r v. Sy, 2015 QCCQ 2029

JH 5280 R. c. Chun 2015 QCCQ 2029 COURT OF QUEBEC Criminal and Penal Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL CITY OF MONTRÉAL N o : 500-01-017422-046 DATE: 18 March 2015 _____________________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE PATRICK HEALY, J.C.Q. _____________________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecutor v. Sy Veng CHUN Leng Ky LECH A & A SERVICES MONÉTAIRES INC. PENG HENG OR/GOLD INC.

Offenders _____________________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT _____________________________________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] On 15 September 2014 the offenders were found guilty of all thirteen (13) counts in the Indictment as drafted. [1] The first six counts ("Part One") are concerned with money-laundering and possession of the proceeds of drug trafficking. The remaining seven counts ("Part Two") concern tax offences related to the offences in Part One.

Submissions on sentence were completed on 24 November 2014. [2] At that time the interim release of Mr. Chun and Ms. Lech was revoked because the presumption of innocence was spent and the parties agreed, in part, that a penitentiary term is appropriate. [3] Moreover, as the defence has filed a notice of appeal concerning the judgment of 15 September 2014, it is appropriate that it should seek release pending appeal in that court. [ 2 ] These reasons for sentence should be read with the reasons given on 15 September 2014 for the findings of guilt.

To minimise duplication cross-references will be made in footnotes to the earlier reasons. The footnotes in both sets of reasons are integral parts of

the text. [ 3 ] The facts are set out at length in the Reasons of 15 September 2014. In short, Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun made an agreement with Mr. Daniel Muir in 2000 and they continued to execute the agreement for some four years. According to the agreement the offenders would launder money supplied to them by Mr. Muir that he had derived from his activities in trafficking drugs. The money-laundering included elaborate schemes for the transfer of money to a bank in Cambodia that is controlled by Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun. The accused also provided a variety of other financial services.

The precise amounts involved in these activities are estimated at more than $100,000,000.00. The tax offences in Part Two of the Indictment are corollaries of the offences in Part One. [ 4 ] On each count any sentence imposed must respect the principle of proportionality and thus reflect the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility. Any sentence must also respect other principles and objectives stated in the Code, recognised in the relevant jurisprudence and justified by the evidence.

As it is common ground between the parties that a penitentiary term is appropriate for offences in Part One, it is also common ground that a fit sentence in this case must include an element of punishment that underscores denunciation and deterrence by isolating the offenders from open society. In this regard the jurisprudence is consistent that denunciation and deterrence are paramount objectives in cases that involve money-laundering and possession of the proceeds of trafficking in drugs.

Apart from these limited points of agreement, which are essentially generalities, there is little common ground between the parties. The discrepancies between them demonstrate irreconcilable views of the manner in which the principles and objectives of sentencing should best be expressed. Indictment [ 5 ] For convenience this is a

summary of counts in the Indictment.

Part One Count 1 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc., A & A services monétaires inc., Sy Veng Chun and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 January 2000 and 31 January 2002 Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , [4] s. 9(1) ( a ), s. 9(2) ( a ) – laundering proceeds Count 2 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc., A & A services monétaires inc., Sy Veng Chun and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 February 2002 and 31 October 2002 Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Criminal Code , [5] s. 462.31(1) ( a ), s. 462.31(2) ( a ) – laundering proceeds Count 3 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc., A & A services monétaires inc., Sy Veng Chun and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 January 2000 and 31 January 2002 Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , s. 8(1) ( a ), s. 8(2) ( a ) – possession of proceeds Count 4 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc., A & A services monétaires inc., Sy Veng Chun and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 February 2002 and 15 November 2004

Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Criminal Code , s. 354(1)( a ), s. 355(1) ( a ) – possession of proceeds Count 5 Accused: Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 September 2002 and 15 November 2004 Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Criminal Code , s. 354(1)( a ), s. 355(1) ( a ) – possession of proceeds Count 6 Accused: Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 October 2002 and 15 November 2004 Place: Québec and Cambodia Offence: Criminal Code , s. 354(1)( a ), s. 355(1)( a ) – possession of proceeds Part Two Count 7 Accused: Leng Ky Lech Dates: on or about 2 April 2002 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , [6] s. 239(1) ( a ), s. 239(2) – false or misleading statement Count 8 Accused: A & A services monétaires inc. and Sy Veng Chun Dates: between 1 October 2000 and 2 April 2002 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( c ), s. 239(2) – omission of important details Count 9 Accused: A & A services monétaires inc. and Sy Veng Chun Dates: between 1 October 2000 and 2 April 2002 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( c ), s. 239(2) – omission of important details

