R. v. McKinnell Fishing Ltd. Date:, 2016 BCPC 466

Citation: R. v. McKinnell Fishing Ltd. Date: 20160223 2016 BCPC 466 File No: 34351-1; 34381-2-C Registry: Duncan IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. McKINNELL FISHING LTD. GARY LORNE McKINNELL REASONS FOR SENTENCE RE McKINNELL FISHING LTD. OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE L. MROZINSKI Counsel for the Crown: N. Fraser Counsel for the Defendant: C. Harvey, Q.C. Place of Hearing: Duncan , B.C. Dates of Hearing: December 21, 2015 and February 23, 2016

Date of Judgment: February 23, 2016 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] THE COURT: The defendant, McKinnell Fishing Ltd., is here today for sentencing on various counts on which it has either pled guilty or been convicted in respect of violations of the Fisheries Act and regulations, as well as its fishing licence attached to the vessel The Mean Streak . [ 2 ] I am sentencing today on offences which were the subject of a trial before my brother, the late Judge Wood, whose Reasons for Judgment were delivered on June 11, 2014.

The charges in that trial, which lasted eight days and stretched out over nearly a year, relate to offences which occurred or were alleged to have occurred in 2011. [ 3 ] Tragically, Judge Wood passed away before the defendant was sentenced in what I will refer to herein as "McKinnell Number 1". [ 4 ] In November 2012, well before Judge Wood gave his Reasons in McKinnell Number 1, the Crown swore an Information alleging various breaches of the Fisheries Act and regulations , as well as the defendant's licence for the vessel The Mean Streak for the year 2012.

Some of the charges in this second Information were akin to the charges in the first, while others were quite distinct. [ 5 ] At the commencement of the trial in respect of this second Information, which I will refer to as "McKinnell Number 2," the Crown sought to proceed first with the sentencing on the counts to which the defendant had either pled to or was found guilty of in McKinnell Number 1. [ 6 ] At the request of defence counsel, I declined to sentence on Judge Wood's case before commencing the trial in McKinnell Number 2. Rather, I accepted Mr.

Harvey's submission that, in all fairness, I should defer sentencing on McKinnell Number 1 until I had concluded the trial in McKinnell Number 2. As such, I am today sentencing for convictions following both trials. [ 7 ] I have begun this sentencing with these remarks for several reasons. First, it will help to explain why in February 2016, the defendant is being sentenced for regulatory offences committed in 2011. Second, I have not lost sight of the fact that the defendant has been embroiled in litigation with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (“DFO”) steadily since 2011.

It is a factor, I think, that has some relevance to the sentencing overall in that the sheer weight of these proceedings over all these years must, in itself, have some deterrent value. The Specific Charges [ 8 ] In order to avoid any confusion in this sentencing, I find it necessary also to distinguish clearly at the outset of these Reasons the offences on which I am sentencing following the proceedings in McKinnell Number 1 from those that arise out of McKinnell Number 2. [ 9 ] The Information in McKinnell Number 1 totalled 21 counts, all of which were directed against McKinnell Fishing Ltd.

Of those counts, the defendant pled guilty or was convicted on Counts 6, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 14 through 20.

Counts 6 and 11 bear some similarity in that the defendant is guilty of having failed to provide complete and accurate information in its harvest log concerning the number of crab traps fished. [ 10 ] In Count 6, Judge Wood's Reasons indicate that the defendant recorded a total of 8,640 traps pulled in its logbook for the relevant time period, while the electronic data provided to the Department of Fisheries by the electronic monitoring system aboard The Mean Streak indicated that only 2,803 traps were scanned during this period.

The harvest log for this period is clearly inaccurate, since it appears to over-report the number of traps hauled. [ 11 ] In submissions, it was suggested by counsel for the defendant that obviously something must have gone wrong with the boat's scanner. That submission might have had some bearing at trial.

