Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society v. L.V., 2013 ONCJ 569

WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file: This is a case under

Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 45(7), 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—

(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (

c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.

(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—

(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(

c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. COURT FILE No.: 357-09 DATE: 2013-10-28 Citation: Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society v. L.V. , 2013 ONCJ 569 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: WINDSOR-ESSEX CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY, Applicant, — AND — L.V. and E.J., Respondents. Before Justice Barry M.

Tobin Heard on September 10 and 11, 2013 Ruling released on October 28, 2013 Mark Hurley ...................................................................................................... for the applicant L.V. .................................................................................................................... on her own behalf No appearance by or on behalf of ......................................................................................... E.J. Michael Frank………………………for the Children’s Lawyer, legal representative for the children

TOBIN J.: [1] The Society brought a motion pursuant to Rule 16, seeking a finding that the children, K.N.V. born ...1996 andM.D.A.V. born ...2001, remain in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(

i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(

g) of the Child and FamilyServices Act, (the Act). [2] The Society further requests an order that the two children be made wards of the Crown with access to the respondentmother. [3] The respondent mother, L.V., opposes the motion. [4] This motion was first returnable November 15, 2012. Because of the length of time it has taken for this matter to beargued, a brief explanation is necessary. [5] On the first return, the matter was not reached by the presiding judge. It was adjourned to November 19, 2012 todetermine whether L.V. would be filing material.

On that date, the matter was further adjourned to November 26, 2012 with thedirection that L.V. file her affidavit material by November 22, 2012. [6] On November 26, 2012, the motion was adjourned to February 5, 2013 for argument. [7] On February 5, 2013, L.V. asked that the matter be adjourned as she was attempting to retain counsel.

The matter wasadjourned to April 2, 2013 for argument, peremptory upon L.V. [8] L.V. did retain counsel and on April 2, 2013 the matter was adjourned at counsel's request to June 18, 2013 to allow herto prepare. [9] On June 18, 2013, L.V.'s counsel was removed as solicitor of record. The case was adjourned to June 21, 2013 so L.V.could determine when she would be able to argue the motion. [10] On June 21, 2013, the date for argument was scheduled and L.V. was given leave to provide her evidence orally. [11] The matter was argued on September 10 and 11, 2013.

L.V. was not represented by counsel. 1: L.V. – UNREPRESENTED BY COUNSEL [12] For much of the time this case has been ongoing, L.V. was unrepresented by counsel. [13] While able to articulate her position orally, L.V. had difficulty providing cogent evidence by way of affidavit.

Those shefiled were sparse and only barely put forward the evidence she needed to rely upon. [14] As an unrepresented litigant facing a very serious claim and possible consequences to her and her children, it wasnecessary to allow L.V. some procedural leeway in presenting her case. [15] I was mindful of the principles to be considered when an unrepresented litigant is before the court. These principles wereset out in Cicciarella v. Cicciarella (2009), (ON SCDC), 72 R.F.L. (6th) 319 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and more recently inBird v. Bird, 2013 SKQB 157. They were summarized in Cicciarella v.

Cicciarella, supra, at para. 45 as follows: "...in a trial where one party is represented by counsel and the other is not, a trial judge must balance the issues of fairness and bemindful of both parties. In doing so, a trial judge should exercise restraint and should maintain impartiality. While a trial judge maywish to exercise some leeway in procedural matters to the self-represented litigant, he or she must never become an advocate for the self-represented litigant.

Finally, a trial judge must not allow assistance to the self-represented litigant to result in the represented side's rightsbeing overridden." [16] These cases direct the trial judge to conduct a procedurally flexible hearing, but one that is fair to all parties. Theunrepresented litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard in an effective fashion. The other parties must not be prejudiced by anyleeway given. See also Family Law Rules, subrules 2(3)(

a) and (c). [17] L.V. was given leave to present her evidence on the motion orally. The reason for this was her obvious struggle inpresenting her evidence by way of affidavit. She was able to express herself clearly and forcefully when doing so orally rather than byway of affidavit. [18] In order to ensure this leeway given was not prejudicial to the Society or Children's Lawyer, both were given time toconduct oral questioning of L.V. before the hearing of the motion.

