2016 NBCA 55, 2016 NBCA 55

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK ESTATE OF JARVIS HAYWARD ESTABROOKS, RUTH ESTABROOKS, Executrix, and in her own capacity and ROBERTA COOK APPELLANTS 62-15-CA 64-15-CA SUCCESSION DE JARVIS HAYWARD ESTABROOKS, RUTH ESTABROOKS, en tant qu’exécutrice et en son propre nom, et ROBERTA COOK APPELANTS - and - - et - SHARON ESTABROOKS BARRY, IRIS DIANE ESTABROOKS, FERN HAZEL BROOKS and HEATHER MARLENE MATTHEWS RESPONDENTS - and – SHIRLEY ANN MACEY SHARON ESTABROOKS BARRY, IRIS DIANE ESTABROOKS, FERN HAZEL BROOKS et HEATHER MARLENE MATTHEWS INTIMÉS - et - SHIRLEY ANN MACEY RESPONDENT Estate of Jarvis Hayward Estabrooks et al. v.

Barry et al. and Macey, 2016 NBCA 55 INTIMÉE Succession de Jarvis Hayward Estabrooks et autres c. Barry et autres et Macey, 2016 NBCA 55 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: December 8, 2014 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 8 décembre 2014

History of case: Decision under appeal: Unreported Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o. Appeal heard: April 20, 2016 Judgment rendered: October 6, 2016 Appel entendu : le 20 avril 2016 Jugement rendu : le 6 octobre 2016 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant Estate of Jarvis Hayward Estabrooks: John P.F.

Morrissy For the appellants Ruth Estabrooks and Roberta Cook: David McMath For the respondents Sharon Estabrooks Barry, Iris Diane Estabrooks, Fern Hazel Brooks, Heather Marlene Matthews: Richard Scott, Q.C. For the respondent Shirley Ann Macey: No one appeared Motifs de jugement: l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant la Succession de Jarvis Hayward Estabrooks: John P.F.

Morrissy Pour les appelantes Ruth Estabrooks et Roberta Cook : David McMath Pour les intimés Sharon Estabrooks Barry, Iris Diane Estabrooks, Fern Hazel Brooks, Heather Marlene Matthews : Richard Scott, c.r. Pour l’intimée Shirley Ann Macey : personne n’a comparu

THE COURT The appeal is allowed in part. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli en partie. The following is the judgment delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction and Background [ 1 ] Abella J., in Pecore v. Pecore , 2007 SCC 17 , [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795 , quoted the following passage from the beginning of Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina : ‘Happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’, and herself noted “[t]hat unhappiness often finds its painful way into a courtroom” (para. 77). Estate litigation can pit family member against family member; it is emotionally charged, and it is costly.

This appeal involves the accidental burning of a will by a testator who unwittingly set in motion a chain of events which led to a six day trial, thrusting daughters against nieces. [ 2 ] On May 3, 2001, Jarvis Estabrooks executed his Last Will and Testament. In April 2010, when he was sorting through some personal papers, the will was accidentally burned. According to that will, two daughters were to receive bequests of $40,000 each, and his other three were largely disinherited as detailed in the will.

The vast majority of the estate was bequeathed to two nieces, Roberta Cook and Ruth Estabrooks. [ 3 ] On January 5, 2012, Mr. Estabrooks died. [ 4 ] The Executrix, Ruth Estabrooks, filed a Notice of Application with the Court of Queen’s Bench so a certified copy of the will could be probated. Following receipt of the probate documents, the daughters filed caveats, as well as a Notice of Action with Statement of Claim Attached, in which they sought relief pursuant to the Provision for Dependants Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c.

P-22.3 (now R.S.N.B. 2012, c. 111 ), asserting they were entitled to share in the distribution of the estate. This unsustainable claim was dropped following the examination for discovery at which time they amended their claims to seek relief pursuant to the Devolution of Estates Act , R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-9. (s. 23), on the basis Mr. Estabrooks intended to destroy his will and, therefore, died intestate. [ 5 ] In February 2014, Mr. Cecil Shaw, a friend of Mr. Estabrooks, gave evidence on commission pursuant to Rule 53. Mr. Shaw confirmed Mr.

Estabrooks had disclosed to him he had accidentally burned his will, but he was not concerned as he believed there was a copy in the possession of his legal counsel. Notwithstanding this evidence, and the fact an offer to settle was filed pursuant to Rule 49, the matter proceeded to trial. [ 6 ] Following the six day hearing, the trial judge found there was no evidence of animo revocandi , the will was destroyed by accident, it was valid, and he gave judgment to the appellants (the defendants at trial).

In a further decision dated June 23, 2015, he assessed costs in favor of the unsuccessful respondents (the plaintiffs at trial) in accordance with Tariff “A”, Scale 3 of Rule 59.08(1) of the Rules of Court , to be calculated on the residual value of the estate in the amount involved of $870,000, plus “allowable” disbursements, to be paid by the estate.

[ 7 ] The trial judge’s conclusions with respect to the validity of the will are not in contest. The appellants contend, however, the costs award runs contrary to the approach to costs awards in estate litigation matters, which was set out by the Court in Breau v. The Estate of Ernest St. Onge et al. , 2009 NBCA 36 , 345 N.B.R. (2d) 101 at paras. 60-62 . They request costs on a solicitor- client basis. [ 8 ] The respondents cross-appeal on the grounds the trial judge erred in not awarding them their costs on a solicitor-client basis.

Shirley Ann Macey, although named as a respondent, did not participate in the proceeding. II. The Issues on Appeal [ 9 ] The grounds of appeal are lengthy, comprising approximately three pages under various headings, and sub- headings.

Distilled to their essence, they can be summarized as follows: 1) the trial judge erred in law, or in mixed fact and law, when he found the respondents had reasonable and sufficient grounds to pursue the litigation; 2) the trial judge erred in law, or in mixed fact and law, by improperly exercising his discretion when he ordered costs payable in favour of the unsuccessful respondents; 3) the trial judge erred in law, or in mixed fact and law, when he found that exceptional circumstances existed, on the facts of this case, which permitted him to depart from the normal rules regarding the costs consequences which follow the rejection of an offer to settle; 4) the trial judge erred in law, or in mixed fact and law, by improperly exercising his discretion when he ordered costs payable in favour of the unsuccessful respondents and the following conduct of the respondents should have invited a costs sanction:

a) pursuing the litigation to its conclusion when they knew, or they ought to have known, following the pre-trial proceedings, their claim was without merit;

b) making serious allegations of undue influence and pursuing those claims when they were neither pled nor founded;

c) refusing to accept a reasonable offer to settle;

d) failing to properly assess the merits of their claims pursuant to the provisions of the Provision for Dependants Act , prior to commencing their action, and/or continuing it;

e) admitting under cross-examination at trial they had given false testimony during the examination for discovery. 5) The appellants should receive an award of solicitor-client costs. III. The Issues on the Cross-Appeal [ 10 ] The respondents contend they are entitled to their solicitor-client costs both for the trial and for the appeal on the basis the trial judge fettered his discretion and the decision to limit them to party-and-party costs is wrong. IV. Standard of Review [ 11 ] The general rule that costs awards are entitled to deference on the basis of discretion and in the absence of an

error in law, or an error in mixed fact and law is trite. This vaccination against appellate intervention is grounded in theacknowledgement that trial judges are in the best position to assess costs and their findings are therefore owed deference. The SupremeCourt in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, per LeBel J., reaffirmedand qualified the above principle stating, however, the discretion “must be exercised judicially”.

The general rule with respect to anaward of costs should be followed, absent circumstances justifying a different approach (para. 22). [12] In Acadia Marble, Tile & Terrazzo Ltd. v. Oromocto Property Developments Ltd. (1998), (NB CA), 205 N.B.R. (2d) 358, [1998] N.B.J. No. 412 (QL), Drapeau J.A. (as he then was), set out the general rule when he stated thefollowing: The general rule is that the successful party is entitled to costs. It is said that “costs follow the event”. In Distributeur Norbec Enrg. andGagnon v.

Daigle (Clarence) & Fils Ltée (1984), (NB CA), 57 N.B.R. (2d) 269, this Court expressed the rule asfollows at p. 277: ... Normally, the party who recovers judgment is entitled to his costs, although there is no doubt that a judge may exercise his discretionby refusing to make such an award. However, this discretion must be exercised in accordance with the purposes of the law. ... [para. 35] [13] In Doucet and Dauphinee v. Spielo Manufacturing Incorporated and Manship, 2011 NBCA 44, 372 N.B.R.(2d) 1; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court refused, [2011] S.C.C.A.

No. 317, Robertson J.A., writing for the Court, stated: No one needs reminding of the principle that cost orders are owed deference. Appellate interference is not warranted unless it isestablished that the trial judge erred in principle, or fixed costs that are so inordinately high or so low as to be manifestly wrong. […][para. 115] [14] Bell J.A. (as he then was), writing for the Court, added to the above in L.T.G.v. C.J.G., 2011 NBCA 12, 369N.B.R. (2d) 202: It is trite law that costs normally follow the cause.

