2013 QCCA 159, 2013 QCCA 159

Asselin c. Daniel Girouard & Associés inc. 2013 QCCA 159 COUR D’APPEL CANADA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC GREFFE DE QUÉBEC N° : 200-09-007704-122 (200-11-015528-071) DATE : LE 31 JANVIER 2013 CORAM : LES HONORABLES BENOÎT MORIN, J.C.A. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.C.A. GUY GAGNON, J.C.A. DANS L'AFFAIRE DE LA FAILLITE DE : ÉRIC ASSELIN APPELANT – Requérant débiteur c.

DANIEL GIROUARD & ASSOCIÉS INC., ès qualités de syndic à la faillite d'Éric Asselin INTIMÉE – Intimée syndic ARRÊT [ 1 ] L'appelant, ayant inscrit de plein droit contre un jugement rendu le 25 avril 2012 par l'honorable Catherine La Rosa (Cour supérieure, chambre commerciale en matière de faillite et d'insolvabilité, district de Québec), qui a rejeté sa requête en rejet d'éléments de preuve avec dépens, demande par requête la permission de bene esse de se pourvoir contre le même jugement; [ 2 ] Pour sa part, l'intimée demande par requête le rejet du pourvoi inscrit de plein droit, et présente des requêtes en rejet d'appel et pour une condamnation contre l'appelant selon l'article 54.1 C.p.c . quant à sa requête pour permission d'appeler; [ 3 ] Toutes ces requêtes, présentées devant une juge unique, étaient déférées à une formation de la Cour; [ 4 ] Pour les motifs du juge Hilton, auxquels souscrivent les juges Morin et Gagnon; LA COUR : [ 5 ] ACCUEILLE la requête en rejet d'appel de l'intimée et rejette l'appel de l'appelant inscrit de plein droit, avec dépens; [ 6 ] REJETTE la requête pour permission d'appeler de bene esse de l'appelant, avec dépens; [ 7 ] REJETTE la requête de l'intimée selon l'article 54.1 C.p.c. , avec dépens.

BENOÎT MORIN, J.C.A. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.C.A. GUY GAGNON, J.C.A. Me Frédéric Desgagné Me William Noonan HICKSON, NOONAN Pour l'appelant Me Patrice Benoît GOWLING, LAFLEUR Pour l'intimée

Date d’audience : le 28 novembre 2012 REASONS OF HILTON, J.A. [ 8 ] There are four issues arising out of the referral by Dutil, J.A. of the appellant's application for leave to appeal and related proceedings to a panel of the Court. A brief review of the procedural context that led to the referral is required before considering these issues. I FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS [ 9 ] Éric Asselin became bankrupt when his creditors rejected his proposal to them on November 27, 2007. Mr. Asselin was deeply involved in the fraud of investors by what may be referred to conveniently as the Norbourg Group.

The losses these investors incurred as a result of the massive fraud was in the millions of dollars. Mr. Asselin's application to be discharged as a bankrupt was unanimously opposed by his Trustee and his creditors, and the outcome of that application remains pending. [ 10 ] Given Mr. Asselin's lack of trustworthiness to fully and honestly disclose his assets and his proclivity to hide them in the name of others or shield them by subterfuge, the Trustee has been obliged to undertake judicially sanctioned investigative measures through the execution of search warrants obtained pursuant to

section 189 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act . [1] An ex parte judgment of Bouchard, J. on June 30, 2011 authorized the issuance of such a search warrant as it related to Mr. Asselin, but not as it related to Mtre Robert Hindle, a lawyer alleged to have been acting on his behalf who was said to be instrumental in effecting offshore transfers of his assets. The basis of the Trustee's application that Bouchard, J. decided was that the R.C.M.P. had informed him that between October of 2005 and February of 2006, Mr.

Asselin would have given Mtre Hindle two bank drafts totalling $390,000. [ 11 ] The Trustee then successfully appealed the dismissal of his application as it related to Mtre Hindle. [2] In the course of its reasons, the Court said this about Mr. Asselin: [2] Asselin est un fraudeur, complice de Lacroix dans l'affaire Norbourg.

Ne serait-ce qu'il a obtenu une immunité pour ses crimes en contrepartie de la dénonciation de ses complices, il aurait sans doute été condamné à une peine d'emprisonnement. [3] Le syndic à l'actif d'Asselin, failli, sait depuis peu que sur l'entrefaite du scandale Norbourg, Asselin a fait parvenir à son avocat deux traites, de 150 000 $ et de 240 000 $. [4] Asselin n'a jamais fait état de ces actifs lors de sa faillite ni par la suite lorsqu'il a été interrogé.

