S.L.I. v. A.D.G., 2011 ONCJ 689

Toronto Registry No. D41326/06 DATE: 2011·VIII·10 CITATION: S.L.I. v. A.D.G. , 2011 ONCJ 689 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: S.L.I. Applicant (Moving Party) — AND — A.D.G. Respondent (Moving Party) Before Justice Carole Curtis Heard on 18 July 2011 Reasons for Decision released on 10 August 2011 Thomas Sosa ................................................................................... counsel for the Applicant David Miller .............................................................................. counsel for the Respondent CURTIS, J.: 1 . Over-view 2 . The Parents’ Positions on the

Summary Judgment Motion a. The Mother’s Position b. The Father’s Position 3 . Background 4 . Litigation History 5 . The Father’s Criminal Behaviour and Criminal History 6 . The Father’s Drug and Alcohol Use 7 . Access 8 . The Legal Framework a. Material Change in Circumstances b.

Summary Judgment Motions c.

Summary Judgment Motion in a Motion to Change 9 . Analysis re Trial and

Summary Judgment

10 . The Law Regarding No Access 11 . The Access Order Over-view 1. This is the decision in a motion for

summary judgment. The mother brought a motion to change the consent order of Zuker, J. made 26 September 2006, which provided for specified unsupervised access, up to five hours per week, to be exercised at the paternal grand-mother’s residence. The mother is now asking that there now be no access to the father and for a restraining order. The Parents’ Positions on the

Summary Judgment Motion The Mother’s Position 2. The mother says that the material change relates to the father’s alcohol abuse, the fact that he is in and out of jail, the fact that he is violent and abusive towards her, and that his inconsistency in the child’s life causes the child emotional harm. The mother does not believe that the father is a person whose access to the child would be positive and beneficial to her. The Father’s Position 3. At the hearing of the motion, the father conceded the following:

a) There is no genuine issue for trial as to whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the order of Zuker, J. made 26 September 2006;

b) There is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a restraining order and he consented to a final restraining order being granted; and,

c) There is no genuine issue for trial as to whether there should be regular unsupervised access at this time. The father appreciates that the evidence of his alcohol use, criminality and unavailability has made weekly unsupervised access untenable. 4.

The father asks for supervised access at the Toronto Supervised Access Centre, on a specific schedule, with access to increase to more frequent visits and eventually to unsupervised visits, when he is able to maintain no jail or criminal charges for twelve months, when one six-month hair strand test shows no evidence of excessive alcohol consumption and no use of cocaine, and when he produces written confirmation of addiction counselling sessions for twelve consecutive months. Background 5. The mother (and moving party) is S.L.I. (“the mother’), born [… ] September 1980, now 30 years old. 6.

The father (and responding party) is A.D.G. (“the father”), born [… ] August 1979, 31 years old when the motion for

summary judgment was heard. 7. The parents lived together from October 2004 to February 2006. They are not married to each other. There is one child of this relationship, J.M.I.G.G. (“the child” or “J.”), born […] September 2005, 5½ years old when the motion for

summary judgment was heard. Litigation History 8. On 26 September 2006, Zuker, J. made a consent order for sole custody to the mother, with specified access to the father of up to five hours per week, to take place at the paternal grand-mother’s residence. Access could also be at other times, as agreed to by the parents.

9. On 26 March 2009 Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (“CAST”) started a protection application claiming no access by the father and a restraining order against him under s. 80 Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 11, as amended (“ CFSA ”). CAST alleged that the father is fixated on the mother, that he was at moderate to high risk of potential violence, and at high risk for continued stalking or threatening behaviour towards the mother. 10. The mother started the motion to change on 14 May 2009 and identified the following reasons to end the father’s access:

a) Emotional harm to the child;

b) Risk of physical harm to the mother and the child;

c) Unaddressed substance addiction;

d) Anti-social and criminal lifestyle; and,

e) Violent and controlling behaviour. 11. On consent, on 16 December 2009 (in the child protection case), temporary access was changed to every other week supervised for one hour at the CAST office. The access was specifically conditional on three terms: a. The father was to attend every session of his Partner Assault Response program (“PARS program”), unless unable to do so by reason of illness, in which case, a doctor’s note was to be provided to CAST; b. The father was to attend for drug testing, such as random urine screens or hair strand analysis, as directed by CAST; c.