Should a trial judge decide to depart from that rule he or she is required to justify thedeparture: Dupuis v. Moncton (City), 2005 NBCA 47, 284 N.B.R. (2d) 97, para. 40. In Orkin, The Law of Costs (Toronto: Canada LawBook Ltd., 1965), the author states: The fundamental principles of costs as between party and party is that they are given by the court as an indemnity to the person entitledto them; they are not imposed as punishment on the person who must pay them.

Party and party costs are in effect damages awarded tothe successful litigant as compensation for the expense to which he has been put by reason of the litigation. [p. 14] Orkin’s observations have, of course, been expanded upon in Rule 59.02 of the New Brunswick Rules of Court.

In fixing an award ofcosts under that Rule, trial judges may consider, in addition to success or failure, the amount claimed and recovered, the complexity ofthe proceedings, the importance of the issues, the conduct of any party which tends to lengthen the proceedings, and any improper orvexatious conduct. [paras. 15-16] [15] As stated, the costs follow the event principle reflects the general rule which is applied in textbook civillitigation matters; however, historical exceptions specific to estate litigation have evolved with the passage of time.

Earlier decisions onthis point concluded that estate litigants, whether they were successful or not, were entitled to full indemnification costs payable by theestate. This historical approach slowly evolved to the granting of party-and-party costs on the basis the unsuccessful plaintiff shouldreceive their litigation costs. Recent jurisprudence reveals a narrower, more circumscribed approach to costs awards that are unique toestate litigation. The “modern” approach to estate litigation confirms a shift towards a public policy rationale on the basis an estateshould not bear the costs of unmeritorious litigation.

A trial judge is now required to “carefully scrutinize” the merits of the contenders’case to ascertain whether there were reasonable and sufficient grounds for the litigation, and whether exceptional circumstances existwhich would warrant a departure from the general rule. For the appellants to succeed in this case, they must establish the trial judge’sdecision to award the respondents their party-and-party costs to the conclusion of the litigation was not properly grounded. Similarconsiderations apply to the requests of both parties for awards of solicitor-client costs.

V. Analysis A. Costs in Estate Litigation [16] The historical rule concerning estate litigation costs was established in Mitchell and Mitchell v. Gard andKingwell (1863), 164 E.R.1280, per Sir J.P. Wilde, and Spiers v. English, [1907] p. 122, as followed and applied by the Court in Breau.Unsuccessful parties will have their costs paid by the estate if they establish the testator created the basis for the litigation, the residualbeneficiaries were at fault, or the litigation was necessary in order to properly administer the estate. In McDougald Estate v. Gooderham, (ON CA), [2005] O.J.

No. 2432 (C.A.) (QL), Gillese J.A. observed Canadian courts of first instance havetraditionally followed the approach of the English courts (paras. 78-79). McDougald holds that estates should not bear the costs ofunmeritorious claims, in the absence of evidence which supports the noted exceptions. Additional factors such as the conduct of thelosing party or their counsel, proportionality, reasonable expectations and offers to settle are also considered relevant factors to theultimate determination.

See also Brian Schnurr, Estate Litigation, loose-leaf (consulted on 10 June, 2016), (Toronto: Carswell, 2010).The conduct of the losing parties as well as the service of an offer to settle in the case at bar, are discussed further in these reasons. [17] McDougald was followed in Orfus Estate v. The Samuel and Bessie Orfus Family Foundation, 2013 ONCA225, [2013] O.J. No. 1626 (QL), where Laskin J.A. stated: In McDougald Estate v. Gooderham (2005), (ON CA), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (Ont.

C.A.), this court said that thecosts rules in civil litigation apply to estate litigation unless one or more public policy considerations come into play. Gillese J.A. set outthese policy considerations, at para. 78: The practice of the English courts, in estate litigation, is to order the costs of all parties to be paid out of the estate where the litigationarose as a result of the actions of the testator, or those with an interest in the residue of the estate, or where the litigation was reasonablynecessary to ensure the proper administration of the estate. See Mitchell v.

Gard (1863), 3 Sw. & Tr. 275, 164 E.R. 1280 and Spiers v.English, [1907] P. 122. Public policy considerations underlie this approach: it is important that courts give effect to valid wills thatreflect the intention of competent testators. Where the difficulties or ambiguities that give rise to the litigation are caused, in whole or inpart, by the testator, it seems appropriate that the testator, through his or her estate, bear the costs of their resolution.

If there arereasonable grounds upon which to question the execution of the will or the testator’s capacity in making the will, it is again in the publicinterest that such questions be resolved without cost to those questioning the will’s validity. [para. 89] [18] The traditional rule that all parties, whether successful or not, would have their costs paid by the estate, was“displaced” in McDougald (para. 80).

The following statement by Gillese J.A. succinctly describes the modern day approach: “[…]Gone are the days when the costs of all parties are so routinely ordered payable out of the estate that people perceive there is nothing tobe lost in pursuing estate litigation” (para. 85). Mark M.

Orkin, in The Law of Costs, 2nd ed., vol. 1, loose leaf (consulted on 10 June2016) (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2016), ch. 2 at s. 219.3 identifies the modern day exceptions: The general rule has been propounded that in cases involving estate litigation, as in other litigation, the successful parties should havetheir costs paid by the unsuccessful parties and not by the estate, unless the testator or the residual beneficiaries were the cause of thelitigation, or where litigation was reasonably necessary to ensure the proper administration of the estate. [19] In Foster v.

Boone, 2010 NBCA 11, 354 N.B.R. (2d) 171, the Court allowed the appeal on the basis there wasan ambiguity in the face of the will. Green J.A., writing for the Court, awarded the unsuccessful litigants solicitor-client costs in thecourt below and on the appeal, to be paid by the estate (para. 30). The decision is in accord with the reasons in Breau on the basis therewas a legitimate issue which had to be determined. In Goguen (Estate of) v. Hachey, 2012 NBCA 56, 392 N.B.R. (2d) 114, a trial judge’sdecision to award costs against the administrators of an estate personally was upheld on the appeal.

Bell J.A. (as he then was), writing forthe Court, found the allegations of undue influence and mental incapacity lacked an evidentiary foundation, and they were ordered tojointly pay the costs of the appeal, which were set at $3,500. See also White v. Gicas, 2014 ONCA 490, [2014] O.J. No. 3036 (QL). Inthat case, leave to appeal a costs award against the appellants personally was granted, and costs on the appeal were ordered to be paid bythe estate on the basis the claim was meritorious (paras. 73-74). [20] In

summary, should litigants pursue unmeritorious claims against an estate, they may not be entitled to theircosts, and they could be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs either on a party-and-party basis, or, in certain circumstances on a solicitor-client basis. This approach to estate litigation not only protects the interests of the estate and the beneficiaries, it discourages frivolous

litigation and an unnecessary waste of resources. [21] The reasons in Breau are consistent with the above statement. Breau involved disputed items of personalproperty and funds that were deposited into a joint bank account. The unsuccessful defendant was ordered to pay, to the estate, costsassociated with the litigation on a party-and-party basis (para. 77).

Robertson and Quigg JJ.A., writing for the Court, acknowledged themodern approach, stating: “[A] rule that unsuccessful litigants are entitled to full indemnification out of the estate would simplyencourage the mistaken belief there is nothing to be lost in pursuing litigation” (para. 3). The appeal was dismissed, and the respondentswere awarded costs of $3,500 on the appeal (para. 78).

The Court in Breau concluded the general rule that costs follow the event applies,absent the exceptions. [22] The exceptions include situations where there is a bona fide reason to challenge a will, perhaps on the basis ofundue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, or alternatively, in those cases where the actions of the testator or the testatrix havetriggered the need to seek clarification from the court. Where it was found there were reasonable and sufficient grounds to commence thelitigation, the unsuccessful litigant would generally have their party-and-party costs paid by the estate.

The question whether and underwhat circumstances solicitor-client costs would be ordered was not dealt with in Breau on the basis the issue was not before the Court(para. 77). [23] The Court left the door open however, when it stated: “Note, however, that the exception does not say that thelosing party is entitled to full indemnification costs of the estate. That too is a matter that remains at the discretion of the court” (para.56). Relying on Jumelle v. Soloway Estate, (MB CA), [1999] M.J.

No. 443 (C.A.) (QL), the Court observed even ifthere was a valid reason to bring an action against an estate, the Court retains the discretion to deny costs to any party: […] Finally, in Jumelle v. Soloway Estate (1999), (MB CA), 142 Man. R. (2d) 119 (C.A.), [1999] M.J. No. 443(QL) the Manitoba Court of Appeal was faced with an unsuccessful litigant, the wife of the deceased testator, who at trial [[1999] M.J.No. 10], had been awarded costs out of the estate [[1999] M.J. No. 120].

