Delphina Bouvier Applicant - v. -, 2020 SKPC 4

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN CIVIL DIVISION Citation: 2020 SKPC 4 Date: January 16, 2020 Location: Meadow Lake _____________________________________________________________________________ In the matter of an application pursuant to sub- clause 166(2) (b)(ii) of The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010 , SS 2010, c N-5.2 Between: Delphina Bouvier Applicant - and - Nadine Couillonneur, Shirley Couillonneur, and Ruby Couillonneur Respondents Benjamin J.

Partyka For the Applicant Ron Cherkewich For the Respondents, Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur Unrepresented Ruby Couillonneur _____________________________________________________________________________ DECISION L.W. S TANG, J

_____________________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Applicant is a voter in the Northern Village of Cole Bay, Saskatchewan [Cole Bay]. She has also been an employee of Cole Bay for many years with the title of Acting Clerk. At the times material to this application the Respondent, Nadine Couillonneur, was the Mayor of Cole Bay, and the other Respondents where councillors on Cole Bay’s municipal council.

In her application, the Applicant alleges that during the time period of January 31, 2017 to May 7, 2018 the Respondents, while in attendance at Cole Bay municipal council meetings, discussed and voted on numerous matters for which they had conflicts of interest.

More specifically, she alleges that the Respondents failed to declare these conflicts of interest and failed to take the other steps required of them pursuant to sub- section 162(1) of The Northern Municipalities Act, 2010 , SS 2010, c N-5.2 . [ Act ]. [ 2 ] In light of the alleged conflicts of interest the Applicant has applied to this court, pursuant to sub- clause 166(2) (b)(ii) of the Act , for an order declaring the Respondents to be disqualified from Cole Bay’s municipal council.

It should be noted when the Applicant initiated these proceedings she did so by filing three separate applications each pertaining to one of the Respondents. These applications were virtually identical to each other. During the pre-hearing process, it was decided that it would be appropriate to hold one hearing to jointly deal with all three applications. This is how the hearing proceeded and consequently I consider the three separate applications to be joined.

They will thus be referred to in this decision as one application, for which the court is issuing this one decision. [ 3 ] The Respondents, Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur, [the Two Respondents] oppose the application on several basis. Firstly, they contest the validity of the purported resolution of the Cole Bay municipal council, made on June 18, 2018, declaring the Respondents to be disqualified and their offices vacated. Secondly, they seek an order dismissing the application on the basis that the evidence presented at the hearing does not support the alleged disqualifications.

Thirdly, they submit that if the court finds a valid disqualification of one or both of them, then pursuant to

section 167 of the Act , such disqualification(

s) should be set aside and a declaration made that the offices held by these two Respondents are not vacated. [ 4 ] The Respondent, Ruby Couillonneur, did not respond to the application in any way and did not participate in the two-day hearing held on October 21 and 22, 2019 in Meadow Lake, Saskatchewan. THE LAW [ 5 ] The Application is brought to this court pursuant to sub- clause 166(2) (b)(ii) of the Act . It and other relevant provisions of the Act are: Quorum 112

(1) Except as provided in this or any other Act , the quorum of a council is the majority of the members of the council.

(2) No act or proceeding of a council that is adopted at any meeting of the council at which a quorum is not present is valid.

PART VII Conflicts of Interest of Members of Council

Interpretation of

Part 159 In this Part: (a) “closely connected person” means the agent, business partner, family or employer of a member of council; (b) “controlling interest” means an interest that a person has in a corporation if the person beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, or exercises control or direction over shares of the corporation carrying more than 25% of the voting rights attached to all issued shares of the corporation;

(b. 1 ) “council, council committee, controlled corporation or other body” includes any committee or subcommittee of a committee, and any board, agency or commission, appeal board or other body, on which a member of council serves in his or her capacity as a member of council; (c) “family” means the spouse and dependent children of a member of council; (c. 1 .) “meeting” includes any regular, special, emergency or other meeting of a council, council committee, controlled corporation or other body, whether formal or informal; (d) “senior officer” means the chairperson or vice-chairperson of the board of directors, the president, any vice-president, the secretary, the treasurer or the general manager of a corporation or any other person who performs functions for the corporation similar to those normally performed by a person occupying any of those offices.

Conflict of interest 159.1(1) A member of council has a conflict of interest if the member makes a decision or participates in making a decision in the execution of his or her office and at the same time knows or ought reasonably to know that in the making of the decision there is the opportunity to further his or her private interests or the private interests of a closely connected person.

(2) A financial interest as described in subsection 161(1) always constitutes a conflict of interest.

(3) Every member of council shall comply with any prescribed standards, procedures and rules in relation to a conflict of interest or a declaration of a conflict of interest.

(4) Nothing in this

Part is to be interpreted as affecting any other rights given by, or the application of other requirements, duties or responsibilities imposed by, any other Act or law in relation to the matters covered by this Part.

(5) For the purposes of this section, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations respecting the standards, procedures and rules in relation to a conflict of interest . . . . Financial interest 161

(1) Subject to subsection (2), a member of council has a financial interest in a matter if: (

a) the member or someone in the member’s family has a controlling interest in, or is a director or senior officer of, a corporation that could make a financial profit from or be adversely affected financially by a decision of council, a council committee, a controlled corporation, a municipal development corporation or other body established by the council; or (

b) the member of council or a closely connected person could make a financial profit from or be adversely affected financially by a decision of council, a council committee, a controlled corporation, a municipal development corporation or other body established by the council pursuant to clause 100(a).

