionality of section 95(2)a)(ii) of the Code [ 8 ] The defendant pleads that this provision laying out the obligation to impose a minimum sentence of five years in the case of a repeat offence infringes on sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [3] (the Charter ). [ 9 ] He asks that this provision of the Code be declared inoperative. [ 10 ] Duly implicated by notice signified in good time, the Attorney General of Quebec appeared before the Court.

Abundant documentation was filed supporting its point of view that the provision of the Code does not contravene sections 7 and 12 of the Charter . [ 11 ] However, should the Court conclude otherwise, the Attorney General maintains that it would constitute a restriction provided by virtue of

section 1 of the Charter .

C) Calculation of the time in provisional detention for the purposes of the application of sections 719(3) and 719(3.1) of the Code [ 12 ] Detained since his arrest on 15 December 2010, the defendant asks that one and a half days be allocated per day spent in provisional detention in calculating the sentence to be served as of this day, given that, according to the terms of section 719(3.1) , certain circumstances would justify this. [ 13 ] The Prosecution contests that probative circumstances exist justifying challenging the rule stipulated under section 719(3) restraining the time allocated to a maximum of one day for each day served in provisional detention. II- The Context

A) The circumstances under which the offences were committed [ 14 ] The decisions of the Court, first on a motion by virtue of sections 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 24(2) of the Charter [4] and then on the verdict [5] exhaustively recall and repeat the relevant and outstanding facts. [ 15 ] It is worth highlighting them once more. [ 16 ] The Court therefore reiterates the elements retained in the decision rendered 25 October 2011 on the Charter motion: […] [9] On the morning of December 14th, 2010, detective Philippe Paul (Paul) receives information form an informer said «coded» and paid whom he knows and controls, and from whom he has, six or seven times already received reliable information.

The content of such information is the following: - a man named Michael Czajkowski (Czajkowski), alias «Miami-Mike», specializing in «home-invasions» («burns» that is to say, drugs and money debts in houses), teaming up with black people, is preparing to perform a «home invasion» in an unknown location, near Montreal; the informer even spells the name «Czajkowski»; - this «home invasion» is to take place the next day, December 15 th ; the suspect Czajkowski is to be accompanied by black people; - a meeting must first take place in a restaurant (Tim Hortons) located at 2450 Chemin Rockland in ville Mont-Royal; - the suspect is to take place in a blue Chrysler vehicle, model 300, plated [...] (the Chrysler). […] [18] On December 15th, police set forth surveillance at 10:00 at 2450 Chemin Rockland, ville Mont-Royal, targeting the Tim Hortons.

According to the surveillance report (exhibit P-4), the SWAT is also hard at work at 10:02. [19] At 10:46, a black individual later identified as a man named Daniel Walker (Walker) fills the tank of a black Chevrolet vehicle, model Malibu, in a gas station, near Tim Hortons near which he will park at 10:47. [20] This is an individual unknown to the police and completely foreign to the information previously received concerning the commission of a crime.

[21] After spending some time inside the restaurant, Walker comes out of it at 11:28 accompanied by a white person. Both enter the nearby mall at 11:36 and come out at 11:47. Walker returns alone to the Tim Hortons. [22] At 12:27, the Chrysler appears. Two individuals, one white and one black, get out of it and go to Tim Hortons. Some physical characteristics of the white individual, written in the surveillance report, are consistent with the ones Paquin reports at the hearing.

In addition, the surveillance report referred to another unknown black individual who at 12:39 comes out of Tim Hortons and sits behind the wheel of the Chrysler. [23] In short, between 12:31 and 12:47, Walker speaks with the three individuals in the restaurant and in the Chrysler. At 12:47, the three individuals take place in the Chrysler. The facts establish the identity of the two individuals sitting in front: Robinson at the wheel and at his side, Czajkowski.

As for the other black individual sitting in the back that the facts in this case do not concern, it would be a man named Samuels, if we retain an allusion about him during Paul's cross-examination. [24] At 12:48, the SWAT intervenes. Police officer Alain Rioux (Rioux), in charge of this five police officer unit, reports the intervention in the following manner. [25] The police first make sure to counter any fleeing of the Chrysler by blocking the way with their vehicle. Then, after having activated the siren to signal their presence, the five police officers surround the Chrysler.

One of them shouts among other things to raise their hands. The two black individuals obey, but not Czajkowski who moves in his seat, shoulders leaning to the left and acting, according to Rioux, as someone who wants to get rid of something. Since Czajkowski's hands are not visible, three police officers get closer to the door and one of them smashes the window.