The Court of Appeal set aside that award on the basis that aparty who brings an action against an estate in circumstances where there is “no substantial merit” to the litigation is personallyresponsible for the payment of the successful party’s costs (party-and-party). This case is significant because it reinforces theunderstanding that even if the case is one which comes within one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule, the court retains thediscretion to deny costs to any party, including the unsuccessful litigant.

The same observation applies to the following decision. [para.63] [24] In overturning the trial judge’s award of costs, the Manitoba Court of Appeal concluded in Jumelle that costscan be awarded against unsuccessful contenders when there is a finding their case was unmeritorious.

This issue is germane to the case atbar as the appellants submit the respondents should have discontinued their action following the examination for discovery, oralternatively, following the date when evidence was taken on commission. [25] I conclude the appellants can succeed, wholly or partially, if it is established the trial judge erred in his analysiswith respect to the applicable exceptions in estate litigation matters, whether there was a failure to consider the effect of the offer to settle(Rule 49.09), or the costs analysis was flawed. B. Reasonable and Sufficient Grounds [26]

Section 15(

d) of the Wills Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-9 states:

A will or part of a will is revoked only by […] (

d) burning, tearing or otherwise destroying itby the testator or by some person in hispresence and by his direction with theintention of revoking it. Un testament n’est révoqué en tout ou partieque […]

d) dans le cas où le testateur ou un tiersagissant en sa présence et sous sa directionbrûle, lacère ou détruit de quelque autremanière le testament dans l’intention de lerévoquer. [27] On this ground of appeal, appellate counsel acknowledged there was a rebuttable presumption Mr. Estabrooks’will was revoked when it was destroyed, thereby cloaking the respondents with reasonable and sufficient grounds to challenge thevalidity of the certified copy and to commence the action. With this concession, I conclude this ground of appeal lacks merit.

As willbecome apparent in these reasons, the analysis does not stop here, as there are additional circumstances which bear directly upon the trialjudge’s analysis. C. The Offer to Settle and the Costs Award [28] On September 8, 2014, approximately one month before the commencement of the trial, the appellants madean offer to settle for an all-inclusive sum of $80,000. The respondents made a settlement offer shortly thereafter advising they wouldaccept $350,000. See Sivret v.

New Brunswick Power Corp. (1995), (NB CA), 157 N.B.R. (2d) 161, [1995] N.B.J.No. 9 (C.A.) (QL), concerning the costs consequences of an offer to settle. [29] Rule 49.02 of the Rules of Court provides:

49.02 Where Available

(1) A party may serve upon an adverse party an Offer to Settle (Form 49A) any claim between them in the proceeding, and, where there is more than one claim between them, to settle one or more of them, on the terms specified. 49.09 Effect of Failure to Accept

(2) Unless ordered otherwise, where an offer to settle was made by a defendant at least 10 days before commencement of the trial or hearing of the proceeding and was not revoked prior to commencement of the trial or hearing, and where the plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than the terms of the offer to settle, the plaintiff shall be entitled only to party and party costs to the date of service of the offer to settle and the defendant shall be entitled to party and party costs from the date of such service. 49.11 Discretion of Court Notwithstanding the provisions of this rule, the court, in exercising its discretion as to costs, may take into account any offer to settle made in writing, the date the offer to settle was served and the terms thereof. 49.02 Applicabilité

(1) Toute

partie à une instance peut proposer à une

partie adverse des conditions de règlement du litige ou d’une

partie du litige en lui signifiant une offre de règlement amiable (formule 49A). 49.09 Effet du défaut d’acceptation

(2) Sauf ordonnance contraire, lorsqu’un défendeur a fait une offre de règlement amiable au moins 10 jours avant le début du procès ou de l’audition de l’instance, qu’il n’a pas révoqué cette offre avant le début du procès ou de l’audience et que le demandeur n’obtient pas un jugement plus favorable que les conditions de l’offre, le demandeur n’aura droit aux dépens au tarif des frais entre parties que jusqu’à la date de la signification de l’offre.

Le défendeur aura droit aux dépens au tarif des frais entre parties à partir de cette date. 49.11 Latitude de la cour Nonobstant la présente règle, la cour peut, dans l’exercice de son pouvoir relatif aux dépens, prendre en considération toute offre de règlement amiable faite par écrit, la date de signification de l’offre et ses conditions. [ 30 ] Counsel for the respondents suggests that Rule 49.09 does not apply on the basis they did not receive a judgment more favorable than the terms of the offer to settle, as required in the Rule.

I reject this submission relying on Rule 49.11 which states the residual discretion of the trial judge is reserved, notwithstanding the wording of Rule 49.09. [ 31 ] The trial judge applied the ratio in Town & Country Market Realty Ltd. v. Jones , 2010 NBCA 7 , 354 N.B.R. (2d) 120 , where Green J.A., writing for the Court, acknowledged “considerable leeway is to be given to a trial judge on the issue of costs” (para. 34).

He acknowledged a departure from the prima facie costs consequences of Rule 49 was not warranted unless the “interests of justice” required him to do so, relying on Watson and McGowan’s text, Ontario Civil Practice (Toronto: Carswell, 2008) (para. 35). Armed with the above, he departed from Rule 49.09 citing the following as his justification: 1. The plaintiffs’ claim was not dubious; 2. The defendants’ offer of $80,000 represented 9.2 per cent of the “potential recovery”, and the “outcome was far from certain”; 3. The plaintiffs agreed to narrow the issues before trial.

They abandoned their claims of dependency, provided security for costs, and consented to the taking of evidence by way of commission before the trial.

[ 32 ] The trial judge rationalized: “[h]aving regard to all of the circumstances I believe this is one of the exceptional cases where the interests of justice require a departure from the costs consequences of Rule 49.09” (para. 33). The appellants argue, however, the threshold for an exception to deviate from the rule was not met, nor were there sufficient reasons given to support the trial judge’s decision to depart from the rule. I agree as will be observed further. D. Rule 59 and the Effect of Conduct [ 33 ] I turn now to the trial judge’s analysis pursuant to Rule 59.

The estate argues the trial judge failed to exercise his discretion reasonably under Rule 59 when he awarded the respondents party-and-party costs to the conclusion of the proceedings on the basis there was evidence taken on commission that supported the accidental burning of the will, there was an offer to settle and the respondents admitted they had no evidence to support their allegations. I n my opinion this submission merits consideration.

As stated, the general rule with respect to the ordering of costs in estate matters was historically based on the exceptional principle all parties would receive their costs as compensation for the expense of the litigation; however, in the case at bar, the trial judge’s analysis pursuant to Rule 59 was incomplete in my opinion. [ 34 ] The trial judge correctly referred to the decision in Foote Estate (Re) , 2010 ABQB 197 , [2010] A.J. No. 315 (QL) , where Graesser J. quoted Riva v. Robinson , 2000 ABQB 391 , [2000] A.J.

No. 681 (QL) , in which Clark J. noted: “[i]f […] the conduct of the testator or beneficiary has been the cause of the dispute or if the circumstances justified investigation into the will, then the estate should bear the costs of the unsuccessful litigants”. This is the general rule, subject to modification in the spotlight of a contextual analysis. It cannot be that an estate litigant is entitled to their party-and-party costs to the conclusion of a trial when they are faced with evidence that suggests their claim may fail, or, indeed, when their conduct is questioned.

The above warrants consideration. [ 35 ] In Morrissey Estate (Re ), [1997] P.E.I.J. No. 100 (S.C.) (QL) , for example, following the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ challenge to a will, Jenkins J. (as he then was), acknowledged the general rule with respect to estate litigation costs, but he added, quoting Mitchell , there may be a “further class of cases” which would require the court to depart from the “normal” rule.

Also drawing from Mitchell , he states: “I speak of those in which, beyond the execution of the will and the capacity of the testator, the opposing party takes upon himself to question the conduct or the good faith of others, and to place on the record pleas of undue influence or fraud” (para. 5).

He adds: “Schnurr observes, at p. 19.4, that […] Courts are now tending to scrutinize more carefully the question of the legitimacy of the initiation of estate litigation and are becoming increasingly prepared to deny costs to an unsuccessful party, and further to require the unsuccessful party to pay a portion of the costs of the successful party” (para. 6). [ 36 ] Jenkins J. found the contesters should have realized the futility of their cause following the examination for discovery. The fact they continued an unmeritorious litigation was reason to deprive them of their costs from that time forward.

He concluded: “[O]nce they had disclosure of the facts, they had an obligation to act responsibly regarding the pending litigation” (para. 14). Having decided not to order costs payable from the estate to the “caveators”, Jenkins J. then turned his mind to the “most difficult question” whether to order the “caveators” pay a share of the costs of the “propounder”. In making an order for the “caveators” to pay the costs of the trial to the “propounder”, Jenkins J. acknowledged the “caveators” raised the issue of undue influence, purported to withdraw it, yet pursued the essence of the claim at trial.

He ordered them to pay one-half the costs of the “propounders”, for the trial, and the trial preparation on a party-and-party basis. [ 37 ] In the case at bar, although the respondents did not plead undue influence, it was evident from the discovery evidence, the evidence at trial and in their pre-trial brief, they were subtly suggesting the testator was influenced by his nieces (see West Estate , 2003 ABQB 205 , [2003] A.J. No. 289 , where the court found that serious costs consequences should follow unfounded allegations of undue influence as a matter of public policy (paras. 19-25)).

