2017 QCCA 384, 2017 QCCA 384

Droit de la famille — 17455 2017 QCCA 384 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-026662-171 500-09-026663-179 (500-12-326763-152) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: March 10, 2017 PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. N o : 500-09-026662-171 APPELLANT COUNSEL S. M. Mtre JAY TURNER (ABSENT) Mtre DANIELLE OIKNINE (ABSENT) Mtre JULIA JIAYANG YU (Oiknine & Associé

s) RESPONDENT COUNSEL C. Mc. Mtre GERALD STOTLAND Mtre MAUDE ADAM-JOLY (ABSENT) (Lavery, De Billy s.e.n.c.r.l.) Garnishees

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA RBC DOMINION SECURITIES INC. TD WATERHOUSE CANADA INC. N o : 500-09-026663-179 APPELLANT COUNSEL S. M. Mtre JAY TURNER (ABSENT) Mtre DANIELLE OIKNINE (ABSENT) Mtre JULIA JIAYANG YU (Oiknine & Associé

s) RESPONDENT COUNSEL C. Mc. Mtre GERALD STOTLAND Mtre MAUDE ADAM-JOLY (ABSENT) (Lavery, De Billy s.e.n.c.r.l.) GARNISHEE [COMPANY A] DESCRIPTION : 500-09-026662-171 Application for leave to appeal and for suspension of provisional execution (article 30 para. 2(8), 357 & 661 para. 2 C.C.P. ) 500-09-026663-179 Application for leave to appeal and for suspension of provisional execution (article 30 para. 2(8), 357 & 661 para. 2 C.C.P. ) Clerk: Adam Scott Courtroom: RC.18

HEARING Continuation of March 8, 2017 hearing. 9:31 Commencement of the hearing. BY THE JUDGE: Judgment – see page 4. Conclusion of the hearing. (

s) Adam Scott Clerk BY THE JUDGE JUDGMENT [ 1 ] I am tasked to decide applications for leave to appeal two judgments rendered in the same file on February 28, 2017, by the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Justice Claude Dallaire), with regard to seizures by garnishment practiced by Respondent to execute financial aspects of a judgment rendered on October 9, 2015 in a divorce matter, homologating an agreement on accessory measures.

The motion before me also seeks a suspension of the order of provisional execution notwithstanding appeal contained in each of the two judgments. [ 2 ] More specifically, each judgment declares the amount of the balance of debt that Applicant owes Respondent, validates seizures by garnishment and orders payment by the garnishees. In what Applicant has entitled the “RESP Judgment”, [1] the judge orders payment of funds held in a registered education savings plan and in a retirement income fund (RRIF).

In the other judgment labelled the “[Company A] Judgment”, [2] a company by such name, (which employs Applicant and of which Applicant is the principal) is ordered to pay to Defendant $238,653. This is the full amount claimed in the writ of garnishment to which [Company A] was condemned given its default to declare as garnishee. The reasons in each of the judgments are similar if not virtually identical. [ 3 ] Historically, Applicant sought the revocation of the judgment of homologation. This revocation was refused and Applicant’s appeal from such judgment is pending before this Court.

Applicant has sought a suspension of the homologation judgment, unsuccessfully, before four different judges of the Superior Court between December 2015 and April 2016. [ 4 ] Since the judgments from which leave to appeal is sought rule on execution matters, leave to appeal is required pursuant to

article 30 C.C.P. and may be granted: 30. (…) …by a judge of the Court of Appeal if that judge considers that the matter at issue is one that should be submitted to that Court, for example because it involves a question of principle, a new issue or an issue of law that has given rise to conflicting judicial decisions. (…) 30. […] … par un juge de la Cour d’appel lorsque celui- ci considère que la question en jeu en est une qui doit être soumise à la cour, notamment parce qu’il s’agit d’une question de principe, d’une question nouvelle ou d’une question de droit faisant l’objet d’une jurisprudence contradictoire. […] [ 5 ] In a motion of fifteen pages, [3] Applicant raises five grounds characterized as errors of law as follows: [17] The RESP Judgment (

Schedule

I) and the [Company A] Judgment (

Schedule II ) were rendered as a result of five (5) errors of law, which can be summarized as follows: (1) by purporting to qualify as alimentary amounts which were not alimentary, and by failing to require basic protections of the garnishee’s rights, the Judge misapplies

article 718 C.C.P. , (2) the Judge clearly misinterprets and misapplies judgments which do not even deal with the issues of law at issue, (3) the Judge accepts calculations which impose a criminal

interest rate, contain obvious and gross errors of calculation, and thus fails to properly apply

article 698 C.C.P. , (4) the Judge misapplies

article 323 C.C.P. , and (5) the Judge allows the Respondent to seize and appropriate to herself an RESP that is for the benefit of the parties’ children, contrary to law and their best interests. [ 6 ] Applicant also raises alleged palpable errors of fact. I will first deal with the errors of law. GROUNDS 1) AND 2) [ 7 ] Applicant states that the judge modified the amount of the original writ of execution to include amounts ordered to be paid under a safeguard order issued by Devito, J. on April 7, 2016 ($40,000 per month).

This safeguard order was issued in the divorce file to order payment of $40,000 on account of the homologation judgment which was not being honored by Applicant because he was seeking revocation. [ 8 ] Applicant argues that art. 718 C.C.P. was not applied or misapplied: 718. If, while a seizure is binding or its execution is stayed, a judgment ordering partition of a family patrimony or awarding support or a compensatory allowance operates to change the amount that the garnishee must pay, the bailiff, on being informed of the judgment, so advises the garnishee, the debtor and the other parties. 718.

Lorsqu’un jugement partageant le patrimoine familial, prévoyant le paiement d’une prestation compensatoire ou octroyant des aliments a pour effet de modifier le montant que doit verser le tiers-saisi alors qu’une saisie est tenante ou son exécution suspendue, l’huissier, dès qu’il en est informé, en avise le tiers-saisi, le débiteur et les autres parties. When ordering payment of the $40,000 per month (because no support payments were being made) Devito, J. stated that the allocation according to the various sums payable under the homologation judgment would be determined later.

Applicant contends that the judgment of Devito, J. (April 2016), is in effect a new condemnation, not alimentary, and so the garnishee ([Company A]) should have been notified. I disagree. The $40,000 payments by way of safeguard were obviously payments on account of the accessory measures homologated in 2015. It cannot be otherwise on the facts. Moreover, the garnishee was notified as appears from the motion seeking the order for payment ruled upon by Dallaire, J. [ 9 ] There is here no risk of contradictory judgments or point of principle justifying that leave to appeal be granted.

GROUND 3) [ 10 ] Dallaire, J. states in the reasons that the interest owing on a $100,000 portion of Applicant’s debt for the period of November 1, 2015 to September 2016, is $66,346.26. This is also raised by Applicant as a palpable error of fact. Even though the judge’s observation may be incorrect, the error is not palpable or determinant since it is not reflected in the conclusions of either judgment. GROUND 4) [ 11 ] Applicant alleges that the judge misapplied

article 323 C.C.P.

Here is what the judge said in the RESP judgment: [41] Considérant que la contestation du demandeur à l’encontre de l’inscription contre les tierces-saisies comporte des allégations que toutes les sommes dues sont payées, ce qui est un élément essentiel au succès de sa contestation de l’inscription, mais que ces faits ne ressortent pas du dossier de la Cour et qu’aucune déclaration assermentée n’est déposée à leur soutien; [42] Considérant que les faits ainsi allégués sont expressément contredits par la déclaration assermentée déposée par la défenderesse au soutien de son inscription pour jugement, qui prétend et démontre le contraire; [43] Considérant qu’en cours de délibéré, le Tribunal a vu ce problème et a invité les parties à lui faire part de leurs commentaires afin de respecter la règle audi alteram partem, chacune ayant pu s’exprimer dans des correspondances déposées au dossier de la Cour; [44] Considérant qu’après avoir répliqué qu’une telle déclaration assermentée n’était pas nécessaire, le demandeur, de manière subsidiaire, a demandé la permission d’en déposer une, si nous le jugions nécessaire; [45] Considérant qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’accorder une telle permission vu la position du demandeur et son comportement, puisqu’il ne s’agit pas d’un élément insignifiant d’une procédure et que si une telle permission lui était accordée, la déclaration du demandeur qu’il ne doit plus rien à la défenderesse est de toutes façons contredite par la preuve au dossier, alors qu’il lui incombait de déposer la meilleure preuve à cet effet, soit des chèques encaissés, ce qu’il n’a également pas fait; [ 12 ] This is not contrary to

article 323 C.C.P. or contrary to Applicant’s right to a fair hearing – to the contrary, the judge invited Applicant to complete his proof. There is certainly no basis here for the granting of leave to appeal under

article 30 C.C.P. GROUND 5) [ 13 ] The judgment orders payment out of a registered education savings plan. Applicant states that the plan is unseizable without reference to any provision of law to support such assertion.

I suggest that there is no such provision. [ 14 ] Applicant also suggests that the fund constitutes a patrimony by appropriation since the holder of the funds (RBC Dominion Securities Inc.) is obliged to sign a “trustee agreement” with the government in order to qualify the fund for contributions by the government over and above the deposits made by the holders of the account. [4] This does not make the account a patrimony separated from that of Applicant and Respondent (or trust) under art. 1260 & foll. C.C.Q. [5] nor would it per se make the account unseizable.

[ 15 ] I see here no issue that should be submitted to the Court. *** [ 16 ] The errors of fact referred to in the motion are arithmetic or calculation errors and are not reflected in the conclusions of the judgment. Leave to appeal is not warranted. *** [ 17 ] With regard to provisional execution ordered by the judge, she justifies the order because the amounts owing are alimentary (art. 660(1) C.C.P. ) and in any event, Applicant’s conduct in the judge’s view justifies provisional execution because of its abusive nature (660(10) C.C.P. ) and

article 661, first paragraph. [ 18 ] There is a clerical error in the judgments in the number of the sub-paragraph of

article 660 C.C.P. but again this is not overriding. The judge’s conclusions on the facts do not warrant intervention by the Court of Appeal since notwithstanding the refusal by four judges of the Superior Court to suspend the execution of the homologation judgment, Applicant has sought by procedural means to, in effect, suspend by stalling execution. I see no reason to grant leave with regard to these issues. [ 19 ] On the whole, the reticence of Applicant to give effect to the homologation judgment has given rise to a plethora of proceedings and certain confusion as to the amounts due.

However, issues surrounding amounts owing and paid or unpaid are questions of fact which do not qualify for leave under

article 30 C.C.P. The applications will be dismissed with legal costs despite the usual practice in family matters and given the circumstances of the file. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE UNDERSIGNED: [ 20 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal and for suspension of provisional execution in record file 500-09-026662-171, with legal costs. [ 21 ] DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal and for suspension of provisional execution in record file 500-09-026663-179, with legal costs. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A.