The individuals are quickly under control; Rioux takes a look inside the vehicle and finds on the rounded protrusion concealing the transmission and dividing in a way the driver's and passenger's seats a hat in which he discovers the weapon previously mentioned, two magazines and 23 bullets. [ 17 ] In the 16 March 2012 decision on the verdict, the Court writes: [41] Even circumstantial, the objective elements inevitably converge towards Czajkowski and establish the personal possession of the tuque and, by way of consequence, of its content. [42] These elements are: - the discovery of the tuque, concealing the weapon, the two magazines, and the ammunition, at the foot of the driver’s seat, at the left of the seat occupied by Czajkowski who, consequently, had the physical capacity to put those objects in that place; - Czajkowski’s movement, wriggling on his seat, with his shoulders bent to the left, at the time of the police intervention and when the officers told the occupants of the Chrysler to put their hands up; - Czajkowski’s refusal or omission to comply immediately with the police orders to put his hands up, provoking a more vigorous intervention from one of the officers who broke the glass of the door allowing access to the passenger seat, on the driver’s side; - Robinson’s and Samuels’ spontaneous reactions, putting their hands up as soon as they heard the police order; - Robinson’s testimony which the Court believes and according to which, we note again, the tuque and the objects that were found in the vehicle did not belong to him and he had never seen them other than, and subsequently, in photographs or during the preliminary inquiry. [ 18 ] Mr.

Robinson, the driver and co-accused, was acquitted. [ 19 ] Furthermore, the facts establish that the weapon seized turned out to be a Para-Ordnance 9mm calibre semi-automatic pistol, a prohibited weapon under section 84(1) of the Code .

B) The subjective elements relating to the defendant [ 20 ] The defendant having chosen not to testify at the trial, the Court does not have his point of view on the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence. [ 21 ] A Canadian citizen who has spent much of his life in the United States, 32 years old at the time of the offence, the defendant has the following priors: - 30 May 2006: armed robbery, sections 343d) and 344 of the Code ; a sentence of 53 months of imprisonment after a provisional detention of 19 months; a prohibition to carry weapons by virtue of

section 109 of the Code ; - possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm, section 95(1) and (2) of the Code ; a sentence of one year of imprisonment concurrently; - disguise with intent, section 351(2) of the Code ; a sentence of one year of imprisonment concurrently and a prohibition by virtue of

section 109 . [ 22 ] Released on 8 May 2009, the defendant is imprisoned anew the following 28 August, his probation having been revoked. Released again on 4 May 2010, he is imprisoned a second time on 4 August 2010. On 3 September 2010, he is released definitively. [ 23 ] Furthermore, it is mentioned he was also found guilty in the United States for possession of narcotics for the purposes of trafficking when the defendant was 20 years old. This condemnation led him to be deported to Canada. [ 24 ] Single, with no child, he has managed to hold various jobs with more or less regularity, the nature of which was not specified.

III- Analysis

A) The length of the sentence to be served [ 25 ] For the following reasons, the constitutional issue has no bearing.

Without considering the minimal sentence required by section 95(2) a)(ii), the five year sentence called for by the Prosecution is justified, given, on the one hand, the objectives to be met by the sentence under such circumstances and, on the other hand, the degree of responsibility of the defendant. - The objective gravity of the offence [ 26 ] The defendant faces a maximum of ten years imprisonment for the offence. [ 27 ] The case law clearly denounces the illegal possession of firearms and the danger they represent. [ 28 ] Thus, in R. v.

Guha [6] , the British Columbia Court of Appeal reminds us: [30] In short, firearms, and in particular handguns, are extremely dangerous when possessed for an illicit purpose. That purpose can only be to threaten or inflict serious bodily harm or death. Sentences for these types of offences must reflect society's absolute rejection of such unacceptable conduct. [ 29 ] In 2007, in R. v. Clayton [7] , the Supreme Court of Canada similarly underlined the danger to the community represented by people possessing firearms. The words of Justice Molloy in R. v.

Ferrigon [8] effectively illustrate both the objective and the subjective gravity of possessing firearms. [25] Guns are dangerous. Handguns are particularly dangerous. Loaded, concealed handguns are even more dangerous. A person who loads a handgun with bullets and then carries that handgun, concealed on his person, into a public place is by definition a dangerous person. Handguns are used to shoot people. A person who carries a loaded handgun in public has demonstrated his willingness to shoot another human being with it. Otherwise there would be no need to have loaded it. That person is dangerous.