The appellants submit the trial judge’s failure to consider the respondents’ conduct in relation to the prolongation of the trial, the false evidence they gave during the discovery proceedings, and the fact a key witness gave evidence by commission prior to the trial which confirmed Mr. Estabrooks knew he had accidentally burned his will, but believed the copy his lawyer maintained in his file was valid, would have permitted the court to deviate from the general rule.

The appellants contend this, coupled with the fact there was an offer to settle, should have persuaded the trial judge not to grant the respondents party-and-party costs to the conclusion of the trial. [ 38 ] As another example, in Town & Country Market Realty , the trial judge awarded party-and-party costs to the plaintiff up to the date of the offer to settle and party-and-party costs were awarded to Jones from that date forward. Town & Country Market Realty unsuccessfully appealed both the judgment and the costs ruling.

The issue in that case was whether the plaintiff had recovered a judgment “more favorable” than the offer to settle. In this case, the answer is more compelling. The respondents recovered no judgment after pursuing a six day trial in their futile attempt to challenge the validity of their father’s will. Surely, as a matter of public policy, they should not be rewarded for their unmeritorious pursuit. I concur with the appellants’ assertions the trial judge made no findings of fact which were supported by the evidence which could have given rise to a positive outcome for the respondents.

This principle was confirmed in Zandersons Estate (Re ), 2011 ONSC 6755 , [2011] O.J. No. 5145 (QL) , at paras. 6 , 13-14, where the court ordered costs to be paid by the parties, not the estate, on the basis the respondents had persisted in their “unreasonable” position. See also Kaptyn Estate (Re ), 2012 ONSC 3766 , [2012] O.J. No. 3055 (QL) .

[39] I turn now to the trial judge’s analysis pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. Rule 59.02 sets out thecriteria that may be considered by a trial judge when making an order for costs. In his reasons, some, but not all, of the criteria wereconsidered by the trial judge. The fact the respondents acknowledged they gave false testimony during the discovery hearings was notconsidered by the trial judge, nor was the fact the respondents acknowledged both during the examination for discovery, as well asduring the trial, they did not have evidence to support their allegations.

In my opinion, these factors should also have been considered bythe trial judge. The trial judge described the respondents’ explanation they were attempting to “get into Jarvis’ mind as to what he wasthinking if he wanted to change his will”, as “difficult to apprehend”, yet they were rewarded for their persistence in continuing thelitigation. [40] On the issue of conduct, the trial judge stated: “[t]here is no allegation of undue influence on the part of RuthEstabrooks or Roberta Cook”.

Yet, at para. 58 he wrote: “[i]n her pre-trial brief counsel for the respondents argues that Ruth exploitedJarvis’ dependence upon her and his fear of having no one to take care of him to influence him to make her his primary beneficiary. Ireject this argument for several reasons”. It is apparent from the above, whether undue influence was pleaded, or not, the respondentspursued the allegations. The trial judge dealt with them in his reasons; however, these innuendos were not reflected in the trial judge’sdecision concerning costs.

At para. 18 of the decision on costs, the trial judge states: “[t]he undue influence allegations are somewhatmore nuanced than the defendants assert”. At para. 19 he continued: “[i]n some areas of cross-examination plaintiffs’ counsel alsobroached the topic of the defendants’ influence over Jarvis” in order to “get into [his] mind”.

He then concluded the “suggestions” ofundue influence “had absolutely no influence on whether the trial proceeded or the length of same”; however, he failed to state how hereached that conclusion. [41] The trial judge acknowledged the respondents withdrew their claims as dependents, albeit following theexamination for discovery. The respondents narrowed the issues, they filed security for costs, and they consented to the taking ofevidence on commission. The trial judge found that “[c]ounsel for both parties agreed at the outset of the trial that the sole issue fordetermination in this action is whether Mr.

Estabrooks deliberately destroyed the will”, yet, the respondents were permitted to leadevidence at trial concerning undue influence. [42] The parties concede there was sufficient reason for the respondents to initiate the litigation, however, I agreewith the appellants’ contention that at a certain point during the course of the pre-trial proceedings, the respondents should have knowntheir case did not have traction. It is my opinion the trial judge ignored evidence of the respondents’ conduct as noted, which, incombination with the service of an offer to settle, calls into question the costs award.

To award the respondents full recovery of theirparty-and-party costs to the conclusion of the trial in these circumstances constitutes an error in principle, in my opinion, and isinconsistent with the modern approach to estate litigation costs. [43] I pause here to discuss the requests by both parties for solicitor-client costs. E. Solicitor-client costs [44] Solicitor-client costs awards are considered exceptional and are reserved for those cases where the conduct ofan unsuccessful party is worthy of penalty. In Laird et al. v. Gregory et al. (1992), (NB CA), 124 N.B.R. (2d) 367,[1992] N.B.J.

No. 144 (C.A.) (QL), a trial judge’s award of solicitor-client costs was reversed on the basis it was not open for the trialjudge to make a finding of fraud, one of the factors which weighs heavily in favor of a solicitor-client costs award. Laird followed thedecision in St-Laurent v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (1988), (NB CA), 90 N.B.R. (2d) 282, [1988] N.B.J. No.621 (C.A.) (QL), where the Court reiterated that solicitor-client costs are reserved for “exceptional and special” cases.

See also Sirois v.Centennial Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. and General Motors of Canada Ltd., (NB CA), 1988, 89 N.B.R. (2d) 244, [1988]N.B.J. No. 407 (C.A.) (QL) at p. 252, per Ryan J.A.; and Clark Estate (Re) (1992), (MB CA), [1992] M.J. No. 528(C.A.) (QL) [45] The exceptional nature of solicitor-client costs was discussed by Larlee J.A., writing for the Court, in Savoie v.Mailhot, 2004 NBCA 17, 268 N.B.R. (2d) 348: That said, solicitor-client costs are the exception, not the rule. They are reserved for a party subjected to wrongdoing that isreprehensible, scandalous or outrageous (see Mackin v.

New Brunswick (Minister of Finance[)]; Rice v. New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 and Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 249-251). [para. 37]

[46] In Doucet, Robertson J.A. concluded full indemnification costs are appropriate on a finding of “reprehensible,scandalous or outrageous conduct” on the part of one of the parties. See Young v. Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3,[1993] S.C.J. No. 112 (QL) at para. 117. In Bossé v. Farm Credit Canada, 2014 NBCA 34, 419 N.B.R. (2d) 1, Richard J.A. summarizedthe governing principle: The following statement of this Court, per Ryan J.A., in Sirois v. Centennial Pontiac Buick GMC Ltd. (1988), (NBCA), 89 N.B.R. (2d) 244, [1988] N.B.J.

No. 407 (C.A.) (QL), continues to govern in determining whether costs should be awarded on asolicitor and client basis: Solicitor and client costs are awarded in rare and exceptional cases where the actions of one of the parties are onerous as against anotherparty. Orkin, The Law of Costs (2nd ed. 1987), at pages 2-61 and 2-62 sets out the author’s opinion along with a number of illustrations: […] An award of costs on the solicitor-and-client scale, it has been said, is ordered only in rare and exceptional cases to mark the court’sdisapproval of the conduct of a party in the litigation.

Orders of this kind have been made where a litigant’s conduct has been particularlyblameworthy, for example, where there were allegations of fraud or impropriety either unproven or abandoned at trial; or wanton andscandalous charges; or allegations of perjury; or collusion; or where the responsible party perpetrated a fraud on the court, e.g., bypreparing and presenting forged documents; or by filing a deliberately deceptive affidavit in support of an order without notice; or byconcealing a document until trial and then relying on it; or prolonged the trial by engaging in obstructionist tactics; or brought motionswithout merit to exhaust an opponent’s resources; or intentionally misled the court by giving false evidence as to material facts; or incontempt proceedings.

Solicitor-and-client costs have been awarded to the successful party where an action was without any foundationin law, or where an appeal was considered to be without merit; and in a libel action where fault was admitted, only the amount ofdamages being contested; or where a carrier failed to admit liability for the contamination of food until shortly before trial, although ithad been aware of the facts much earlier; or where defendant in a wrongful dismissal action pleaded just cause without basis for the plea;or in an action for indemnification by an insured against his insurer where the insurer, in refusing to settle a personal injury claim had notused reasonable care for the protection of its insured, acted in bad faith and the plaintiff ought not to have had to bring the action. [para.10] [para. 40] [Emphasis added.] [47] In Calvy v.