They were also given the opportunity to cross-examine L.V. onher oral evidence given on the hearing of the motion. [19] At the hearing of the motion, I engaged to the extent of explaining the process to be followed, the legal tests to be appliedand when necessary refocusing the evidence being provided so it would be directed to the issues raised in the case. My purpose inproceeding in this matter was to give L.V. the opportunity to provide her evidence on the issues raised, including the ability to answer oraddress the evidence of the Society. 2: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS –

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION [20] Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules permits a party to make a motion for

summary judgment. The following sub-rules in

Rule 16 are relevant to this case: When Available 16.

(1) After the respondent has served an answer or after the time for serving an answer has expired, a party may make a motion forsummary judgment for a final order without a trial on all or part of any claim made or any defence presented in the case. Evidence Required

(4) The party making the motion shall serve an affidavit or other evidence that sets out specific facts showing that there is no genuineissue requiring trial. Evidence of Responding Party

(4.1) In response to the affidavit or other evidence served by the party making the motion, the party responding to the motion maynot rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuineissue for trial. Evidence Not From Personal Knowledge

(5) If a party's evidence is not from a person who has personal knowledge of the facts in dispute, the court may draw conclusionsunfavourable to the party. No Issue for Trial

(6) If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make a final order accordingly. [21] Rule 16(6) is mandatory: If the court concludes that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim, the court shallmake a final order accordingly. [22] On a motion for

summary judgment, the court is required to take a hard look at the merits of the case to determine if thereis a genuine issue for trial. The onus is on the Society to show that there is no genuine issue for trial. See Children’s Aid Society ofHamilton v. M.N., (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 1526 (Ont. S.C.J.). [23]

Summary judgment should proceed with caution. It is not, however, limited to or granted only in the clearest of cases. Thecourt must ensure the best interests of the children are adequately addressed on the available evidence. If the evidence does not raise atriable issue as to where the best interests lie, those best interests themselves call for a resolution without the delay associated with thetrial and the resulting prolongation of the state of uncertainty about the children’s future. See Jewish Child and Family Services ofToronto v. A.(R.), [2001] O.J. No. 47 (Ont. S.C.J.). [24] Courts should be very cautious in granting

summary judgment in child protection cases since the stakes for the family areso high and the granting of

summary judgment deprives the parent of his or her day in court and the procedural safeguard of cross-examination of witnesses before a judge. See C.R. v Children’s Aid Society of the District of Thunder Bay, 2013 ONSC 1357. [25] The responding party, faced with a prima facie case for

summary judgment, must provide evidence of specific factsshowing that there is a genuine issue for trial. In other words, once the moving party shows there is no genuine issue for trial theresponding party must prove that his or her defence has a real chance of success. [26] Mere allegations or blanket denials, or self-serving evidence not supported by specific facts showing that there is agenuine issue for trial, are insufficient to defeat a claim for

summary judgment. See Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v.A.(M.), (ON CJ), [2002] O.J. No. 2371 (Ont. C.J.). [27] The court is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence that the parties would present at trial. SeeToronto-Dominion Bank v. Hylton, 2012 ONCA 614 at para. 5. [28] In determining if there is sufficient evidence led by the parent, the question is not whether there is any evidence tosupport their position, but whether the evidence is sufficient to support a trial. See C.A.S. Dufferin v. J.R., (ON CJ),[2002] O.J.

