2019 QCCQ 7079, 2019 QCCQ 7079

R. c. Farruggia 2019 QCCQ 7079 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL «Criminal Division» No: 500-01-164731-173 DATE: October 16, 2019 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE DAVID SIMON, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecution v.

COLAGERO FARRUGGIA Accused ______________________________________________________________________ DECISION ON COMMITTAL TO TRIAL [1] ______________________________________________________________________ There is an order directing that the evidence taken at the preliminary inquiry shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way pursuant to

section 539 of the Criminal Code (“ C.C . ”). I. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] On January 23, 2017, the police executed a search warrant at the accused’s residence. During the search, the police found and seized three paintings from Jean Paul Riopelle and brass knuckles. The three paintings were reported stolen in 1999. [ 2 ] The accused is now charged with one count of possession of stolen property of a value exceeding $5,000 [2] and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon [3] . [ 3 ] Committal to trial is not contested on the count of possession of a prohibited weapon (brass knuckles).

Only the count of possession of stolen artwork is in dispute. [ 4 ] The accused acknowledges that he had possession of the three paintings from Riopelle and that their value exceeds $5,000. He does not challenge that they were stolen in 1999 and, as such, were obtained by or derived, directly or indirectly, from crime [4] . [ 5 ] However, the accused argues that there is no evidence upon which a jury properly instructed and acting reasonably could conclude that he knew of their unlawful origin. In his view, the doctrine of recent possession cannot apply to the case at bar. II. ISSUE

[ 6 ] I must determine whether a jury properly instructed and acting reasonably could conclude that the accused knew that the three paintings were stolen property. [ 7 ] As agreed by the parties, the answer to this question hinges on whether or not the jury could rely on the doctrine of recent possession to infer knowledge. III.

THE EVIDENCE [ 8 ] In addition to filing documentary evidence, the Crown called three witnesses: Detective Alain Dumouchel, Simon Blais, owner of Galerie Simon Blais, and Yseult Riopelle, daughter of Jean Paul Riopelle. [ 9 ] The evidence led by the Crown can be summarized as follows. [ 10 ] In 1999, Galerie Simon Blais, an art gallery located in Montreal, entered into a contract with Acquavella Modern Art to purchase five paintings from Jean Paul Riopelle, one of the most renowned Canadian artists. [ 11 ] The five paintings included two larger works and three smaller ones.

Galerie Simon Blais agreed to purchase them for $69,000 USD [5] . Two of the three smaller paintings were to be sold for $12,000 USD each. The cost of the third one was set at $15,000 USD. [ 12 ] In May 1999, the paintings were placed in two separate crates and shipped from Nevada to Montreal. One crate contained the two larger paintings; the other contained the three smaller ones. [ 13 ] While stored in a warehouse in Dorval pending clearance by Canadian Customs, the crate containing the three smaller paintings was stolen.

The theft was reported by Simon Blais to Montreal police on May 14, 1999. [ 14 ] Acquavella Modern Art accepted to assume liability for the loss of the three smaller paintings. [ 15 ] Police investigation of the theft proved unsuccessful and the three paintings were never recovered until the following events unfolded some seventeen years later. [ 16 ] Yseult Riopelle is the world leading expert on Jean Paul Riopelle. She is the author of the nine-volume Catalogue Raisonné – a comprehensive, annotated listing of all of her father’s artwork. [ 17 ] In mid-December 2016, the accused’s spouse, Ms.

Flavia Longo, contacted Yseult Riopelle to purchase a volume of the Catalogue Raisonné for a friend. [ 18 ] Ms. Longo came over to Yseult Riopelle’s place and purchased the volume. She mentioned that she owned paintings from Riopelle and that her husband had them before they met. [ 19 ] A few days later, Ms. Longo returned a second time to visit Yseult Riopelle, this time to purchase volumes II and III of the Catalogue Raisonné for her husband. She showed photographs on her cell phone of the Riopelle paintings owned by her husband.

The image on the phone was not clear enough for Yseult Riopelle to be able to identify the paintings. [ 20 ] Yseult Riopelle suggested to Ms. Longo that she send photographs of the paintings by e-mail. Ms. Longo agreed.