Count 10 Accused: A & A services monétaires inc. and Sy Veng Chun Dates: between 1 October 2001 and 31 March 2003 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( c ), s. 239(2) – omission of important details Count 11 Accused: A & A services monétaires inc. and Sy Veng Chun Dates: between 1 October 2001 and 31 March 2003 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( c ), s. 239(2) – omission of important details Count 12 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc. and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 October 2001 and 31 March 2003 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( c ), s. 239(2) – omission of important details Count 13 Accused: Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc., A & A services monétaires inc., Sy Veng Chun and Leng Ky Lech Dates: between 1 January and 15 November 2005 Place: Québec Offence: Income Tax Act , s. 239(1) ( d ), s. 239(2) – aiding tax evasion Positions Prosecution [ 6 ] For the offences in Part One of the Indictment the prosecution proposes the following: Counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6: concurrent penitentiary terms of eight (8) to ten (10) years for Ms.

Lech and Mr. Chun on each count; in lieu of an order of forfeiture, a fine in the amount of $2,452,354.90 for each of Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun and, in the event of non- payment of this fine, a term of imprisonment of six (6) years consecutive to the term of eight (8) years for these five counts. Counts 1, 2 and 4 : a fine of $333,333.33CDN, on each count and for each of A & A services monétaires inc. and Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc.; and For offences in Part Two of the Indictment the prosecution proposes the following: Count 7 : a fine of $14,410.00CDN for A & A services monétaires inc. and two (2) years for Mr. Chun.

Count 8 : a fine of $26,250.00CDN for A & A services monétaires inc. and four (4) years for Mr. Chun.

Count 9 : a fine of $26,250.00CDN for A & A services monétaires inc. and four (4) years for Mr. Chun. Count 10 : a fine of $16,720,000.00CDN for A & A services monétaires inc. and 3.5 years for Mr. Chun. Count 11 : a fine of $16,720,000.00CDN for A & A services monétaires inc. and 3.5 years for Mr. Chun. Count 12 : a fine of $12,920.00 for Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc. and 3.5 years concurrent for Ms. Lech. Count 13 : a fine of $603,422.00CDN for all four offenders.

The prosecution proposes that all terms of imprisonment be concurrent, with the exception of a submission for a consecutive term of six (6) years in default of non-payment of any fines in lieu of forfeiture. [7] The prosecution also submits that the fines proposed for offences in Part Two be assessed against the corporations particularised in each count. Defence [ 7 ] For the offences in Part One the defence proposes concurrent penitentiary terms of three (3) to four (4) years for both Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun on each of the five (5) counts.

The defence proposes, without further detail as to amounts or the relevant counts, a forfeiture order of several tens of thousands of dollars but submits that the amount sought by the prosecution ($2,452,354.90 for each of Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun) is excessive. The defence proposes no fines for the corporate offenders for any of the offences in Part One. [ 8 ] For the offences in Part Two the defence proposes for Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun the minimum fine contemplated by section 239(1) ( a )(

i) of the Income Tax Act and no terms of imprisonment. The defence proposes also that the corporate offenders be fined at the minimum level contemplated by

section 239 of the Income Tax Act .

Summary [ 9 ] For offences in Part One, the prosecution proposes imprisonment and fines in lieu of forfeiture for Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun, and fines for the corporate offenders. The defence proposes imprisonment but no fines for Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun, and a lower fine in lieu of forfeiture, and no fines against the corporate offenders. [ 10 ] For offences in Part Two, the prosecution proposes imprisonment for Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun and fines for the corporate offenders. The defence proposes fines for Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun, and no terms of imprisonment, and fines for the corporate offenders.

Proportionality [ 11 ] The sentence imposed in respect of each count must be proportionate and must reflect all relevant principles and objectives of sentencing. Proportionality refers generally to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility. These general terms are amplified by reference to ordinal and cardinal proportionality in sentencing. [8] Ordinal proportionality is a comparative measure of the range of dispositions that are appropriate between and among classes of offences.

It expresses the notion that likes should be treated alike [9] and ideally it expresses a measure by which sentences for offences that are not alike can be arranged in a normative hierarchy of commensurate values. [10] Cardinal proportionality refers to the range of dispositions that are appropriate for a specific offence. [ 12 ] Ordinal and cardinal proportionality have both legislative and judicial dimensions. The first, obviously, relates to determinations by the legislature and the second refers to the jurisprudence of the courts.