The father was to provide consent to CAST to obtain information from his service providers including probation, addictions treatment, and domestic violence/PARS resource. 12 . On consent on 24 March 2010 (in the child protection case), temporary access was changed to two hours every two weeks. 13 . On consent on 17 May 2010 (in the family law case), Zuker, J. changed temporary access to supervised access at the Toronto Supervised Access Centre every second Sunday from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

The order contained a proviso that the father was to “refrain from making any comments or asking any questions of the child about the mother during the visits”. 14 . On 26 October 2010, Zuker, J. (in the family law case) changed temporary access to no access to the father. 15 . The mother sought a restraining order in October 2010. 16 . When the motion for

summary judgment was heard, the child protection case was still on-going. The Father’s Criminal Behaviour and Criminal History 17 . Since the motion to change was started on 14 May 2009, the father has been in jail twice (19 August to 12 November 2010, and 6 March to 27 May 2011). 18 . At the time the motion to change was started (May 2009), the father had not seen the child since 31 August 2008. The father admits that on 31 August 2008 he called the mother a number of times (he says “in a drunken stupor”) and threatened her, and was charged with criminal harassment and two counts of threatening bodily harm. In September 2008 he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to seven

months in jail plus three years probation. He was released on 7 March 2009. 19 . While he was in jail, the father admits that he sent a letter to the mother and a letter to the child. As a result, he was charged with criminal harassment and fail to comply. The criminal harassment charge was withdrawn and he pleaded guilty to the fail to comply, as he was not then allowed to contact the mother. This extended his sentence. 20 . The father was released on 17 March 2009 and was arrested on 9 April 2009 and charged with criminal harassment and fail to comply.

He admits that he attended the Centennial College Campus and that the mother works there. He says he did not go there to see the mother, didn’t see her, and was not drunk. The criminal harassment charge was withdrawn and he pleaded guilty to fail to comply with his probation terms for not keeping the peace, by attending the campus. He received a sentence of time served. 21 . The father says that he completed a six week anger management program in jail in December 2008. 22 . The father was again in jail from 19 August 2010 to 12 November 2010.

On 19 August 2010 the father was arrested and charged with assault of A.W., his girlfriend, and with failure to comply with probation. The father says he was not drunk when the assault happened. He pleaded guilty to assault and breach of probation and was sentenced to four months in jail and two years probation. 23 . The father says that he completed the 16 week PARS program in May 2010. 24 . The father’s criminal record was not produced by either parent. But a

summary of charges (from 1997 to 2009) was provided.

The father has a long, detailed record of charges, mostly related to offenses involving violence, including the following offenses: Charges Frequency Sexual assault Threaten death 2 occasions, 3 charges Threaten bodily harm 2 charges Assault Assault peace officer 2 occasions Assault with weapon Weapons dangerous Criminal harassment 3 occasions, 4 charges Robbery Break and enter 3 occasions Harassing phone calls Theft over Attempt theft under Possession stolen property over Drive over 80 2 occasions Impaired driving Drive disqualified Fail to remain 3 charges Fail to remain bodily harm Dangerous operation Dangerous operation causing bodily harm Fail to stop for police Take auto without consent Mischief over Mischief interfere with property Mischief under Failure to comply probation 6 occasions Failure to comply recognizance Failure to comply undertaking 2 occasions 25 .

At least seven criminal incidents which resulted in charges against the father relate to the mother:

Date Charges 2 March 2005 Assault, failure to comply undertaking 20 May 2006 Threaten death, harassing phone calls 9 December 2007 Threaten death X2, failure to comply probation 31 August 2008 Criminal harassment, threaten bodily harm X2, failure to comply probation, assault peace officer 15 January 2009 Failure to comply probation, criminal harassment 9 April 2009 Criminal harassment X2, failure to comply probation 26 . The father was arrested again on 11 March 2011.

He says that he had been drinking and got into a confrontation, at 3.30 a.m., with a drug store clerk regarding merchandise he was eating that he had not yet paid for. He hit the clerk and was charged with assault and mischief. He pleaded guilty to both charges, and was sentenced to jail time (length unspecified) and twelve months probation, with a term that he engage in alcohol abuse counselling. 27 . The father’s criminal court contact restrictions with respect to the mother (from a three year probation order made 5 February 2009) expire on 5 February 2012. The Father’s Drug and Alcohol Use 28 .