Calvy, 2015 NBCA 53, 440 N.B.R. (2d) 85, Quigg J.A., writing for the Court, stated: […] In Boivin, Deschênes J.A. states: It is generally the function of a trial judge, as a matter of discretion, to award the costs and disbursements in a proceeding, and this Courtwill not interfere unless the decision is patently wrong (see Comeau v. Saint John Regional Hospital et al. (2001), 2001 NBCA 113, 244 N.B.R. (2d) 201 at para. 139 (C.A.)). As for solicitor-client costs, they are only awarded in exceptional and special cases;in this regard, see Laird et al. v. Gregory et al. (1992), (NB CA), 124 N.B.R. (2d) 367 (C.A.).

This is not such a case.[para. 15] [para. 33] See also Calvy v. Calvy (2014), 426 N.B.R. (2d) 390, [2014] N.B.J. No. 282 (C.A.) (QL). [48] Turning to costs awards in estate litigation matters, in Prevost Estate v. Prevost Estate, 2013 NSCA 20, [2013]N.S.J. No. 74 (QL), Bryson J.A. at para. 17, explains “[a]n adverse party may receive party-and-party costs; an executor or trustee willusually receive solicitor-client costs by way of indemnity. One cannot assume judicial generosity in all of these cases”. See alsoCasavechia v. Noseworthy, 2015 NSCA 56, [2015] N.S.J.

No. 238 (QL), at para. 62. [49] The Court in Breau concluded an award of solicitor-client costs is a discretionary exception: “So long as theestate litigant has reasonable grounds for pursuing the action and so long as the litigation falls within one of the recognized exceptions,the trial judge may award solicitor-client costs to the unsuccessful party out of the estate”. Notably, however, is that the inherent power

of the trial judge is retained, regardless of which costs rule is applied based on the circumstances of each case and in accordance withestablished principles (para. 68). Robertson and Quigg JJ.A. observed this when they stated: So too has the Manitoba Court of Appeal been called on to reaffirm the conventional costs rule based on the English precedents. It did soin Bjorninen v. Mercredi (1984), (MB CA), 27 Man.R. (2d) 67 (C.A.), [1984] M.J. No. 132 (QL) and again in Balan’sEstate, Re (1992), (MB CA), 76 Man.R. (2d) 241 (C.A.), [1992] M.J.

No. 50 (QL) and once more in Clark Estate, Re(1992), (MB CA), 83 Man.R. (2d) 21 (C.A.), [1992] M.J. No. 528 (QL).

The latter case reaffirms the propositionthat solicitor-client costs should be awarded only in exceptional cases and that all parties involved in estate litigation cannot rely on theexpectation that their costs will be paid out of the assets of the estate. […] [para. 63] [50] The appellants contend there are exceptional circumstances to support an award of solicitor-client costs in theirfavour, asserting the respondents’ conduct prolonged the litigation on the basis they knew, or ought to have known following theexamination for discovery hearings, as well as the evidence which was taken on commission, they did not have a case.

The appellantssubmit further the respondents made serious, unfounded allegations of undue influence, and they were required to respond to anunsustainable dependency claim. They argue the respondents’ conduct in prolonging the litigation should have been considered. In thealternative, they assert the respondents’ costs should have been assessed to the date of the completion of the examination for discoveryhearings (July 2013), on the date when Mr.

Cecil Shaw’s evidence was taken by commission (February 2014), or at the very latest, to thedate they served the respondents with an offer to settle one month before trial. The fact the respondents elected to continue the litigationwas sufficient reason to justify an award of solicitor-client costs. I do not agree. The conduct of the respondents did not rise to the levelcontemplated in the jurisprudence so as to warrant such an award in my opinion. VI.

Rule 62.21 [51] Rule 62.21 of the Rules of Court grants the Court the authority to draw inferences of fact, to render anydecision, to make any order which ought to have been made, and to make such further or other order as the case may require. Rule1.02.1, the proportionality rule, allows the court to make the order that should have been made rather than to remit the matter.

I amprepared to make an order in substitution of the order which was granted in the first instance. [52] On the basis there were reasonable and sufficient grounds to initiate the Notice of Action, I conclude therespondents are entitled to their party-and-party costs, payable by the estate, from the date of the filing of their Notice of Action to thedate they were served with the Offer to Settle. I see no reason to depart from the normal tariff which was applied by the trial judge. Thecosts shall be taxed pursuant to Rule 59.08(1), Tariff “A”, Scale 3. Deschênes J.A. writing in Saint John Regional Hospital v.

Comeau,2003 NBCA 17, 256 N.B.R. (2d) 356, states: Undoubtedly, the task of assessing or fixing party and party costs following a trial, with or without reference to Tariff “A” under Rule 59of the Rules of Court, has been entrusted to the trial judge who, as Stratton, J.A. put it in Williams et al v. City of Saint John (City), NewBrunswick and Chubb Industries Ltd. (1985), (NB CA), 66 N.B.R. (2d) 10; 169 A.P.R. 10 (C.A.) at pp.40-41 “is theperson best able to assess all matters relative to the question of costs”.

The trial judge enjoys a very wide discretion and much flexibilityin fixing costs by reference to tariff “A” under Rule 59 as he or she is allowed some maneuverability in terms of what the “amountinvolved” (not necessarily the amount allowed) will be and what Scale will be used. [para. 25] [53] In Robichaud et al. v.

Pharmacie Acadienne de Beresford Ltée et al., 2008 NBCA 12, 328 N.B.R. (2d) 205,Drapeau C.J.N.B, states the following with respect to Rule 59.08(1)(b): […] In the case at bar, nothing in Rules 59.01 and 59.02 warrants a departure from Tariff “A”, the presumptive basis for the assessmentof costs on a motion for judgment. Likewise, nothing in those Rules militates against the application of the “basic” figure for costs,namely Scale 3 of Tariff “A”. […] [para. 42] On the same basis as noted, I would not interfere with the trial judge’s decision to order costs payable pursuant to Rule 59.08(1), Tariff“A”, Scale 3.

[ 54 ] I would order costs to be assessed by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal pursuant to Rule 59.08(1), Tariff “A”, Scale 3. [ 55 ] I conclude the appellants are entitled to their costs on a party-and-party basis. For the purposes of this order, the appellants include the estate of Jarvis Estabrooks, as represented by Ruth Estabrooks, in her capacity as Executrix, and Ruth Estabrooks and Roberta Cook in their personal capacities. Rule 59.02(

j) permits the court to consider whether, or not, two sets of costs should be ordered in circumstances where the parties have been represented by separate counsel. Counsel for the respondents assert it was not necessary for Roberta Cook and Ruth Estabrooks to be represented by counsel separate from the estate. I disagree. Ruth Estabrooks represented the interests of the estate in her capacity as Executrix, and she and her sister, Roberta Cook, were named in the Notice of Action as defendants personally. Their personal interests were separate from those of the estate.

Ruth Estabrooks, in her capacity as Executrix of the estate, represented the interests of the estate and she should be entitled to full indemnification of her costs out of the estate from the date she was served with the Notice of Action to the conclusion of the proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench. [ 56 ] In my opinion, the estate is entitled to one set of party-and-party costs against the respondents, jointly and severally, from the date the Offer to Settle was served to the conclusion of the proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench.

In addition, the party-and-party costs of Ruth Estabrooks and Roberta Cook in their personal capacities should be paid jointly and severally by the respondents personally in one set of party-and-party costs assessed on the same basis as noted. [ 57 ] Again, I would order the costs above to be assessed pursuant to Rule 59.08(1) Tariff “A”, Scale 3 by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal. VII. The Cross-appeal [ 58 ] The respondents cross-appeal requesting the award of party-and-party costs be set aside and substituted with an order for solicitor-client costs in their favour.

They assert the trial judge improperly “fettered his discretion” by finding solicitor-client cost awards are “exceptional” in estate litigation matters. They cite obiter from Breau , where the court acknowledged solicitor-client costs may be ordered to the unsuccessful litigant; however, as noted, such an award is considered exceptional. The decision in Breau was silent whether the conduct must rise to the same level as was described by the court in Bossé .

As observed, the modern approach to estate litigation is more in keeping with the standard costs award rule in general litigation matters with exceptions as discussed. Breau stated, “the exercise of discretion must be effected on a principled basis” (para. 69). The fact the respondents commenced their Notice of Action cloaked with legitimacy, does not, on its own, support an order for solicitor-client costs. Surely, a litigant should not be rewarded with full indemnification costs when they have been presented with sufficient evidence to question the futility of their quest.

I conclude the trial judge correctly found the defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level as was described in Doucet and Bossé so as to warrant a costs sanction of this kind. The respondents referred us to the decisions in Foster and Morrison Estate v. Rinehart et al. , 2011 NBQB 48 , 368 N.B.R. (2d) 86 , both involving estate litigation matters where solicitor-client costs were awarded.

With due respect, those decisions have limited precedential value and are easily distinguished. [ 59 ] I further conclude the trial judge was correct in his determination the respondents were not entitled to solicitor- client costs. Although Breau left the door open for a court to consider an award of solicitor-client costs in estate litigation matters, the award is considered exceptional ( see Breau at para. 63 ).