In either case a failure to satisfy the principle of ordinal proportionality necessarily implies a risk that the principle of cardinal proportionality cannot be satisfied. The maximisation of ordinal and cardinal proportionality in a rational system of sentencing would thus tend to diminish, but never eliminate, disparity. Inflexible tariffs intended to minimise disparity risk the introduction, or perpetuation, of an artificial principle of proportionality that can fail to produce a just and fit sentence in individual cases. [ 13 ] Money-laundering and possession of proceeds carry maximum sentences of ten years.

The circumstances of this case support an argument that the range of dispositions for money-laundering (and related offences) fails to satisfy the principle of ordinal proportionality when compared to fraud or even theft. Fraud carries a maximum sentence of fourteen years and theft a maximum of ten. The principle of ordinal proportionality would thus suggest that the harm in money-laundering is comparable in to that of theft but not fraud. I disagree.

The facts in this case support a strong argument that under the principle of ordinal proportionality a maximum sentence of ten years for money-laundering is disproportionately – or ordinally - low and could justify a modification to fourteen. This is a judgment for Parliament. For me the task is to find within the principle of cardinal proportionality – including other relevant principles and objectives of sentencing – a result that reflects the gravity of these offences and the degree of the offenders’ responsibility. Gravity [ 14 ] The gravity of all the offences, objective and subjective, is self-evident.

In this case, the offences were committed on an immense scale, with both premeditation and deliberation, over a period of some four years. [11] The precise amounts are not known but the evidence suggests a total of more than $100,000,000.00. There was nothing spontaneous, reckless or inadvertent about these offences. Taken together, they demonstrate a systematic and complex campaign of dishonesty fuelled by greed and an appetite for illicit gain.

The sustained execution of the agreement with Daniel Muir not only assisted him in laundering the money he obtained through drug trafficking but provided the offenders with a means of self-enrichment by deceit and ill-gotten gains. [12] The offenders’ crimes were parasites thriving on the crimes of others. [ 15 ] The scope of criminality in this case is described in the judgment pronounced on 15 September 2014. [13] Not only did the accused execute a sustained campaign of crimes over four years and on a global scale. Before Mr.

Muir’s death in 2004, they reneged on their agreement to pay him interest at a rate of $80,000.00 each month. Further, after his death, there is no indication that they did anything to return or restore any of the money they had received from him. The offenders were aware of the source of that money in

drug trafficking and continued to launder it for four years. They cheated their source. In the end, they kept the money they still had. Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun were partners in their crimes and there is nothing to suggest that their culpability is anything but equal. [ 16 ] Aggravating factors are abundant. The prolonged execution of the agreement concluded with Mr. Muir in 2000 provided sustenance for the continuation of his activities.

It matters little that the offenders did not personally handle narcotics or physically participate in their distribution. [14] The continuation of their activities required elaborate planning and complex arrangements to ensure maximum concealment of their scheme in all of its diverse parts. [15] In previous dealings with authorities they had been clearly warned to be vigilant about laundering proceeds of trafficking through currency exchanges. Yet they embarked with Mr. Muir on a campaign to do just that. They persisted after Mr.

Chun was found with $600,000.00 at Trudeau Airport in 2002 and compounded their complicity by a bewildering array of dishonest transactions, mendacious statements and calculated misrepresentations. [16] [ 17 ] The offences in Part Two of the Indictment only magnify the culpability inherent in the offences in Part One. Given the magnitude of the offenders’ activities in money-laundering and possessing proceeds of drug crime, the tax offences in Part Two of the Indictment are unsurprising corollaries.

These too were fuelled by greed but they were also animated by the intent to conceal their activities. [ 18 ] In short, and from any perspective, this case is one of the largest and most complex prosecutions of its kind in the history of Canadian criminal law. To my knowledge the only cases of comparable gravity are Tran , [17] in which a sentence of ten (10) years was imposed following a joint submission, and Nicolucci , in which the maximum sentence was imposed. [18] In Tran, there was money- laundering in amounts of more than $200,000,000.00 over three years.

The defence did not address the significance of Tran or Nicolucci and thus did not address any basis on which the imperatives of denunciation and deterrence could justify a significantly lower sentence in this case. The jurisprudence submitted by the defence does not address the magnitude or severity of this case. Peloso [19] was sentenced to two years less a day for laundering $500,000.00 over thirteen (13) months. Goulet [20] involved a sentence of twenty-seven (27) months for transportation of proceeds valued at $3,500,000.00.