The father admits that he is an alcoholic. He admits that he has an “anger management problem that is directly tied to (his) alcohol use”. He says that when he is not intoxicated that he does not have an anger problem. 29 . Hair follicle tests for alcohol done on the father on 21 December 2010 place the father in the category of chronic alcohol abuser. The lab reported that chronic alcohol abuser refers to long-term (i.e., three to six months) history exhibiting a repeated behaviour of drinking to the point of intoxication (i.e., alcohol abuse).

The designation is intended to provide information regarding average intensity of alcohol consumption. 30 . The same hair sample also produced positive cocaine results which placed the father in the medium range for cocaine abuse. 31 . The father admits that he has not stopped drinking. He says that he has reduced his drinking from the drinking binges that would last two to three weeks. 32 . The father was in “on-again-off-again” counselling regarding his drinking until December 2009, and then again from November 2010 to March 2011. There was no evidence provided from the counsellor. Access 33 .

Visits stopped altogether in summer 2010 due to the father’s incarceration for domestic assault regarding his most recent partner, and have not resumed. 34 . Observation notes from the CAST social workers regarding the father’s access to the child were generally positive:

a) The father is generally very good with J. during his visits;

b) The father is attentive, playful and typically appropriate with J.; and,

c) In a supervised setting the father does well in his visits with J.. Effect on the Child 35 . The father conceded that the issue regarding access is the emotional effects of his absences on the child, and that his inconsistency with access has taken an emotional toll on the child. The father admits that the lack of consistency in his contact with the child creates a risk for her. He acknowledged that it is extremely difficult for the child to get used to having access with him and then to have that taken away. 36 .

The mother says that the child has suffered from the father’s pattern of moving in and out of her life, which is no longer tolerable. The mother says that the child was extremely distraught and confused following a series of fully supervised CAST office visits with the father. The visits stopped altogether due to the father’s incarceration for domestic assault regarding his girlfriend during the summer of 2010. The mother says that there was an emotional toll on the child and that she accessed therapeutic services for the child.

The child’s emotional state had improved by May 2011, she currently presents as settled, happy, and content. She does not speak nor ask about the father. The Legal Framework Material Change in Circumstances 37 . The mother’s motion is a motion to change a previous order under s. 29 Children’s Law Reform Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, as amended, (“ CLRA ”). Order varying an order 29.

(1) A court shall not make an order under this Part that varies an order in respect of custody or access made by a court in Ontario unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child. 38 . The test for changing a previous custody or access order is whether there has been a material change in circumstances. The father concedes that there has been a material change in circumstances since the making of the original access order by Zuker on 26 September 2006.

Summary Judgment Motions 39 . A party may make a motion for

summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, as amended (“the rules”). These are the sub-rules in rule 16 are relevant to this case: When Available 16.

(1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion for

summary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case. Evidence Required

(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue requiring trial. Evidence of Responding Party

(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Evidence Not From Personal Knowledge

(5) If a party's evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusionsunfavourable to the party. No Issue for Trial

(6) If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly. 40. The onus is on the moving party to persuade the court that there is no genuine issue for trial. If there is not, the court is required tomake a final order and grant

summary judgment: F.I. v. K.F., , 95 A.C.W.S. (3d) 108, [2000] O.J. No. 479, 2000Cars​well​Ont 455 (Ont. Fam. Ct.). 41. On a motion for

summary judgment such as this, the court should not be assessing credibility, weighing the evidence or finding thefacts. Instead, the court’s role is narrowly limited to assessing the threshold issue of whether a genuine issue exists as to material factsrequiring a trial. Evaluating credibility, weighing evidence and drawing factual inferences are all functions for the trier of fact: Bedardv. Huard, (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No 969 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 42.

When the court looks at whether there is a genuine issue for trial, the question is not whether there is any evidence to support theresponding party’s position, but rather whether the evidence is sufficient to require a trial: Children’s Aid Society of the County ofDufferin v. J.R., (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 43. Rule 16 (4.1) requires that a responding party, however, may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but shall set out in an affidavitor other evidence, specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial: Native Child and Family Services of Toronto and D.C., 2010ONSC 1038 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), para. 6.