(2) A member of council does not have a financial interest by reason only of any interest:

(

a) that the member or a closely connected person may have as a voter, taxpayer or utility customer of the municipality; (

b) that the member or a closely connected person may have by reason of being appointed: (

i) by the council as a director of a company incorporated for the purpose of carrying on business for and on behalf of the municipality; or (ii) as the representative of the council on another body; (

c) that the member or a closely connected person may have with respect to any allowance, honorarium, remuneration or benefit to which the member or person may be entitled by being appointed by the council to a position described in clause (b); (

d) that the member may have with respect to any allowance, honorarium, remuneration or benefit to which the member may be entitled by being a member of council; (

e) that the member or a closely connected person may have by being employed by the Government of Canada, the Government of Saskatchewan or a federal or provincial Crown corporation or agency, except with respect to a matter directly affecting the ministry, corporation or agency of which the member or person is an employee; (

f) that someone in the member’s family may have by having an employer, other than the municipality, that is monetarily affected by a decision of the municipality; (

g) that the member or a closely connected person may have by being a member or director of a non-profit organization as defined in

section 170 or a service club; (

h) that the member or a closely connected person may have: (

i) by being appointed as the volunteer chief or other volunteer officer of a fire or ambulance service or emergency measures organization or other volunteer organization or service; or (ii) by reason of remuneration received as a volunteer member of any of those voluntary organizations or services; (

i) that the member or a closely connected person may hold in common with the majority of voters of the municipality or, if the matter affects only part of the municipality, with the majority of voters in that part; (

j) that is so remote or insignificant that it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to influence the member of council; (

k) that the member may have by discussing or voting on a bylaw that applies to businesses or business activities when the member or a closely connected person has an interest in a business, unless the only business affected by the bylaw is the business of the member or closely connected person; or (

l) that the member may have by being the publisher of a newspaper who publishes advertisements for or on behalf of the municipality in that newspaper, as long as only the regular advertising rate is charged and the advertisement before council for consideration is for a notice or other matter required by statute or regulation to be published in a newspaper.

(3) Clauses (2)(

g) and (

h) do not apply to a member of council who is an employee of an organization, club or service mentioned in those clauses. Disclosure of conflict of interest 162

(1) If a member of council has a conflict of interest in a matter before the council, a council committee, a controlled corporation or other body, the member shall, if present: (

a) before any consideration or discussion of the matter, declare that he or she has a conflict of interest; (

b) disclose the general nature of the conflict of interest and any material details that could reasonably be perceived to affect the member’s impartiality in the exercise of his or her office; (

c) abstain from voting on any question, decision, recommendation or other action to be taken relating to the matter; (

d) subject to subsection (4), refrain from participating in any discussion relating to the matter; and (

e) subject to subsections (3) and (4), leave the room in which the meeting is being held until discussion and voting on the matter are concluded.

(2) No member of a council shall attempt in any way, whether before, during or after the meeting, to influence the discussion or voting on any question, decision, recommendation or other action to be taken involving a matter in which the member of council has a conflict of interest.

(3) If the matter with respect to which a member of council has a conflict of interest is the payment of an account for which funds have previously been committed and the payment is the amount previously approved, the member shall comply with clauses (1) (

a) to (d), but it is not necessary for the member to leave the room.

(4) If the matter with respect to which a member of council has a conflict of interest is a question on which, pursuant to this Act or another enactment, the member, as a taxpayer, voter or owner, has a right to be heard by the council: (

a) the member shall leave his or her place at the council table, but is not required to leave the room; and (

b) the member may exercise a right to be heard in the same manner as a person who is not a member of the council.

(5) Every declaration of a conflict of interest made pursuant to subsection (1) and the general nature and material details of the declaration and any abstention or withdrawal must be recorded in the minutes of the meeting.

(6) On a declaration in accordance with clause (1) (a), the person presiding at the meeting with respect to the matter shall ensure that the other requirements of this

section are followed with respect to the member of council. . . . Effect of conflict of interest on resolutions or bylaws

(1) Subject to subsection (2), if a contravention of

section 162 occurs at a meeting to which that

section applies, the proceedings related to the matter are not invalidated, but the council or other body may, within three years after the day on which a bylaw or resolution was passed or a decision was made, declare the bylaw, resolution or decision to be void. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a Development Appeals Board or a planning commission established pursuant to The Planning and Development Act, 2007 . Effect of conflict of interest on quorum 164

(1) Any member of a council who declares a conflict of interest pursuant to

section 162 is not to be counted for the purpose of determining whether a quorum of the council is present when the question or matter is put to a vote.

(2) If the number of members of council declaring a conflict of interest on a matter pursuant to

section 162 results in a loss of quorum at a meeting with respect to the question or matter, the remaining number of members is deemed to be a quorum for that question or matter, unless that number is less than two.

(3) When all, or all but one, of the members of a council have declared a conflict of interest in a matter pursuant to

section 162, the council may, by resolution, apply without notice to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, or to a provincial court judge in the prescribed manner, for an order authorizing the council to give consideration to, discuss and vote on that question or matter.

(4) On an application brought pursuant to subsection (3), the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, may issue an order declaring that

section 162 does not apply to all or any of the members of the council with respect to the question or matter in relation to which the application is brought.

(5) If a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or a provincial court judge, as the case may be, issues an order pursuant to subsection (4), the council may give consideration to, discuss and vote on the question or matter as if those members had no conflict of interest in the question or matter, subject to any conditions and directions that the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, may state in the order.

PART VIII Disqualification of Members of Council Reasons for disqualification 165

(1) A member of council is disqualified from council if the member: (

a) when nominated, was not eligible for nomination or election as a candidate pursuant to The Local Government Election Act, 2015 ; (

b) ceases to be eligible for nomination or election or to hold office pursuant to The Local Government Election Act, 2015 or any other Act ; (

c) is absent from all regular council meetings held during any period of three consecutive months during which at least two meetings of the council have been held, starting with the date that the first meeting is missed, unless the absence is authorized by a resolution of council; (

d) is convicted while in office of any indictable offence;

(

e) contravenes: (

i) a bylaw passed pursuant to

section 34 of The Local Government Election Act, 2015 ; or (ii)

section 160 or 162 of this Act ; (

f) is determined to have made a false statement or declaration in the nomination paper filed in accordance with The Local Government Election Act, 2015 ; or (

g) is removed from office by the minister or by the Lieutenant Governor in Council pursuant to

section 420 or 424, as the case may be, unless the order directs that the person is not disqualified.

(2) A member of council who is disqualified from council pursuant to this

section is not eligible to be nominated or elected in an election in any municipality until the earlier of: (a) 12 years following the date of the disqualification; and (

b) the date of any pardon obtained with respect to a disqualification pursuant to a conviction pursuant to clause (1) (d). Enforcement of disqualification 166

(1) A member of council who is disqualified must resign immediately.

(2) If a member of council does not resign as required by subsection (1): (

a) the council may, by resolution, declare the person’s office vacant because the person has become disqualified pursuant to this Act from holding office as a member of council; (

b) the council or a voter may apply to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, or to a provincial court judge in the prescribed manner, for: (

i) an order determining whether the person was never qualified to be or has ceased to be qualified to remain a member of council; or (ii) an order declaring the person to be disqualified from council.