However at paragraph 75 of his Reasons, Judge Wood found that: The discrepancy between the rounded off estimates in the harvest log of The Mean Streak and the actual scans recorded by its EMS falls so far outside the realm of what could be considered reasonable as to banish all hope of a defence of due diligence. [ 12 ] From these comments, I must assume that the court considered all aspects of the defence of due diligence, including the possibility of a faulty scanner.

Even if that was not argued at trial, it is something that ought to have been. [ 13 ] In this sentencing, I must proceed on the basis that the defendant carelessly and inaccurately recorded its trap records in the harvest log. I cannot, at this stage, speculate that the inaccuracies were the fault perhaps of a scanner, a finding that would, in my view, call into question the conviction. [ 14 ] Count 11 is the flip side of Count 6 in that there the defendant is convicted of having failed to record fishing activity in the harvest log.

At paragraph 73 of his Reasons in McKinnell Number 1, Judge Wood wrote that: ... the EMS data records 3 days on which no traps were pulled and 7 days on which traps were scanned, but no fishing was recorded in the harvest log. [ 15 ] These observations form the basis of the offence under s. 11, to which the defendant pled guilty. [ 16 ] In its sentencing submissions, the defendant proposed that I Kienapple Counts 6 and 11, and sentence only on the one. I find that the counts, though similar, are separate delicts.

On the one hand, Count 6 is an offence by which the defendant completed its harvest logbook with no semblance of due diligence, even crediting it with a margin of error. On the other, there is simply a failure to

report traps that were clearly shown to have been scanned into the EMS data. As these are quite separate and distinct offences, I will sentence on both. [ 17 ] Judge Wood's Reasons for conviction on Count 7 are set out at paragraph 77 of his Reasons for Judgment. There, the court noted that the defendant admitted the offence of fishing for commercial purposes with crab traps without a buoy floating on the surface of the water with an explanation.

Judge Wood wrote, "The explanation offered, which in any event is purely hypothetical, goes to sentence." [ 18 ] In the sentencing hearing before me, the defendant explained that for some time in 2011, it sunk its traps near the seasonal closure off Kuiper Island without floats because of constant vandalism and theft of its gear.

The defendant advised the DFO Fisheries Officers on June 29, 2011, that it suspected the traps were tampered with because of a dispute involving the local First Nations and the defendant's traps being in relative proximity to their aboriginal fishing grounds. [ 19 ] After that meeting in June 2011, the defendant received a letter from the DFO advising that whatever its concerns were regarding the possible tampering of its fishing gear by other fishers, it was required to comply with Fisheries' regulations.

The Crown points to this letter of warning in its submissions on sentence, though of course the warning letter postdates the offence, which is on or about May 24, 2011. [ 20 ] This latter fact deserves mention in light of Judge Wood's reasoning regarding the propriety of charging the defendant with an offence under the Fisheries Act and regulations without first warning it.

While I will discuss this part of Judge Wood's Reasons in more detail below in regard to Count 19 of the Information sworn in McKinnell Number 2, I note only that, here, the defendant knew it was not complying with the Act and regulations and its licence requirements. In failing to utilize buoys, it made a calculated, albeit understandable, decision.

Still it was unlawful, and I find no unfairness in this charge. [ 21 ] The defendant pled guilty to Counts 8 and 11, which charge it failed to hail before setting its traps in the water at the beginning of the year in January 2011, and with regard to a new area in June and September of 2011. [ 22 ] In the sentencing hearing, the defendant stated that it regretted entering a guilty plea to Count 13, since, while it acknowledged carelessness in regard to the charge in Count 8, it submitted it did not hail in June and September of 2011 because it did not realize that it had changed fishing areas. [ 23 ] The argument that the defendant did not know it had to hail is not a mitigating factor.

It is one that goes to the question of guilt. As there is no application to withdraw the guilty plea, and no intention to do so on the part of the defendant, I am left with no choice but to proceed to sentence on the assumption that the defendant is at fault. [ 24 ] The defendant characterized Count 8, in particular, as a technical offence in that the DFO expects a vessel to hail at the beginning of a season so that it knows which vessel is fishing out of which area.