Summary Judgment Motion in a Motion to Change 44. A motion to change under R. 15 proceeds as a motion unless the court orders otherwise under R. 15(26). 45. A motion to change does not automatically conclude with a trial. There is not an entitlement to a trial in a motion to change. In fact,the opposite is the case. Powers of the Court – Directions 15.

(26) If the court is of the opinion that a motion, whether proceeding on consent or not, cannot be properly dealt with because ofthe material filed, because of the matters in dispute or for any other reason, the court may give directions, including directions for a trial. 46. Before considering whether or not to order a trial for a motion to change, the court first has to find that the motion cannot beproperly dealt with as a motion. The court has a wide discretion in making this finding, as the court can rely on the material filed, thematters in dispute or on “any other reason” to so decide. 47.

The court then also has a wide discretion in dealing with motions to change and can give directions. A trial is one option availableto the court in giving directions, but is not the only option. 48. This motion for

summary judgment was brought within the context of a motion to change under R. 15. In I. v. W., 2011 ONSC 2021(Ont. Sup. Ct.), Czutrin, J. upheld on appeal the decision of Waldman, J. to dismiss a motion to change without a trial (para. 31 of thereasons for decision of Waldman, J.):

I am satisfied, having reviewed the evidence, that a trial of the issue of father’s access to the child is not required. There is no issue ofcredibility that needs to be resolved through viva voce evidence. The court does not require examination and cross-examination to allowfor a full exploring of the evidence and issues before the court. The affidavit materials filed, particularly by father, are extensive and hehas carefully documented his concerns. The evidence supported each party’s position and each party had an opportunity to makesubmissions to the court and to explain his or her position fully.

Subrule 15(26) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, as amended,allows the court to give directions including directions for a trial if “the court feels that the motion cannot be adequately dealt withbecause of the material filed, because of the matters in dispute or for any other reason.” Under rule 15, a motion to change a final ordershall be dealt with on the basis of the documentary evidence filed, unless the court is of the opinion that it cannot properly be dealt within this fashion. See M. v. O., 2006 ONCJ 176 , 2006 ONCJ 176 , 2006 ONCJ 176, 148 A.C.W.S. (3d) 410, [2006]W.D.F.L. 3201, [2006] O.J.

No. 1955, 2006 Cars​well​Ont 3019 (Ont. C.J.). The onus is on the applicant father to show that a trial isneeded. In this particular case, while this is a motion to change, the issue to be determined, father’s access, is actually the same issuethat has been central to this case from virtually the beginning. Given this history, along with the evidence filed and submissions made, Iam satisfied that a trial is not required. 49.

Where there are material facts in dispute that require the court to observe cross-examination of the parties and determinecredibility to justly determine the issues, a trial of the issue should generally be ordered: Ierullo v. Ierullo, 2006 Cars​well​Ont 5887 (Ont.C.A.); Burisch v. Gosal, 2007 Cars​well​Ont 5227 (Ont. C.A.); Preston v. Markle, unreported, Ont. Ct., 9 May 2011, para 7. Analysis re Trial and

Summary Judgment 50. The facts in this case are not in dispute. And the facts are quite persuasive. There is no triable issue here. This is really one of theclearest of cases for

summary judgment. What issue can the father now raise which would affect the result at trial? The result is aforegone conclusion. 51. A trial of the issue of the father’s access to the child is not required. There is no issue of credibility that needs to be resolved throughoral evidence. The court does not require examination and cross-examination to allow for a full exploring of the evidence and issuesbefore the court. The affidavit materials filed are detailed. 52. The onus is on the applicant father to show that a trial is needed.

Given the five year history since the making of the originalaccess order in 2006, and given the recent history since the motion to change was started in May 2009, along with the evidence filed andsubmissions made, it is abundantly clear that a trial is not required. 53. The father’s last supervised access to the child was in August 2010, almost a year ago. Access was suspended by court order on 26October 2010 by Zuker, J.. 54. The problem is not the access itself; the problem is the father. The father repeatedly returns to jail after each release.