References such as these do not help in the circumstances of this case. [ 19 ] Mitigating factors are negligible. Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun have no criminal record but in the circumstances of this case this fact counts for little for several reasons. A clean record in some measure provided cover for them to conduct and continue their clandestine activities. [21] They knew the rules of their profession and, despite warnings from authorities about illicit trading, they persisted over four years in the execution of their agreement with Mr. Muir.

In short, there is nothing in the evidence that can be meaningfully quantified as a mitigating factor. Imprisonment [ 20 ] Imprisonment is the norm for offences in Part One. [22] Penitentiary terms of three or four years are common for serious cases. This case is exceptional in its gravity and it demands a proportionate sentence. I conclude without hesitation that in this case a proportionate sentence requires a lengthy term of incarceration on Counts 1, 2 and 4. Further, I accept the prosecution’s submission that this requirement will be satisfied by a concurrent sentence of eight (8) years for Mr. Chun and Ms.

Lech on each of these three counts. The gravity of these offences requires a sentence that is comparable to the sentences imposed in Tran and Nicolucci . The proposals of the defence are thus manifestly disproportionate because they obscure or ignore the seriousness of this case and thus fail to recognise the principle of parity. [ 21 ] With respect to Counts 5 and 6 the gravity of the offences and degree of culpability in the offender are also elevated because they form integral parts of the sustained and complex web of criminality involved in Part One of the Indictment.

But, due solely to differences of scale, the objective gravity of those two offences cannot be equated with that of the other three counts in Part One. To reflect this difference, I conclude that the sentences imposed in respect of Counts 5 and 6 should not be as severe as those on the other three counts. In this regard, I accept the submission of the defence that a concurrent term of four years is fit and appropriate. [ 22 ] The defence has submitted that the term of imprisonment proposed by the prosecution for the offences in Part One of the Indictment is excessive.

It says that such a submission could only be sustained if the prosecution discharged a burden to prove that the offences were of the worst kind and committed by the most culpable offenders. This submission cannot be accepted for two reasons. The first is that, as already noted, this case is among the worst of its kind, both as regards the gravity of the offences and the responsibility of the offenders. The second is that the proposition advanced by the defence in this regard was rejected by the Supreme Court in L.M . [23] That Court’s rejection was neither ambivalent nor ambiguous.

The Court concluded that a severe sentence, perhaps even the maximum, might well be a proportionate sentence in the circumstances of a particular case, provided that the sentencing judge gives due weight to relevant evidence and appropriate principles and objectives of sentencing as set by the Code (or other law) and pertinent jurisprudence. [ 23 ] For this reason, I conclude without hesitation that the maximum sentence of imprisonment is a viable option in this case.

I also conclude without hesitation, for three overlapping reasons, that the sentence of imprisonment proposed by the defence for offences in Part One of the Indictment is manifestly unreasonable. First, it is not reconcilable with cases of comparable gravity both as regards the offences in question and the degree of the offenders’ responsibility. Second, as just mentioned, it is not reconcilable with sentences imposed in other cases of serious commercial crime.

Third, it is not reconcilable with sentencing trends in matters of serious commercial crime. [ 24 ] I cannot accept the submission of the defence that imprisonment is inappropriate for the offences in Part Two of the Indictment. These offences were committed in violation of obligations that depend on the honesty of all taxpayers and, as the courts have said, such violations are an offence to the integrity of Canadian society. [24] As previously noted, these offences were deliberately undertaken in the furtherance of the offences in Part One.

It could scarcely be expected that the offenders would comply with the requirements of the Income Tax Act by duly accounting for the activities contemplated in Part One of the Indictment. As a result, the offences in Part Two are fully imbued and tainted with the culpability that stains the offences in Part One. [25] Here again the gravity of these offences is magnified by the sustained and contrived scheme to execute the agreement with Mr. Muir. The degree of deliberation in these offences is apparent not only in their duration and complexity.

The fact that the offenders filed tax returns for the relevant periods demonstrates that the offences in Part Two reflect a calculated choice to violate provisions of the Income Tax Act of which the

offenders were entirely aware. For these reasons, terms of imprisonment are fully merited in this case for offences in Part Two of the Indictment. Parole eligibility [ 25 ]

Section 743.6 of the Criminal Code permits an order at the time of sentence that half of any term of imprisonment be served before consideration of parole eligibility.