No. 4319. [29] In interpreting Rule 16, Rule 2 of the Family Law Rules must be considered. As well, reference to subsection 1(1) of theAct – which provides that the paramount purpose of the Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children – isnecessary to the

interpretation of the Act. See Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.W., (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No.220. 3: EVIDENCE CONSIDERED [30] I have read and rely upon the following documents: (

a) Affidavits of Marie Bondy, sworn November 8, 2012 and July 30, 2013; (

b) A transcript of questioning of L.V. taken July 29, 2013; and (

c) With the consent of counsel for the Society and Children; a letter dated January 19, 2013 signed by R. G. J. and the

affidavits of L.V. sworn January 31 and March 21, 2013. [ 31 ] I also considered the oral evidence given by L.V. at the hearing of the motion. 4: LITIGATION HISTORY [ 32 ] L.V. is the mother of the two children, K.N.V. and M.D.A.V. Service upon K.'s biological father was dispensed with by Order of Phillips J., dated December 29, 2011. The biological father of M.D.A.V. is unknown. There are no other persons considered to be a parent to the children as defined in the Act . [ 33 ] On July 8, 2011, Justice Phillips found the children were in need of protection under subclauses 37(2)(b)(

i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(

g) of the Act . The children were made wards of the Society for a period of four months. The bases of the findings were as follows: (

a) Historical concerns related to L.V.'s mental health; (

b) Adult conflict between L.V. and her extended family members; (

c) Dental neglect of the children; (

d) Non-compliance with home schooling requirements; (

e) The home environment put the children at risk; and (

f) The report of Dr. Janet Orchard who psychologically assessed the children found they presented with emotional issues as a result of their problematic relationship with their mother. [ 34 ] As part of the plan of care adopted by the court, L.V. was to attend for a parenting capacity assessment and follow all reasonable recommendations resulting from this assessment. As well, she was to sign releases as requested by the Society in order to allow it to monitor terms of the plan of care. [ 35 ] The Society's status review application initiated in respect of Justice Phillips' order was issued October 4, 2011.

K.N.V. was then 15 years of age and M.D.A.V. was 10. The Society sought the same finding and relief as in this motion: that the children remain in need of protection and that they be made wards of the Crown with access to L.V. [ 36 ] L.V. filed her answer and plan of care seeking an order returning the two children to her care. [ 37 ] As set out above, the Society's motion for

summary judgment was filed November 13, 2012. 5: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS – CONTINUED FINDING CHILDREN ARE IN NEED OF PROTECTION [ 38 ] The Society seeks a finding that the children are in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(

b) and (

g) of the Act . These clauses are as follows: 37(2) A child is in need of protection where, ... (

b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person's, (

i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or (ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child. ... (

g) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (

v) resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child's parent or the person having charge of the child. [ 39 ] Clause 37(2)(

f) provides: 37(2) A child is in need of protection where,… (

f) the child has suffered emotional harm, demonstrated by serious, (

i) anxiety, (ii) depression, (iii) withdrawal, (iv) self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or

(

v) delayed development, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the emotional harm suffered by the child results from the actions, failure toact or pattern of neglect on the part of the child's parent or the person having charge of the child. [40] Child protection proceedings are unlike ordinary civil litigation as the court can choose a flexible approach that wouldadmit evidence arising at any time up to the date of court hearing, subject to disclosure to all parties, in considering whether a child is inneed of protection. See Children's Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. K.R. and C.W., [2001] O.J.

No. 5754 (Ont. S.C.J. F.C.) Thisis applicable here as the children have been in care for almost three years. 5.1: Clause 37(2)(b) – Risk of Physical Harm [41] The risk of physical harm means real, not speculative, risk. The Society does not need to prove an intention to causephysical harm as a pre-requisite to a finding under this clause. See Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. P.(T.), (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 412. [42] Failure to address the risks that lead to the finding that the children were in need of protection can support a finding theyremain in need of protection on the same basis.

If risk has not been addressed in a meaningful way or through the passage of time, therisk, previously found, continues. The risk remains real. [43] L.V. did not participate in a parenting capacity assessment since this expectation was articulated in the plan of careadopted by Justice Phillips when he made his order of July 8, 2011. She avoided attempts to have the assessment completed.