In my opinion, the respondents are entitled to their party-and-party costs from the date of service of the Notice of Action to the date of service of the Offer to Settle, to be assessed by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal pursuant to Rule 59.08(1), Tariff “A”, Scale 3. [ 60 ] As noted, the estate as represented by Ruth Estabrooks, is entitled to full indemnification costs, payable by the estate from the date of service of the Notice of Action to the conclusion of the proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench. VIII. Disposition [ 61 ] I would allow the appeal in part.

The trial judge’s decision with respect to costs is set aside and substituted with the following: 1) The respondents shall receive one set of party-and party costs payable by the estate from the date of the filing of the Notice of Action to the date of service of the Offer to Settle;

2) The estate shall receive one set of party-and-party costs payable by the respondents, who are jointly and severally liable, from the date of the service of the Offer to Settle to the conclusion of the proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench; 3) Ruth Estabrooks and Roberta Cook, in their personal capacities, shall receive one set of party-and-party costs against the respondents, who are jointly and severally liable from the date the Offer to Settle was served to the conclusion of the proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench; 4) Costs under 1), 2) and 3) are to be assessed by the Registrar pursuant to Rule 59.08(1), Tariff “A”, Scale 3.

IX. Costs on the Appeal [ 62 ] Counsel for the respondents requested the opportunity to file a brief submission on the issue of costs on the appeal, pursuant to Rule 49.13 on the same basis as was ordered in L.T.G. v. C.J.G ., 2011 NBCA 12 , 369 N.B.R. (2d) 202 . I would reject the request on the basis it will prolong the conclusion and it will increase the costs associated with this litigation, thus depleting the estate further. Ruth Estabrooks, in her capacity as Executrix on behalf of the estate shall have costs payable by the respondents, other than Ms.

Macey, who are jointly and severally liable in the amount of $2,500. Ruth Estabrooks and Roberta Cook shall have one set of costs, payable by the respondents, other than Ms. Macey, who are jointly and severally liable in the amount of $2,500. [ 63 ] I would dismiss the cross-appeal without costs. ____________________________ BARBARA L. BAIRD, J.A. WE CONCUR: ___________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A. ____________________________ RAYMOND T. FRENCH, J.A. Version française de la décision rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD

I. Introduction et contexte [1] Dans l’arrêt Pecore c. Pecore , 2007 CSC 17 , [2007] 1 R.C.S. 795 , la juge Abella a cité le passage suivant que l’on trouve au tout début du roman Anna Karénine , de Léon Tolstoï : « Les familles heureuses se ressemblent toutes; les familles malheureuses sont malheureuses chacune à leur façon », et a elle-même ajouté que « leur malheur les acheminent souvent vers les tribunaux » (par. 77). Les litiges successoraux peuvent mettre les membres d’une famille en conflit avec d’autres membres de la même famille; ils sont chargés d’émotion et ils sont couteux.

Le présent appel concerne la destruction accidentelle, par le feu, d’un testament par un testateur qui a ainsi involontairement lancé une suite d’événements qui ont donné lieu à un procès de six jours opposant des filles à des nièces. [2] Le 3 mai 2001, Jarvis Estabrooks a signé son testament. En avril 2010, pendant qu’il triait des documents personnels, le testament a accidentellement été brûlé. Selon ce testament, deux de ses filles devaient recevoir des legs de 40 000 $ chacune, ses trois autres filles étant dans une large mesure déshéritées conformément aux précisions données dans le testament .

La grande majorité de la masse successorale a été léguée à deux de ses nièces, Roberta Cook et Ruth Estabrooks. [3] Le 5 janvier 2012, M. Estabrooks est décédé. [4] L’exécutrice testamentaire, Ruth Estabrooks, a déposé un avis de requête à la Cour du Banc de la Reine afin qu’une copie certifiée conforme du testament puisse être homologuée. Après avoir reçu les documents homologués, les filles ont déposé des oppositions ainsi qu’un

Avis de poursuite accompagné d’un exposé de la demande dans lequel elles sollicitaient des mesures de redressement conformément à la

Loi sur la provision pour personnes à charge , L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. P-22.3 (aujourd’hui L.R.N.-B. 2012, ch. 111), et faisaient valoir qu’elles avaient le droit de participer à la distribution de l’actif. Cette prétention insoutenable a été abandonnée à la suite de l’interrogatoire préalable et elles ont alors modifié leurs demandes afin de solliciter des mesures réparatoires au

titre de la

Loi sur la dévolution des successions , L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. D-9. (art. 23), pour le motif que M. Estabrooks avait eu l’intention de détruire son testament et était donc décédé intestat. [5] En février 2014, M. Cecil Shaw, un ami de M. Estabrooks, a fait une déposition dans le cadre d’une commission rogatoire conformément à la règle 53. M. Shaw a confirmé que M. Estabrooks lui avait confié qu’il avait accidentellement brûlé son testament, mais que cela ne l’inquiétait pas parce qu’il croyait qu’il en existait une copie qui se trouvait en la possession de son conseiller juridique.

Malgré ce témoignage et le fait qu’une offre de règlement amiable avait été déposée conformément à la règle 49, l’affaire a été instruite. [6] À l’issue de l’audience qui a duré six jours, le juge du procès a conclu qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve d’une intention révocatoire, que le testament avait été détruit par accident et qu’il était valide et il a rendu jugement en faveur des appelantes (les défenderesses au procès). Dans une autre décision datée du 23 juin 2015, il a attribué des dépens aux intimées (les défenderesses au procè

s) qui n’avaient pas eu gain de cause conformément au tarif « A », échelle 3 de la règle 59.08(1) des Règles de procédure , calculés d’après la valeur du reliquat de la succession, soit un montant clé de 870 000 $, plus les débours [TRADUCTION] « admissibles », et prélevés sur la masse successorale. [7] Les conclusions du juge du procès en ce qui concerne la validité du testament ne sont pas contestées.

Les appelantes prétendent, toutefois, que les dépens adjugés vont à l’encontre de la démarche en matière d’adjudication des dépens dans le cadre des litiges successoraux qui a été énoncée par notre Cour dans l’arrêt Breau c. La succession de Ernest St. Onge et autres , 2009 NBCA 36 , 345 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 101 , aux par. 60 à 62 . Elles sollicitent des dépens sur la base des frais entre avocat et client. [8] Les intimées ont formé un appel reconventionnel dans lequel elles prétendent que le juge du procès a commis une erreur en ne leur adjugeant pas les dépens sur la base des frais entre avocat et client.

Shirley Ann Macey, bien qu’elle soit désignée comme intimée, n’a pas pris part à l’instance. II. Questions en litige en appel [9] Les moyens d’appels sont longs; ils comptent environ trois pages et sont énoncés sous différents titres et sous-titres. Ramenés à l’essentiel, ils peuvent être résumés ainsi :

1) le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, ou une erreur mixte de droit et de fait, lorsqu’il a conclu que les intimées avaientdes motifs raisonnables et suffisants pour engager le litige; 2) le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, ou une erreur mixte de droit et de fait, parce qu’il a exercé son pouvoirdiscrétionnaire d’une façon inappropriée lorsqu’il a ordonné que des dépens soient payés aux intimées qui n’ont pas eu gain de cause; 3) le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, ou une erreur mixte de droit et de fait, lorsqu’il a conclu qu’il existait, d’après lesfaits de l’instance, des circonstances exceptionnelles qui l’autorisaient à déroger aux règles ordinaires concernant les conséquences surles dépens qui découlent du rejet d’une offre de règlement amiable; 4) le juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit, ou une erreur mixte de droit et de fait, parce qu’il a exercé son pouvoirdiscrétionnaire d’une façon inappropriée lorsqu’il a ordonné que des dépens soient payés aux intimées qui n’ont pas eu gain de cause etles actes suivants des intimées auraient dû donner lieu à une sanction sur le plan des dépens : a. elles ont mené le litige à terme alors qu’elles savaient, ou auraient dû savoir, à l’issue des formalités préalables au procès, que leurdemande était sans fondement; b. elles ont formulé de graves allégations d’abus d’influence et ont maintenu ces allégations alors qu’elles n’avaient pas été plaidées etqu’elles n’étaient pas fondées; c. elles ont refusé d’accepter une offre raisonnable de règlement amiable; d. elles n’ont pas convenablement évalué le bien-fondé de leurs prétentions au

titre de la

Loi sur la provision pour personnes àcharge, avant d’engager leur action et d’y donner suite; e. au procès, elles ont reconnu en contre-interrogatoire qu’elles avaient rendu un faux témoignage pendant l’interrogatoire préalable. 5) Les appelantes devraient se voir adjuger des dépens sur la base des frais entre avocat et client. III.

Les questions à trancher dans le cadre de l’appel reconventionnel [10] Les intimées prétendent qu’elles ont droit aux frais entre avocat et client pour ce qui concerne à la fois le procès et l’appelpour le motif que le juge du procès a lui-même fait entrave à l’exercice de son pouvoir discrétionnaire et que la décision de limiter lesdépens aux dépens entre parties est erronée. IV.