(3) The person whose office has been declared vacant pursuant to clause (2)(

a) may, within 10 business days after the passing of the resolution by council, appeal the resolution to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, or to a provincial court judge in the prescribed manner.

(4) After hearing an application pursuant to subsection (3) and any evidence, either oral or by affidavit, that is required, the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, may: (

a) confirm the disqualification resolution; or

(

b) set aside the disqualification resolution.

(5) A voter who applies to a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench pursuant to clause (2)(

b) shall: (

a) file an affidavit showing reasonable grounds for believing that the person who is the subject of the application never was or has ceased to be qualified as a member of council; and (

b) pay into court the sum of $500 as security for costs.

(6) An application pursuant to clause (2)(

b) may only be made within three years after the date the disqualification is alleged to have occurred.

(7) An application pursuant to clause (2)(

b) may be started or continued whether or not: (

a) an election has been held between the time the disqualification is alleged to have occurred and the time the application is or was commenced; and (

b) the person with respect to whom the application is being brought: (

i) resigns before or after the election; (ii) was re-elected in the election; (iii) was not re-elected or did not run in the election; or (iv) has completed a term of office.

(8) After hearing an application pursuant to clause (2)(

b) and any evidence, either oral or by affidavit, that is required, the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, may: (

a) declare the person to be disqualified and a position on council to be vacant; (

b) declare the person able to remain a member of council; (b.1) declare the person eligible to be nominated in the next election; or (

c) dismiss the application.

(9) If a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or a provincial court judge, as the case may be, declares a person disqualified or confirms a disqualification resolution because of a failure to disclose a conflict of interest pursuant to

section 162 and the judge of the Court of

Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, finds that the contravention has resulted in personal financial gain, the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, may require the person to pay an amount equal to the amount of that gain to: (

a) the municipality; or (

b) any person who, in the discretion of the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, is appropriate. Inadvertence or honest mistake 167 A judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or a provincial court judge, as the case may be, who hears an application pursuant to clause 166(2) (

b) or subsection 166(3) with respect to an alleged disqualification pursuant to clause 165(1)(

e) and finds that the person is disqualified shall dismiss the application or set aside the disqualification resolution, as the case may be, if the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge, as the case may be, is of the opinion that the disqualification arose through inadvertence or by reason of an honest mistake, and may declare the office held by the person not to be vacant. . . . Reimbursement 169

(1) The council may reimburse the person with respect to whom an application pursuant to clause 166(2)(

b) or subsection 166(3) was made for any costs and expenses that the council considers reasonable, other than costs that have already been awarded to the person by the judge, if: (

a) a disqualification resolution pursuant to clause 166(2)(

a) is set aside; (

b) an application pursuant to clause 166(2)(

b) is dismissed; or (

c) an order is issued declaring the person able to remain a member of council.

(2) The council may reimburse a voter for legal expenses incurred in bringing an application pursuant to clause 166(2)(b), in addition to costs awarded to the person by the judge, if: (

a) the application is successful; or (

b) an order is issued declaring that the person with respect to whom the application was made is disqualified to remain a member of council. [ 6 ] The Applicant also relies on the common law as it pertains to conflicts of interest of municipal councillors. THE EVIDENCE

[ 7 ] During the two-day hearing held pursuant to clause 166(2) (

b) and sub- section 166(8) of the Act , the court heard testimony from the Applicant herself, from Aldina Bouvier, who was called as a witness on behalf of the Applicant, and from one of the Respondents, Nadine Couillonneur. The court also received into evidence a number of documents [1] including a bound volume of “minutes” of 23 different meetings of the Northern Hamlet of Cole Bay from January 31, 2017 to June 18, 2018 (Exhibit A-1). [ 8 ] I note that the Two Respondents dispute that the contents of Exhibit A-1 are in fact proper minutes of meetings of Cole Bay’s municipal council.

This is because the documents do not include the required signatures of the person who presided at each meeting and the administrator (or designate), as required by subsection 131(1) of the Act . I find that there is merit to this argument however, these documents, be they proper minutes or not, are ordinary records of meetings of Cole Bay’s municipal council, as kept by the Applicant who was employed by Cole Bay as the Acting Clerk.

Furthermore, from the Applicant’s testimony it was clear that she would not have a proper recollection of many topics without reference to the “minutes”, as such these documents are also recordings of her past recollections. It is for these reasons that I found the documents to be admissible during the hearing and not on the basis that they are proper minutes of municipal council meetings. Notwithstanding the foregoing, for ease of reference I will refer to the documents contained in Exhibit A-1 as “minutes”. [ 9 ] Additionally, the accuracy of some of the minutes is disputed.

The Applicant testified that the minutes are accurate. I find that some of them are not. Notably, the minutes of March 29, 2018, motion “M-140-18”, seems to indicate that a resolution or motion regarding the Mayor’s remuneration was passed. However, Nadine Couillonneur testified that no vote was ever taken on this issue. Additionally, the general poor quality of the minutes belies their purported accuracy. From reviewing these documents, all prepared by the Applicant, it is clear that they are not a consistent and accurate record of what occurred at the council meetings.

It appears that there was an obvious over-recording of things as motions (including mentions of items being ‘carried’) when it is clear from the content of many entries that it was simply information being provided to the council, or simply discussion. It is also striking that these minutes purport to record over 550 different motions, for which not a single amendment was proposed, and of which none were defeated.

I can only surmise that the Applicant simply was in the habit of delineating every new item of business with the word “moved” and the end of that item of business with the word “carried”, whether or not a formal motion was made and whether or not an actual vote was taken. [ 10 ] Notwithstanding the questionable accuracy of the minutes, much of the evidence essential to deciding most of the issues is uncontested. It and areas of contested evidence will be discussed below as required to deal with the various issues.

The alleged pecuniary conflict of interest [ 11 ] A significant area of contested and conflicting evidence pertains to the issue of whether or not the Respondent, Nadine Couillonneur, was personally benefiting from her receipt of cheques for sums to be used for a variety of authorized expenses to be incurred by Cole Bay. [ 12 ] The foregoing arises from the practice of the council authorizing purchases or other expenditures for the benefit of the community and then authorizing a cheque for same payable to the Mayor.