Thoughstating she would do so now, no specifics were given to suggest that this would be the case. [44] The Society's evidence, which was not contradicted, is that it is not able to determine whether L.V. has addressed themental health concerns identified when the children were found to be in need of protection. I accept this evidence. [45] L.V., as a party answering a motion for

summary judgment, must put her best foot forward showing there is a genuineissue for trial. She was given a considerable period of time to do so. As well, at the motion she was able to give her evidence orally, justas she would at a trial. L.V. did not provide evidence that she addressed the mental health concerns. She has had over two years toparticipate in a parenting capacity assessment as arranged by the Society but has not done so.

She did not provide evidence that shesought out, participated in and benefitted from counselling or other mental health treatment. [46] There is no evidence the finding made by Justice Phillips based on L.V.'s then outstanding medical health concerns, hasbeen addressed. [47] I find therefore the Society has met its onus in demonstrating that the children remain in need of protection undersubclauses 37(2)(b)(

i) and (ii). L.V. has not put forward evidence that requires a trial to determine material facts relative to this issue. [48] There is no need for a trial to establish the material facts necessary for the determination of this finding. 5.2: Clause 37(2)(g) – Risk of Emotional Harm [49] Justice Phillips found that the psychological assessments prepared by Dr. Janet Orchard contained evidence sufficient tosupport a finding under clause 37(2)(

g) as "both [children presented] with emotional issues as a result of their problematic relationshipwith the respondent mother." [50] In Ms. Bondy's affidavit of November 8, 2012, she deposed that L.V. last attended for access with the children on July 15,2011. L.V. stopped attending because of an incident that occurred on that date. She brought a birthday present to access to give to herson. Doing so was against Society rules for access. L.V. protested. Police were summoned.

L.V.’s evidence was that she was treateddisrespectfully and unnecessarily roughly by the police. [51] Following this incident she did not return for access but did speak with the children regularly on the telephone. [52] In Ms. Bondy's second affidavit of July 26, 2013, she deposed that she and L.V. arranged for a supervised visit betweenL.V. and M.D.A.V on M.D.A.V.'s birthday. This occurred at the Society's office. K.N.V. did not attend. Interaction between L.V. andM.D.A.V. was appropriate and no issues were observed by Ms. Bondy during the visit. [53] A second visit with M.D.A.V. occurred on May 9, 2013.

Again, there were no concerns noted and Ms. Bondy observedthe interaction between M.D.A.V. and her mother to be positive. Access visits with M.D.A.V. have continued, most recently supervisedat the Windsor Art Gallery. No problems have been observed during these visits. [54] On July 24, 2013, K.N.V. attended at a meeting at the Society with Ms. Bondy, L.V. and the children's services worker. Ms. Bondy observed that K.N.V. appeared uncomfortable at this meeting. K.N.V. assured his mother that he was fine and that he lovedher.

I admitted and considered the statements of the child under the state of mind exception for the hearsay rule. They were offered bythe Society and not challenged by L.V. [55] In the Dr. Orchard report, referred to at paragraph 34 footnote 10 of Justice Phillips' reasons, it states that, "[K.N.V.]loves [his mother] and knows she loves him but he is tormented by the anger he feels toward her. He perceives her as having failed himand as having mistreated him tremendously. He feels resentful and terribly hurt.

He has a tendency to internalize these emotions andtherefore is vulnerable to depression and low self-esteem." [56] In the Dr. Orchard report concerning M.D.A.V., referred to at paragraph 35 footnote 11 of the decision, it states that hersocial and emotional functioning reflect, "...her awareness of past difficulties in her relationship with her mother and in the care giving

she experienced." [57] These facts grounded the clause 37(2)(

g) finding made by Justice Phillips. [58] In this case there is no evidence that L.V. has addressed in a meaningful way the behaviours that gave rise to the findingat first instance based on clause 37(2)(g). [59] L.V.'s failure to address her mental health supports a finding that the risk to the children under 37(2)(

g) remains real. During this hearing, L.V. struggled, sometimes without success, to control her emotions when talking about past events and whenlistening to counsel's submissions. Argument of the motion was adjourned overnight so she could compose herself and have time toprepare her submissions. [60] Both K.N.V. and M.D.A.V. are at risk of emotional harm, as originally described by Dr. Orchard, by reason of theirmother not addressing in a meaningful way her mental health. [61] On this basis, I find the children remain in need of protection under clause 37(2)(g).

