2014 QCCA 103, 2014 QCCA 103

Droit de la famille — 1468 2014 QCCA 103 COUR D'APPEL CANADA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC GREFFE DE MONTRÉAL N o : 500-09-023767-130 (500-04-059943-127) PROCÈS-VERBAL D'AUDIENCE DATE: 16 janvier 2014 CORAM: LES HONORABLES FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.C.A. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.C.A. CLAUDE C. GAGNON, J.C.A. APPELANTE AVOCAT(

S) M. H. Me Farzad Bigdeli-Azari Me Farzad Bigdeli, avocat INTIMÉ AVOCAT(

S) G. S. Personnellement

En appel d'un jugement rendu le 28 juin 2013 par l'honorable Eva Petras de la Cour supérieure, district de Montréal. Requête de l’appelante pour le rejet de l’exposé de l’intimé (Art. 2, 20, 45, 54.1, 499(1) et 192, 195, 501(2)(4.1) par analogie C.p.c . 7 R.p.fam. et 3c) par analogie, 74 R.c.a.) Requête pour permission de présenter une preuve nouvelle indispensable. (Art. 509 C.p.c.) NATURE DE L'APPEL : Famille Greffière: Marcelle Desmarais Salle: Antonio-Lamer AUDITION 10 h 25 Argumentation par Me Farzad Bigdeli-Azari. 10 h 27 La

partie appelante retire sa demande de présenter à

titre de preuve l'affidavit souscrit par Me Farzad Bigdeli-Azari. 10 h 49 Fin de l'argumentation de Me Bigdeli-Azari. 10 h 49 Suspension de la séance. 10 h 52 Reprise de la séance. PAR LA COUR: Arrêt unanime prononcé par l'honorable François Doyon, J.C.A. – voir page 3. Marcelle Desmarais Greffière d’audience PAR LA COUR:

Sur la requête pour permission de présenter une preuve nouvelle indispensable: [ 1 ] La requête est rejetée au motif que la requérante ne fait pas voir qu'il s'agit d'une preuve nouvelle indispensable, sans frais. Sur la requête pour le rejet de l'exposé de l'intimé: [ 2 ] La requête est rejetée, sans frais tout en soulignant que la Cour ne tiendra pas compte de faits qui n'ont pas été mis en preuve lors du procès.

JUDGMENT [ 3 ] The appellant, maternal grandmother of the child X, has inscribed in appeal a judgment of the Superior Court, rendered on June 28, 2013, dismissing her motion in which she sought a right of access to her grandson, who is 13 years old. [ 4 ] The respondent, who is father of the boy and son-in-law of the appellant, is opposed to the appellant having access rights. [ 5 ] According to the trial judge, there is no doubt that the appellant’s request was made in the best interest of the child.

Contrary to the appellant’s submission on appeal, however, the judge did not conclude that granting access rights would be in the child’s best interest, at least not at the present time. [ 6 ] The child’s mother, who suffered from mental illness, and his older brother, died in a fire at the mother’s home in November, 2011.

The boy managed to escape unharmed, but the respondent blames the mother’s family for the two deaths. [ 7 ] According to the respondent, members of the mother’s family were negligent in leaving the mother alone with the two children when she was not in a proper state to ensure their safety. [ 8 ] Since the fire, the relationship between the child and his grandmother has been practically non-existent. The child refuses to speak to her and does not want her to be granted access rights.

In point of fact, he is still in the process of grieving and wants no contact with his mother’s family. [ 9 ] After having considered all of the circumstances of the case, the trial judge concluded that the respondent was not in bad faith, even if he might have passed on some of his ill-feeling for his in-law’s family to his son.

The relationship between father and son is an excellent one and the granting of access rights would not be without consequence, as the judge explained: [26] The father's own feelings of loss and consequent anger are such that if the Court were to order regular access with the grandmother and the mother's family, this would place [X] into an untenable situation of conflict with his own father.

This would cause [X] even more intense stress, especially as [X] has indicated that he does not want such access. [32] […] However, the Court also believes that it would be detrimental to [X’s] present psychological and emotional state to order such access against his will. [ 10 ] Even though the judge recognized that contact between the child and his mother’s family could well be advantageous, she chose to take a more cautious approach by suggesting to the parties that they re-evaluate the situation in six months, at which time X’s period of bereavement should have progressed. [ 11 ] In the circumstances, the appellant has shown no error that would justify disturbing the trial judgment.

FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED REASONS , the Court: [ 12 ] DISMISSES the appeal, without costs given the nature of the dispute.

FRANÇOIS DOYON, J.C.A. NICHOLAS KASIRER, J.C.A. CLAUDE C. GAGNON, J.C.A.