He is dangerous to those with whom he associates; he is dangerous to the police and other law enforcement personnel; he is dangerous to the members of his community; he is dangerous to innocent bystanders, including children, who may be killed or maimed by stray bullets. And equally importantly, he is dangerous to a way of life that is treasured in Canada […] [ 30 ] Furthermore, the modifications to the Code [9] confirm not only the concern of the legislator but also his response in the face of what was described at the time as “a serious and growing societal danger posed by handguns” [10] . [ 31 ] In R. v.

Nur [11] , Judge Code, with an appeal before him under

section 12 of the Charter of a three year minimum sentence for a first offence under section 95(1) and (2) a)(ii), set out the worrying issue of offences involving firearms in the following terms: [88] Parliament was faced with an alarming situation in 2008, when the present legislation was passed into law. Satistical data was presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (39 th Parliament, 1 st session, No. 033, November 22, 2006). That data indicated overall declining trends in crime rates, including violent crime rates.

However, in contrast to these overall declines, certain firearms offences were increasing dramatically. Experts from Statistics Canada gave the following evidence to the Standing Committee: With respect to several Criminal Code sections… Under

section 244, the discharge of a firearm with intent, we have seen between 2002 and 2005 an increase of 53% in incidents, from 86 to 132. Under

section 85, using a firearm to commit an offence, we've seen a steadily increasing number, from 326 in 2002 to 542 in 2005, an increase of 66%. Under sections 88 to 96, which are various weapons possession offences, we've seen a doubling since 1999, from just over 4,900 to just over 10,500 by 2005. […] [91] Statistical data, relating only to s. 95 offences, was specifically prepared by Statistics Canada for the present constitutional challenge.

That data indicates that 887 charges were laid under s. 95 in the year 2000-2001 in cases of possession simpliciter , that is, in cases without any accompanying more serious crime of violence. By the year 2006-2007, the number of such s. 95 charges had increased to 2120. In other words, in the seven year period leading up to passage of the 2008 legislation, there was an increase of 139% in the number of s. 95 firearms charges. That increase had taken place in spite of the existing legislative regime, which required one year mandatory minimum sentences.

Furthermore, the trend over this seven year period did not appear to be irregular or aberrant. In very single year there were dramatic increases. [ 32 ] The hardening of sentences reflects the seriousness the legislator accords offences related to the possession of firearms.

The courts must echo the intention of the legislator by imposing sentences which translate the high objective gravity of the offence in a country in which, in addition, no-one can possess a firearm without a licence. - The subjective gravity [ 33 ] The defendant is right to underline the fact that there exists no evidence of aggravating circumstances associated with the committing of the offence besides the facts which established, according the Court, the possession of the firearm. [ 34 ] Thus, the nature of the information and the objective sought by the suspect individuals, disclosed by a reliable indicator and which set off the police investigation and surveillance, do not constitute, under the circumstances, proof beyond all reasonable doubt of

an aggravating factor ( section 724(3)

e) of the Code ). [ 35 ] However, even in the absence of peripheral aggravating factors to the possession of the firearm, the file becomes more onerous in the light of the following considerations about the defendant himself. [ 36 ] First of all, it would be unreasonable to imagine that a person can drive about on a public thoroughfare in possession of an illegal firearm with entirely innocent motives. [ 37 ] Secondly, the following facts increase the responsibility of the defendant: - this is a repeat offence for the possession of firearms; a little over three months earlier, he had just been released from a sixty month prison sentence imposed in 2006, notably for possession of a firearm; - this involves not only possession of an illegal firearm, but also a possession that flouts a prohibition to possess firearms following the 2006 conviction; - the defendant possessed the firearm in a vehicle traveling on a public thoroughfare; - there were a significant number of easily accessible munitions that could be used with the firearm. - Other considerations [ 38 ] There is no attenuating factor. [ 39 ]

Section 718.1 of the Code sets out the proportionality principle: the sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the delinquent. [ 40 ] In general, the more serious the offence, the higher will be the responsibility of the defendant.

This being said, sentencing is an exercise in individualization, which must also take into account the particular characteristics of the defendant. [ 41 ] In this case, by possessing a firearm in what are, without proof to the contrary, at least suspect circumstances, and this barely three months and a week after having served a six year prison sentence - for a similar offence, it should be noted - the defendant demonstrates, on the one hand, that the sentence he received did not have the calculated effect and has not been able to reform his behaviour, and on the other hand, that he was ready to assume the full consequences of his actions, however harsh they might be. [ 42 ] On the basis of the file, the rehabilitation of the defendant would seem, for the moment, problematic.

Such serious backsliding so soon after his release after a long prison term leads to believe that the defendant still represents a danger to the public. The double repeal of the conditional release he had been granted following his sentencing in 2006 must also be noted. It is therefore difficult for the defendant to invoke social reintegration as a factor to be taken into account for sentencing. [ 43 ] A long period of incarceration is called for. [ 44 ] The principles of dissuasion and denunciation are foremost in firearms cases, in particular when dealing with handguns [12] .

In this case, given the repeat offence, the principle outlined in

section 718(

c) must also be taken into account, according to which these circumstances justify isolating the defendant from the rest of society. [ 45 ] Furthermore, in R. v. Bacon [13] , the Provincial Court of British Columbia summarizes case law with respect to sentences for firearms possession before and after the 2008 amendments when the accused has a prior record in similar matters. The sentences range from three and a half to nine years of imprisonment. 80 Before the amendments in May 2008, the range of sentence varied depending upon the record of the offender and the circumstances of the offences.

Counsel provided a number of cases to consider. For first offenders, the range of sentence was between eighteen months and two years, three months. R. v. Nguyen , 2005 BCCA 115 ; R. v. Green , supra ; R. v. Mann , [unreported], 18 Feb 2009, Vancouver Registry No. 196590-2-C (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Jarsch , 2007 BCCA 189 ; R. v. Lynnerup , 2009 BCCA 531 ; R. v. Violette , 2009 BCSC 1557 . For offenders with a criminal record but facing their first firearms offences, the range of sentence was between three years eight months and four years. R. v. Thurston , 2004 CarswellBC 2767 , aff'd 2004 BCCA 526 ; R. v.

Ross , 2010 BCCA 314 . For offenders with a prior criminal record for firearms offences, the range of sentence was three years six months to nine years. R. v. Vidal , 2009 BCSC 1557; R. v. Grant , supra ; R. v. Fester , 2007 BCSC 1102 ; R. v. Frohock , 2008 BCSC 735 , aff'd 2009 BCCA 227 . The Crown concedes that the circumstances in this case are not as serious as those in R. v. Frohock , supra , where Mr. Frohock received a sentence of nine years. 81 After the amendment in May 2008, the range of sentence did not change significantly except for offenders facing their first offence.

The range of sentence for offenders with a criminal record but facing their first firearms offences was between three and one half years and five years. R. v. Huard , 2009 BCSC 999 ; R. v. Kiely , [unreported], 26 May 2010, Kamloops Registry No. 87259 (B.C.S.C.). The range of sentence for offenders with a prior criminal record for firearms offences was between three years and six years. R. v. Iyeke , 2009 CarswellOnt 1771, (Ont. S.C.J.) ; R. v. Cuthbertson , 2009 BCSC 1865 ; R. v. Ivanic , 2009 BCSC 931 ; R. v.

Peterson , [unreported], 19 March 2010, Vancouver Registry No.: 25067 (B.C.S.C.). [ 46 ] The decisions cited in R. v. Bacon obviously do not include all of the same aggravating and attenuating factors. The principle of proportionality set out in

section 718.1 of the Code inevitably leads to variable sentences. However, one can retain from this case law that sentences are more severe in the case of repeat offences. [ 47 ] For these reasons, the Court considers that a five year sentence is fair, reasonable and proportional to the gravity and degree of responsibility of the defendant.

B) The unconstitutionality of section 95(2)a)(ii)

[ 48 ] Taking into consideration the conclusion of the Court determining the sentence which the defendant deserves, the principle of judicial restraint is applicable on the constitutional question that it is no longer necessary to deal with according to the principle established by case law from the Supreme Court of Canada [14] . [ 49 ] The Ontario Court of Justice applies this principle in R. v. Élie [15] , a case in which the defendant had raised the constitutionality of the minimal sentence under sections 244(2)a)(

i) and 93(2)a)(i).