The Society met its onus and L.V.did not provide specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for hearing in relation to this finding. I find there is no need for a hearingto establish material facts necessary to the determination of a finding under clause 37(2)(g). 6: DISPOSITION: THE STATUTORY PATHWAY [62] The Act provides a statutory pathway that is to be followed in a child protection application. See L.(R.) v. Children’s AidSociety of Metropolitan Toronto, (ON SC), [1995] O.J. 119. [63] The starting point in determining the proper disposition is to consider ss. 57(1).

If the children remain in need ofprotection the court must then determine if a court order is necessary to protect the children in the future: See CFSA ss. 57(1) and (9). [64] For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the children remain in need of protection and an order is necessary toprotect the children in the future. [65] The next step is to consider which one of the orders under ss. 57(1), paras 1, 2, 3 or 4 or s. 57.1 should be made in thebest interests of the children. It is necessary to consider the circumstances enumerated in CFSA ss. 37(3) when determining thechildren’s best interests.

See CFSA ss. 57(1). [66] The court must consider what efforts the Society or another Society or person has made to assist the children before theintervention under

Part III of the CFSA. See CFSA ss. 57(2). [67] Before making an order removing the children from the parents, the court must enquire into the least disruptivealternatives that would adequately protect the children. See CFSA ss. 57(3). [68] If the children are to be removed from a parent's care, the court is to consider whether there are family or communityplacements before making a society or Crown wardship order. See CFSA ss. 57 (4). [69] I am also guided by the following. [70] A Crown wardship order is the most profound order that a court can make.

To take someone’s children from them is apower that a judge must exercise only with the highest degree of caution and only on the basis of compelling evidence and only after acareful examination of possible alternative remedies. See Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. Jill G.-T. (1996), 90O.A.C. 5, 23 R.F.L. (4th) 79, [1996] O.J. No. 1394, 1996 CarswellOnt 1428 (Ont. Div. Ct.). [71] When determining whether an order of Crown wardship is an appropriate disposition, the issue is not whether thechildren will be better off with parents other than the natural parents.

The issue is whether the children will receive a level of parentingcare that is below the minimum standard tolerated by our community. See Sask. Minister of Social Services v. E.(S.), (SK KB), [1992] 5 W.W.R. 289 (Sask.Q.B.) and Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A.(N.), 2010 CarswellOnt 11079 at para. 311 6.1: Material Facts Relating to Disposition [72] The children have been in care of the Society since November 25, 2009. This being the case the option of a continuedSociety wardship order is not available. See C.F.S.A. s. 70. [73] The two plans presented on this

Summary Judgment Motion are the Society's for Crown wardship with access and L.V.'sfor return of the children to her care without or in the alternative with supervision. [74] The Society's plan of care dated November 3, 2011 sets forth the services it intended to provide to L.V. Though the planis dated it remains, on the evidence, an appropriate one in the circumstances of this case. It is a proper plan as required by s. 56 of theAct. [75] There is no doubt that L.V. loves her children profoundly. They are always on her mind and she misses them. She wantsmore time to see if they can be returned to her care.

However, permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to the children's needsrequires that legal process not be used as a strategy to allow a parent time to develop the ability to parent. In this case, much time hasbeen provided to L.V. but to no avail. L.V. has not cooperated with the Society so services could be ascertained and implemented toassist her in having the children returned safely to her care.

[76] In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression ofa parent's desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from the parent's evidence that she faces somebetter prospects than what existed at the time of the removal of the child from her care and that she has developed new abilities as aparent. See Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.(H.), (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. C.J.) This is the casehere.