The defendant notes that it fishes in the same area each year, such that the DFO could have been under no misunderstanding as to its fishing activities. This was, it is submitted, nothing more than an oversight that caused no practical harm. [ 25 ] Still, at the material time, hailing was a requirement of the law, and there appears no justifiable reason for the defendant, a seasoned fishing operator, to have failed to meet this simple obligation.

The only possible explanation is sheer carelessness and a pattern of what is obviously a laissez-faire attitude to Fisheries regulations generally. [ 26 ] There is perhaps no better example of this attitude than the circumstances underlying Counts 14 through 20, which counts the defendant pled guilty to before Judge Wood.

In these counts, the defendant admits to failing to provide completed harvest logs within 28 days following the end of each month, as required by law, for the months of March, April, June, July, August and December of 2011 and January 2012. [ 27 ] Although this is a clear requirement of its fishing licence, the defendant submitted in this sentencing submission that it had long engaged in a practice of sending in its harvest book when the page was completed. Mr.

Harvey added that his client had never been warned against this practice, and, as such, it should not be heavily penalized for this persistent failure to abide by the licencing conditions. [ 28 ] I will discuss the significance and import of the defendant's licencing requirements and its compliance with the regulations momentarily.

I will also refer to some of the comments made by Judge Wood regarding the defendant's various, long-term practices, and the unfairness or fairness of addressing these practices in the first instance by criminal charges. [ 29 ] First, however, I will finish this portion of my Reasons for Sentence by briefly addressing the offences for sentencing arising out of McKinnell Number 2. [ 30 ] McKinnell Number 2 originally proceeded as a 35-count Information in which the defendant herein, as well as Gary Lorne McKinnell personally, were charged with various offences, including fishing for crab by trap during a closed time in a number of areas in the Stuart Channel South dioxin closure and the Kuiper Island seasonal closure.

The Crown stayed all of the counts against Mr. Gary McKinnell, and the trial known as McKinnell Number 2 proceeded against the corporate defendant only. [ 31 ] Of the counts that proceeded to trial, the defendant was convicted only on Counts 19, 27 and 29.

In convicting on Count 19, I found the defendant failed to comply with a condition of its licence by failing to provide complete information in its harvest log concerning the vessel master's name. [ 32 ] In essence, the skipper of The Mean Streak , most often but not always, Kevin McKinnell, simply wrote the name McKinnell on the part of the log in which the name of the skipper had to be noted. As there are three McKinnells potentially acting as masters of The Mean Streak , the DFO could not know with certainty which of the McKinnells was skippering The Mean Streak at any point in time.

As such, the DFO did not really know the name of the skipper as it should have.

[ 33 ] This offence had also been the subject of Count 21 in the Information laid in McKinnell Number 1. At paragraphs 89 to 91 of his Reasons, Judge Wood acknowledged it was reasonable for the DFO to want to know the identity of the skipper of any crab boat on a given day. Still, he felt that where there had been a longstanding practice which had never before been challenged, and where the defendant had a reasonably based belief it was complying with the requirements, the charge was, in his view, unjustifiable.

Judge Wood used the language of an acquittal on Count 21, though his Reasons amount to something more akin to a judicial stay. [ 34 ] I held that following the charges laid in McKinnell Number 1, the corporate defendant in this case, McKinnell Number 2, would have had knowledge of the DFO's position on the skipper's name, and as such the rationale that moved Judge Wood was not present in this case.

Moreover, it is clear in the Reasons of Judge Wood that what was most vexing to him was that the defendant could quite possibly have thought it was complying with the DFO's form when it indicated that the master was simply "McKinnell." [ 35 ] Getting back to the discussion concerning Counts 14 through 20, that same distinction does not, in my view, apply to the defendant's practice, quite contrary to its licence and the regulations, of delivering its harvest logs to the DFO only once the page was full rather than at the end of each month. These are not potentially honest mistakes.

They are deliberate decisions to do one thing, though the regulations and licence require another. [ 36 ] Finally, to conclude the counts in McKinnell Number 2, the defendant was convicted on Counts 27 and 29 for failing to have the data produced by its Electronic Monitoring System ("EMS") delivered to the DFO within the time requirement set out in its licence and the regulations. In regard to these offences, the court heard at trial that Kevin McKinnell would download the EMS information once a month onto a memory stick which he then gave to his father.