C) Calculating provisional detention time for the purposes of applying sections 719(3) and 719(3.1) of the Code [ 50 ] To date, uniform case law does not appear to exist in Canada on the

interpretation and application of sections 719(3) and 719(3.1) of the Code . [ 51 ] The Court relies on the

interpretation given in R. v. Gosselin [16] . Other decisions by the Court of Quebec have since adopted the same reasoning [17] . [ 52 ] There is no presumption that the time spent in provisional detention merits the maximum credit of a day and a half, in accordance with section 719(3.1) . The time allotted for the time spent in provisional detention cannot exceed one day for each day passed locked up, unless in accordance with sub-section 3.1 of

section 719 of the Code , the defendant demonstrates that circumstances exist justifying increasing the time allotted to a day and a half per day. [ 53 ] The defendant has the burden of offering satisfactory evidence which convinces the Court to exercise its discretion to depart from the rule of a maximum of one day per day spent in detention. [ 54 ] Detained since his arrest on 15 December 2010, the defendant essentially pleads the following: - his unilingualism in English in a detention centre in Quebec; - the inaccessibility of programs offered to detainees by the corrections facility; - the absence of contacts with his family. [ 55 ] The circumstances which the defendant sets forth to justify an increase from one to one and a half days of credit for the time spent in provisional detention are limited to the statements made about them, and no more. [ 56 ] There is no clear evidence establishing the true reasons the defendant does not have access to the different programs of the corrections facility.

He submits at the hearing that his unilingual English could have affected accessibility to programs, but that is all. The Court has no further substantiation. [ 57 ] Furthermore, the defendant points out having received a single visit from the members of his family. As the Prosecution observes, the reason for the sparsity of visits from the members of his family is unknown. In fact, we know nothing. Given that the family lives in Florida, one can presume that the distance in itself would be motive enough to make the visits extremely rare. [ 58 ] However, on the basis of the file, the arguments are unconvincing.

According to the defendant, he was deported from the United States to Canada in his early twenties because of a conviction for possession of drugs for the purposes of trafficking.

Since then, there is reason to believe he has been prohibited from entering the United States for more than ten years. [ 59 ] Therefore, one can presume he has not been able to enter the United States to visit his family; on the other hand, the frequency of visits from members of his family when he lived at liberty in Canada is unknown. [ 60 ] In addition, the defendant does not show how provisional detention has been harder on him either because of the absence of contacts with members of his family or because of the inaccessibility for him of the detention facility programs. [ 61 ] The defendant does not therefore establish by preponderance of evidence the circumstances justifying increasing the credit for time served to a day and a half. [ 62 ] Therefore, the Court will allocate a day for each day served, according to section 719(3) of the Criminal Code , from 15 December 2010 to 26 October 2012. [ 63 ] Found guilty on 16 March 2012, the defendant filed a notice contesting the constitutionality of the provision which obliges the Court to impose on him a minimum sentence of five years.

This challenge inevitably brought about an adjournment, in order for the Attorney General of Quebec to intervene and respond to the allegation of unconstitutionality. For this purpose, a hearing took place on 10 October 2012.

This certainly was a long delay, which explains the respective agendas of the parties, including that of the Court. [ 64 ] However, this is a delay resulting from the petition of the defendant, and while he cannot be held to account for having asserted his rights, he must assume the consequences in terms of the delays. [ 65 ] At the end of the 10 October 2012 hearing, the defendant asked for a postponement to 26 October to present his point of view on the application of section 719(3.1) of the Code .

There is no reason to increase to a day and a half the days in detention for this period, seeing that this was also a delay for which the defendant must assume responsibility. [ 66 ] Between 15 December 2010 and 26 October 2012, 22 months and 11 days were served, the equivalent of which the Court subtracts from the five year sentence. [ 67 ] For 26 October 2012 to 18 January 2013, a period of 84 days, and for the reasons expressed in R. v. Gosselin , cited above, there is reason to grant a credit of one and a half days per day spent in detention for a total of 126 days.

[ 68 ] Calculated on a monthly basis and rounded off to the nearest unit, the Court allocates a period of 26½ months for provisional detention which is to be subtracted from the five year prison term. [ 69 ] A perpetual prohibition order by virtue of section 109(1)

b) and (3) of the Code is in order. Given the sentence imposed, the Court dispenses the defendant from paying the victim surcharge. FOR THESE MOTIVES, THE COURT: IMPOSES a sentence of 33½ months of imprisonment; RENDERS a perpetual prohibition on possessing firearms and all other categories of weapons, munitions and explosive substances listed in section 109(1) of the Criminal Code , by virtue of section 109(1)

b) and (3) of the Code ; DISPENSES the defendant from paying the victim surcharge. __________________________________ DENIS LAVERGNE, J.C.Q. M e Pascal Dostaler Attorney for the Prosecution M e Julio Péris Péris & Sutton Attorney for the defendant Michael Czajkowski M e Alexandre Duval et M e Julien Bernard Bernard, Roy Attorney General of Quebec Third Party Dates of the hearings : 10 and 26 October 2012.