The father hasnot addressed his underlying problems through treatment. The issues and concerns which relate to the father’s access to the child havenot adequately been addressed by the father. Any programs or treatment the father has been required to take have been to no avail. Thefather is not currently in counselling. He is not currently in any programs (anger management, drinking, etc.). He called no evidenceregarding the counselling he did have. He is still drinking. He is still in and out of jail. In fact, he was in jail only a few weeks beforethe motion for

summary judgment was argued. The father has not addressed the issues which cause the court concern regarding access,despite many years in which to do so. Nothing has changed since Zuker, J. suspended his access. 55. The father has proven incapable of putting the child’s interests ahead of his own. His sad history indicates that it is unlikely that hehas the ability to do so. 56. The father admits that the child has experienced emotional harm due to his conduct and his inconsistency. The child has beendisappointed countless times by the father.

The child has suffered from the father’s pattern of disappointing the child and moving in andout of her life. 57. The father’s explanation for his behaviour is that he has an alcohol problem, and that violence and alcohol go hand in hand, and thatleads to criminal behaviour. The father has made choices, and those choices affect his life and affect the child’s life. The Law Regarding No Access 58. There were several access orders made in the current court case, ranging from specified access of up to five hours per week, to takeplace at the paternal grand-mother’s residence; to supervised access; to no access.

The parents and the child have had five years (since

2006) to see if the original order, or the subsequent orders are working and whether access is in the child’s best interests. 59. The principles of family law suggest that access to both parents is generally in the interests of children. This is not a hard and fastrule. A parent does not have an absolute right to access: Worthington v. Worthington, (ON SC), 2000 CarswellOnt4889, 13 R.F.L. (5th) 220 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); Jafari v. Dadar, 1996 CarswellNB 386, [1996] W.D.F.L. 2455 (N.B.Q.B.). 60. In V. S. J. v. L.J.G., (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 2238 (Ont. Sup.

Ct.) at para. 135, Blishen J. provided an usefuloverview of the factors that have led courts to terminate access: 1. Long term harassment and harmful behaviours towards the custodial parent causing that parent and the child stress and orfear. See M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.), supra; Stewart v. Bachman, [2003] O.J. No. 433 (Sup.Ct.); Studley v. O'Laughlin, [2000] N.S.J. No.210 (N.S.S.C.) (Fam.Div.); Dixon v. Hinsley, (ON CJ), [2001] O.J. No. 3707. 2.

History of violence; unpredictable, uncontrollable behaviour; alcohol, drug abuse which has been witnessed by the childand/or presents a risk to the child's safety and well being. See Jafari v. Dadar, supra; Maxwell v. Maxwell, [1986] N.B.J.No. 769(N.B.Q.B.); Abdo v. Abdo (NS C.A.), (1993), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (N.S.C.A.); Studley v. O'Laughlin, supra. 3. Extreme parental alienation which has resulted in changes of custody and, at times, no access orders to the former custodialparent. See Tremblay v. Tremblay (AB Q.B.), (1987), 10 R.F.L. (3d) 166; Reeves v. Reeves, [2001] O.J. No. 308(Sup.Ct). 4.

Ongoing severe denigration of the other parent. See Frost v. Allen, [1995] M.J. No. 111 (Man.Q.B.); Gorgichuk v.Gorgichuk, supra. 5. Lack of relationship or attachment between noncustodial parent and child. See Studley v. O'Laughlin, supra; M.(B.P.) v. M.(B.L.D.E.), supra. 6. Neglect or abuse to a child on the access visits. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, supra. 7. Older children's wishes and preferences to terminate access. See Gorgichuk v. Gorgichuk, supra; Frost v. Allen, supra; Dixonv. Hinsley, supra; Pavao v. Pavao, [2000] O.J. No. 1010 (Sup.Ct.). 61. None of the above cited cases deal with one factor alone.

In every case, there are a multitude of factors which must be carefullyconsidered and weighed in determining whether to terminate access is in the best interests of the child. V. S. J. v. L.J.G., supra, 2004(Ont. Sup. Ct.), para. 136. 62. Access is only to be ordered in circumstances where there will be a positive benefit to the child. It is not sufficient to show thataccess will not harm the child: Worthington v. Worthington, supra, 2000 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 63. There are circumstances where it is not in the best interests of children to have continued contact with one of their parents. This issuch a case. 64.