Il semble bien qu'il s'agisse là de biens mis à l'écart en fraude de ses créanciers, d'où la perquisition autorisée par le Juge. [5] Son avocat, l'intimé Hindle, qui a reçu les traites, est spécialisé en transactions offshore , un moyen bien pratique pour dissimuler un actif. [ 12 ] The Court's formal order contained the following specific provision relating to the manner in which the seizure at the office of Mtre Hindle would be executed: [24] PREND ACTE de l'engagement de l'appelant de s'adjoindre les services d'un avocat du Syndic du Barreau du Québec pour procéder à la perquisition, de façon à ce que celle-ci s'effectue dans les règles de l'art, discrètement et de façon à ce que toute information protégée par le secret professionnel, s'il en est, soit dans un premier temps mise sous scellés par les représentants du Barreau et ORDONNE à l'appelant de procéder conformément à cet engagement; [ 13 ] The judgment of Bouchard, J. as it related to Mr.

Asselin, which was not in issue in this Court, did not contain a similar obligation on the part of the Trustee that is often seen in an Anton Piller type order to have an independent third-party present when the seizure against Mr. Asselin was to be executed. [3] The judgment limited the seizures to what Bouchard, J. considered to be its true object, namely the two bank drafts dated October 20, 2005 and February 16, 2006.

The judgment of this Court relating to Mtre Hindle was not similarly limited: [21] AUTORISE la délivrance d’un mandat de perquisition contre Me Robert Hindle au 2135, rue de la Montagne à Montréal, ou en tout autre lieu au Québec qui pourrait être porté à la connaissance des huissiers instrumentant, pour saisir tout bien, document, dossier ou information, sur quelque support qu’ils se trouvent, appartenant ou pouvant être relatifs à l’intimé Éric Asselin et, notamment, toute somme d’argent comptant ou en dépôt dans tout compte en fidéicommis ou autre, ouvert au nom de Me Robert Hindle auprès de toute institution financière qui pourrait être identifiée comme appartenant à Éric Asselin ; [Emphasis added.] [ 14 ] Subsequent to the judgment of this Court, the search warrants were executed on August 31, 2011 against Mr.

Asselin and Mtre Hindle pursuant to warrants Émond, J. issued. That relating to Mr. Asselin reproduced the conclusions of the judgment of Bouchard, J., thus restraining the seizure to the documents relating to the two bank drafts, and contained no Anton Piller type requirement for the presence of an independent third party to accompany the bailiff executing the seizure. [ 15 ] When the seizure was executed at Mr.

Asselin's residence, the bailiff seized data on three computers, while the seizure at the office of Mtre Hindle generated six hard drives, information from two smart phones as well as a variety of documents and files. Both

seizures occurred in the manner specified by the judgments of this Court and the Superior Court. All of the data, documents and materials seized have been sealed pending the outcome of these proceedings. [ 16 ] The execution of these seizures gave rise to Mr. Asselin's motion and the judgment of La Rosa, J. dismissing it.

The operative conclusion of his motion sought to "rejeter les éléments de preuve obtenus par le Syndic dans le cadre des perquisitions et des saisies qui se sont déroulées le 31 août 2011 au domicile du Débiteur et au bureau de Me Robert Hindle". [4] Mtre Hindle, who the Court was informed fully collaborated when the seizure took place at his office, did not apply to contest the seizure or the manner of its execution at his office. II THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT [ 17 ] Mr. Asselin's motion then came on for hearing before La Rosa, J., who dismissed it.

The essential basis of her judgment was that the seizures had been conducted in conformity with the authorizations of the Superior Court and this Court contained in the warrants Émond, J. issued. [ 18 ] The essence of the conclusion of La Rosa, J. is well summed up in the following extract from her judgment: [30] La perquisition a été exécutée par les huissiers en exécution des conclusions émises par la Cour d'appel.

L'exécution de la perquisition ne déconsidère pas l'administration de la justice. [31] Soutenir que la perquisition a pour effet de mettre sous saisie certaines informations qui peuvent se révéler non pertinentes est vraisemblable. Toutefois, une telle conséquence est probable dans toute saisie et perquisition, surtout lorsqu'elle a pour but de mettre la main sur des informations ou actifs que le débiteur tente avec insistance de camoufler.

Les tiers visés pourront faire valoir leurs prétentions et demander que les éléments saisis qui les regardent, et qui n'ont aucun lien avec la présente affaire, puissent être écartés des éléments de preuve pertinents. III PROCEEDINGS IN APPEAL [ 19 ] Mr. Asselin then filed a notice of appeal as a matter of right against the judgment of La Rosa, J. in which it was argued that the grounds of appeal he proposed involved future rights, as contemplated by paragraph 193(

a) of the Act , and in the alternative, if the Court was of the view that such was not the case, that leave be granted in any event. [ 20 ] Prior to the hearing of the motion for leave before a judge in chambers of this Court, however, and without obtaining the prior approval required by

article 88 C.C.P ., the Trustee filed a written contestation to the motion soliciting its dismissal. The Trustee's proceeding also contained a conclusion in which he sought to have the judge in chambers declare the foregoing proceeding of Mr. Asselin to be improper and dilatory within the meaning of articles 54.1 C.C.P. and following, and to condemn him and his counsel of record to reimburse the Trustee's extrajudicial fees and disbursements for the proceedings in the Superior Court on his motion as well as those in this Court.