[ 21 ] On December 25, 2016, Yseult Riopelle received an e-mail from Ms. Longo with attached photographs of both the front and back of three paintings. She was immediately able to recognize the paintings as being the ones reported stolen in 1999. [ 22 ] Yseult Riopelle wrote an e-mail to Ms. Longo to ask her how and when the paintings came into her husband’s possession. Ms. Longo never replied.

Yseult Riopelle communicated with the police to report this matter. [ 23 ] Upon further investigation, Detective Alain Dumouchel obtained a warrant to search the accused’s residence. [ 24 ] During the execution of the warrant, on January 23, 2017, the police found and seized three small-sized gouache paintings from Riopelle. Two of the paintings were hung in the living room fairly close to the main entrance of the residence [6] .

The third one was in the staircase leading to the first floor and could be seen from the living room [7] . [ 25 ] Various exhibit and gallery labels, including that of Acquavella Modern Art, were visible on the back of two of the three paintings [8] . The labels are designed to identify previous owners or possessors of the artwork. The business card of a framing store (“Art Frame L.C.

Inc.”) appeared at the back of all three paintings [9] . [ 26 ] The police did not find any documents pertaining to the purchase or ownership of the three Riopelle paintings. [ 27 ] The police found brass knuckles in a black bag [10] . [ 28 ] The three paintings seized at the accused’s residence were examined by Yseult Riopelle on January 25, 2017. She certified that they were painted by her father and that their last known owner was Acquavella Modern Art. [ 29 ] She also confirmed that they are included in volume II of the Catalogue Raisonné published in 2004.

Each of them bears the mention “ oeuvre déclarée volée ” (artwork reported stolen) [11] . [ 30 ] Moreover, Yseult Riopelle compared the three paintings with 1999 ektachrome images provided by Acquavella Modern Art. She concluded that the three paintings had been reframed but could not say whether it was before or after the theft. [ 31 ] A few weeks later, counsel for the accused sent two affidavits to Detective Alain Dumouchel: one from a relative of the accused, Marco Virone [12] ; the other from a close friend of his, Robert Zavolta [13] .

Both affidavits were filed into evidence. [ 32 ] In his affidavit, Marco Virone stated that he first saw the Riopelle paintings in 2002 or 2003. At the time, they were hanging in the accused’s condominium. He later saw them hanging in his current residence. As far as he can recall, they were always visible when he visited the accused [14] . [ 33 ] As for Robert Zavolta, he stated that he has known the accused for over twenty years. They are friends and business associates. He also employs him in his painting business as an estimator. [ 34 ] The very first time Mr.

Zavolta saw the three Riopelle paintings was when he helped the accused paint the room of his newborn daughter. He believes that she was born in August 2001. At the time, the accused told him that the paintings were real. [ 35 ] Mr. Zavolta further stated that the three paintings were displayed in the same place every time he went to the accused’s condominium. Likewise, after the accused moved, he saw the same three paintings on the walls of his new home every time he went there, up until the time they were seized by the police.

[ 36 ] According to Mr. Zavolta, sometime in the last year and a half, the accused mentioned that he intended to get the paintings insured. However, the accused loved the paintings and did not seem willing to part with them [15] . [ 37 ] Finally, Simon Blais provided information regarding the works of Jean Paul Riopelle and the general intricacies of the art market.

Of relevance, he stated that: - he purchased nearly 200 works from Riopelle since 1999; - Riopelle paintings were and remain in high-demand; - Riopelle paintings can be sold within weeks or years from the time they are displayed; - it is not a sound practice for an art dealer to display all his inventory at once – it is strategically preferable to keep an artwork for some time in inventory to make it more in demand ; - he would not have displayed the three Riopelle paintings at the same time; - he intended to set the selling price of two of the three stolen paintings at $40,000 CAD each and the third one at $48,000 CAD; - he never saw the three paintings on the market since they were stolen; - back in 1999, volumes of Riopelle’s Catalogue Raisonné were not available on the internet; - the fact that the three paintings had been stolen was not publicized on the internet at the time; - art buyers always inquire as to the origin of an artwork; and - art forgers sometime place labels on the reverse end of a painting to mislead buyers.