He assumed his father gave that to his mother and that his mother would have mailed it off. There being no evidence whatsoever of due diligence, the defendant was convicted on these grounds. The Nature of the Offences [ 37 ] That concludes the

summary of offences that are the subject of these Reasons for Sentence.

These are all regulatory offences in which the defendant failed to comply, purposely and carelessly, with the conditions of its licence and with the laws and regulations governing crab fishing in the province. [ 38 ] In considering what might be an appropriate sanction in this sentencing, it is important to consider not only the specific regulatory offences in their immediate context, but also in the larger context. [ 39 ] In the immediate sense, it is apparent that the defendant had developed a pattern of regulatory non-compliance, much of which went unchecked, possibly for decades.

To be fair, in this the defendant is not entirely alone. As an example, in McKinnell Number 1, George Jorgenson, a Fisheries Officer with the DFO, acknowledged that in regard to harvest logbooks for example, there is a "frequent disregard for accurate reporting." Still, it does not follow that every fisher in the area disregards regulations in the manner fleshed out in these two proceedings. [ 40 ] I have already noted that it is clear on the evidence before me that the defendant had adopted a casual approach to its licencing and regulatory requirements.

In saying that, I do not say that the defendant deliberately tried to mislead the DFO, nor do I find it obtained any commercial advantage from its laissez-faire approach. [ 41 ] It is not so much a case of the defendant benefiting from these offences as the public, including the defendant, potentially suffering from this approach to regulatory and licencing requirements. This is the larger context against which these offences must be measured. [ 42 ] As counsel for the DFO notes, the crab fishery, at least at the material time, contributed significantly to British Columbia's overall fishing economy.

It may well still be the case today. There is no reason to suspect otherwise. Still, the evidence I refer to relates to the industry as it was in the year 2012. In that year, the DFO reports that the crab fishery was among the province's most significant exports, exceeded only by Atlantic and sockeye salmon, the largest export markets being China and the United States.

Although the industry generates millions, 2012 marked the fourth consecutive year of a harvest decline. [ 43 ] Those benefiting directly, both economically and otherwise, from this resource are of course First Nations, who are interested in preserving their aboriginal right and interest in the crab fishery, recreational fishers and commercial fishers.

Indirectly, of course, all residents of British Columbia benefit from a sustainable and vibrant fishery. [ 44 ] The value of this resource to British Columbians, coupled with the decline in the crab harvest, serves to underscore the importance of resource management. There may have been a time in the distant past when a mind of a practical bent might have wondered about the futility of the finer points of fisheries laws. In the present day, there is no room for such complacency.

In a world in which resource sustainability is strained, not just by demand but by the environment itself, the value of regulatory compliance cannot be overstated. [ 45 ] As the Crown notes in its submissions, the nature of the crab fishery is such that catch is the only indication of abundance.

This fact mandates that the crab fishery occur in a highly regulated environment, and it is only when everyone complies with the regulations and licencing requirements that we can ensure a sustainable fishery for the benefit and enjoyment of all and that includes the defendant herein. [ 46 ] Seen in this light, while the defendant's transgressions may, to it, have seemed innocuous, they clearly are not. The failure to comply with its licence and regulations has the potential to contribute to a failure of this fishery, particularly if all fishers were of the same view.

It is for this reason, clearly, that virtually all of the case law before me in this sentencing emphasizes the importance of the sentencing objectives of specific and general deterrence in regard to these regulatory offences. The Nature of the Offender [ 47 ] I will address sentencing objectives in slightly more detail shortly, but first, having discussed the nature of the offences, I want

to turn to the nature of the offender. [ 48 ] I did refer to the defendant's background in my Reasons in McKinnell Number 2 in some detail. There I noted that the defendant is a family-owned business, with long roots in the commercial crab fishery on Vancouver Island. The defendant owns and operates three boats under various licences.