Subsidiarily, the Trustee solicited an order to refer his motion to a panel of the Court if the judge in chambers to whom the motion would be presented was of the view that jurisdiction was lacking. As a further subsidiary conclusion, and to the extent it might be considered that Mr. Asselin had an appeal as of right, the Trustee sought to refer his motion to a panel of the Court as if it were a motion to dismiss the appeal. [ 21 ] In light of the questions relating to the jurisdiction of a judge of this Court sitting in chambers to consider an application for an order under

article 54.1 C.C.P . at the stage of a motion for leave to appeal, Dutil, J.A. referred the proceedings before her to a panel of the Court. [5] IV ISSUES [ 22 ] The issues that are now before the Court are as follows:

(1) Does Mr. Asselin have an appeal as of right under paragraph 193(

a) of the Act ?

(2) If not, should his motion for leave to appeal be granted pursuant to paragraph 193(

e) of the Act ?

(3) If his motion were to be dismissed, would a judge in chambers have jurisdiction to hear an application pursuant to articles 54.1 C.C.P. and following?

(4) If not, should a panel of the Court entertain and adjudicate a motion pursuant to articles 54.1 and following C.C.P. , either in response to a motion for leave to appeal it dismisses or a motion to dismiss an appeal it grants? V ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION [ 23 ] I will deal with each of these issues in the same sequence.

(1) Does Mr. Asselin have an appeal as of right under paragraph 193(

a) of the Act ? [ 24 ] Paragraph 193(

a) of the Act – the point at issue involves future rights – is the basis on which Mr. Asselin contends the circumstances of his appeal provide him an appeal as of right. His basic contention is that the manner in which the warrants were

executed deprived him of his right to have data and documents completely unrelated to any issue in which the Trustee might have aninterest not be subject to the seizures. [25] In this respect, he claims everything seized should be returned to him or Mtre Hindle, as the case may be, with any subsequentseizures requiring that the seizing officer be accompanied by an independent third party to ensure that nothing to which the Trustee is notentitled falls into his hands.

For his part, the Trustee argues that no future rights are involved and relies in support of this proposition onthe reasons of Dalphond, J.A. in Valeurs mobilières iForum inc. (Syndic de),[6] which he interprets to mean that a judgment rendered inthe course of a trustee's investigative process cannot be considered as affecting future rights in the manner required by paragraph 193(a). [26] Whatever else may be said of the judgment of La Rosa, J., it is difficult to see how the future rights of Mr. Asselin are affected.No one, including the Trustee, argues that Mr.

Asselin's does not have the right to seek the exclusion from the Trustee's purview of dataand other materials that are irrelevant to the purpose of the seizures once it is known what has been seized. After all, as La Rosa, J.affirmed in the extract I have quoted from her judgment at paragraph [18] above, the seizures were executed in accordance with thejudicial authorizations on which they were based. Mr. Asselin's real complaint is against those authorizations, and not the manner of theirexecution. [27] I therefore consider that Mr.

Asselin did not enjoy an appeal as of right from the judgment of La Rosa, J. and would thereforepropose that the Trustee's motion to dismiss Mr. Asselin's appeal inscribed as of right be granted and the appeal be dismissed with costs.

(2) If not, should his motion for leave to appeal be granted pursuant to paragraph 193(

e) of the Act? [28] My colleague Chamberland, J.A., sitting as a judge in chambers, had occasion to consider the proper approach to be taken whenfaced with a leave application under the Act involving the Norbourg Group. I find the following extract from his reasons particularlynoteworthy: [16] La décision de permettre, ou de refuser, un appel selon le paragraphe

e) de l'article 193 LFI relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire dujuge saisi de la requête en autorisation. [17] Il existe un certain flottement dans la jurisprudence quant au test à appliquer. Selon certains, la permission ne peut être accordéeque si le jugement a quo est contraire à la loi, ou encore s'il constitue un abus judiciaire ou enfin, s'il comporte une erreur évidente sansremède et causant préjudice. C'est le test que proposait le juge Bissonnette de cette Cour dans l'affaire MacNab c. B.S. & B. EnterprisesLtd., (1952) 32 C.B.R. 53 (C.A.