IV. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES Test for committal [ 38 ] The test that must be applied by a preliminary inquiry judge in considering whether to commit an accused to trial is whether there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilt [16] . [ 39 ] Committal to trial is warranted “in any case in which there is admissible evidence which could, if it were believed, result in a conviction” [17] . The test is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [18] .

However, the judge’s treatment of evidence adduced at the preliminary inquiry will vary depending on whether it is direct or circumstantial.

[ 40 ] Where there is direct evidence on all the elements of the offence charged, the judge must commit the accused to trial regardless of the existence of defence evidence. As a general rule, it is not open to the judge to assess the quality, credibility and reliability of direct evidence [19] . [ 41 ] The prohibition against weighing evidence is narrowly modified where the prosecution adduces circumstantial evidence said to point toward guilt. Even here, the Supreme Court in R . v.

Arcuri makes it clear that the role of the preliminary inquiry judge is limited: […] However, where the Crown’s evidence consists of, or includes, circumstantial evidence, the judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole of the evidence (i.e. including any defence evidence) to determine whether a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty. In performing the task of limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge does not draw inferences from facts. Nor does she assess credibility.

Rather, the judge’s task is to determine whether, if the Crown’s evidence is believed, it would be reasonable for a properly instructed jury to infer guilt. Thus, this task of “limited weighing” never requires consideration of the inherent reliability of the evidence itself. It should be regarded, instead, as an assessment of the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence [20] . [ 42 ] Where more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence, only the inferences that favour the Crown are to be considered at the stage of the preliminary inquiry [21] .

Possession of property obtained by or derived from crime ( s. 354(1) C.C . ) [ 43 ] For an accused to be found guilty of this offence, the Crown must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: i. the accused was in possession of the property; ii. the property was obtained by or derived from crime; iii. the accused knew that the property had been obtained or derived from crime; and iv. the value of the property exceeds $5,000 [22] . [ 44 ] The mental element of the offence, knowledge of the unlawful origin of the property, is the only contested issue in the case at bar. [ 45 ] Knowledge may be proven on the basis of actual knowledge or wilful blindness.

Where knowledge is a component of the mens rea , as in s. 354(1) C.C . , wilful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge [23] . [ 46 ] Recklessness, however, will not satisfy the knowledge requirement on a charge of possession of stolen property [24] . [ 47 ] Proof of knowledge or wilful blindness requires a subjective assessment of the issue. The question is “what did the accused know”, not “what ought s/he to have known” [25] . [ 48 ] Wilful blindness arises where a person who has become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the inquiry because he does not wish to know the truth.

He would prefer to remain ignorant. The culpability in wilful blindness is justified by the accused’s fault in deliberately failing to inquire when he knows there is a reason for inquiry [26] . [ 49 ] Knowledge, like wilful blindness, is a state of mind. Generally speaking, especially short of an admission by the person of that

state of his mind, it must be found to exist by proper inferences from facts proved, in other words from circumstantial evidence. [ 50 ] In the context of a case of possession of stolen goods, the doctrine of recent possession, if applicable, may assist the trier of fact in drawing such inferences. Doctrine of recent possession [ 51 ] In the seminal case of R . v.

Kowlyk [27] , the Supreme Court succinctly stated the doctrine of recent possession in the following terms: […] Upon proof of the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, the trier of fact may—but not must—draw an inference of guilt of theft or of offences incidental thereto . Where the circumstances are such that a question could arise as to whether the accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will be for the trier of fact upon a consideration of all the circumstances to decide which, if either, inference should be drawn .

In all recent possession cases the inference of guilt is permissive, not mandatory, and when an explanation is offered which might reasonably be true, even though the trier of fact is not satisfied of its truth, the doctrine will not apply [28] . [ 52 ] The doctrine of recent possession applies if the trier of fact is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that: 1. the accused was in possession of the property; 2. the property was stolen; 3. the theft was recent; and 4. the accused’s possession of the property was unexplained [29] . [ 53 ] If applicable, the doctrine of recent possession permits, but does not require, the trier of fact to draw a common sense inference that a person in unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a thief, or is knowingly in possession of stolen goods [30] .