L.V. offered no evidence she would parent any differently than she did when the children were apprehended. She has not engagedin any services that could lead to any other conclusion. [77] The children are in the care of their maternal aunt and uncle. They have been there for some time and the Society iscommitted to maintaining this placement for the children. The evidence is uncontradicted that the children have and continue to thrive inthis placement. They are doing well academically, socially and behaviourally. K.N.V. attends bi-weekly and sometimes weeklycounselling.

M.D.A.V. is not in counselling as it has not been seen necessary that she do so. Both children have integrated into thefamily of relatives with whom they now reside. [78] The children's needs; physical, mental and emotional, are being met in their current placement. In their currentplacement, they will continue to have continuity of care by family members.

Their counsel expressed no reservations with respect to therelief sought by the Society and to that limited extent I consider this to be consistent with their views and wishes. [79] As Justice Pazaretz stated at para. 43 of Children's Aid Society of Niagara Region v. S.(C)., (ON SC),[2008] O.J. No. 3969 (Ont. S.C.), "No genuine issue for trial exists where there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that assought by the applicant." This is the case here. [80] I find on the evidence that it is in the best interests of the children that they be made wards of the Crown.

A hearing isnot required to determine any material facts with respect to this disposition sought by the Society. 6.2: Access by the mother [81] I now turn to the issue of access. [82] The Act provides at Subsection 59(2.1) that Court shall terminate access with a Crown Ward unless the relationshipbetween the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful for the child. [83] A person claiming access has the onus of meeting, on the balance of probabilities, that access would be meaningful andbeneficial.

The opportunity to be adopted is not a factor in this case. [84] In Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region v. J.C., R.R. and S.B., (ON SCDC), [2007] O.J. No. 1058,the Divisional Court stated: [29] “Beneficial" has been held to mean "advantageous". "Meaningful" has been held to mean "significant" (Children's Aid Societyof the Niagara Region v. M.J., supra, at para. 45). The person seeking access must prove that her relationship with the child brings asignificant positive advantage to the child.

The only positive factors which the trial judge identified in regard to the mother's relationshipwith the children at the time of trial was that she loved the children, the children loved her, and through her access she conveyed to thechildren that she loved them and wanted to be part of their lives. Standing alone, these findings were inadequate to satisfy therequirement that the relationship between the children and their mother was "beneficial" within the meaning of s. 59(2)(

a) of the Act.More is required than love, the display of love, the fact that the mother had cared for the children in the past, the fact that the mother wasthe biological parent, and the fact that some visits were pleasant, especially when various negative factors impacting on the children'semotional health, were identified.” [85] The Society and counsel for the children support a finding that access be ordered in this case. K.N.V. is 17 years of ageand should have the opportunity to have access with his mother subject to his wishes.

M.D.A.V. has resumed supervised access visitswith her mother and the observations of the worker are that these visits have been positive. [86] I find that access by the mother is beneficial and meaningful to the children.

Given their ages, their views and wishes areto be given serious consideration. [87] I am satisfied the evidence supports a finding that access between L.V. and the children is beneficial and meaningful tothem and that it is in their best interests. 7: ORDER [88] The children K.N.V., born July 15, 1996, and M.D.A.V., born April 18, 2001, are found to remain in need of protectionunder subclauses 37(2)(b)(

i) and (ii) and clause 37(2)(

g) of the Act. [89] The children are made wards of the Crown and placed in the care of the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society. [90] The respondent, L.V., shall have access with the children a minimum of one time per month for a minimum of two hoursper visit, to be supervised by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society, or a third party approved by it, and such access shall be inaccordance with the wishes of each child. [91] The children shall have access to the respondent, L.V., a minimum of one time per month for a minimum of two hours pervisit, to be supervised by the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society, or a third party approved by it, and such access shall be inaccordance with the wishes of the children. [92] The respondent mother L.V. shall be permitted to call the children every Wednesday sometime between 4:00 p.m. and7:00 p.m.

[ 93 ] A child may call the respondent mother at any time, in accordance with his or her wishes. [ 94 ] There is no need for a trial to establish the material facts that are necessary to the determination of the application of the Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society. Released: October 28, 2013 "original signed and released" Barry M. Tobin Justice