2018 QCCQ 9369, 2018 QCCQ 9369

Zhou c. Bernier & Associés Syndic de faillite inc. 2018 QCCQ 9369 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU TOWN OF GATINEAU Civil Division No: 550-22-018839-181 DATE: December 20 th , 2018 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ FENG QIONG ZHOU Plaintiff v. BERNIER & ASSOCIÉS SYNDIC DE FAILLITE INC . Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT on an exception to dismiss (168 C.c.p) ______________________________________________________________________

[ 1 ] The Special clerk of the Superior Court, Me Ann-Laure Brouillette, rendered a judgment, on December 18 th 2017, ordering the Plaintiff, in a matter of bankruptcy, to pay to the Trustee (Defendant) an amount of 40 000$, thus suspending her discharge up until December 18, 2019. [ 2 ] The Plaintiff appealed from such Judgment. The appeal was rejected, on October 19 th , 2018, by the Honourable Pierre Dallaire, J.C.S. [1] [ 3 ] The Plaintiff introduced in front of the Court of Québec [2] , on November 21 st , 2018, an Application to the court in civil matters.

The Plaintiff claims from the Defendant, an amount of 50 000$ in damages, invoking, specifically the following grounds, which the Court will quote directly from her Application: 1. The defendant violated the Act 135 that accepted the fake creditor’s claim of the National Bank lawyer; 2. The defendant misled the plaintiff to proceed a wrong bankruptcy and cheated the plaintiff during the total bankruptcy process; 3.

The defendant didn’t provide the real key information relate to the plaintiff’s bankruptcy to the court and to the creditors; [ 4 ] Furthermore, the Plaintiff produces a Modified Application on December 2 nd , 2018, as it appears from the court file. [ 5 ] The Defendant submits, on December 14 th 2018, an Exception to dismiss based on

section 168 of the Code of civil procedure and on the lack of any prior authorization obtained by the Plaintiff as to such claim in damages against the Trustee Bernier et associés, in contradiction with

section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act [3] . (hereinafter the BIA ) [ 6 ] At the hearing on said Exception to dismiss, the Plaintiff confirms the following elements:

i) She did not obtain a prior authorization, from the relevant Court, granting her such authorization to sue the Defendant. She did not know that such authorization was necessary; ii) Her claim of 50 000$ relates to damages that would have been caused by the Defendant, acting as Trustee to her bankruptcy; iii) Such damages would have been caused by said Defendant because of its alleged negligence, dishonesty, lack of respect of the relevant ethics code and misconduct; [ 7 ] In essence, the Plaintiff submits that she should not have been “put into bankruptcy” and that the result of the process is the consequence of various faults committed by the Defendant, acting as Trustee. [ 8 ]

Section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is clear and provides as follows: No action against Superintendent, etc., without leave of court 215 Except by leave of the court, no action lies against the Superintendent, an official receiver, an interim receiver or a trustee with respect to any report made under, or any action taken pursuant to, this Act. [ 9 ] The virtue of such

section is duly explained by various authors:

Section 215 of the Act gives the court a “gatekeeper” function requiring anyone who wishes to commence an action [against] the Superintendant, Official Receiver, interim receiver, or trustee to obtain leave of the court with respect to any action taken under the Act. (…) Most lawsuits against trustees in bankruptcy will arise out of their administration, and therefore in their professional capacity. In these cases, leave is necessary. [4] [ 10 ] Justice Michel A. Pinsonnault, J.C.S. in the case of Les Hôtels HRH Ltée [5] , furthermore explains the role of

section 215 BIA in the following terms: [37] L’intention du législateur en rédigeant l’article 215 de la LFI était manifestement d’instaurer un système rapide et efficace visant à filtrer en quelque sorte les recours qu’une personne désirerait instituer, entre autres, contre un syndic ou un séquestre nommé par le Tribunal afin d’éliminer sans délai tout recours dénué d’un fondement juridique ou tout recours abusif, frivole ou vexatoire.

[11] The prior authorization, when it is necessary, is an essential one.[6] [12] As it was explained by the Court of Appeal in 2858-4665 Québec inc v. Sam Lévy etassociés inc[7]:

L'article 215 de la loi fait de la permission du tribunal une condition préalable à l'introductiond'une action contre le syndic relative «à tout rapport fait ou toute mesure prise conformément à laprésente loi». Cette disposition a pour but d'empêcher l'exercice de recours abusifs, frivoles ouvexatoires contre le syndic (596289 Saskatchewan Ltd. c. Pinder (1994), (SKQB), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 196 (Sask. Q.B.); Mancini (Trustee of) c. Falconi (1989), 76 C.B.R. (N.S.) 90(Ont. H.C.); Re Lemontzis : Morris c.

Pfeiffer & Pfeiffer Inc. (1983), 57 C.B.R. (N.S.) 274 (C.S.Qué.); Re Pelee Motors Inn Ltd. (No. 2) (1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 216 (Ont. S.C.)). Un examen de la jurisprudence (alors que la permission était recherchée ou, le défaut de l'obtenir,invoqué) permet de circonscrire la portée de cet article. On y remarque que la cause d'action esttoujours en relation avec des actes posés par le syndic agissant expressément en cette qualité: (…) - Faute ou négligence dans l'exercice de ses fonctions (Perez c. Deloitte & Touche Inc. (1998), (ON SC), 49 C.B.R. (3d) 242 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Chénier c.

Basile (1997), (BC SC), 42 C.B.R. (3d) 195 (C.S. C.-B.); Toronto Dominion Bank c. Alex L. ClarkLtd. (1994), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 6 (Ont. Gen. Div.)); - Faute ou négligence dans la vente des actifs de la faillite (Cirillo c. Royal Bank (1996), (ON SC), 39 C.B.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Re Chastan Ventures Ltd. (1994), (BC SC), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 115 (C.S. C.-B.); MacCulloch c. Price Waterhouse Ltd.(1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 48 (C.S.

N.-É.) – (infirmé pour d'autres motifs à 1993 NSCA 58 , (NS CA), 123 N.S.R. (2d) 351 (C.A.)); (…) [our emphasis] [13] In the current instance, the scope of the Plaintiff’s claim is clear and is confirmed, séancetenante, in front of the Court. She claims damages from the Trustee for various allegedprofessional misconducts as it relates to its handling of her own bankruptcy file. [14] Such claim clearly falls under the scope of

section 215 BIA. Consequently, a priorauthorization was to be obtained from the Superior Court.[8] [15] Considering the fact that such authorization was not obtained by the Plaintiff, theDefendant’s Exception to dismiss is well founded and must consequently be granted. [16] As discussed at the hearing[9], the rights of the Plaintiff, if any, will be reserved in theConclusions of the Judgment, as it appears hereinafter.

FOR THOSE REASONS, THE COURT: GRANTS the Defendant’s Exception to dismiss; DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s Application[10] because of the lack of prior authorization; RESERVES the rights and recourses, if any, of the Plaintiff; THE WHOLE, with court costs. __________________________________ STEVE GUÉNARD, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: December 18th 2018.