Section 743.6 is not applicable in this case. If it were I would readily conclude that the gravity of this case would justify consideration of its provisions. Having considered the gravity of this case on its own and in comparison with others, I will say only that this is a matter for Parliament. Fine in lieu of forfeiture [ 26 ]

Section 462.37(1) of the Code provides for the confiscation or forfeiture of proceeds of crime or derivative property. The purpose of this provision is not only to contribute to the realisation of general principles and objectives of sentencing. It is to ensure that crime does not pay or at least that it will pay less. [26] An order must be issued if the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the items sought are proceeds obtained by the commission of a designated offence. This procedure contemplates surrender of the item.

As an alternative to such an order, it also provides for the imposition of a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property in question. This alternative may be invoked if the item cannot be made subject to an order of forfeiture because it cannot be effectively seized or identified. Where such an order is made it is immaterial whether the offender is able to pay the amount specified. [27] In the event that the offender fails to pay the amount specified

section 462.37(4) further provides that in default of payment the offender shall be ordered to serve a term of imprisonment that is consecutive to any other term of imprisonment imposed or already in force. The term of such an order is prescribed as a mandatory sentence in a tariff fixed according to the amount of the fine imposed under

section 462.37(3). The prosecution seeks such orders in this case because what is sought is not within the jurisdiction of the court. [28] [ 27 ] In support of this position the prosecution refers to evidence adduced at trial [29] and it has summarised that evidence for present purposes. The evidence concerns amounts of money sent to Cambodia by the offenders and the calculation of amounts of proceeds used to acquire other property. For the periods covered in Counts 1 and 2 in the Indictment the total in November 2004 is $4,904,709.90CDN.

This figure represents money transferred to Cambodia by A & A services monétaires inc. and Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc. between 2000 and 2004. [30] The prosecution seeks an order under

section 462.37(3) in the amount of $2,452,354.90CDN against each of Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun. I will accede to this submission because the prosecution has discharged its burden to prove these facts. [ 28 ] I pause to note that the order I will make under

section 462.37 will stipulate a fine that is concurrent between Counts 1 and 2. As noted in the reasons given on 15 September 2014, these counts charge the same offence over a continuous period but are split by date to reflect legislative amendments. The substance of the offences charged is identical but at different dates they were enacted in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and in the Criminal Code . The two counts effectively charge a continuing offence and this explains the nature of the orders under

section 462.37 . [ 29 ] The defence said nothing to suggest that the application of

section 462.37, as proposed by the prosecution, might raise a question relating to the principle of totality in sentencing. As the defence said nothing, neither will I. Fines [ 30 ] The prosecution proposes fines for the corporate offenders for offences in Part One and Part Two of the Indictment. [ 31 ] The defence proposes that no fines should be imposed upon the corporate offenders for any offences in Part One. The apparent basis for this submission is that Mr. Chun was the sole director of A & A services monétaires inc. and Ms. Lech was the sole director of Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc.

Thus, according to the argument, a fine on each of the corporations would amount to double punishment in view of the sentences imposed upon Mr. Chun and Ms. Lech. By contrast, the defence proposes that the corporate offenders should be fined for offences in Part Two. This submission is evidently inconsistent with the position taken regarding fines on the corporate offenders for offences in Part One. But there is more to this point. The corporate offenders are distinct from Ms. Lech and Mr.

Chun. [ 32 ] The corporate offenders were granted legal personality by law and thus had privileges, obligations and protections afforded by that status. The corporate offenders are distinct legal personalities from Ms. Lech and Mr. Chun, even if each of these natural persons was the sole director of one of the companies. These two legal personalities were exploited by Mr. Chun and Ms. Lech to execute offences of which they were found guilty. Moreover, they were exploited to facilitate the concealment of the offences.

To suggest that the corporate offenders should be exempt from fines for any offence of which they have been found guilty is effectively a claim that they are entitled to immunity, or even impunity, by virtue of their status. I reject this suggestion.

With respect to offences in Part One and Part Two of the Indictment, I accept the submission that the corporate offenders deserve an exemplary fine that reflects the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. [ 33 ] Given the findings of fact in this case concerning the amounts of money transferred by the offenders to Cambodia, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the offenders are unable to pay fines that may be imposed by the sentence of the court. [31] To the contrary, there is compelling evidence that the offenders retained millions of dollars that they had received in the execution of their agreement with Mr.