V. ANALYSIS [ 54 ] As acknowledged by the parties, if the doctrine of recent possession applies to the case at bar, then committal to trial is warranted. [ 55 ] Again, it is not disputed that the accused was in possession of stolen property of a value exceeding $5,000. The parties also agree that three Riopelle paintings found at the accused’s residence are the same paintings stolen in the warehouse in 1999. [ 56 ] The evidence also clearly establishes that the accused knew that he was in possession of Riopelle paintings.

At this stage of the proceedings, he provided no explanation for his possession of the stolen property. [ 57 ] It is common ground between the parties that the evidence points to the accused being in possession of the three Riopelle paintings at the earliest in August 2001. As such, the possession is some 2 years and 3 months after the theft.

[ 58 ] Defence counsel contends that the accused’s possession of the paintings (as of August 2001) was not recent relative to the theft, thus precluding reliance on the doctrine of recent possession. [ 59 ] Crown counsel argues otherwise. Relying on R . v. Killam [31] and R . v. Saieva [32] , he claims that given their very unique nature, a jury would be entitled to conclude that the accused was in possession of recently stolen property. [ 60 ] Whether the doctrine of recent possession can apply in the present matter is therefore contingent on a finding of recency.

In other words, could the trier of fact be satisfied that the accused was in possession of recently stolen property in August 2001? [ 61 ] The courts have recognized that “recency” depends largely upon the nature of the

article stolen. In R . v. Wilson [33] , Justice Martin for the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated: The expression ‘recent possession’ is pliable. In one case it might be held to be recent possession if the

article were found in the possession of the accused within a month of the theft, and in another case 12 months after [34] . [ 62 ] This statement was referenced in R . v. Killam [35] . In that case, Mr. Killam appealed his conviction for possession of stolen property. The property involved was a shipment of pearls contained in two steamer trunks valued by various witnesses at between $250,000 and one million dollars. Mr.

Killam was found in possession of the two trunks full of pearls 8½ months after they had been stolen in a robbery. [ 63 ] The main ground of appeal argued was that the Crown failed to prove that the appellant had knowledge that the pearls were stolen as opposed to being smuggled. The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court held that the trial judge applied his mind to the theory of the defence that the accused’s actions were consistent with knowledge the pearls were smuggled, not stolen, and rejected it as he was entitled to. [ 64 ] Also at issue was whether the trial judge had improperly relied on the doctrine of recent possession. The appellant argued that a finding that the doctrine applied, where the possession was some 8½ months after the theft, was wrong.

The Court did not consider that the trial judge applied the doctrine of recent possession, but concluded that he would have been entitled to do so. [ 65 ] Adopting Justice Martin’s statement in Wilson [36] , the Court reiterated that recent possession in cases of this class depends upon the nature of the goods. Justice Maclean stated: Here it must be remembered that the property in question was one quarter million dollars-worth or more of cultured pearls contained in two trunks, a most unusual piece of property.

The pearl expert Sereth said in his evidence that this quantity of pearls would represent a quantity equal to that traded in the Canadian market for five years. I think that the learned trial Judge was entitled to apply the doctrine of “recent possession” in this case [37] . [ 66 ] Although dissenting in the result, Justice Bull also concluded that the trial judge was entitled to implement the doctrine of recent possession even if the possession was some 8 ½ months after the theft.

Of significance, he mentioned the following: [...] The question of whether a theft is or is not "recent" must of necessity depend on all the circumstances. The word "recent" is relative and is incapable of any exact or precise definition . It is a question of fact and the very nature of the stolen article, its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass from hand to hand, the ease of its identification and the likelihood of transferability all may have bearing to reach a conclusion as to whether its theft was recent or not .

Possession of clothing, household and personal effects or appliances, jewellery and common tools might require a very short period after theft to be considered "recently stolen ". On the other hand, possession of extraordinary, unique, large, unusual or unlikely transferable goods might permit a very much longer time for the theft to retain the status of "recent". The very volume of the goods might have an important bearing.

In my view, the nature of the goods in this case, a unique, bulky and very valuable shipment of cultured pearls said to weigh about 600 lb. and sufficient to satisfy the Canadian market for some years, leads me to the same conclusion the trial Judge must have reached, that the appellant in early August, 1970, had possession of pearls fairly described as “recently stolen” some 8½ months before . I am unable, therefore, to accede to the appellant’s first submission that the doctrine was not applicable because the pearls in question were not “recently stolen” [38] .