A child needs stability and routine. Every child is entitled to a parent who is available, consistent, not drinking, and not involved incriminal behaviour. 65. How long does this child have to wait while the father tries to become a better person and a better parent? The court does not orderaccess in order to help the father get over his demons. 66. An order for no access to a child is a last resort: Jafari v. Dadar, supra, 1996, (N.B.Q.B.). It should only be considered in limitedcircumstances and when other alternatives have failed: Jennings v. Garrett, (ON SC), 2004 CarswellOnt 2159 (Ont.Sup. Ct.).

For J. and her father there are no suitable alternatives. The alternatives have all been tried, and they have failed. 67. The court considered and rejected an order for supervised access. The father asked for this. This has been tried several times, underseveral different orders, and under several different regimes. The result is the same. The father continues the same behaviour:unaddressed substance addiction; anti-social and criminal lifestyle; violent and controlling behaviour; a risk of physical harm to the

mother and the child; and emotional harm to the child. 68 . The father cannot put the child’s needs ahead of his own. He cannot stay out of trouble. He is incapable of not disappointing the child. 69 . The previous order for access was not working. Access to J. was not working. In addition, if access was at one time in the child’s best interests, it is no longer in the child’s best interests. There will be an order changing the order of Zuker, J. made 26 September 2006 and providing no access by the father. 70 . The father shall have no access to the child starting immediately.

No access means no access: no personal contact; no indirect contact; no notes or letters or cards; no telephone contact; no gifts; no contact by electronic means (no e-mail, MSN, Facebook, My Space, Twitter, other social networking sites or game sites); no contact through other people; no hanging around the school or day-care property hoping to get a glimpse of the child or to talk to the child. No access means no contact. 71 . One cannot be a good parent and offer violence and abuse to the child’s other parent.

Courts are required to take into account, in determining custody and access, whether a person has committed violence or abuse towards his spouse, the child’s parent, a member of that person’s household or any child ( CLRA s. 24(4)). The father’s violent behaviour towards the mother qualifies under s. 24(4) CLRA . His behaviour is the antithesis of good parenting: Evangelista v. Galloro, unreported, Ont. Ct., 14 April 2009, para 81. 72 . The father is not a suitable role model for his child J., nor indeed, for any child. The father has a long, continuing, and recent criminal record.

His criminal record is for offences of violence, often violence against women. There are many charges which directly relate to the mother. The father has a long history of assault convictions regarding the mother and other girlfriends. The child knows when the father has been in jail, in part because the access stops. The father is not a meaningful and positive force in the life of this child. 73 . The father has had several detailed access orders in place for nearly five years. The father has had many chances, under several different formats, to make access to the child work. It does not work. 74 .

The father is unable or unwilling to regulate his behaviour to ensure that he can continue to be involved in his child’s life. This is a choice. The father has made choices for himself. He is entitled to do so. But his choices are such that he is not appropriate as an access parent. The Access Order 75 . On consent, there will be a restraining order regarding both the mother and the child. There shall be no contact by the father with either the mother or the child. The details of the restraining order are set out in the accompanying endorsement. 76 . There will be an order for no access by the father.

Released: 10 August 2011 ___________________________ Justice Carole Curtis

CASES CITED Jafari v. Dadar, 1996 CarswellNB 386, [1996] W.D.F.L. 2455 (N.B.Q.B.) F.I. v. K.F., 2000 CarswellOnt 455 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) Worthington v. Worthington, (ON SC), 2000 CarswellOnt 4889, 13 R.F.L. (5th) 220 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) Bedard v. Huard (2000) (ON SC), O.J. No 969 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) Children’s Aid Society of the County of Dufferin v. J.R.,

(2002) CanLII 45515 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) V. S. J. v. L.J.G., (ON SC), [2004] O.J. No. 2238 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) Jennings v. Garrett, (ON SC), 2004 CarswellOnt 2159 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). Ierullo v. Ierullo, 2006 Cars​well​Ont 5887 (Ont. C.A.) Burisch v. Gosal, 2007 Cars​well​Ont 5227 (Ont. C.A.) Evangelista v. Galloro, unreported, Ont. Ct., 14 April 2009 Native Child and Family Services of Toronto and D.C., 2010 ONSC 1038 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) I. v. W., 2011 ONSC 2021 Canlii (Ont. Sup. Ct.) Preston v. Markle, unreported, Ont. Ct., 9 May 2011