Norme de contrôle [11] Puisque l’adjudication des dépens relève d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, la règle générale qui veut que les décisions sur lesdépens commandent la déférence, en l’absence de toute erreur de droit ou erreur mixte de droit et de fait, est bien établie. Cetteimmunisation contre l’intervention en appel repose sur la reconnaissance du fait que les juges des procès sont les mieux placés pourévaluer les dépens et que leurs conclusions commandent donc à la déférence.

Dans l’arrêt Colombie-Britannique (Ministre des Forêts) c.Bande indienne Okanagan, 2003 CSC 71, [2003] 3 R.C.S. 371, le juge LeBel a réaffirmé et nuancé ce principe en disant que ce pouvoirdiscrétionnaire « doit » toutefois « être exercé de façon judicieuse » (par. 22). La règle générale relative à l’attribution des dépens doitêtre suivie à moins que les circonstances ne justifient une approche différente et il s’agit alors d’exceptions restrictives (par. 22). [12] Dans l’arrêt Acadia Marble, Tile & Terrazzo Ltd. c.

Oromocto Property Developments Ltd. (1998), (NB CA), 205 R.N.-B. (2e) 358, [1998] A.N.-B. no 412 (QL), le juge d’appel Drapeau (tel était alors son titre) a énoncé la règle généralelorsqu’il a dit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]La règle générale veut que la

partie qui a eu gain de cause ait droit aux dépens. On dit que « les dépens suivent l’issue de la cause ». Dans Distributeur Norbec Enrg. and Gagnon c. Daigle (Clarence) & Fils Ltée (1984), (NB CA), 57 R.N.-B. (2e) 269,[…] notre Cour a exprimé la règle de la façon suivante, à la page 277 :

[...] Ordinairement la

partie qui a gain de cause a droit à ses dépens, bien qu’il ne fait pas de doute que le juge peut exercer sa discrétion en les lui refusant. Mais cette discrétion doit toutefois être exercée conformément aux objectifs de la loi. [par. 35] [13] Dans l’arrêt Doucet et Dauphinee c.

Spielo Manufacturing Incorporated et Manship , 2011 NBCA 44 , 372 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 1 ; autorisation de pourvoi devant la Cour suprême refusée, [2011] C.S.C.R. n o 317, le juge d’appel Robertson, qui rendait jugement au nom de la Cour, a dit ceci : Il n’est besoin de rappeler à personne le principe de déférence envers les ordonnances de dépens.

L’intervention d’une instance d’appel n’est pas justifiée, à moins qu’il ne soit établi que le juge du procès a commis une erreur de principe ou fixé des dépens si élevés ou si faibles qu’il y a erreur manifeste. [par. 115] [14] Le juge d’appel Bell (tel était alors son titre), qui rendait jugement au nom de la Cour dans l’affaire L.T.G. c. C.J.G. , 2011 NBCA 12 , 369 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 202 , a complété l’énoncé qui précède : Il est élémentaire que les dépens suivent normalement l’issue de la cause. Si le juge du procès décide de s’écarter de cette règle, il est tenu de justifier cet écart : Dupuis c.

City of Moncton , 2005 NBCA 47 , 284 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 97 , par. 40 . Dans son ouvrage, The Law of Costs (Toronto : Canada Law Book Ltd., 1965), Orkin affirme : [TRADUCTION] Les principes fondamentaux des dépens entre parties veulent qu’ils soient accordés par la Cour pour indemniser la personne qui y a droit; ils ne sont pas imposés comme punition à la personne qui doit les payer.

Les dépens entre parties sont, en pratique, des dommages- intérêts accordés au plaideur qui a gain de cause comme dédommagement des frais qu’il lui a fallu engager par suite du litige. [p. 14] Évidemment, les observations d’Orkin ont été amplifiées dans la règle 59.02 des Règles de procédure du Nouveau-Brunswick. En fixant le montant des dépens en vertu de cette règle, le juge du procès peut considérer, en plus du fait qu’une

partie a eu gain de cause ou non, le montant de la poursuite et celui qui a été recouvré, le degré de complexité de l’instance, l’importance des questions en litige, toute conduite d’une

partie qui tend à prolonger la durée de l’instance ainsi que toute conduite injustifiée ou vexatoire. [par. 15 et 16] [15] Comme nous l’avons vu, le principe selon lequel les dépens suivent l’issue de la cause reflète la règle générale qui est appliquée dans le contentieux civil classique; des exceptions propres aux litiges successoraux ont toutefois vu le jour et évolué avec le temps. Des décisions plus anciennes sur ce point ont conclu que les parties à un litige successoral, qu’elles aient gain de cause ou non, avaient droit à des dépens leur apportant une indemnisation complète prélevés sur la succession.

Cette démarche a lentement évolué pour en arriver à l’attribution de dépens entre parties suivant le principe que le demandeur qui n’a pas gain de cause devrait recouvrer les frais qu’il a supportés aux fins du litige. La jurisprudence récente révèle une façon plus étroite et plus restrictive d’aborder l’attribution des dépens qui est particulière aux instances se rapportant à une succession.

Cette démarche « moderne » en matière de litiges successoraux confirme un changement de cap en faveur d’un recours à des considérations d’intérêt public pour la raison qu’une succession ne devrait pas supporter le coût d’un litige mal fondé. Le juge du procès doit maintenant « examiner attentivement » le fondement de la cause de la

partie contestataire afin de déterminer s’il y avait des motifs raisonnables et suffisants pour engager le litige et s’il existe des circonstances exceptionnelles qui justifient une dérogation à la règle générale. Pour pouvoir avoir gain de cause en l’espèce, les appelantes doivent établir que la décision du juge du procès d’accorder aux intimées les dépens entre parties jusqu’à la fin du litige n’était pas bien fondée. Des considérations semblables s’appliquent aux demandes des deux parties en vue d’obtenir des dépens sur la base des frais entre avocat et client. V. Analyse A.

Les dépens dans les instances en matière de succession [16] La règle historique concernant l’attribution des dépens dans les litiges successoraux a été établie dans l’arrêt Mitchell and Mitchell c. Gard and Kingwell (1863), 164 E.R. 1280 , sous la plume de sir J.P. Wilde, et dans la décision Spiers c. English , [1907] p. 122, que la Cour a suivie et appliquée dans l’arrêt Breau . Les dépens de la

partie déboutée seront payés par la succession si cette

partie

établit que le litige trouve son origine chez le testateur, que les bénéficiaires du reliquat étaient fautifs ou que le litige était nécessairepour pouvoir administrer convenablement la succession. Dans l’arrêt McDougald Estate c. Gooderham, (ON CA),[2005] O.J. No. 2432 (C.A.) (QL), la juge d’appel Gillese a fait observer que les tribunaux de première instance au Canada onttraditionnellement suivi la démarche adoptée par les tribunaux anglais (par. 78 et 79).

Dans l’arrêt McDougald, la Cour a conclu que lasuccession ne devrait pas supporter le coût des demandes mal fondées en l’absence d’éléments de preuve étayant la présence desexceptions susmentionnées. Certains facteurs additionnels comme la conduite de la

partie déboutée ou de son avocat, la proportionnalité,les attentes raisonnables et les offres de règlement amiable sont également considérés comme des facteurs pertinents pour la décisionfinale. Voir aussi l’ouvrage de Brian Schnurr, intitulé Estate Litigation, feuillets mobiles (consulté le 10 juin 2016), (Toronto : Carswell,2010). La conduite de la

partie qui n’a pas gain de cause ainsi que la signification d’une offre de règlement amiable, en l’espèce, sontexaminées plus en détail dans les présents motifs. [17] L’arrêt McDougald a été suivi dans l’arrêt Orfus Estate c. The Samuel and Bessie Orfus Family Foundation, 2013 ONCA 225,[2013] O.J. No. 1626 (QL), où le juge d’appel Laskin a dit ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION]Dans l’arrêt McDougald Estate c. Gooderham (2005), (ON CA), 255 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (C.A.

Ont.), notre Cour a ditque les règles régissant l’adjudication des dépens dans les instances civiles s’appliquent aux litiges successoraux à moins quen’interviennent une ou plusieurs considérations d’intérêt public.

La juge d’appel Gillese a fait état des considérations d’intérêt public enquestion au par. 78 : [TRADUCTION]Dans les litiges en matière successorale, la formule adoptée par les tribunaux anglais consiste à ordonner que les dépens de toutes lesparties soient payés sur la succession lorsque le litige a pris naissance par suite des actes du testateur, ou des personnes ayant un intérêtdans le reliquat de la succession, ou lorsque le litige était raisonnablement nécessaire pour garantir la bonne administration de lasuccession. Voir l’arrêt Mitchell c.

Gard (1863), 3 Sw. & Tr. 275, 164 E.R. 1280 et la décision Spiers c. English, [1907] P. 122]. Ce sontdes considérations ressortissant à l’intérêt public qui sous-tendent cette démarche : il importe que les tribunaux donnent effet à destestaments valides qui reflètent l’intention de testateurs capables. Lorsque les difficultés ou ambiguïtés qui sont à l’origine du litige sontimputables, en tout ou en partie, au testateur, il semble juste que le testateur, par l’intermédiaire de sa succession, supporte le coût engagépour résoudre les difficultés ou lever les ambiguïtés.