The vessel at issue in both McKinnell Number 1 and McKinnell Number 2 is The Mean Streak , which is skippered, for the most part, by Kevin McKinnell, the secretary of the defendant corporation. [ 49 ] It was submitted in argument that the defendant fishes in total some 15,000 crab traps each year. Whatever the exact number, I am left in no doubt that the defendant operates a successful and prolific crab fishing business. The Crown submitted in this sentencing proceeding that the total catch value for The Mean Streak alone for 2012 was $151,240.46.

As the case has made clear, crab fishing is a costly industry, and this is by no means a net figure. [ 50 ] Still, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I will assume that this is a moneymaking enterprise. [ 51 ] Though no longer charged personally, Kevin McKinnell is the protagonist, if I could put it that way, of most, if not all, of these offences.

As such, it bears noting that it is Kevin McKinnell's practice of sending in his harvest logs once the page is full contrary to the licence requirement; and Kevin McKinnell's practice of filling in the last name of The Mean Streak 's skipper only; and Kevin McKinnell's practice of rounding out the harvest number in his logbook, that is at issue in this case. It is Kevin McKinnell who admitted on the witness stand that he was essentially unfamiliar with The Mean Streak 's fishing licence. [ 52 ] The fault is the defendant's, to be sure.

The licences are issued to the defendant, and it is the defendant that must ensure those conditions are met and that the licences are fished by persons capable of meeting those conditions. Moreover, the defendant bears the responsibility ultimately for ensuring its harvest logs and EMS data gets in on time. [ 53 ] There was before me no evidence as to what systems, if any, were in place to ensure these things were done and the conditions met.

There was, for example, as I noted earlier, virtually no explanation for the defendant's failure to get its EMS data into the DFO on time, in accordance with its licence and regulations. [ 54 ] Since the charges were laid in McKinnell Number 2, Crown advises that, as an example, the defendant now complies with the requirement to fill in the name of the skipper of its vessels.

Since then, as well, certain technological innovations have overtaken the old regulatory requirements, such that hailing, for example, is no longer required. [ 55 ] These matters have a bearing on this sentence, but they are not determinative. Position of the Parties [ 56 ] At issue in this sentence is the amount of the fine that this court ought to impose on this defendant for each of these various offences.

The parties are at a considerable distance in this regard, and that appears largely based on their disparate views of the purpose of sentencing in this regulatory context. [ 57 ] First, in terms of the actual disparity, the Crown points to s. 78 of the Fisheries Act which provides that a person convicted of an offence punishable on

summary conviction is liable for a first offence to a fine not exceeding $100,000. The Crown seeks nothing like this amount, but notes that pursuant to s. 78.1 of the Act , where any contravention of the Fisheries Act is committed or continued on more than one day, the contravention constitutes a separate offence for each day.

The Fisheries Act provides for substantial fines, a signal of Parliament's concern for the contravention of this legislation and a reflection, obviously, of the importance of the management of the fisheries resources for all Canadians. [ 58 ] In the case at bar, the defendant has pled guilty or been convicted of offences, many of which range over several days or weeks. As such, the Crown submits that the fines could be substantial.

Still, it seeks fines no greater than $3,000 to $5,000 for most offences. [ 59 ] For Counts 14 to 20 of the Information in McKinnell Number 1, it seeks a much lower fine, in the amount of $500 for Count 14 and $250 for each offence thereafter. [ 60 ] In all, for the offences pursuant to both McKinnell Number 1 and McKinnell Number 2, the Crown seeks a maximum fine in the amount of $25,000. [ 61 ] The defendant submits that no one offence should attract a fine of anything greater than $100.

The Purpose and Principles of Sentencing [ 62 ] As a general matter, this sentencing, like all sentencing in a criminal context, must comport with the purposes and principles of sentencing, and those are set out in subsections 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 63 ] The Criminal Code establishes that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more objectives.

These objectives include denunciation, deterrence of this offender and others, separating the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation, repairing harm, promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender, and acknowledging the harm caused to the victim and the community. [ 64 ] In determining a fit sentence, the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances, and the least restrictive sanction that is appropriate.