The Mayor, who during the relevant time period was the Respondent, Nadine Couillonneur, would cash or deposit the cheque in her personal account, and then use the cash or her personal account to make the purchases or pay for the expenses previously authorized by the council. [ 13 ] The Applicant alleges that on several occasions Nadine Couillonneur received money from Cole Bay in this way, failed to properly account for the funds by providing receipts, and failed to return the amounts that would remain after the authorized purchases or expenditures were made.

In her evidence the Applicant said that on various occasions various amounts of money were provided to Nadine Couillonneur, and that she indeed spent some of the money as authorized, but never provided any receipts or other accounting of the money spent for Cole Bay’s records.

She also said that some of the items authorized for purchase were never provided and that Nadine Couillonneur never returned any unspent money. [ 14 ] In her evidence, Nadine Couillonneur indicated that on all occasions where she received money in this way she always spent that money only on items or services acquired for the authorized purpose. The one exception to this was cheque 000709 for $1,268.00, which was for the purchase of new tires for Cole Bay’s van.

On this occasion, she was unable to purchase the tires as planned so she offered to transfer the funds to someone else who could do so; but when that did not work out, she returned the funds to the village office. Moreover, she also testified that in all situations where she did not “spend” all of the funds authorized she always returned the balance to the village office. She also testified that she did not request receipts for these amounts of cash returned to the village office as it did not occur to her that receipts would be needed for money being returned in this fashion.

Although she did not specifically say so, I infer from her testimony that she essentially trusted that the return of such sums of money would be recorded as a matter of course in Cole Bay’s accounting and banking records.

[ 15 ] Nadine Couillonneur also testified that when she spent Cole Bay’s money as described above, she always obtained and kept receipts for everything; and that she still has those receipts. During the hearing, she produced many of these receipts so counsel for the Applicant could examine them and she answered questions about them. An important area of this questioning pertained to the issue of Ms. Couillonneur not providing these receipts to the Applicant or other employees at the village office. She explained that she kept the receipts in her own possession because of what had happened in early July 2017.

She testified that shortly after Cole Bay’s Canada Day celebration she took all the receipts for money spent on that event and turned them in to the village office. However, when she stopped by the village office a day or two later she found all of these receipts in a trash container. She retrieved the receipts from the trash and subsequently kept them and further receipts in her own possession for fear of them being discarded at the village office. [ 16 ] I find that Nadine Couillonneur was a very credible witness.

She had a very good and detailed recollection of relevant events, and she testified in a straightforward factual manner. She did not shy away from hard questions or routinely retreat to any pat answers such as “I do not recall.” Her evidence was consistent from start to finish and was not shaken in any way during cross-examination. Notably, her evidence regarding her spending money for Cole Bay was corroborated by the receipts produced and discussed during her testimony. I find her evidence to be quite believable. [ 17 ] The evidence of the Applicant was not nearly as believable.

She was generally credible, but seemed to often falter when pressed for details, and lacked an independent memory of many things. This was obvious from the various times she could only answer things by referencing certain entries in the minutes. Additionally, the Applicant, in her capacity as the Acting Clerk, was responsible for preparing agendas for council meetings and for keeping the minutes of these meetings, and she was not shy about simply adding things to the meeting agendas and the minutes that she felt were important.

This would be consistent with my assessment, from her testimony that she has a strong personality and is not reluctant to express her points of view. At the hearing, the Applicant claimed that she was concerned about Nadine Couillonneur’s practice of not returning unspent funds, and of not providing receipts. Yet, there is no evidence that she ever raised this as a concern at any of the many meetings held over a period of at least a year. Furthermore, she provided no evidence of raising this as a concern with anyone prior to initiating this application.

Nor did she provide any financial or bank records to show an absence of records of receiving funds “back” from Nadine Couillonneur. Consequently, I do not believe her claim that she was concerned about village funds being handled and spent by Nadine Couillonneur as described above.

In addition to this specific finding, I find that the Applicant generally provided her evidence with a causal disregard for the importance of accuracy. [ 18 ] I do not have concerns to such a degree that would cause me to reject all of the Applicant’s evidence but there are certainly aspects of it that I do not believe, and generally I find Nadine Couillonneur’s evidence to be more believable and I do not reject any of it. To be clear, where the evidence provided by these two witnesses is not consistent I accept the evidence of Nadine Couillonneur and reject inconsistent evidence provided by the Applicant.

Notably, I accept Nadine Couillonneur’s evidence that there was no vote taken on the issue of remuneration for the Mayor. As such, the minutes from March 29, 2018 are not accurate. Furthermore, I accept Nadine Couillonneur’s evidence that she only spent Cole Bay’s money as authorized by the municipal council and that she returned any excess funds or funds that were not spent at all. Importantly, I find that she did not in any way profit from receiving and spending Cole Bay’s money in the manner described in paragraph 12 above. THE ISSUES [ 19 ] The issues to be addressed in this decision are the following: a.

Is the impugned resolution of June 18, 2018 confirming conflicts of interest by the Respondents and declaring their offices to be vacant a proper and valid resolution of council pursuant to paragraph 166(2) (

a) of the Act ? b. Has the Applicant proven, on a balance of probabilities, that any or all of the Respondents contravened

section 162 of the Act , resulting in their disqualification from council pursuant to sub- clause 165(1) (e)(ii) of the Act ? c. Does this court have the jurisdiction to deal with alleged violations of common law rules pertaining to conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils? d. If the application is dismissed, should the court award costs as requested by the Two Respondents? First Issue: Is the impugned resolution of June 18, 2018 confirming conflicts of interest by the Respondents and declaring their offices to be vacant a proper and valid resolution of council pursuant to paragraph 166(2) (

a) of the Act ? [ 20 ] Cole Bay’s municipal council held a meeting on June 18, 2018. The mayor, Nadine Couillonneur, the Deputy Mayor, Roseann Daigneault, council member, Shirley Couillonneur, and council member, Freda Desjarlais, attended. Council member, Ruby Couillonneur, was absent. The Applicant, in her capacity of Acting Clerk, was also present at the meeting. [ 21 ] Just prior to any discussion leading to the impugned resolution Roseann Daigneault and Freda Desjarlais asked Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur to leave the meeting. They complied and left the meeting.

The apparent purpose of the request that they leave the meeting was to discuss a recently received report from Ombudsman Saskatchewan [the Ombudsman]. This report is

dated “June 2018” and is accompanied by a cover letter dated June 6, 2018. The report is titled “Draft Investigation Report – Allegations of Conflict of Interest Against Council Members of the Northern Hamlet of Cole Bay”. Exhibit A-3 is a copy of this report and cover letter.

This was a report prepared by the Ombudsman following an investigation into alleged conflicts of interest by the Respondents. [ 22 ] Exhibit A-3 clearly indicates in its title that the report was a “draft report”; and the text of the cover letter indicates that the Ombudsman was inviting further comment on the draft report from both Cole Bay and the three Respondents. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Deputy Mayor, Roseann Daigneault, and council member, Freda Desjarlais, apparently understood the report to be definitive and that it required immediate action on their part.

This is apparent from the fact that they requested that the Two Respondents leave the meeting at 4:32 p.m. and five minutes later, at 4:37 p.m., they purport to pass a resolution disqualifying the Respondents and declaring their seats vacant [the impugned resolution]. [ 23 ] It is clear from the evidence that this was not an occasion where either of the Two Respondents declared a conflict of interest; nor did they voluntarily excuse themselves from the meeting, pursuant to

section 162 of the Act . This is important because it is determinative, in this case, of the legitimacy of the following actions of the remaining members of the municipal council. [ 24 ]

Section 112 of the Act reads: Quorum 112

(1) Except as provided in this or any other Act , the quorum of a council is the majority of the members of the council.

(2) No act or proceeding of a council that is adopted at any meeting of the council at which a quorum is not present is valid. [ 25 ] On June 18, 2018, the Cole Bay municipal council was comprised of five persons, meaning that the attendance of no less than three of these persons was required to constitute and maintain quorum for any meeting or portion of a meeting. As noted above, council member, Ruby Couillonneur, was absent from this meeting. The meeting started with a proper quorum of four.

However, when Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur were excluded from the meeting, as indicated above, there remained only two members of the municipal council and consequently, quorum was lost. Thereafter, pursuant to subsection 112(2) of the Act , any act or proceeding adopted is not valid. It necessarily follows that the impugned resolution, purporting to disqualify the Respondents and declare vacant their positions on the municipal counsel, was not, and is not, valid. [ 26 ] It is worth noting that

Section 164 of the Act provides for a “reduced quorum”, of as few as two, if the number of available council members is below the normal quorum because of other council members declaring conflicts of interest and absenting themselves from the meeting. As such, if the Two Respondents had actually declared conflicts of interest and absented themselves from a portion of the meeting of June 18, 2018 for that purpose, then quorum would have been maintained. However, the evidence demonstrates that this is not what occurred, and thus the provisions of

section 164 of the Act for a “reduced quorum” did not apply. [ 27 ] If I were in error in my determination of the inapplicability of

Section 164 of the Act , I would still find that the impugned resolution M-232-18 is fundamentally flawed, and therefore not valid. This is because the “record” of the impugned resolution, as set out in Tab 23 of Exhibit A-1, is poorly written and it has a very significant deficiency in that it purports to enforce a disqualification pursuant to subsection 166(2) of the Act , “Due to Conflict of Interest”. Nowhere in the Act does it state that having a conflict of interest disqualifies a member of a municipal council.

Section 165 of the Act sets out the various reasons for disqualification. The only one that has any rapport with “conflict of interest” is sub- paragraph 165(1) (e)(ii) which sets out that a contravention of

section 162 of the Act would be a reason for disqualification. However, nowhere in the “record” of the impugned resolution, or elsewhere in the evidence presented at the hearing, is there any indication as to whether or not the two members of council remaining at the meeting actually set their minds to the issue of whether or not the Respondents had actually contravened

section 162 of the Act . [ 28 ] In the circumstances of this case, and notwithstanding my conclusion that the impugned resolution of June 18, 2018 was not valid, it is appropriate to confirm that even if it had been a valid resolution it would not have had the effect attributed to it by the Applicant and the remaining municipal councillors. To be blunt, a northern municipal council does not have the legal authority to remove council members from their positions by way of a resolution of council.

It defies common sense that a municipal council could remove a council member from office, thus undoing a decision of the electorate, by a simple resolution passed by the majority of council members at a council meeting. Moreover, the authority to remove a northern municipal council member from their office following a conflict of interest and failure to comply with

section 162 of the Act rests with judges of this court and judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench. [ 29 ] In the decision Council of the Rural Municipality of Sherwood No. 159 v Probe , 2018 SKQB 24 at paras 49 and 50 , Chief Justice Popescul wrote: [49] Section 148(1) of the Act stipulates that a member of council who is disqualified must resign immediately. [50] Mr. Probe did not do so. As a result, ss. 148(1) (b), 148(6) and 149 are brought into play.

These provisions provide a process that authorizes the court to remove a councillor who does not resign as required. [underlining added] [ 30 ] Chief Justice Popescul was ruling on an application that was brought pursuant to subsection 148(2) of The Municipalities Act , SS 2005, c M-36.1 [ Municipalities Act ] the wording of which is identical to the wording of sub- clause 166(2) (

b) of the Act . Similarly, all of the sections of the Municipalities Act mentioned by Chief Justice Popescul in the citation above have virtually identical counterparts in

the Act . See: sub- clause 166(2) (b)(ii); subsection 166(8) ; and

section 167 of the Act . The only substantive difference between these provisions pertains to the judicial authority to hear these types of applications. Under the Municipalities Act this authority is a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench; whereas under the Act this authority is “a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or a provincial court judge”. Consequently, in my view, this decision stands as authority for my finding that a northern municipal council does not have the legal authority to remove from office one of its own council members. The relevant provisions of

section 166 of the Act provide a process that authorizes a judge of this court or a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench to remove a northern municipal councilor who does not resign as required. [ 31 ] Notably, the Act does include clause 166(2) (

a) which does not appear to have an equivalent in the Municipalities Act . It reads as follows: (

a) the council may, by resolution, declare the person’s office vacant because the person has become disqualified pursuant to this Act from holding office as a member of council;. [ 32 ] In my view, this additional clause does not give a northern municipal council the authority to remove a councillor from his or her position. It simply provides a mechanism by which a northern municipal council can formally declare its view that the office of one (or more) of its members shall be considered to be vacant due to the council member becoming disqualified.

It serves as notice to the public and as notice to the affected council member of the council’s formal view of the matter. Such a resolution would serve to notify the affected council member that the council feels there has been a disqualification and that he or she should have resigned pursuant to subsection 166(1) of the Act . Presumably, and logically, such a resolution could also confirm the council’s continuing expectation that the affected council member should still resign; failing which a court application would or could be instituted to fully enforce the disqualification.

Second issue: Has the Applicant proven, on a balance of probabilities, that any or all of the Respondents contravened

section 162 of the Act , resulting in their disqualification from council pursuant to sub- clause 165(1) (e)(ii) of the Act ? [ 33 ] Notwithstanding, my finding that the impugned resolution of June 18, 2018 is not valid this question must still be answered. This is because the Applicant, in making this application as a voter, does not require a valid municipal council resolution as a prerequisite to invoking her right to make an application under sub- clause 165(1) (e)(ii) of the Act .

The Two Respondents argue that a valid “disqualification resolution” must proceed a valid “enforcement resolution” and resulting application to the court by a municipal council. I am not convinced that this is correct but this is immaterial because the application before the court has not been made by a municipal council. Rather, as indicated above, it is made by a voter. [ 34 ] Although not expressly argued by the Two Respondents, I have considered if there must be some form of a valid council resolution in place before a voter can make this type of application. Clearly the answer must be no.

If otherwise, a corrupt or “conflicted” majority of a municipal council would be able to thwart any voter’s application to the court by failing to pass the required resolution. Furthermore, there is nothing in the wording or purposes of the Act to suggest that the right of the Applicant, as a voter in Cole Bay, to bring this type of application is impeded or fettered in such a manner. [ 35 ] To establish that the Respondents, or any of them, have contravened

section 162 of the Act , the onus is on the Applicant to present sufficient evidence to show firstly, that the Respondents were in a conflict of interest as defined by subsections 159.1(1) and (2) which read as follows: 159.1

(1) A member of council has a conflict of interest if the member makes a decision or participates in making a decision in the execution of his or her office and at the same time knows or ought reasonably to know that in the making of the decision there is the opportunity to further his or her private interests or the private interests of a closely connected person.

(2) A financial interest as described in subsection 161(1) always constitutes a conflict of interest. If the evidence establishes such a conflict of interest then the continuing onus on the Applicant is to demonstrate on the evidence presented at the hearing that the Respondents failed to comply with their obligations under

section 162 of the Act . [ 36 ] In this matter, I find that the evidence presented at the hearing falls short of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that any of the Respondents had any conflicts of interest as defined in subsections 159.1(1) and (2) of the Act .

[ 37 ] Firstly, in the Applicant’s final brief, at paragraph 13, she confirms her allegation of a pecuniary conflict of interest by Nadine Couillonneur is based on her receipt and use of funds as described in paragraph 12 above. Given my findings on the evidence presented that Nadine Couillonneur did not benefit financially in this manner, this alleged conflict of interest has not been proven. [ 38 ] Secondly, in the Applicant’s final brief, at paragraphs 14, 15, and 16, she concedes that none of the Respondents explicitly contravened the conflict of interest rules in the Act .

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing I come to this same conclusion. While there were various matters dealt with by the Cole Bay municipal council which pertained to relatives of the Respondents none of these matters involved a relative who was also “family” or otherwise a “closely connected person” as defined in

section 159 of the Act . [ 39 ] In my view, the

definitions of “family” and “closely connected person” make the issue of potential conflicts of interest quite straightforward if the subject matter before the municipal council involves someone who falls within those

definitions. Notwithstanding the fairly narrow definition of a “closely connected person”, the Act still provides for other possible conflicts of interest. Subsection 159.1(1) of the Act includes the words “…in the making of the decision there is the opportunity to further his or her private interests…”. Thus, there will be conflicts of interest if the matter being dealt with could or would further the private interests of the council member. This can occur if the matter in question pertains to a relative or a non-relative of a council member.

However, in my view, there must be something more than a genetic link to the council member to establish such a conflict of interest. Furthermore, in the context of an application like the one before the court there must be some evidence to show how the particular action or decision of the council member advances his or her own private interests. No such evidence was presented at the hearing of this Application. [ 40 ] The Applicant seems to be arguing that conflicts of interest are established simply because the Respondents dealt with a variety of matters involving various relatives.

This argument is premised upon the suggestion that any action taken for the benefit of a relative necessarily advances the private interests of the Respondents. This argument does not withstand the scrutiny of common sense. Relatives, no matter how close they are biologically, are not automatically close emotionally, financially, or otherwise. In fact, municipal councillors, like many other people, may have little or no significant connection to a relative other than the biological one.

Additionally, if it is obvious that it is always a conflict of interest for a council member to deal with anything involving any biological relative, or certain categories of them, then the legislature could have included this in the definition of “family” or “closely connected person”. [ 41 ] Since none of the Respondents’ relatives mentioned in the evidence is covered by the

definitions of “family” or “closely connected person” in the Act , it was incumbent on the Applicant to provide additional evidence showing how the alleged conflict of interest would or could have furthered the Respondents’ personal interests. No such evidence was provided and consequently the Applicant has failed to establish that any of the Respondents were in any conflicts of interest as defined in subsections 159.1(1) and (2) of the Act . Since the Applicant has failed to demonstrate any such conflicts of interest, the issue of compliance with

section 162 of the Act is moot, and is unproven by the Applicant. Third issue: does this court have the jurisdiction to deal with alleged violations of the common law pertaining to conflicts of interest by members of municipal councils? [ 42 ] The Applicant suggests in her final brief that that the common law as it applies to the issue of conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils, continues to apply and is actually incorporated into the Act via subsection 159.1(4) , which reads as follows. Nothing in this

Part is to be interpreted as affecting any other rights given by, or the application of other requirements, duties or responsibilities imposed by, any other Act or law in relation to the matters covered by this Part.

I note that the Applicant’s original applications with respect to each of the Respondents sets out that the Application is for an order pursuant to the Act : “ subclause 166(2) (b)(ii) via subclause [sic] 159.1(4)” . [underlining added] [ 43 ] In my view, there is nothing in the wording of this subsection 159.1(4) to suggest that this court has the jurisdiction to interpret the common law in this regard, including the ability to make findings that a relevant common law rule has been violated or not. Nor does the Applicant’s final brief provide any submissions or guidance on the proper

interpretation of subsection 159.1(4). In particular, the Applicant cites no jurisprudence as support for the proposition that this subsection somehow provides this court with the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the relevant common law regarding conflicts of interest. Although, it may well be that no court has yet considered this specific issue in the context of an application of this sort being made to this court.

[44] In my view, subsection 159.1(4) of the Act cannot be understood to have augmented this court’s jurisdiction in this way. In myview, this subsection simply protects other rights given by other Acts or law, including the common law; and preserves the application ofother requirements, duties or responsibilities already imposed by other Acts or law, including the common law.

As will be discussedfurther below, this court does not generally have jurisdiction to deal with matters of common law, and specifically does not havejurisdiction to deal with alleged violations of common law rules for conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils.Such jurisdiction, in this province, resides with the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. [45] The Two Respondents submit in their final brief, at paragraph 98, that

section 159 and subsection 166(2) of the Act read togetherdisplace the common law as it applies to the issue of conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils. I disagree. In myview, there is nothing in

section 159 or subsection 166(2), read together or separately, that supports this submission. Furthermore, theseportions of the Act must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Act, which would include subsection 159.1(4), cited above, which hasthe effect of protecting rights and preserving requirements, duties and responsibilities pursuant to the common law. [46] In my view, the common law as it pertains to conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils co-exists with thestatute law pertaining to northern municipalities as set out in the various provisions of the Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada hasrecognized the fact of this coexistence. In its decision Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v Winnipeg (City), (SCC),[1990] 3 SCR 1170 at 1196, Justice Sopinka wrote: I would distinguish between a case of partiality by reason of pre-judgment on the one hand and by reason of personal interest on theother. It is apparent from the facts of this case, for example, that some degree of pre-judgment is inherent in the role of a councillor. That is not the case in respect of interest.

There is nothing inherent in the hybrid functions, political, legislative or otherwise, ofmunicipal councillors that would make it mandatory or desirable to excuse them from the requirement that they refrain from dealing withmatters in respect of which they have a personal or other interest. It is not part of the job description that municipal councillors bepersonally interested in matters that come before them beyond the interest that they have in common with the other citizens in themunicipality.

Where such an interest is found, both at common law and by statute, a member of Council is disqualified if the interest isso related to the exercise of public duty that a reasonably well-informed person would conclude that the interest might influence theexercise of that duty. This is commonly referred to as a conflict of interest. See Re Blustein and Borough of North York, (ON SC), [1967] 1 O.R. 604 (H.C.); Re Moll and Fisher (1979), (ON SC), 23 O.R. (2d) 609 (Div. Ct.);Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, supra; and Valente v. The Queen, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R.673.

Statutory provisions in various provincial Municipal Acts tend to parallel the common law but typically provide a definition of the kindof interest which will give rise to a conflict of interest. See Blustein and Moll, supra. [underlining added] [47] Although not directly addressing the issue of the coexistence of the common law and statute law, relevant portions of the citationabove have been incorporated into Saskatchewan jurisprudence.

See: Fleet v Davies, 2011 SKQB 159, 373 Sask R 171, at para. 13; and,Shellbrook (Rural Municipality) No. 493 v Muller, 2015 SKQB 346 at para 4. [48] Of course, simply noting that the common law and statute law co-exist does not mean that this court has jurisdiction to deal withalleged violations of common law conflict of interest rules for councillors of northern municipalities. Since this court is created by statuteits jurisdiction is limited to that which is expressly granted by a statute.

See: Beaton v Sjolander (1903), 9 BCR (BCCA); National TrustCompany v The Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood Ltd., (SCC), [1941] SCR 601; MacKenzie v Martin, (SCC), [1954] SCR 361. This is a long-standing legal principle that has been codified in

section 5 of The ProvincialCourt Act, 1998, SS 1998, c P-30.11. Consequently, unless a statue expressly confers to this court the jurisdiction to apply the commonlaw as it pertains to conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils no such jurisdiction exists. [49] I have reviewed the Act and its regulations[2], and can find no statutory provision that expressly confers jurisdiction on this courtto apply the common law as it pertains to conflicts of interest by members of northern municipal councils.

While it is apparent from thewording of various sections of the Act that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Queen’s Bench for certain things, suchas applications pursuant to paragraph 166(2)(b), nowhere does the Act indicate that this court’s jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdictionof the Court of Queen’s Bench. Notably, the Act itself contains numerous provisions where the Court of Queen’s Bench is recognized asthe sole court having jurisdiction. See: paragraph 2(1)(l) - definition of “court”; subsections 22(4.1) and 22(4.2); subsection 152(6);section 378; subsections 385(4) and 385(5);

section 390; and

section 408. Various provisions of the Act also confirm that decisions ofthis court can be appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench.

[ 50 ] There are also a few provisions of the Act , which appear to exclude the Court of Queen’s Bench, by specifically and exclusively granting jurisdiction to a justice of the peace or a judge of this court. See: sections 383, 395, and 399. At various places the Act also references the Court of Appeal, primarily to confirm it as the appropriate court to hear an appeal of a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench.

It is also noteworthy that in each and every instance where the Act confers concurrent jurisdiction to this court and the Court of Queen’s Bench it is specifically recognized with the phrase “the judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench or the provincial court judge” or slight variation thereof.

In reviewing the entire Act it is clear that the Legislature of Saskatchewan established a variety of jurisdictions for the various courts of this province, but in doing so was very precise and unambiguous as to which court or courts has jurisdiction to deal with a wide variety of issues. [ 51 ] As a result, I find that as pertaining to the present application, this court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate issues or applications arising from or premised upon alleged violations of common law rules of conflict of interest by northern municipal councillors. [ 52 ] This does not mean that northern municipal councillors are not bound by the relevant common law pertaining to conflicts of interest, because they are.

However, it does mean that if an application such as this one is founded solely upon a “common law conflict of interest” the application ought to be made in the Court of Queen’s Bench. Additionally, if a similar application is founded solely upon a “statutory conflict of interest” as defined by subparagraphs 159.1(1) and (2) , then this court or the Court of Queen’s Bench should be able to hear and deal with the application without any issues or complications related to jurisdiction, or lack thereof.

Lastly, if a similar application is founded upon a combination of “common law conflicts of interest” and “statutory conflicts of interest”, then the Applicant could still bring the application to either court but should decide carefully which court is more appropriate considering the jurisdictional limitations of this court. [ 53 ] Notwithstanding the foregoing, I do not think that judges of this court should simply ignore evidence of common law conflicts of interest if such evidence arises during an application such as this one.

In particular, if consideration of that evidence can assist the court in making findings or decisions that it does have the jurisdiction to make. For example, evidence of a common law conflict of interest may be relevant to the issue of credibility of a witness, in which case the court should consider that evidence for that purpose. For further example, evidence of a common law conflict of interest may be relevant to establishing a pattern of conflicts of interest.

Alternatively, in a case where this court finds that a northern municipal councillor had a conflict of interest, as defined in subsections 159.1(1) and (2) of the Act , and failed to comply with his or her obligations under

section 162 of the Act , evidence that said councillor also violated common law rules of conflict of interest could be relevant to other issues. Such as deciding the appropriate result pursuant to subsection 166(8) ; or whether or not to dismiss the application pursuant to

section 167 of the Act . [ 54 ] In this case, I note in particular, that one of the alleged conflicts of interest pertained to the appointment of a member of the community of Cole Bay to sit as a director on the board of directors for the Primrose Lake Economic Development Corporation [PLEDCO]. The foundation of this alleged conflict of interest lies in the fact that the Respondents participated in the municipal council decision to appoint Camilla Couillonneur to this directorship, as she related to the Respondents.

In my view, there was a considerable amount of evidence to support this allegation, in particular as pertaining to Nadine Couillonneur, because of the additional evidence regarding how she, as Mayor, handled the complaint filed with her by Aldina Bouvier.

However, because it would serve no meaningful purpose to the result of this application, I decline to opine as to whether or not the evidence was sufficient to establish a violation of the common law rules pertaining to conflicts of interest. [ 55 ] I have however mentioned the PLEDCO issue as it may assist the parties in understanding why the outcome and findings of this court are different from the findings of the Ombudsman. In my view, these differences are not necessarily inconsistent.

This is because the Ombudsman was indeed considering potential common law conflicts of interest, and because the evidence considered by this court was almost certainly very different from the evidence and information considered by the Ombudsman. Additionally, it is important to note that the Ombudsman was conducting a general investigation with a view to making findings and recommendations to assist the parties in resolving their dispute.

Whereas, in the hearing before this court, the Applicant had the onus on presenting sufficient evidence to prove her allegations; and the court’s role is to decide the issues based on the relevant evidence presented at the hearing. In addition, while the Ombudsman’s report (both draft and final) was presented as evidence at the hearing, this report was relevant only as to context that informs the subsequent acts of the parties and other important persons, such as the other members of the municipal council who are not directly involved in this application.

The findings and recommendations of the Ombudsman are not evidence, and as it would constitute inadmissible hearsay, I did not consider or take into account the evidence that may have been available to or considered by the Ombudsman. Fourth issue: If the application is dismissed, should the court award costs as requested by the Two Respondents? [ 56 ] In their final brief at paragraph 121, the Two Respondents request that this court make an order directing Cole Bay to reimburse

their reasonable costs and expenses in the amount of $2,500 each. They suggest that the court is able to do this pursuant to

section 169 of the Act . In my view, the Two Respondents misunderstand the purpose of

section 169 . The purpose of this

section is to permit the parties to make applications for reimbursement of costs and expenses to their northern municipal council, in some circumstances. Notably, if a judge has otherwise already awarded costs the party benefiting from it is precluded from asking the northern municipality to reimburse those same costs. This

section does not authorize an application to this court for costs and expenses, nor does it authorize this court to award costs or expenses to any party. [ 57 ] The Two Respondents have not identified any other statute or authority upon which this court could grant costs and I am not aware of any. Consequently, I decline to make any order related to costs or reimbursement of expenses. RUBY COUILLONNEUR [ 58 ] During the pre-hearing process, it was discussed by counsel for the Applicant and counsel for the Two Respondents that the third Respondent, Ruby Couillonneur, had resigned from Cole Bay’s Municipal Counsel.

It was anticipated that someone would be able to produce a copy of her letter of resignation at the hearing. This did not happen; however, Nadine Couillonneur testified that she had indeed received a letter of resignation from Ruby Couillonneur on or about October 10, 2018. I accept her evidence in this regard and find it sufficient to conclude that Ruby Couillonneur resigned from Cole Bay’s municipal council on or about October 10, 2018. Since she has resigned the application, as it pertains to her, is moot. Consequently, there will be no decision or order made with respect to Ruby Couillonneur.

CONCLUSION [ 59 ] For all of the reasons above the court makes the following declarations and orders: (

a) The within application, as against Ruby Couillonneur, is moot. Consequently, no order is made in her regard; however, the court observes that in light of her resignation from the municipal council, her council position remains vacant. Cole Bay municipal council should act as soon as possible to fill this vacancy pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Act and The Local Government Election Act , 2015, SS 2015, c L-30.11 ; (

b) The court finds that the impugned resolution M-232-18, of June 18, 2018, was not a valid resolution. Consequently, there is no valid resolution of the Cole Bay municipal council pertaining to the disqualification of Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur; (

c) This application, made pursuant to subparagraph 166(2) (b)(ii) of the Act , as pertaining to Nadine Couillonneur, is dismissed; (

d) Nadine Couillonneur’s position as Mayor of Northern Village of Cole Bay was not lawfully altered or affected by actions taken on June 18, 2018, by the Applicant and the other members of Cole Bay’s municipal council, or otherwise. Her position as Mayor of Cole Bay now, and since June 18, 2018, is hereby confirmed; (

e) This application, made pursuant to subparagraph 166(2) (b)(ii) of the Act , as pertaining to Shirley Couillonneur, is dismissed; (

f) Shirley Couillonneur’s position as a council member of the Northern Village of Cole Bay was not lawfully altered or affected by actions taken on June 18, 2018, by the Applicant and the other members of Cole Bay’s municipal council, or otherwise. Her position as a council member of the Northern Village of Cole Bay now, and since June 18, 2018, is hereby confirmed. (

g) The application of Nadine Couillonneur and Shirley Couillonneur for costs and reimbursement of expenses is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

______________________________ L.W. Stang, J