S’il existe des motifs raisonnables sur lesquels s’appuyer pour mettre en doutel’exécution du testament ou la capacité du testateur au moment où il a fait le testament, il est là encore dans l’intérêt public que cesquestions soient réglées sans que les personnes qui mettent en doute la validité du testament en supportent le coût. [par. 89] [18] La règle traditionnelle, savoir que les dépens de toutes les parties, qu’elles aient ou non gain de cause, sont payés par lasuccession, a été « écartée » dans l’arrêt McDougald (par. 80).

L’énoncé suivant qu’a fait la juge d’appel Gillese décrit la démarchemoderne de façon succincte : [TRADUCTION] « [L]’époque où les tribunaux ordonnaient systématiquement que les dépens de toutes lesparties soient prélevés sur la masse successorale à telle enseigne que les gens estimaient n’avoir rien à perdre à engager un litige en matière successorale est révolue » (par. 85). Mark M.

Orkin, dans son ouvrage intitulé The Law of Costs, 2e éd., vol. 1, feuillets mobiles(consulté le 10 juin 2016) (Toronto : Canada Law Book, 2016), ch. 2 au par. 219.3, énonce les exceptions aujourd’hui reconnues : [TRADUCTION]On a proposé l’adoption d’une règle générale voulant que dans les instances ressortissant à une succession, comme dans les autresinstances, les dépens de la

partie qui a gain de cause soient payés par la

partie qui n’a pas gain de cause et non par la succession, sauf sile testateur ou les bénéficiaires du reliquat étaient la cause du litige ou que le litige était raisonnablement nécessaire pour garantir labonne administration de la succession. [19] Dans l’arrêt Foster c. Boone, 2010 NBCA 11, 354 R.N.-B. (2e) 171, la Cour a accueilli l’appel en raison d’une ambiguïté auvu du testament.

Le juge d’appel Green, qui rendait jugement au nom de la Cour, a accordé aux parties déboutées les frais entre avocat etclient devant le tribunal d’instance inférieure et devant la Cour d’appel, ces frais devant être prélevés sur la succession (par. 30). Cettedécision s’accorde avec les motifs donnés dans Breau étant donné qu’il y avait une question légitime à trancher. Dans l’arrêt Goguen (Succession) c. Hachey, 2012 NBCA 56, 392 R.N.-B. (2e) 114, la décision du juge du procès de condamner les administratrices d’unesuccession à payer personnellement les dépens a été confirmée en appel.

Le juge d’appel Bell (tel était alors son titre), qui rendaitjugement au nom de la Cour, a conclu que les allégations d’abus d’influence et d’incapacité mentale ne trouvaient pas appui dans lapreuve et les administratrices ont été condamnées à payer conjointement les dépens en appel, lesquels ont été fixés à 3 500 $. Voir aussil’arrêt White c. Gicas, 2014 ONCA 490, [2014] O.J. No. 3036 (QL).

Dans cette affaire, l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de lacondamnation des appelantes à payer personnellement les dépens a été accordée et la Cour a ordonné que les dépens afférents à l’appelsoient payés par la succession pour le motif que la demande était fondée (par. 73 et 74).

[20] En résumé, dans le cas où une

partie engage une demande non fondée contre une succession, elle pourrait ne pas avoir droit àses dépens et elle pourrait être condamnée à payer les dépens du défendeur, soit sur la base des frais entre parties soit, dans certainescirconstances, sur la base des frais entre avocat et client. Non seulement cette démarche en matière de litiges successoraux protège lesintérêts de la succession et des bénéficiaires mais elle décourage aussi les litiges frivoles et le gaspillage inutile des ressources. [21] Les motifs donnés dans l’arrêt Breau sont compatibles avec l’énoncé qui précède.

L’affaire Breau se rapportait à certainsobjets personnels et à certaines sommes qui avaient été déposées dans un compte bancaire conjoint que les parties se disputaient. Ledéfendeur débouté avait été condamné à payer à la succession les dépens entre parties afférents au litige (par. 77). Les juges d’appelRobertson et Quigg, qui rendaient jugement au nom de la Cour, ont souscrit à la démarche moderne puisqu’ils ont dit ceci : « [U]ne règleselon laquelle la

partie perdante a droit à une indemnisation complète prélevée sur la masse successorale encouragerait tout simplementla croyance erronée qui veut que l’on n’ait rien à perdre à engager un litige » (par. 3). L’appel a été rejeté et les intimées se sont vuadjuger des dépens de 3 500 $ en appel (par. 78).

Dans l’arrêt Breau, la Cour a conclu que la règle générale voulant que les dépenssuivent l’issue de l’affaire s’applique, en l’absence des exceptions admises. [22] Ces exceptions comprennent notamment les situations où il existe un motif légitime de contester un testament, du fait peut-être d’un abus d’influence ou d’une absence de capacité de tester ou, subsidiairement, celles où il faut demander des éclaircissements à laCour en raison des actes du testateur ou de la testatrice. Lorsque la Cour conclut qu’il existait des motifs raisonnables et suffisants pourengager le litige, les dépens entre parties de la

partie déboutée sont généralement payés par la succession. La question de savoir si et dansquelles circonstances les frais entre avocat et client pourraient être adjugés n’a pas été examinée dans l’arrêt Breau puisque cette questionn’avait pas été soumise à la Cour (par. 77). [23] La Cour a toutefois entrouvert la porte lorsqu’elle a dit : « L’exception ne précise pas, toutefois, que la

partie perdante a droità une indemnisation totale prélevée sur la masse successorale. Cette question aussi relève du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Cour »(par. 56). S’appuyant sur l’arrêt Jumelle c. Soloway Estate, (MB CA), [1999] M.J. No. 443 (C.A.) (QL), la Cour afait observer que même s’il existait une raison valable d’engager une action contre une succession, la Cour conserve le pouvoirdiscrétionnaire de refuser d’accorder des dépens à une

partie quelle qu’elle soit : […] Finalement, dans l’affaire Jumelle c. Soloway Estate et al. (1999), (MB CA), 142 Man. R. (2d) 119 (C.A.),[1999] M.J. No. 443 (QL), la Cour d’appel du Manitoba avait devant elle une

partie perdante, l’épouse du testateur décédé, à qui onavait, au procès [[1999] M.J. No. 10], adjugé des dépens payables sur la masse successorale [[1999] M.J. No. 120]. La Cour d’appel aannulé les dépens ainsi adjugés pour le motif qu’une

partie qui intente une action à une succession dans des circonstances où le litige est[TRADUCTION] « sans fondement substantiel » est personnellement responsable du paiement des dépens de la

partie qui a gain decause (les dépens entre parties). Cette décision est importante parce qu’elle renforce la notion qui veut que même si l’instance est uneinstance qui relève d’une des exceptions reconnues à la règle générale, la cour conserve le pouvoir discrétionnaire de refuser des dépens àune partie, y compris celle qui n’a pas gain de cause.

La même observation vaut pour la décision suivante. [par. 63] [24] Dans l’arrêt Jumelle, la Cour d’appel du Manitoba avait annulé les dépens accordés par la juge du procès et avait conclu quedes parties qui engagent une action et qui sont déboutées peuvent être condamnées aux dépens lorsque la Cour conclut que leur actionétait mal fondée.

Cette question s’apparente à celle qui nous occupe en l’espèce puisque les appelantes prétendent que les intiméesauraient dû se désister de leur action à la suite de l’interrogatoire préalable ou, subsidiairement, après que des témoignages ont étérecueillis dans le cadre de la commission rogatoire. [25] Je conclus que les appelantes peuvent avoir gain de cause, en totalité ou en partie, s’il est établi que le juge du procès acommis une erreur dans son analyse en ce qui concerne les exceptions applicables dans les litiges en matière successorale, qu’il s’agissed’une omission de prendre en compte l’incidence de l’offre de règlement amiable (règle 49.09) ou du fait que l’analyse concernant lesdépens était défectueuse.

B. Les motifs raisonnables et suffisants [26] L’alinéa 15d) de la

Loi sur les testaments, L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. W-9, est ainsi rédigé :

A will or part of a will is revoked only by […] (

d) burning, tearing or otherwise destroying itby the testator or by some person in hispresence and by his direction with theintention of revoking it. Un testament n’est révoqué en tout ou partieque […]

d) dans le cas où le testateur ou un tiersagissant en sa présence et sous sa directionbrûle, lacère ou détruit de quelque autremanière le testament dans l’intention de lerévoquer. [27] En ce qui concerne ce moyen d’appel, les avocats qui représentent les appelantes en appel ont reconnu qu’il existait uneprésomption réfutable selon laquelle le testament de M. Estabrooks a été révoqué au moment de sa destruction, ce qui a donné auxintimées des motifs raisonnables et suffisants pour contester la va

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