[ 67 ] In R . v.

Saieva [39] , the Supreme Court of Canada, in considering the concept of “recency”, approved the statement made by Justice Bull in Killam that the criteria to be used to establish whether a possession is recent are the nature of its object, “ its rareness, the readiness in which it can, and is likely to, pass from hand to hand, the ease of its identification and the likelihood of transferability” [40] . [ 68 ] Applying those principles to the case at bar, I can safely conclude that the Riopelle paintings are not on the same footing as clothing, household, personal effects or appliances for the purpose of determining the issue of recency. [ 69 ] Unlike the aforementioned objects, the three Riopelle paintings are quite unique, as is the case for any famous artwork.

This is not in dispute. [ 70 ] Riopelle paintings are not rare in the sense that the artist produced many of them. As evidenced by the testimony of Simon Blais, there are numerous Riopelle paintings (or other works) on the market. He himself purchased 200 Riopelle works since 1999. However, each painting is one of a kind. [ 71 ] Because of their uniqueness, the paintings can be said to be readily identifiable, certainly in the eyes of art connoisseurs. They bear the signature of Riopelle [41] .

The reverse side of the paintings also provide means to ascertain their origin. [ 72 ] Given their size [42] , the paintings found at the accused’s residence do not qualify as bulky. They can be transported fairly easily. While their monetary value is somewhat significant, it is far below that of the cultured pearls in Killam which, in addition to having a retail value in Canada in the area of $500,000, were said to weigh 600 pounds and filled two streamer trunks [43] . [ 73 ] I agree that the paintings are much less likely to pass from hand to hand than ordinary everyday items of personal property.

While their uniqueness surely impacts their transferability, I am not ready to conclude that the paintings are unlikely transferable goods. [ 74 ] As the evidence points out, Riopelle artwork was and remains in high-demand. There is always a good market for Riopelle. Simon Blais testified that some Riopelle works may sell within years of being displayed but that others can change hands within weeks. [ 75 ] Moreover, the transferability of artwork is not solely dependent on its nature, size or value.

Commercial strategy may also impact the readiness in which artwork in general can be transferred. [ 76 ] As explained by Simon Blais, he sometimes purposely delays the display and sale of artwork, including Riopelle paintings, to enhance its uniqueness and thereby inflate its market price.

However, there is no evidence that this is a practice adopted by all mainstream art dealers [44] , private owners or even resellers on the black market. [ 77 ] Overall, taking into account the criteria set out in Killam and Saeiva , it could be reasonable for a jury in our matter to conclude that a longer than usual period of time between the theft and the possession is still within the range to qualify as “recent”. [ 78 ] But how long is too long?

The question is whether the 2 years and 3 months gap can reasonably be within this range. [ 79 ] Defence counsel submitted exhaustive case law on the application of the doctrine of recent possession. To be precise, I received the benefit of 157 cases summarized in a chart. [ 80 ] The case law reveals that a wide range of time periods have been found to come within the concept of recency.

Depending on the individual circumstances of the case, it may be a matter of minutes [45] , hours [46] , days [47] , months [48] , but never a matter of years . [ 81 ] The longest documented time intervals which qualified (or may have qualified [49] ) as “recent possession” are found in the Killam and Saieva cases.

[ 82 ] As discussed previously, the gap between the theft and the possession of unique and highly valuable pearls in Killam was 8 ½ months. [ 83 ] Saieva dealt with the possession of a stolen “Safety Standards Certificate” – a document which the accused presented to a licence bureau on June 3, 1977, for the purpose of effecting the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle from his father to himself. [ 84 ] While there was no evidence of exactly when the certificate had been stolen, the Supreme Court nevertheless determined that it could have been stolen as far back as 50 to 55 weeks (a year or so) prior to June 3, 1977. [ 85 ] The Court concluded that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury that it was incumbent upon the Crown to prove that the certificate was stolen on or about June 3, 1977 in order for the possession to be considered recent.

As a result, the Court ordered a new trial. Justice Lamer explained that a new trial, as opposed to entering an acquittal, was justified because there was evidence upon which the jury could well have reasonably found the possession to be recent (in spite of the 50 to 55 weeks interval) [50] . [ 86 ] While the time gap in both Killam and Saieva neared the one-year mark, there are no reported cases in which the doctrine of recent possession applied beyond that. [ 87 ] I have not found any cases dealing with the possession of stolen eminent artwork.