Additionally, a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [ 65 ] As my brother Judge Quantz summed it up in R. v. Connor , [2011] B.C.J. No. 168 , at paragraph 20 , quoting from Reasons of

the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. C.A.M., (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at p. 559: ... in the final analysis, the overarching duty of a sentencing judge is to draw upon all legitimate principles of sentencing to determine a"just and appropriate" sentence which reflects the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. [66] In this sentencing, the defendant takes issue with the gravity of the offences.

Its position is that these are minor, technicaloffences that, given their nature, should not attract much in the way of a deterrent. [67] The defendant does not disagree with the proposition, given some greater nuance in the Reasons of my brother Judge Gouge inR. v. Steer, (November 26, 2013) unreported, Nanaimo Registry No. 72718-C5, that the primary sentencing objective in Fisheries casesis the protection of the fishery. [68] The question is whether that primary objective is at issue in this case, given the nature of these offences.

The defendantsubmits it is not, since nothing done or not done by the defendant has actually endangered the fishery. As Mr. Harvey stated in hissubmissions, this is not a case of fish being caught illegally or undersized or before the season opening. [69] By contrast, the Crown submits that the paramount objectives in this sentencing must be deterrence, both general and specific,because it is a Fisheries case. There is some support for the Crown's position in both R. v. Henneberry, 2006 NSPC 26, and R. v.Phillips, (October 28, 2013) unreported, Masset Registry No. 6314-1.

In Henneberry, the court wrote, at para 37, with respect to thecharges therein that: These are serious charges each involving multiple breaches of licence conditions in a lucrative, but seriously threatened fishery. Takentogether they establish a pattern of behaviour which can only be described as a deliberate, concerted effort to catch the maximum numberof tuna, regardless of the rules. The offenders here seem to have treated the quota as a target to be met, rather than an upper limit to theirfishing activity.

It is important that they learn that their fishing licences represent a privilege, not a right, and that in exercising thatprivilege they are exploiting a resource that belongs to the people of Canada. [70] While many of the offences at issue in Henneberry were more serious than in the case at bar, the court did issue significant finesfor failing to enter confirmation numbers, for example, and for failing to hail after catching and tagging tuna.

As in this case, theobligation to hail was changed between the time of the offence and the time of the sentencing, yet the court noted at paragraph 54 thatthe need for deterrence in regard to breach of licence conditions in general remained. [71] The point being that, in Fisheries cases, I am aware of no instance where a court has determined that a failure to comply withthe licencing requirements, such as the requirement to complete harvest logs accurately and completely, or to provide information to theDFO when required, or to hail, were best characterized as technical offences. [72] In R. v.

Phillips, Judge MacKay also heard that harvest log data is basically the only data available to managers and researchersto address conservation and sustainable utilization questions. That same evidence is before this court. In his brief Reasons for Sentencein Phillips, Judge MacKay acknowledged the importance of keeping these records. Again, this kind of record keeping offence is nottreated as a mere technicality. [73] I am convinced on the evidence that record keeping is critical to the fisheries and more so every year.

It is, in my view,imperative that fishers understand their licence requirements are not suggestions. The fishery off this coast, as in most places in theworld, is highly regulated and for good reason. I do not think that the fishery is endangered only when fishers cheat, though certainlywhen they do it is.

I think it clear on the evidence that the fishery is also endangered when Fisheries managers lack accurate and timelyinformation for whatever reason. [74] The licence requirements and the Fisheries Act and its regulations are designated to foster the gathering and management ofinformation through a series of requirements, be it hailing, the filling out of harvesting logs, or the forwarding of EMS data. DFOpersonnel must know where fishing is occurring and when. They must have the ability to enforce Fisheries regulations and thereforemust know where traps are set.

Obviously the use of buoys is an essential part of that measure. [75] There is really nothing about the offences for which the defendant is being sentenced here today, save possibly for therequirement to provide the full name of the master, that do not directly and adversely affect the DFO's ability to manage the fishery.