Québec) (repris dans plusieurs autres affaires, dont Re Leard, (1994) (ON CA), 25C.B.R. (3d) 210 (Ont. C.A.) et Re NsC Diesel Power Inc., (1997) (NS CA), 43 C.B.R. (3d) 162 (N.S. C.A.). [18] Pour d'autres, ce test est trop sévère. Ils proposent une approche moins stricte de la question. Les auteurs Houlden et Morawetz,dans The 2006 Annoted Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act, Toronto, Thomson Carswell, 2005, p. 850), résument comme suit les facteurs àconsidérer dans le cadre d'une requête pour permission d'appeler formée en vertu du paragraphe

e) de l'article 193 LFI : The factors to be considered on an application for leave to appeal are: (

a) whether the point of appeal is of significance to the practice;(

b) whether the point raised is of significance to the action itself; (

c) whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious or, on the other hand,whether it is frivolous; and (

d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action: [références omises] [19] Ce sont les facteurs que mon collègue le juge Morin appliquait récemment dans PricewaterhouseCoopers inc. c. Guay Inc., 2006QCCA 48 (le 11 janvier 2006). Mon collègue le juge Baudouin suivait la même approche, il y a quelques années, dans In re : MeublerieAndré Viger. c. Wener, (1990) 8 R.D.J. 549 (C.A.). [20] Je partage l'approche moins stricte préconisée depuis quelques années.

Je crois cependant qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue lanécessité que les affaires de faillite procèdent avec célérité, sans être retardées par des appels aux enjeux incertains. En d'autres mots,l'appel doit être réservé selon moi aux affaires qui en valent la peine.

Il y va, à mon avis, de l'intérêt de tous ceux qui sont impliqués dansune affaire de faillite, notamment des créanciers.[7] [29] Whichever view of the matter one takes – a strict approach or one that is less strict – I am of the view that leave should not begranted. [30] First, the main question being presented for consideration does not appear to be particularly meritorious. The issue of whetherand to what extent data or items may have been seized that are irrelevant to the purpose of the seizures and thus subject to exclusioncannot be resolved by quashing the entirety of the seizures.

This is all the more so especially when, at this stage of the proceedings, theextent of what has been seized is unknown, since everything has been sealed.[8] [31] Rather, the appropriate means to exclude that to which the Trustee should not have access has already been adopted by theparties in this file with respect to other seizures. Once the extent of the seizure is known, Mr.

Asselin is free to object to whatever suchitems there may be from being subject to seizure and returned to him or Mtre Hindle as the case may be, with any unresolved disputesbeing submitted to La Rosa, J. or a different judge of the Superior Court for adjudication. [32] There is thus no need or indeed means for this Court to consider the issue in an evidentiary vacuum.

Moreover, asChamberland, J.A. observed in the concluding extract of his judgment cited at paragraph [28] above, appeals in bankruptcy mattersshould be reserved for those that are worth the time and effort involved by all concerned, and that the need for bankruptcy matters to beresolved expeditiously should always be an animating factor in deciding whether or not to grant leave. [33] The seizures in issue here were executed in August of 2011. It is time that the purpose of these seizures – determining whetherMr.

Asselin has other property hidden elsewhere that are part of his bankrupt estate – should resume its course. [34] I would accordingly propose that Mr. Asselin's motion for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

(3) If his motion were to be dismissed, would a judge in chambers have jurisdiction to hear an application pursuant to articles 54.1 C.C.P. and following? [ 35 ] In her judgment referring the various proceedings to a panel of the Court, Dutil, J.A. explained why she did so in the following manner: [6] La question de la compétence d'un juge unique, en vertu de l'article 54.1 C.p.c ., de déclarer une demande en justice ou un acte de procédure abusif et de prononcer une sanction n'a jamais été soumise à une formation de la Cour. [7] Mon collègue, le juge Rochon, a décidé que lorsque le juge unique rejette une demande de permission d'appeler, il épuise sa compétence et l'article 54.1 C.p.c. ne lui donne aucune assise juridique pour lui en conférer une nouvelle qui viserait à sanctionner l'abus de procédure . [9] [8] Dans une autre affaire entendue au début de l'année 2012, le juge Dalphond a, pour sa part, rejeté une requête pour permission d'appeler et condamné le requérant à payer 250 $ à

titre de compensation pour les honoraires encourus inutilement . [10] [9] À mon avis, il y a lieu que la Cour se prononce sur la question. [ 36 ] Articles 54.1 and 54.4 C.C.P. are to the following effect:

54.1. Les tribunaux peuvent à tout moment, sur demande et même d'office après avoir entendu les parties sur le point, déclarer qu'une demande en justice ou un autre acte de procédure est abusif et prononcer une sanction contre la

partie qui agit de manière abusive. L'abus peut résulter d'une demande en justice ou d'un acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire, ou d'un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent. Il peut aussi résulter de la mauvaise foi, de l'utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, notamment si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d'expression d'autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. […] 54.4.

Le tribunal peut, en se prononçant sur le caractère abusif d'une demande en justice ou d'un acte de procédure, ordonner, le cas échéant, le remboursement de la provision versée pour les frais de l'instance, condamner une

partie à payer, outre les dépens, des dommages-intérêts en réparation du préjudice subi par une autre partie, notamment pour compenser les honoraires et débours extrajudiciaires que celle-ci a engagés ou, si les circonstances le justifient, attribuer des dommages-intérêts punitifs. Si le montant des dommages-intérêts n'est pas admis ou ne peut être établi aisément au moment de la déclaration d'abus, il peut en décider

sommairement dans le délai et sous les conditions qu'il détermine. [Soulignage ajouté.] 54.1. A court may, at any time, on request or even on its own initiative after having heard the parties on the point, declare an action or other pleading improper and impose a sanction on the party concerned. The procedural impropriety may consist in a claim or pleading that is clearly unfounded, frivolous or dilatory or in conduct that is vexatious or quarrelsome.

It may also consist in bad faith, in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or causes prejudice to another person, or in an attempt to defeat the ends of justice, in particular if it restricts freedom of expression in public debate. […] 54.4. On ruling on whether an action or pleading is improper, the court may order a provision for costs to be reimbursed, condemn a party to pay, in addition to costs, damages in reparation for the prejudice suffered by another party, including the fees and extrajudicial costs incurred by that party, and, if justified by the circumstances, award punitive damages.

If the amount of the damages is not admitted or may not be established easily at the time the action or pleading is declared improper, the court may summarily rule on the amount within the time and under the conditions determined by the court. [Emphasis added.] [ 37 ] It is useful to begin the analysis by emphasizing that

article 513 C.C.P . provides that the Court of Appeal sits with three judges, which can be increased as the Chief Justice directs, and that fewer than three judges can carry out certain ministerial tasks in the name of the Court "which do not require the exercise of judicial discretion". [11] Moreover, whenever the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates a joint exercise of jurisdiction by a judge and by the Court, it says so specifically, as articles 502, 509 (fourth paragraph) and 522.1 C.C.P. illustrate.

The Code is also replete with provisions that attribute jurisdiction to a judge sitting alone, [12] or to the Court, [13] which in the latter case necessarily means to a panel of the Court composed of at least three judges. [ 38 ] The two conflicting judgments of judges of this Court dealing with the application of

article 54.1 C.C.P. to which Dutil, J.A. referred in her judgment warrant examination.

[ 39 ] In Peluso v. Dolmen (1994) inc ., the petitioner applied for leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Quebec that had dismissed his application to revoke a judgment of that court. In the course of his reasons, the trial judge had been particularly critical of the professionalism of counsel for Peluso, but refused a request that he be condemned to damages pursuant to

article 54.1 C.C.P . [ 40 ] Upon being served with Peluso's motion for leave to appeal, counsel for Dolmen (1994) inc. applied by motion to dismiss it, to have his motion for leave declared abusive, to condemn Peluso and his counsel to pay it $7,000 for the reimbursement of extra-judicial fees, and $5,000 as other damages. [ 41 ] Insofar as relevant to these proceedings, Rochon, J.A. noted that he was not seized with an application for leave to appeal the conclusions of the Court of Quebec judgment that dismissed the claim based on

article 54.1 C.C.P . in that court, but only with the motion seeking a condemnation in this Court upon the dismissal of the motion for leave to appeal. He characterized the issue before him as whether a judge of the Court of Appeal, sitting as a judge in chambers, was invested with the jurisdiction to grant the relief sought against Peluso and his counsel, an issue that had not been considered by the Court or any of its judges. [ 42 ] Rochon, J.A. began by drawing attention to judgments rendered prior to the coming into force of

article 54.1 C.C.P. that held that a judge of the Court could not exercise the authority of the Court under

article 524 C.C.P . to condemn a party for damages caused by an abusive or dilatory appeal when it dismissed a motion for leave to appeal. [14] He then noted that in Simard v. Larouche , [15] the Court recognized the distinct character of the relief contemplated by

article 54.1 C.C.P from that contained in

article 524 C.C.P ., although Gendreau, J.A., writing for the Court, added this significant qualification: [19] Il est inopportun de me prononcer aujourd'hui sur la portée des articles 54.1 et suiv. en appel. L'on peut certes concevoir des situations où ces dispositions pourraient trouver application devant la Cour. Ce ne peut cependant être que dans un contexte exceptionnel car le Code de procédure civile contient déjà un ensemble de règles spécifiques à l'appel qui visent à filtrer les pourvois abusifs et à sanctionner les parties fautives.

Ces mesures, parce qu'elles sont en vigueur depuis plusieurs années, sont d'application judiciaire courante et constituent maintenant un régime complet, rodé et efficace auquel l'article 54.1 C.p.c. n'apporte rien de neuf. [Emphasis added.] [ 43 ] Finally, Rochon, J.A. observed that Dutil, J.A. had dismissed an application under

article 54.1 C.C.P. similar to the one with which he was seized, although she had done so on the merits of the motion and without reference to any consideration of her jurisdiction. [16] [ 44 ] Rochon, J.A. then examined many of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to which I have referred, and consistent with the view that appeals only exist to the extent they have a statutory foundation, relied on the recognized principle that a judge of this Court did not have the jurisdiction to issue safeguard orders, except in the limited circumstances when a judge had a motion for leave to appeal under advisement: [17] [8] Ainsi, l'autorisation de pourvoi d'un jugement interlocutoire est attribuée à un juge de la Cour.