In the end, the one case that bears the closest resemblance to ours is Killam . The fact that 8 ½ months qualified as “recent” in that case does not compel that 2 years and 3 months could in ours.

A delay of this magnitude has not been recognized by our courts as coming within the ambit of “recency”. [ 88 ] As conceded by defence counsel, on the facts of this case, given the uniqueness of the three Riopelle paintings, a gap in the ballpark of 12 months would have likely been within the range to qualify as “recent”. [ 89 ] I understand that a finding of “recency” is relative and incapable of any exact or precise definition.

However, having considered the criteria set out in Killam and Saieva as well as the relevant case law, I conclude that a jury could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 2 years and 3 months gap between the theft and the possession of the paintings is within the range to qualify as “recent”. [ 90 ] The doctrine of recent possession is premised on the existence of a temporal proximity between the accused’s possession and the time of theft.

The strength of the inference that the trier of fact may draw depends on how recent the possession is, that is, in proportion to the shortness of the interval since the theft [51] .

The closer in time possession is to the theft, the more likely it is that the trier of fact will draw the inference of knowledge of the unlawful origin of the property. [ 91 ] Here, the significant time lapse of 2 years and 3 months precludes reliance on the doctrine of recent possession and displaces an inference that the accused knew the paintings were stolen. [ 92 ] The fact that the accused was in possession of the very three paintings that were stolen together in 1999, as Crown counsel underlined, does not alter my conclusion.

I recognize that this is a factor that may be considered in determining the issue or recency [52] , but no to the extent of qualifying the possession of the three paintings 2 years and 3 months after the theft as recent. [ 93 ] A determination that there is no recent possession does not necessarily end the analysis.

In some instances, there may be other evidence that allows a fact finder to conclude that the possessor knew of the unlawful origin of the property. [ 94 ] Questioned as to whether there was any other evidence from which knowledge could be inferred, Crown counsel again pointed to the fact that the accused was in possession of all the paintings contained in the stolen crate. While suspicious, this fact alone cannot give rise to a reasonable inference of knowledge. To conclude that the accused knew the paintings were stolen because he possessed all of them at once amounts to speculation.

[ 95 ] I have also considered the fact that Mr. Zavolta employed the accused in his painting business as an estimator and that art buyers typically inquire into the origin of artwork.

At best, these items of evidence could lead the trier of fact to conclude that the accused objectively “ought to have known” of the unlawful origin of the paintings, but not that he subjectively knew they were stolen. [ 96 ] Also, the fact that the paintings were not insured for an extended period cannot, in and of itself, give rise to an inference of knowledge of their unlawful origin, just like evidence of the accused’s intent to insure them cannot lead to an inference that he lacked such knowledge. [ 97 ] Furthermore, I note that there is no evidence connecting the accused to the theft.

The fact that the Riopelle paintings were stolen was not publicized on the internet at the time. The stolen paintings were not catalogued until 2004 and the Catalogue Raisonné was not on the internet in the early two thousands.

The physical appearance of the paintings, including their reverse side, does not make plain that they were stolen and there is no clear evidence that they were reframed after the theft [53] . [ 98 ] Finally, because the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the paintings by the accused are unknown, there is no evidence capable of supporting a finding of wilful blindness. [ 99 ] Having engaged in a limited weighing of the whole of the evidence, I conclude that a jury properly instructed and acting reasonably could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the spurious character of the artwork in his possession. [ 100 ] As a result, the evidence could not support a finding of guilt on the charge of possession of stolen property obtained by or derived from crime [54] . [ 101 ] However, the evidence warrants committal to trial on the charge of possession of a prohibited weapon (brass knuckles). [ 102 ] Therefore, the Court: DISCHARGES the accused on count n o 1 of the information; ORDERS the accused to stand trial on count n o 2 of the information. __________________________________ DAVID SIMON, J.C.Q.

Me Jimmy Simard Attorney for the prosecution Me Christian Gauthier Attorney for the accused Hearing dates: May 10 and September 26, 2019.