Muir. On the strength of this evidence I am confident that they have the means to pay any financial penalty that may be assessed and it would appear that they have the means to pay more than the prosecution seeks. This observation is equally applicable to fines that may be imposed upon the corporate offenders under

section 734 and fines imposed in lieu of a forfeiture order under

section 462.37 of the Criminal Code , even though as regards the latter the ability to pay is not a relevant concern at this stage. [32] [ 34 ] As noted, the prosecution proposes that the corporate offenders be fined for the offences in Part Two of the Indictment. It further submits that these fines should be set at the minimum contemplated by

section 239 of the Income Tax Act . But it is important to note that any fines imposed on the corporate offenders for offences in Part Two are not strictly imposed by virtue of the Income Tax Act . As the Court of Appeal has made clear, where an enactment fails to specify the amount of a fine, a sentencing court may impose such a penalty under the sentencing provisions of

Part XXIII of the Criminal Code . [33] This is what I will do, based upon the uncontradicted calculations tendered by the prosecution. [34] Those calculations provide a conservative estimate of the amounts contemplated in Part

Two. As the fines proposed are not based on

section 239 of the Income Tax Act , the prosecution is not bound to prove the precise amounts in issue. It may make its submissions on a rational estimate that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offenders. The uncontradicted evidence of the prosecution on this point provides such an estimate. [ 35 ] Finally, pursuant to section 737(5) as it was then in force, the offenders have not established that undue hardship will result from the application of the surcharge. Accordingly, it will apply. FOR THESE REASONS THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT IS AS FOLLOWS: Ms.

Lech Count 3 A.1 There will be a conditional stay of proceedings. [35] Counts 1 and 2 A.2 Eight (8) years concurrent on the two counts; and A.3 in lieu of an order for confiscation, a fine in the amount of $2,452,354.90, concurrent between the two counts and payable before 18 March 2017, and in default of such payment a consecutive term of imprisonment for a term of five (5) years. [36] Count 4 A.4 Eight (8) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment except that contemplated in paragraph A.3.

Counts 5 and 6 A.5 Three (3) years, concurrent between the two counts and concurrent with any other term of imprisonment except that contemplated in paragraph A.3. Count 12 A.6 Three (3) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment except that contemplated in paragraph A.3. Count 13 A.7 Four (4) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph A.3. A.8 A fine in the amount of $603,422.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Mr. Chun Count 3 B.1 There will be a conditional stay of proceedings.

Counts 1 and 2 B.2 Eight (8) years concurrent on the two counts; and B.3 in lieu of an order for confiscation, a fine in the amount of $2,452,354.90, concurrent between the two counts and payable before 18 March 2017, and in default of such payment a consecutive term of imprisonment for a term of five (5) years. Count 4 B.4 Eight (8) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment except that contemplated in paragraph B.3. Count 7 B.5 Four (4) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3.

Count 8 B.6 Four (4) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3. Count 9

B.7 Four (4) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3. Count 10 B.8 Three (3) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3 Count 11 B.9 Three (3) years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3 Count 13 B.10 Three years, concurrent with any other term of imprisonment in this order except that contemplated in paragraph B.3. B.11 A fine in the amount of $603,422.00, payable before 18 March 2017.

A & A services monétaires inc. Count 3 C.1 There will be a conditional stay of proceedings. Counts 1, 2 and 4 C.2 A fine in the amount of $333,333.00 on each of the three counts, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 7 C.3 A fine in the amount of $14,410.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 8 C.4 A fine in the amount of $26,250.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 9 C.5 A fine in the amount of $26,250.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 10 C.6 A fine in the amount of $26,250.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 11 C.7 A fine in the amount of $16,720.00, payable before 18 March 2017.

Count 13 C.8 A fine in the amount of $603,422.00, payable before 18 March 2017. Peng Heng Or/Gold Inc. Count 3 D.1 There will be a conditional stay of proceedings. Counts 1, 2 and 4 D.2 A fine in the amount of $333,333.00 on each of the three counts, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 12 D.3 A fine in the amount of $333,333.00 on each of the three counts, payable before 18 March 2017. Count 13 D.4 A fine in the amount of $603,422.00, payable before 18 March 2017. The surcharge will apply to all offenders.

With respect to the terms of imprisonment concerning Counts 1 and 2, credit is given for pre-sentence custody between 24 November 2014 and 18 March 2015, which is a period of 108 days. Calculated at a ratio of 1.5, the offenders will be granted a credit of 162 days against the term of imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2. ____________________________________ PATRICK HEALY, J.C.Q. M e Marie-Michèle Meloche M e Fabienne Simon For the prosecution M e Raphael H. Schachter, Ad. E., Q.C. M e Dominique St-Laurent M e Rachel Payeur For the offenders