Cela signifie qu'il peut, à compter du moment où il est saisi de la requête et jusqu'au jugement qu'il prononcera, assumer tous les pouvoirs nécessaires à l'exercice de cette compétence, y compris, lorsque cela s'avérera nécessaire, l'émission d'une ordonnance visant à sauvegarder les droits des parties pendant la durée de son délibéré. Toutefois, dès qu'il a statué et décidé du sort des procédures selon l'article 511 C.p.c ., il devient functus officio.

Il ne peut donc s'autoriser de la permission qu'il vient d'accorder pour ensuite se saisir d'une autre requête à moins que la loi ne pourvoie expressément à sa compétence à statuer sur ce deuxième remède, quel qu'il soit, recherché par l'une ou l'autre des parties maintenant engagées dans un appel; l'article 46 ne confère que des pouvoirs auxiliaires, accessoires ou complémentaires à l'exercice de la compétence.

Ainsi, l'ordonnance de sauvegarde des droits des parties pendant l'appel, c'est-à-dire à compter de l'autorisation du pourvoi jusqu'à l'arrêt de la Cour sur le fond, n'est pas un accessoire de la demande d'autorisation de pourvoi mais de l'appel lui-même. [9] De plus, l'article 46 C.p.c ., tel que formulé, ne donne pas compétence à un juge seul d'émettre une ordonnance de sauvegarde lorsque l'appel s'exerce de plein droit; le texte de l'article 46 C.p.c. ne crée pas une nouvelle compétence, mais décrit plutôt la portée ou l'étendue de la compétence déjà définie.

Or, aucune autre disposition du Code de procédure civile ne confère une compétence au juge seul d'émettre une ordonnance de sauvegarde. Dès lors, il serait étonnant que le législateur ait voulu que le juge seul puisse émettre une ordonnance de sauvegarde lorsqu'il accueille une requête d'autorisation de pourvoi et qu'il soit privé de cette compétence lorsque l'appel est logé de plein droit. [10] Dans l'état actuel du droit, seule la Cour, siégeant en formation, peut émettre une ordonnance de sauvegarde.

Cette conclusion est d'ailleurs conforme à trois décisions d'un juge unique de la Cour. [ 45 ] Rochon, J.A. then concluded as follows: [24] Contrairement à l'article 46 C.p.c . qui accorde "aux tribunaux" et "aux juges" certains pouvoirs, l'article 54.1 C.p.c. ne mentionne que "les tribunaux".

Si, à la vue du texte de l'article 46 C.p.c. notre Cour n'a pas reconnu la compétence au juge unique pour l'émission d'une ordonnance de sauvegarde, je conçois difficilement, à partir du texte de l'article 54.1 C.p.c ., que nous pourrions reconnaître une compétence à ce même juge unique pour sanctionner les abus de procédure. [25] Le pouvoir d'autoriser les appels est l'une des fonctions les plus importantes confiées au juge unique.

Son rôle consiste à tamiser les demandes de permission d'appeler à l'aide de critères propres à la discrétion judiciaire : "lorsque la question en est une qui mérite d'être soumise à la Cour" (art. 26 C.p.c .) ou "lorsque les fins de la justice requièrent..." (art. 511 C.p.c .) pour ne citer que ceux-là. [26] Ce rôle de filtre du juge unique l'amènera de façon inéluctable à rejeter toute demande de permission d'appeler qui constituerait une forme d'abus de procédure.

Une fois cette fonction accomplie, le juge unique a épuisé sa compétence et je ne décèle pas dans l'article 54.1 C.p.c . une assise juridique pour lui en conférer une nouvelle, qui viserait à sanctionner l'abus de procédure. [ 46 ] As far as a remedy is concerned under

article 54.1 C.C.P . for a party who claims to be aggrieved by the presentation of a motion for leave to appeal that is dismissed, Rochon, J.A. directed such a party to the appropriate trial court:

[27] Dans ces circonstances, la

partie qui se dit victime d'un abus de procédure n'est pas sans recours. Elle peut s'adresser aux tribunaux de première instance, compétents dans le cadre d'une action en responsabilité civile, pour obtenir une compensation adéquate, le cas échéant. [ 47 ] I take that reasoning to mean that the Court has no residual jurisdiction to entertain such an application by the subsequent presentation of a motion to a panel of the Court based on

article 54.1 C.C.P ., since the court file giving rise to the application is closed with the dismissal of the motion for leave to appeal. [ 48 ] The judgment of Rochon, J.A. was followed by Bouchard, J.A., sitting as a chambers judge, in Goulet v. Doyon . [18] He dismissed an application based on

article 54.1 C.C.P. for want of jurisdiction. [ 49 ] Apart from the judgment of Dalphond, J.A. that I will next examine, as well as that of Dutil, J.A. that I mentioned in paragraph [43], only two other judges of the Court sitting as judge in chambers have been called upon to apply

article 54.1 C.C.P. upon the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal. In Olymbec Investments Inc. v. GLF Construction & Trade , [19] Bich, J.A. was invited to adopt the approach of Dalphond, J.A. referred to below, but declined to do so, without however considering whether she had jurisdiction to entertain the application. Similarly, in St-Pierre v. Gonzalez Cruz , [20] Thibault, J.A. dismissed an oral motion under

article 54.1 C.C.P. when dismissing an application for leave to appeal, but did not consider whether she had jurisdiction to entertain the motion as judge in chambers. [ 50 ] Brahimi v. Proulx [21] was also a case in which the applicants sought leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Quebec in which the value in dispute was less than $50,000, thus requiring leave pursuant to

article 26 C.C.P . Dalphond, J.A. was sceptical that the application was made on a timely basis given the inadequately explained delay between the date of the trial judgment and the date of the filing of the motion for leave to appeal, but nevertheless undertook to consider the motion on its merits. [ 51 ] Given the circumstances before him, he considered that none of the criteria that would justify leave being granted had been established, with the result that the motion would be dismissed.

He then went on to explain how and why he concluded that the motion was dilatory and frivolous: [22] La requête qui m'est soumise, à supposer qu'elle l'ait été dans le délai de 30 jours applicable, tient du dilatoire et de la frivolité. Si elle est hors délai, cela est encore plus vrai. [23] Pendant l'audience, j'ai demandé au requérant, un avocat, de m'expliquer pourquoi je ne devrais pas me prévaloir des dispositions qui permettent de sanctionner les abus de procédures.

Il m'a répondu qu'il peut sérieusement prétendre que les critères pour un enrichissement injustifié n'étaient pas satisfaits et que les intimées n'ont droit à rien. [24] L'avocat de la

partie adverse m'indique qu'il n'a pas fait le calcul précis des honoraires que la requête occasionne pour son client. Il estime que ceux-ci ne devraient pas excéder 500 $. [25] Je cite les art. 54.1 et 54.4 du Code de procédure civile : 54.1. Les tribunaux peuvent à tout moment, sur demande et même d'office après avoir entendu les parties sur le point, déclarer qu'une demande en justice ou un autre acte de procédure est abusif et prononcer une sanction contre la

partie qui agit de manière abusive. L'abus peut résulter d'une demande en justice ou d'un acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire , ou d'un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent.

Il peut aussi résulter de la mauvaise foi, de l'utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, notamment si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d'expression d'autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. [...] 54.4 Le tribunal peut, en se prononçant sur le caractère abusif d'une demande en justice ou d'un acte de procédure, ordonner, le cas échéant, le remboursement de la provision versée pour les frais de l'instance, condamner une

partie à payer, outre les dépens, des dommages-intérêts en réparation du préjudice subi par une autre partie, notamment pour compenser les honoraires et débours extrajudiciaires que celle-ci a engagés ou, si les circonstances le justifient, attribuer des dommages-intérêts punitifs. Si le montant des dommages-intérêts n'est pas admis ou ne peut être établi aisément au moment de la déclaration d'abus, il peut en décider

sommairement dans le délai et sous les conditions qu'il détermine . (je souligne) [26] Je suis d'avis que la requête qui m'est soumise justifie l'application de l'art. 54.1 C.p.c. Elle était non seulement insuffisamment motivée quant au délai, mais frivole et dilatoire sur le fond. Il s'agit d'un bel exemple de cas où je peux accorder des dommages compensatoires. J'estime qu'un montant de 250 $ est approprié à la suite des représentations qui m'ont été faites. [Underlining in original.] [ 52 ] I would note that my colleague raised the matter of

article 54.1 C.C.P of his own volition, and that applicants were self-represented, although one of them claimed to be a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada. The record shows that the matter was argued and judgment rendered the same day.

It is apparent that the judgment of Rochon, J.A. in Peluso was not brought to the attention of Dalphond, J.A., and that he did not embark on a consideration of whether in light of the wording of articles 54.1 and 54.4 C.C.P . he had the jurisdiction to issue the order he did, for however minimal a sum it may have been. [ 53 ] I agree with and would adopt the reasoning of Rochon, J.A. in Peluso . [ 54 ] The clear distinction in the Code of Civil Procedure between what a judge in chambers can do as opposed to a panel of the Court, and the text of articles 54.1 to 54.6 C.C.P. by the use of the word "court/tribunal" make it clear that a judge in chambers cannot

issue an order pursuant to those provisions, however inclined to do so that judge may be. I am persuaded that if Dalphond, J.A. had had the occasion to consider the reasons of Rochon, J.A. in Peluso and the benefit of the full argument of counsel in the matter now before the Court, he would have concluded that he did not have the jurisdiction to condemn the applicants before him to pay compensatory damages to the respondents. [ 55 ] Indeed, the proper course would have been for Dalphond, J.A. to direct the respondents to initiate a claim based on

article 54.1 C.C.P. in the Court of Quebec, and possibly even before the Small Claims Division, to the extent their claim would be less than $7,000. [ 56 ] Thus, a judge in chambers to whom an application is made under

article 54.1 C.C.P. should dismiss such a motion for want of jurisdiction, as Rochon, J.A. and Bouchard, J.A. did, respectively, in Peluso v. Dolmen (1994) inc. [22] and Goulet v. Doyon, [23] rather than dismiss them on their merits. A judge in chambers who dismisses such a motion on the merits, in my respectful view, creates the misimpression that the judge had jurisdiction to entertain the motion to begin with, and could have granted it, which is not the case.

(4) If not, should a panel of the Court entertain and adjudicate a motion pursuant to articles 54.1 and following C.C.P. , either in response to a motion for leave to appeal it dismisses or a motion to dismiss an appeal it grants? [ 57 ] As previously indicated, I propose that the Court grant the Trustee's motion to dismiss Mr. Asselin's appeal that he filed as of right. The Trustee has not presented an application based on

article 524 C.C.P . for a declaration that the appeal be declared dilatory or abusive. In my view, there is no basis on which the Court could properly exercise its jurisdiction as contemplated by that provision to issue such a declaration proprio motu . [ 58 ] Mr. Asselin and his counsel were alert to the potential obstacle they faced by inscribing the appeal as of right based on paragraph 193(

a) of the Act , since in the same proceeding they simultaneously presented a motion for leave to appeal pursuant to paragraph 193(

e) of the Act . [ 59 ] Under either procedural scenario, the judgment of La Rosa, J. correctly dismissed Mr. Asselin's motion to reject en bloc the data and other items seized at his home and the office of Mtre Hindle pursuant to the warrants Émond, J. issued. For La Rosa, J. to grant his motion would have been premature, for the reasons that I have indicated. It is only once it is known what exactly has been seized that any determination can be made as to what if anything should be excluded. Further proceedings in the Superior Court will necessarily occur where that issue can be ventilated. [ 60 ] Mr.

Asselin's motion in the Superior Court and his attempt in this Court to reverse the judgment of La Rosa, J. have all failed That does not mean, however, they were of such a character as to attract a monetary sanction other than dismissal with taxable costs against him, and much less so against his counsel personally, whose professionalism has never been in dispute. I note, for example, that the Trustee made no claim against Mr. Asselin or his counsel in the Superior Court under

article 54.1 C.C.P ., which I believe is indicative of the lack of seriousness of the Trustee's claim based on that provision in this Court. [24] [ 61 ] The end result on the procedural issue is this. [ 62 ] A party who contends an appeal is abusive or dilatory has long had an appropriate remedy under

article 524 C.C.P. That is the recourse that should be exercised before the panel of the Court hearing an appeal on the merits, or hearing a motion to dismiss an appeal pursuant to article 501(5) C.C.P. The superfluous nature of adding reference to

article 54.1 C.C.P. to a motion to dismiss an appeal is reflected in the judgment of this Court in Simard v. Larouche . [25] [ 63 ] A respondent to a motion for leave to appeal cannot, whether by a written contestation or motion [26] or orally, solicit an order from a judge in chambers to grant relief under

article 54.1 C.C.P . In principle, if the judge grants the motion for leave to appeal, no claim under

article 54.1 C.C.P. could ever lie, irrespective of any jurisdictional issue, since by definition an appeal that a judge has authorized cannot be considered dilatory or abusive. [27] If, however, the motion for leave to appeal is dismissed, the judge is functus officio . [ 64 ] Therefore, any claim based on

article 54.1 C.C.P. upon the dismissal of such a motion must be asserted in the trial court within whose monetary jurisdiction the matter falls. [28] In this case, however, because the jurisdictional issue has been referred to the Court, it has before it, exceptionally, the Trustee's motion pursuant to

article 54.1 C.C.P. [ 65 ] For the reasons I have already mentioned in paragraph [60], that motion fails, and I accordingly propose that it be dismissed with costs. VI

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS [ 66 ] In

summary, I propose: • to grant the Trustee's motion to dismiss Mr. Asselin's appeal filed as of right and therefore to dismiss the appeal with costs; • to dismiss Mr. Asselin's motion for leave to appeal, with costs; • to dismiss the Trustee's claim for an order under

article 54.1 C.C.P ., with costs. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A.