Asfor the name requirement, I find this is but one more example of the defendant's lack of concern for the niceties of the regulated industryof which it is a part and from which it benefits greatly. [76] The purposes and principles of sentencing applicable in this case call for a sentence that sends a message of personal andgeneral deterrence.

The notion that this could be accomplished by the imposition of fines of no more than $100 per offence is, to quoteJudge Crawford at paragraph 44 of Henneberry, risible. [77] A sentence must reflect the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. These are, I find,serious offences in the context of the fisheries in this province.

The defendant was, for the most part, careless in the true sense of theword, in that his conduct is marked by the absence of any care or attempt to comply with his licence requirements in regard to theoffences. [78] A sentence should also be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similarcircumstances. In some of the cases relied on by Crown, the conduct is much more egregious.

In others, such as Phillips, the conduct issimilar. [79] In the cases provided, a fine in the amount of $7,500 was imposed by the court in Henneberry for a failure to enter confirmationnumbers, while fines totalling $2,250 was imposed for three counts of failing to accurately report a catch in the harvest log books in R. v.Phillips. The court in Henneberry also imposed a fine in the amount of $7,500 for the defendant's failure to hail immediately after acatch.

[ 80 ] In determining a proper sentence in this case, I am mindful of the differences even between the offences in the above-noted cases and those before me. Still the cases suggest a range which provides some useful guidance. [ 81 ] Finally, as in every sentence, I must take into account mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There are no aggravating circumstances that I could see in either McKinnell Number 1 or McKinnell Number 2. In terms of the mitigating circumstances, I have taken into account the guilty pleas on Counts 8, 11 and 13 through 20 in McKinnell Number 1.

I have also taken into account the sheer length of this litigation and bear in mind that that too will have a deterrent effect. [ 82 ] I have noted the defendant's submissions that the fines be no more than $100 per offence is far off the mark. Such a fine would not, in my view, deter others from engaging in similar conduct. It could, in fact, have the opposite effect.

If nothing else, such an insignificant judicial response to these offences would signal to fishers that they are free to comply or not comply with their licences as they like, since the downside would be entirely negligible. [ 83 ] The licence requirements are an important aspect of fisheries management and the health of the fisheries in general. They are not to be ignored with impunity.

CONCLUSION [ 84 ] With these comments in mind, I sentence the defendant as follows. [ 85 ] In regard to Information number 34351, Count 6, which is the charge of failing to accurately report a catch in the harvest log, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $3,000. [ 86 ] In regard to Count 7 of that same Information, which is the charge of fishing for crab by trap without a buoy, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $1,000. [ 87 ] The defendant pled guilty to and will be sentenced as follows on the remaining counts of Information 34351.

In regard to Count 8 of that Information, which is the charge of failing to hail, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $1,000. [ 88 ] In regard to Count 11 of that Information, which is the charge of failing to accurately report a catch in the harvest log, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $3,000. [ 89 ] In regard to Count 13 of that Information, which is the charge of failing to hail, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $1,000. [ 90 ] In regard to the offences listed in Counts 14 to 20 of that Information, I sentence the defendant to a fine in the amount of $500 for Count 14 and $250 for each count thereafter up to Count 20. [ 91 ] In regard to Information number 34381-C-2, that is McKinnell Number 2, I sentence the defendant on Count 19, which is the charge of failing to fill out the master's name, to a fine in the amount of $250. [ 92 ] In regards to Counts 27 and 29 of that Information, which are charges that the defendant failed to arrange for the EMS data to be delivered to the DFO on time, I sentence the defendant to a fine of $500 on each count. [ 93 ] The fine in total for all of these offences amounts to $12,000.

If the defendant needs time to pay, I am prepared to hear submissions in that regard. [ 94 ] MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, I would address the request, six months to pay. [ 95 ] THE COURT: Six months to pay? [ 96 ] MR. FRASER: Yes. [ 97 ] THE COURT: All right. I will grant the defendant six months to pay the fines. All right. [ 98 ] Thank you very much to everyone for your help. [REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED]