Ktunaxa Nation Council v. Kathryn Teneese, on their own behalf and on behalf of all citizens of the Ktunaxa Nation, 2017 SCC 54

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA Citation: Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia ( Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54, [2017] 2 S. C.R. 386 Appeal heard: December 1, 2016 Judgment rendered: November 2, 2017 Docket: 36664 Between: Ktunaxa Nation Council and Kathryn Teneese, on their own behalf and on behalf of all citizens of the Ktunaxa Nation Appellants and Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations and Glacier Resorts Ltd.

Respondents - and - Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, Kootenay Presbytery (United Church of Canada), Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Christian Legal Fellowship, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council, Amnesty International Canada, Te’mexw Treaty Association, Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance, Shibogama First Nations Council, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Council of the Passamaquoddy Nation at Schoodic, Katzie First Nation, West Moberly First Nations and Prophet River First Nation Interveners Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.

Joint Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 115) McLachlin C.J. and Rowe J. (Abella, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Brown JJ. concurring) Partially concurring reasons: (paras. 116 to 156) Moldaver J. (Côté J. concurring)

Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia ( Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 386 Ktunaxa Nation Council and Kathryn Teneese, on their own behalf and on behalf of all citizens of the Ktunaxa Nation Appellants v. Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations and Glacier Resorts Ltd.

Respondents and Attorney General of Canada, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, Kootenay Presbytery (United Church of Canada), Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Christian Legal Fellowship, Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council, Amnesty International Canada, Te’mexw Treaty Association, Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance, Shibogama First Nations Council, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Council of the Passamaquoddy Nation at Schoodic, Katzie First Nation, West Moberly First Nations and Prophet River First Nation Interveners Indexed as: Ktunaxa Nation v.

British Columbia ( Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations) 2017 SCC 54 File No.: 36664. 2016: December 1; 2017: November 2.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Freedom of religion — First Nation alleging that ski resort project would drive spirit central to their religious beliefs from their traditional territory — Provincial government approving ski resort despite claim by First Nation that development would breach right to freedom of religion — Whether Minister’s decision violates s. 2(

a) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Constitutional law — Aboriginal rights — Crown — Duty to consult — Provincial government approving ski resort despite claim by First Nation that development would breach constitutional right to protection of Aboriginal interests — Whether Minister’s decision that Crown had met duty to consult and accommodate was reasonable — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35 . The Ktunaxa are a First Nation whose traditional territories include an area in British Columbia that they call Qat’muk.

Qat’muk is a place of spiritual significance for them because it is home to Grizzly Bear Spirit, a principal spirit within Ktunaxa religious beliefs and cosmology. Glacier Resorts sought government approval to build a year-round ski resort in Qat’muk. The Ktunaxa were

consulted and raised concerns about the impact of the project, and as a result, the resort plan was changed to add new protections for Ktunaxa interests. The Ktunaxa remained unsatisfied, but committed themselves to further consultation. Late in the process, the Ktunaxa adopted the position that accommodation was impossible because the project would drive Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk and therefore irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and practices. After efforts to continue consultation failed, the respondent Minister declared that reasonable consultation had occurred and approved the project.

The Ktunaxa brought a petition for judicial review of the approval decision on the grounds that the project would violate their constitutional right to freedom of religion, and that the Minister’s decision breached the Crown’s duty of consultation and accommodation. The chambers judge dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision. Held : The appeal should be dismissed. Per McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Brown and Rowe JJ.: The Minister’s decision does not violate the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(

a) Charter right to freedom of religion. In this case, the Ktunaxa’s claim does not fall within the scope of s. 2 (

a) because neither the Ktunaxa’s freedom to hold their beliefs nor their freedom to manifest those beliefs is infringed by the Minister’s decision to approve the project. To establish an infringement of the right to freedom of religion, the claimant must demonstrate (1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion, and (2) that the impugned state conduct interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.

In this case, the Ktunaxa sincerely believe in the existence and importance of Grizzly Bear Spirit. They also believe that permanent development in Qat’muk will drive this spirit from that place. The second part of the test, however, is not met. The Ktunaxa must show that the Minister’s decision to approve the development interferes either with their freedom to believe in Grizzly Bear Spirit or their freedom to manifest that belief. Yet the Ktunaxa are not seeking protection for the freedom to believe in Grizzly Bear Spirit or to pursue practices related to it.

Rather, they seek to protect the presence of Grizzly Bear Spirit itself and the subjective spiritual meaning they derive from it. This is a novel claim that would extend s. 2 (

a) beyond its scope and would put deeply held personal beliefs under judicial scrutiny. The state’s duty under s. 2 (

a) is not to protect the object of beliefs or the spiritual focal point of worship, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit. Rather, the state’s duty is to protect everyone’s freedom to hold such beliefs and to manifest them in worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. In addition, the Minister’s decision that the Crown had met its duty to consult and accommodate under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was reasonable. The Minister’s decision is entitled to deference.

A court reviewing an administrative decision under s. 35 does not decide the constitutional issue de novo raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, and therefore does not decide the issue for itself. Rather, it must ask whether the decision maker’s finding on the issue was reasonable. The constitutional guarantee of s. 35 is not confined to treaty rights or to proven or settled Aboriginal rights and title claims.

Section 35 also protects the potential rights embedded in as-yet unproven Aboriginal claims and, pending the determination of such claims through negotiation or otherwise, may require the Crown to consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests. This obligation flows from the honour of the Crown and is constitutionalized by s. 35 . In this case, the Ktunaxa’s petition asked the courts, in the guise of judicial review of an administrative decision, to pronounce on the validity of their claim to a sacred site and associated spiritual practices.

This declaration cannot be made by a court sitting in judicial review of an administrative decision. In judicial proceedings, such a declaration can only be made after a trial of the issue and with the benefit of pleadings, discovery, evidence, and submissions. Nor can administrative decision makers themselves pronounce upon the existence or scope of Aboriginal rights without specifically delegated authority. Aboriginal rights must be proven by tested evidence; they cannot be established as an incident of administrative law proceedings that centre on the adequacy of consultation and accommodation.

To permit this would invite uncertainty and discourage final settlement of alleged rights through the proper processes. In the interim, while claims are resolved, consultation and accommodation are the best available legal tools for achieving reconciliation. The record here supports the reasonableness of the Minister’s conclusion that the s. 35 obligation of consultation and accommodation had been met. The Ktunaxa spiritual claims to Qat’muk had been acknowledged from the outset. Negotiations spanning two decades and deep consultation had taken place.

Many changes had been made to the project to accommodate the Ktunaxa’s spiritual claims. At a point when it appeared all major issues had been resolved, the Ktunaxa adopted a new, absolute position that no accommodation was possible because permanent structures would drive Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk. The Minister sought to consult with the Ktunaxa on the newly formulated claim, but was told that there was no point in further consultation. The process protected by s. 35 was at an end.

The record does not suggest, conversely, that the Minister mischaracterized the right as a claim to preclude development, instead of a claim to a spiritual right. The Minister understood that this right entailed practices which depended on the continued presence of Grizzly Bear Spirit in Qat’muk, which the Ktunaxa believed would be driven out by the development. Spiritual practices and interests were raised at the beginning of the process and continued to be discussed throughout.

Nor did the Minister misunderstand the Ktunaxa’s secrecy imperative, which had contributed to the late disclosure of the true nature of the claim: an absolute claim to a sacred site, which must be preserved and protected from permanent human habitation. The Minister understood and accepted that spiritual beliefs did not permit details of beliefs to be shared with outsiders. Nothing in the record suggests that the Minister had forgotten this fundamental point when he made his decision that adequate consultation had occurred. In addition, the Minister did not treat the broader spiritual right as weak.

The Minister considered the overall spiritual claim to be strong, but had doubts about the strength of the new, absolute claim that no accommodation was possible because the project would drive Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk. The record also does not demonstrate that the Minister failed to properly assess the adverse impact of the development on the spiritual interests of the Ktunaxa. Ultimately, the consultation was not inadequate. The Minister engaged in deep consultation on the spiritual claim. This level of consultation was confirmed by both the chambers judge and the Court of Appeal.

Moreover, the record does not establish that no accommodation was made with respect to the spiritual right. While the Minister did not offer the ultimate accommodation demanded by

the Ktunaxa — complete rejection of the ski resort project — the Crown met its obligation to consult and accommodate.

Section 35guarantees a process, not a particular result. There is no guarantee that, in the end, the specific accommodation sought will be warrantedor possible.

Section 35 does not give unsatisfied claimants a veto. Where adequate consultation has occurred, a development mayproceed without consent. Per Moldaver and Côté JJ.: The Minister reasonably concluded that the duty to consult and accommodate the Ktunaxa unders. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was met; however, the Minister’s decision to approve the ski resort infringed the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(a)Charter right to religious freedom. The first part of the s. 2(

a) test is not at issue in this case. The second part focuses on whether state action has interfered withthe ability of a person to act in accordance with his or her religious beliefs or practices. Where state conduct renders a person’s sincerelyheld religious beliefs devoid of all religious significance, this infringes a person’s right to religious freedom. Religious beliefs havespiritual significance for the believer. When this significance is taken away by state action, the person can no longer act in accordancewith his or her religious beliefs, constituting an infringement of s. 2(a).

This kind of state interference is a reality where individuals find spiritual fulfillment through their connection to the physicalworld. To ensure that all religions are afforded the same level of protection, courts must be alive to the unique characteristics of eachreligion, and the distinct ways in which state action may interfere with that religion’s beliefs or practices. In many Indigenous religions,land is not only the site of spiritual practices; land itself can be sacred.

As such, state action that impacts land can sever the connection tothe divine, rendering beliefs and practices devoid of spiritual significance. Where state action has this effect on an Indigenous religion, itinterferes with the ability to act in accordance with religious beliefs and practices. In this case, the Ktunaxa sincerely believe that Grizzly Bear Spirit inhabits Qat’muk, a body of sacred land in their religion,and that the Minister’s decision to approve the ski resort would sever their connection to Qat’muk and to Grizzly Bear Spirit.

As a result,the Ktunaxa would no longer receive spiritual guidance and assistance from Grizzly Bear Spirit. Their religious beliefs in Grizzly BearSpirit would become entirely devoid of religious significance, and accordingly, their prayers, ceremonies, and rituals associated withGrizzly Bear Spirit would become nothing more than empty words and hollow gestures. Moreover, without their spiritual connection toQat’muk and to Grizzly Bear Spirit, the Ktunaxa would be unable to pass on their beliefs and practices to future generations.

Therefore,the Minister’s decision approving the proposed development interferes with the Ktunaxa’s ability to act in accordance with theirreligious beliefs or practices in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial. The Minister’s decision is reasonable, however, because it reflects a proportionate balancing between the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(a)Charter right and the Minister’s statutory objectives: to administer Crown land and dispose of it in the public interest. A proportionatebalancing is one that gives effect as fully as possible to the Charter protections at stake given the particular statutory mandate.

When theMinister balances the Charter protections with these objectives, he must ensure that the Charter protections are affected as little asreasonably possible in light of the state’s particular objectives. In this case, the Minister did not refer to s. 2(

a) explicitly in his reasons for decision; however, it is clear from his reasonsthat he was alive to the substance of the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(

a) right. He recognized that the development put at stake the Ktunaxa’s spiritualconnection to Qat’muk. In addition, it is implicit from the Minister’s reasons that he proportionately balanced the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(

a) right with hisstatutory objectives. The Minister tried to limit the impact of the development on the substance of the Ktunaxa’s s. 2(

a) right as much asreasonably possible given these objectives. He provided significant accommodation measures that specifically addressed the Ktunaxa’sspiritual connection to the land. Ultimately, however, the Minister had two options before him: approve the development or permit theKtunaxa to veto the development on the basis of their freedom of religion. Granting the Ktunaxa a power to veto development over theland would effectively give them a significant property interest in Qat’muk — namely, a power to exclude others from constructingpermanent structures on public land.

This right of exclusion would not be a minimal or negligible restraint on public ownership. It can beimplied from the Minister’s reasons that permitting the Ktunaxa to dictate the use of a large tract of land according to their religiousbelief was not consistent with his statutory mandate. Rather, it would significantly undermine, if not completely compromise, thismandate. In view of the options open to the Minister, his decision was reasonable, and amounted to a proportionate balancing. Cases Cited By McLachlin C.J. and Rowe J. Applied: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Haida Nation v.

British Columbia(Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; referred to: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R.551; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay(City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3; Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467;Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256; R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. (1984), (ON CA), 48 O.R. (2d) 395, rev’d R. v.

Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; Reference re PublicService Employee Relations Act (Alta.), (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Health Services and Support — FacilitiesSubsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391; Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and EmergencyPreparedness), 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 157; India v. Badesha, 2017 SCC 44, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 127; S.L. v. Commission scolairedes Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235; Alberta v.

Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567;Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650; R. v. Van derPeet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010;Mitchell v. M.N.R., 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911; Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257;Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103. By Moldaver J. Applied: Doré v.

Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395; referred to: Loyola High School v. Quebec

(Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912;Reference re Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; Syndicat Northcrest v.Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551; Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256;Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567; S.L. v.

Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3; Newfoundland and LabradorNurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Agraira v. Canada (Public Safetyand Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559; R. v. Van der Peet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. Statutes and Regulations Cited Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(a). Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 1994, c. 35. Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 43.

Land Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 245, ss. 4, 11(1). Ministry of Lands, Parks and Housing Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 307, s. 5(b). Treaties and Other International Instruments American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 12(1), (3). Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [European Convention on HumanRights], art. 9(1). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, art. 18(1). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), art. 18.

Authors Cited Dyzenhaus, David. “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed., The Province ofAdministrative Law. Oxford: Hart, 1997, 279. Ross, Michael L. First Nations Sacred Sites in Canada’s Courts. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005. Ziff, Bruce. Principles of Property Law, 6th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2014. APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Lowry, Bennett and Goepel JJ.A.), 2015 BCCA 352,387 D.L.R. (4th) 10, 78 B.C.L.R. (5th) 297, 376 B.C.A.C. 105, 646 W.A.C. 105, 89 Admin.

L.R. (5th) 63, 93 C.E.L.R. (3d) 1, [2015] 4C.N.L.R. 199, 339 C.R.R. (2d) 183, [2016] 3 W.W.R. 423, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1682 (QL), 2015 CarswellBC 2215 (WL Can.), affirming adecision of Savage J., 2014 BCSC 568, 306 C.R.R. (2d) 211, 82 Admin. L.R. (5th) 117, 86 C.E.L.R. (3d) 202, [2014] 4 C.N.L.R. 143,[2014] B.C.J. No. 584 (QL), 2014 CarswellBC 901 (WL Can.), dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Ministerto approve a ski resort. Appeal dismissed. Peter Grant, Jeff Huberman, Karenna Williams and Diane Soroka, for the appellants. Jonathan G.

Penner and Erin Christie, for the respondent the Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations. Gregory J. Tucker, Q.C., and Pamela E. Sheppard, for the respondent Glacier Resorts Ltd. Mitchell R. Taylor, Q.C., and Sharlene Telles-Langdon, for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada. Richard James Fyfe, for the intervener the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. Justin Safayeni and Khalid Elgazzar, for the interveners the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, the South Asian LegalClinic of Ontario and the Kootenay Presbytery (United Church of Canada).

Albertos Polizogopoulos and Derek Ross, for the interveners the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada and the Christian LegalFellowship. Written submissions only by Avnish Nanda, for the intervener the Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council. Joshua Ginsberg and Randy Christensen, for the intervener Amnesty International Canada. Robert J. M. Janes, Q.C., and Claire Truesdale, for the intervener the Te’mexw Treaty Association. Written submissions only by Lisa C. Fong, for the intervener the Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance. Senwung Luk and Krista Nerland, for the intervener the Shibogama First Nations Council.

Neil Finkelstein, Brandon Kain and Bryn Gray, for the intervener the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. Jessica Orkin and Adriel Weaver, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. Paul Williams, for the intervener the Council of the Passamaquoddy Nation at Schoodic. Written submissions only by John Burns and Amy Jo Scherman, for the intervener the Katzie First Nation. Written submissions only by John W. Gailus and Christopher G. Devlin, for the interveners the West Moberly First Nationsand the Prophet River First Nation.

The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Brown and Rowe JJ. was delivered by The Chief Justice and Rowe J. — I. Introduction [1] The issue in this case is whether the British Columbia Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations(“Minister”) erred in approving a ski resort development, despite claims by the Ktunaxa that the development would breach theirconstitutional right to freedom of religion and to protection of Aboriginal interests under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. [2] The appellants represent the Ktunaxa people.

The Ktunaxa’s traditional territories are said to consist of land thatstraddles the international boundary between Canada and the United States, comprised of northeastern Washington, northern Idaho,northwestern Montana, southwestern Alberta and southeastern British Columbia. [3] This case concerns a proposed development in an area the Ktunaxa call Qat’muk.

This area is located in a Canadianvalley in the northwestern part of the larger Ktunaxa territory, the Jumbo Valley, about 55 kilometres west of the town of Invermere,B.C. [4] The respondent Glacier Resorts Ltd. (“Glacier Resorts”) wishes to build a year-round ski resort in Qat’muk withlifts to glacier runs and overnight accommodation for guests and staff.

For more than two decades, Glacier Resorts has been negotiatingwith the B.C. government and stakeholders, including the Aboriginal peoples who inhabit the valley, the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap, onthe terms and conditions of the development. [5] Early on in the process, the Ktunaxa and Shuswap peoples raised concerns about the impact of the resort project.The Ktunaxa asserted that Qat’muk was a place of spiritual significance for them.

Notably, it is home to an important population ofgrizzly bears and to Grizzly Bear Spirit, or Kⱡawⱡa Tukⱡuⱡakʔis, “a principal spirit within Ktunaxa religious beliefs and cosmology”: A.F.,at para. 18. [6] Consultation ensued, leading to significant changes to the original proposal. The Shuswap declared themselvessatisfied with the changes and indicated their support for the proposal given the benefits it would bring to their people and the region.The Ktunaxa were not satisfied, but committed themselves to further consultation to remove the remaining obstacles and find mutuallysatisfactory accommodation.

Lengthy discussions ensued, and it seemed agreement would be achieved. Then, late in the process, theKtunaxa adopted an uncompromising position — that accommodation was impossible because a ski resort with lifts to glacier runs andpermanent structures would drive Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk and irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and practices.

Afterfruitless efforts to revive the consultation process and reach agreement, the government declared that reasonable consultation hadoccurred and approved the project. [7] The appellants, the Ktunaxa Nation Council and the Chair of the Council, Kathryn Teneese, brought proceedings injudicial review before the British Columbia Supreme Court to overturn the approval by the Minister of the ski resort on two independentgrounds: first, that the project would violate the Ktunaxa’s freedom of religion under s. 2(

a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms; and second, that the government breached the duty of consultation and accommodation imposed on the Crown by s. 35 of theConstitution Act, 1982. The chambers judge dismissed the petition for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal affirmed his decision.The Ktunaxa now appeal to this Court. [8] We would dismiss the appeal. We conclude that the claim does not engage the right to freedom of conscience andreligion under s. 2(

a) of the Charter.

Section 2(

a) protects the freedom of individuals and groups to hold and manifest religious beliefs:R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 336. The Ktunaxa’s claim does not fall within the scopeof s. 2(

a) because neither the Ktunaxa’s freedom to hold their beliefs nor their freedom to manifest those beliefs is infringed by theMinister’s decision to approve the project. [9] We also conclude that the Minister, while bound by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to consult with the Ktunaxain an effort to find a way to accommodate their concerns, did not act unreasonably in concluding that the requirements of s. 35 had beenmet and approving the project. [10] We arrive at these conclusions cognizant of the importance of protecting Indigenous religious beliefs and practices,and the place of such protection in achieving reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous communities.

II. Facts [11] The Jumbo Valley and Qat’muk are located in the traditional territory of the Ktunaxa. The Ktunaxa believe thatGrizzly Bear Spirit inhabits Qat’muk. It is undisputed that Grizzly Bear Spirit is central to Ktunaxa religious beliefs and practices. [12] The Jumbo Valley has long been used for heli-skiing, which involves flying skiers to the top of runs by helicopter,

whence they ski to the valley floor.

In the 1980s, Glacier Resorts became interested in building a permanent ski resort on a site near the north end of the valley and sought government approval of the project. [ 13 ] The regulatory process for approval of the ski resort was a protracted matter, involving a number of cascading processes: (1) the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (“CASP”) process to determine sole proponent status; (2) the Commission on Resources and the Environment (“CORE”) process to determine best uses of the land; (3) an environmental assessment process to resolve issues related to environmental, wildlife and cultural impact and culminating in an Environmental Assessment Certificate (“EAC”); and (4) submission of a Master Plan which, if approved, would lead to a Master Development Agreement (“MDA”) between the developer and the government.

These processes involved public consultation, and the Ktunaxa participated at every stage. In the course of the various reviews, many changes were made to the original plan. The entire process, until the Minister determined consultation was adequate, took place from 1991 to 2011 — over 20 years. [ 14 ] Until 2005, the Ktunaxa participated in the regulatory processes jointly with the Shuswap as part of the Ktunaxa/Kinbasket Tribal Council (“KKTC”). However, in 2005, the Shuswap parted company with the Ktunaxa over the proposed ski resort and left the KKTC.

The Shuswap support the project, believing their interests have been reasonably accommodated and that the project will be good for their community. The Ktunaxa, by contrast, say their interests cannot be accommodated and demand the project’s rejection. [ 15 ] Adequacy of consultation is a central issue in this appeal. It is therefore necessary to set out in some detail what occurred at each step of the regulatory process. A. Stage One: The CASP Process [ 16 ] In 1991, Glacier Resorts filed a formal proposal to build a year-round ski resort in the upper Jumbo Valley.

The government conducted public hearings on the project under the CASP, the first phase in the regulatory approval process. The predecessor of the appellants, the KKTC, participated in public hearings in the fall of 1991. After a call for proposals, Glacier Resorts was granted sole proponent status and moved up to the next step on the regulatory ladder. B. Stage Two: The Land Use or CORE Process [ 17 ] In 1993 and 1994, the second phase of the regulatory process began.

The government conducted a site utilization review under the CORE process, with the goal of producing a new land use plan for the region focusing specifically on construction of the ski resort. The CORE process involved public hearings, which the KKTC attended as an observer. In 1994, the CORE process concluded with a report that assigned very high recreational and tourism values to the area of the proposed ski resort and recommended that the approval process for the resort include a statutory environmental assessment . [ 18 ] In March 1995, the government released a

summary of the CORE East Kootenay Land Use Plan and West Kootenay-Boundary Land Use Plan, identifying a ski resort development as an acceptable land use of the upper Jumbo Creek Valley. In July 1995, the government and Glacier Resorts entered into an interim agreement pursuant to the CASP, and the third step on the regulatory ladder, review under the Environmental Assessment Act , S.B.C. 1994, c. 35, began. C. Stage Three: The Environmental Assessment Process [ 19 ] The environmental assessment process lasted almost a decade, from 1995 to 2004.

The KKTC, representing both the Ktunaxa and the Shuswap peoples, and supported by government funding, was extensively involved in the environmental assessment process for the ski resort. It was invited to participate in the technical review committee and to comment on the project report.

It raised the issue of “sacred values” in the valley, which were discussed in the “First Nations Socio-Economic Assessment: Jumbo Glacier Resort Project, A Genuine Wealth Analysis”, a 2003 report of consultants retained by the B.C. government’s Environmental Assessment Office (“EAO”). [ 20 ] In parallel, Glacier Resorts submitted the information required to complete the environmental review under the new Environmental Assessment Act , S.B.C. 2002, c. 43, in a comprehensive “Project Report” in December 2003 that was accepted by the EAO in the following months. [ 21 ] In response to this report, the KKTC submitted a document to the EAO entitled “Jumbo Glacier Resort Project: Final Comments on Measures Proposed to Address Issues Identified by the Ktunaxa Nation” stating that the Jumbo Valley area is invested with sacred values, and Glacier Resorts should be required to negotiate an Impact Management and Benefits Agreement (“IMBA”) to mitigate the potential impact of the ski resort.

The KKTC submitted detailed comments, under protest, on the measures proposed by the EAO to address the concerns of the valley’s Indigenous inhabitants. [ 22 ] On October 4, 2004, an EAC was issued, approving the development subject to numerous conditions. Among them was a requirement that Glacier Resorts negotiate with the KKTC and attempt to conclude an IMBA before the next stage of the regulatory process. The KKTC did not seek judicial review of the conditional EAC. At this point, from the government’s perspective, the consultation was proceeding smoothly toward mutually acceptable accommodation. D.

Stage Four: Development of a Resort Master Plan [ 23 ] The regulatory process moved to the fourth stage — the development of a Master Plan and an MDA for the ski resort. [ 24 ] Glacier Resorts submitted a revised draft Master Plan in 2005. The process of reviewing this plan took place from December 2005 to July 2007. [ 25 ] At the outset of the review process, the government offered to enter into additional consultations with the Ktunaxa

Nation Council, which was formed following the withdrawal of the Shuswap from the KKTC. In June 2006, a consultant retained by the Ktunaxa and funded by the government prepared a “Gap Analysis” to identify what the Ktunaxa considered to be the outstanding issues for discussion.

The Gap Analysis highlighted the need for further information to facilitate discussion on: (1) contemporary land and resource use by the Ktunaxa of the Jumbo Valley; (2) the effectiveness of proposed mitigation measures to reduce disturbance, displacement and mortality impacts to key wildlife populations from road traffic on the access road; and (3) project-induced socio- economic effects to the regional economy, including land use and cost of living that might affect Ktunaxa well-being.

One of the 34 issues identified in the Gap Analysis was that the Jumbo Valley is an “area of cultural significance and has sacred values”: chambers judge’s reasons, 2014 BCSC 568 , 306 C.R.R. (2d) 211, at para. 69 . In this regard, the analysis stated that the “cultural impacts remain unassessed” ( ibid. ). [ 26 ] The Ktunaxa met with the Minister and they agreed on further consultation built around the Gap Analysis. As part of this process, the cultural significance/sacred values issue was discussed at the “Land Issues” workshop held on October 12 and 13, 2006 in Cranbrook, B.C.

Following the workshop, the Ktunaxa consultant circulated a document entitled “Working Outline: Ktunaxa-British Columbia Accommodation”, which identified the cultural and sacred significance of the valley as an issue to be addressed, and suggested a conceptual framework for accommodating the Ktunaxa land use concerns through: (

a) a fee simple land transfer to the Ktunaxa; (

b) the establishment of a land reserve; and (

c) the establishment of a conservancy area in proximity to the ski-run site. The land use issues workshop was followed by workshops in November and December 2006 and January 2007. These addressed grizzly bear, other wildlife, and residual issues. [ 27 ] In November 2006, prospects for agreement on accommodation looked bright. The Minister received a copy of a letter where the Ktunaxa informed Glacier Resorts that they had made “considerable progress in setting up a process for the negotiation of an [IMBA]”: chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 76.

Only two issues appeared to stand in the way of final agreement — “funding” and “the outstanding issue of unpaid monies” ( ibid. ). In April 2007, Glacier Resorts wrote the Minister that it believed it had reached an “agreement in principle” with the Ktunaxa ( ibid. ).

On July 12, the Minister approved a Master Plan, which outlined the nature, scope and pace of the proposed development, identified land tenure requirements, and incorporated recommendations arising from consultation with Glacier Resorts, the public and First Nations and from the environmental review process. [ 28 ] The Minister advised the Ktunaxa that Master Plan approval did not preclude additional mitigation measures based on ongoing consultation. In the months following the approval, the discussion turned to economic issues.

The Minister made an accommodation proposal to the Ktunaxa in December 2007, which included $650,000 in economic benefits to be taken in cash or Crown land, plus nine non-financial accommodations. In February 2008, the Ktunaxa rejected the proposed accommodation on the basis that (1) the financial component was “grossly insufficient” and (2) it was inappropriate for the Minister to provide identical financial accommodation to the Shuswap, given the Ktunaxa’s “far greater history in the Jumbo area”: chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 82.

The rejection letter did not mention the sacred nature of the Jumbo Valley or Grizzly Bear Spirit. [ 29 ] The Minister came back in September 2008 with a second offer of accommodation to the Ktunaxa, in the form of revenue sharing in an Economic and Community Development Agreement. The Ktunaxa rejected this proposal in December. While the negotiations suggested that an agreement could be reached regarding the construction of the ski resort project, the Ktunaxa rejected this proposal on the basis that the Jumbo Valley is a “place unique and sacred” to them: chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 83.

Again, there was no special mention of Grizzly Bear Spirit. [ 30 ] Discussions continued. In February 2009, the Ktunaxa gave formal notice to the Minister that they wished to enter into a process to negotiate an accommodation and benefits agreement. In April, the Minister accepted and offered additional capacity funding for the process.

In May, the Ktunaxa provided the Minister with a list of outstanding issues and possible accommodation measures to be discussed, including land transfers, land reserves, a wildlife conservancy, development-free buffer zones beside the access road, access rights in the controlled recreation area, a stewardship framework for economic compensation, revenue sharing, ongoing supervision of environmental commitments, and other measures.

The Ktunaxa did not place the sacred nature of the Jumbo Valley on the list of outstanding issues. [ 31 ] On June 3, 2009, the Minister advised the Ktunaxa that, in his opinion, a reasonable consultation process had occurred and that most of the outstanding issues were “primarily interest-based rather than legally driven by asserted Aboriginal rights and title claims”: chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 86. Accordingly, he was of the view that approval for the resort could be given.

The Minister expressed the intention to continue negotiating a benefits agreement with the Ktunaxa. [ 32 ] At this point, the big issues appeared to have been resolved. In deference to the Ktunaxa claim, the MDA changed the scope of the proposed development and added new protections for Ktunaxa interests. The size of the controlled recreational area was reduced by approximately 60% and the total resort area was reduced to approximately 104 hectares.

Protections for Ktunaxa access and activities were put in place, and environmental protections were established. [ 33 ] To accommodate the Ktunaxa’s spiritual concerns, changes had been proposed to provide special protection of grizzly bear habitat: · The lower Jumbo Creek area was removed from the recreation area because it was perceived as having greater visitation potential from grizzly bears; · Ski lifts were removed on the west side of the valley, where impact to grizzly bear habitat was expected to be greatest; and · The province committed to pursuing a Wildlife Management Area to address potential impacts in relation to grizzly bears and Aboriginal claims relating to the spiritual value of the valley.

[34] On June 8, 2009, five days after the Minister had concluded that all major issues had been resolved, the Ktunaxaresponded with a table of outstanding concerns. They did not list the sacred nature of the area or a threat to the grizzly bear populationamong their concerns. [35] At meetings on June 9 and 10, however, the Ktunaxa took a very different and uncompromising position regardingthe spiritual value of Qat’muk.

They asserted that the consultation process was deficient, not because interest-based issues like moneyand land reserves had not been concluded, but because the process had not properly considered information that the Jumbo Valley was asacred site. They advised the Minister that only certain members of the community, knowledge keepers, possessed information aboutthese values. Elder Chris Luke Sr. was better placed to speak to the issue. The Minister agreed to meet Mr. Luke on June 22, 2009 butthe meeting did not proceed on that date.

The Minister agreed to extend the consultation process with the Ktunaxa until at leastDecember 2009 to specifically address the issue of the sacred nature of the Jumbo Valley. [36] After ongoing efforts to arrange a meeting about sacred values, the Minister was finally able to meet with theKtunaxa and Mr. Luke on September 19, 2009 in Cranbrook. Mr.

Luke, through translators, advised the Minister that Qat’muk was “alife and death matter”, that “Jumbo is one of the major spiritual places”, and that to say the sacredness of the area for the Ktunaxa wasimportant would be an understatement: chambers judge’s reasons, at para. 94. He stated that any movement of earth and the constructionof permanent structures would desecrate the area and destroy the valley’s spiritual value. The Ktunaxa at the meeting told the Ministerthat there was no middle ground regarding the proposed resort. Simply put, no accommodation was possible.

The Ktunaxa confirmed thisposition in a second meeting in Creston, B.C., on December 7, 2009. It emerged that the revelation that led to the position that permanentstructures would desecrate and irrevocably devalue the sacred site came to Mr. Luke in 2004, but that health problems and secrecyconcerns had prevented him from disclosing the revelation to others until 2009. [37] The Minister persisted. After further study of the Ktunaxa’s spiritual claims, on June 11, 2010 he sent the Ktunaxa a71-page draft “Consultation/ Accommodation

Summary” that included seven pages devoted to describing the consultation andaccommodation specifically related to the Ktunaxa’s assertions regarding the sacred nature of the Jumbo Valley and invited theKtunaxa’s comments. He met with the Ktunaxa on July 8, 2010 and revisions were made to the document. [38] The Ktunaxa responded with a 40-page document that devoted the first page and a half to sacred values. A fewmonths later, in November 2010, the Ktunaxa issued the “Qat’muk Declaration” (Schedule “E” of 2014 BCSC 568, at pp. 115-16) — a unilateral declaration of rights based on “pre-existing sovereignty”.

The Qat’muk Declaration mapped an area in whichthe Ktunaxa would not permit development. No disturbance or alteration of the ground would be permitted within an area identified asthe “refuge area”. Construction of buildings with permanent foundations or permanent human habitation was forbidden within the refugearea and the access road and buffer area.

This amounted to saying that the resort could not proceed, as the proposed resort was partiallywithin the refuge area and its access road ran through the buffer area. [39] Consistent with the Qat’muk Declaration, the Ktunaxa now took the position that negotiations were over. The onlypoint of further discussion was to make decision makers understand why the proposed resort could not proceed. The Minister continuedto explore potential mitigation and accommodation measures through additional consultations, without success.

Negotiations were at anend. [40] On March 20, 2012, the Minister signed the MDA with Glacier Resorts. The MDA contained a number of measuresresponding to concerns raised by the Ktunaxa during the consultations: chambers judge’s reasons, at paras. 236-39. [41] In

summary, the Ktunaxa played an active

part in all phases of the lengthy regulatory process leading to the approvalof the resort project. As a result of the consultation that occurred during the regulation process, the resort plan was significantly reducedin scope; safeguards for the grizzly bear population and the spiritual interests of the Ktunaxa were put in place; and economic andinterest-based issues, including compensation, were discussed. Areas of significant frequentation by grizzly bears were removed from theproject.

Progress was made and agreement seemed imminent. [42] This trajectory toward accommodation ended in 2010, with the issuance of the Qat’muk Declaration. The Ktunaxasaid at the September 2009 meeting that their spiritual concerns could not be accommodated.

The 2010 Qat’muk Declarationunequivocally changed the process from a search for accommodation to rejection of the entire project; from a search for protection ofspiritual values inhering in the valley and the grizzly bear population, to the position that any permanent structures on the proposed resortsite would drive out Grizzly Bear Spirit and destroy the foundation of Ktunaxa spiritual practice. [43] The stance taken by the Ktunaxa in September 2009 and again in late 2010 with the issuance of the Qat’mukDeclaration amounted, in effect, to a different and uncompromising claim regarding suitable accommodation.

The claim now was not aclaim to generalized spiritual values that could be accommodated by measures like land reserves, economic payments and environmentalprotections. Instead, it was an absolute claim to a sacred site, which must be preserved and protected from permanent human habitation.To identify this claim — which first arose in September 2009 and was affirmed in December 2009 and again by the Qat’mukDeclaration — we refer to it below as the “Late-2009 Claim”.

There was no way the proposed resort could be reconciled with this claim.The Minister made efforts to continue consultation, but, not surprisingly, they failed. In 2011, the Minister concluded that sufficientconsultation had occurred and approved the resort development. III. Decisional History A. The Minister’s Rationale [44] On March 20, 2012, the Minister approved the resort MDA and issued the Rationale for his decision:

Schedule “F”of 2014 BCSC 568, at pp. 117-24 (“Rationale”). The Rationale in turn referenced the detailed Consultation/AccommodationSummary, which was finalized in March 2011: see R.R. (Minister), at pp. 66-154. [45] The Minister stated that while the Aboriginal claims to the area remained to be proven, he was required to give themdue respect and recognition, and consult with the groups with a view to accommodating their interests. The Shuswap had concluded that

sufficient consultation had occurred, but the Ktunaxa had not. [ 46 ] The Minister stated that he recognized the genuinely sacred values at stake for the Ktunaxa leadership and knowledge keepers. He stated that it was not clear whether the Ktunaxa spiritual claims would be found to be a constitutionally protected right or whether the claimed right could be reconciled with other claimed Aboriginal rights and Ktunaxa access to the valley for a variety of traditional and modern uses, including hunting, gathering and fishing.

He viewed the claim as weak, due to lack of indication that the claimed right was part of an Aboriginal tradition, practice or activity integral to the Ktunaxa culture, and the fact that details of the spiritual interest were not shared with or known to the general Ktunaxa population. (The latter point must refer to the Late-2009 Claim, since the more general spiritual claims that had been advanced from the start of the process were broadly known and shared.) [ 47 ] The Minister reviewed the extensive record of consultation with the Ktunaxa over the past two decades, and noted the many accommodations and adjustments that had been made in an effort to accommodate their interests.

These included a 60% reduction in the resort development area, on-site environmental monitors, continued use of the area for traditional practices, and measures designed to reduce the impact of the development on grizzly bears. The lower Jumbo Creek area and a ski lift on the west side of the valley had been removed from the development because of perceived greater visitation by grizzly bears in these areas. A wildlife management area had been established to address potential impacts in relation to grizzly bears and the spiritual value of the valley.

And the province committed to continue to proactively manage the grizzly bear population through existing legislation and policies. The Minister stated in his Rationale: For these reasons I have concluded that, on balance, the commitments and strategies in place are reasonable and minimize the potential impact to the environment and specifically, to Grizzly bear habitat. [p. 124] [ 48 ] The Minister concluded that overall, consultation had been at the “deep end of the consultation spectrum” (p. 123).

This, combined with the accommodation measures put in place, was adequate “in respect of those rights for which the strength of claim is strong, and for which potential impacts of the project could be significant” ( ibid. ).

The extensive accommodation measures relating to the continued ability of the Ktunaxa to continue to exercise their Aboriginal rights, balanced against the societal benefits of the project ($900 million in capital investment and 750 to 800 permanent, direct jobs), were reasonable. [ 49 ] Noting once again the extensive consultation and assessment processes that had taken place, the Minister stated that he had decided to approve the MDA for the Jumbo Glacier Resort. B. The Chambers Judge’s Reasons [ 50 ] The Ktunaxa sought judicial review of the Minister’s decision.

They filed a petition, claiming the decision violated their freedom of religion guaranteed by s. 2(

a) of the Charter , and breached the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate their Aboriginal rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . [ 51 ] The chambers judge, Savage J. (as he then was), dismissed the petition. On the Charter claim, he held that s. 2(

a) protects against state coercion or constraint on individual conduct, but does not encompass “subjective loss of meaning” to a religion, without associated coercion or constraint on conduct (para. 299). He therefore rejected the claim that the state had a duty under s. 2 (

a) to stop the development because the Ktunaxa believe it would undermine their religious beliefs and practices. [ 52 ] The chambers judge went on to say that if he were wrong in this conclusion about the scope of s. 2( a ), the Minister’s actions and accommodations represented a reasonable balancing of the s. 2(

a) value and the statutory objectives, and thus did not unreasonably trench on freedom of religion. [ 53 ] On the issue of consultation, the chambers judge found that the consultation process undertaken by the Minister was reasonable and appropriate, and that the Minister’s proposed accommodations fell within a range of reasonable responses which upheld the honour of the Crown and satisfied the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . C.

The Court of Appeal [ 54 ] The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal: 2015 BCCA 352 , 387 D.L.R. (4th) 10. [ 55 ] The Court of Appeal held that the Minister’s decision did not violate the Ktunaxa’s right to freedom of religion under s. 2(

a) of the Charter . The chambers judge’s view that s. 2(

a) protected only against state coercion or constraint on individual conduct was too narrow; s. 2(

a) freedom implies the vitality of a religious community as a whole. The proper test was whether “the subjective loss of meaning more than trivially or substantially interfere[d] with the communal dimension of the s. 2(

a) right by diminishing the vitality of the Ktunaxa religious community through a disruption of the ‘deep linkages’ between the asserted religious belief and its manifestation through communal Ktunaxa institutions”: para. 67 (emphasis in original). However, protection of the communal dimension of freedom of religion does not extend to “restraining and restricting the behaviour of others who do not share that belief in the name of preserving subjective religious meaning” (para. 73).

The court found that the Ktunaxa cannot, in the name of their own religious freedom, require others who do not share that belief to modify their behaviour. As stated in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem , 2004 SCC 47 , [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 62 , “[c]onduct which would potentially cause harm to or interference with the rights of others [may not] be protected.” [ 56 ] On s. 35, the Court of Appeal agreed with the chambers judge’s conclusion that “the process of consultation and the accommodation offered meets the reasonableness standard” (para. 93).

It concluded that the chambers judge did not err in law by finding reasonable the Minister’s characterization of the potential Aboriginal right as a right to “preclude permanent development” rather than a right to “exercise spiritual practices which rely on a sacred site and require its protection” (para. 81). Nor did the chambers judge understate the scale of the alleged infringement to the Ktunaxa and apply too light a standard of consultation; in fact, deep consultation

consistent with an important impact took place. Finally, the chambers judge did not err in finding that the Ktunaxa first asserted thepermanent nature of the proposed project would infringe their s. 35 Aboriginal rights in 2009. In fact, the chambers judge found that whatwas first asserted in 2009 was the position that “no accommodation” was possible — a finding supported by the record. IV. Issues [57] A. Did the Minister’s decision violate the Ktunaxa’s freedom of conscience and religion? B.

Was the Minister’s decision that the Crown had met its duty to consult and accommodate under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982reasonable? V. Analysis A. Did the Minister’s Decision Violate the Ktunaxa’s Freedom of Conscience and Religion?

(1) The Claim [58] The Ktunaxa contend that the Minister’s decision to allow the Glacier Resorts project to proceed violates their rightto freedom of conscience and religion protected by s. 2(

a) of the Charter. This claim is asserted independently from the Ktunaxa’s s. 35claim. Even if the Minister undertook adequate consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, his decision could be impeachedon the ground that it violated the Ktunaxa’s Charter guarantee of freedom of religion. We note that with respect to the s. 2(

a) claim, theKtunaxa stand in the same position as non-Aboriginal litigants. [59] The Ktunaxa assert that the project, and in particular permanent overnight accommodation, will drive Grizzly BearSpirit from Qat’muk. As Grizzly Bear Spirit is central to Ktunaxa religious beliefs and practices, its departure, they say, would removethe basis of their beliefs and render their practices futile.

The Ktunaxa argue that the vitality of their religious community depends onmaintaining the presence of Grizzly Bear Spirit in Qat’muk. [60] The Ktunaxa fault the Minister for not having considered their right to freedom of religion in the course of hisdecision. The Ktunaxa raised the potential breach of s. 2(

a) before the Minister. Nevertheless, the Minister’s Rationale for approving theJumbo Glacier Resort did not analyze the s. 2(

a) claim. The Minister should have discussed the s. 2(

a) claim. However, his failure toconduct an analysis of the Ktunaxa’s right to freedom of religion is immaterial because the claim falls outside the scope of s. 2(a). Thiswas the finding of both the chambers judge and the Court of Appeal and we agree, though for somewhat different reasons.

(2) The Scope of Freedom of Religion [61] The first step where a claim is made that a law or governmental act violates freedom of religion is to determinewhether the claim falls within the scope of s. 2(a). If not, there is no need to consider whether the decision represents a proportionatebalance between freedom of religion and other considerations: Amselem, at para. 181. [62] The seminal case on the scope of the Charter guarantee of freedom of religion is this Court’s decision in Big M DrugMart. The majority of the Court, per Justice Dickson (as he then was), defined s. 2(

a) as protecting “the right to entertain such religiousbeliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right tomanifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination” (p. 336). [63] So defined, s. 2(

a) has two aspects — the freedom to hold religious beliefs and the freedom to manifest those beliefs.This definition has been adopted in subsequent cases: Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R.613, at para. 58; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 68; Saskatchewan (HumanRights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, at para. 159; Multani v.

Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, at para. 32; Amselem, at para. 40. [64] These two aspects of the right to freedom of religion — the freedom to hold a religious belief and the freedom tomanifest it — are reflected in international human rights law.

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) (“UDHR”), first defined the right in international law in these terms: “Everyone has the right tofreedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or incommunity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” [65] Similarly, art. 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Can.

T.S. 1976 No. 47 (“ICCPR”),defined the right to freedom of religion as consisting of “freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of [one’s] choice” and “freedom,either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practiceand teaching”. The relevance of art. 18(1) of the ICCPR to s. 2(

a) of the Charter was considered by a noted human rights jurist,Tarnopolsky J.A., in R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. (1984), (ON CA), 48 O.R. (2d) 395 (C.A.). He observed that art. 18(1)defined freedom of religion “as including not only the right to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice, but also to be able to‘manifest’ the religion or belief” (p. 421 (emphasis deleted)), and added that s. 2(

a) of the Charter — then a new and judiciallyunconsidered feature of Canada’s Constitution — should be “interpreted in conformity with our international obligations” (p. 420). Onfurther appeal to this Court, Dickson C.J. approved Tarnopolsky J.A.’s approach to s. 2(a), noting that his definition of freedom ofreligion “to include the freedom to manifest and practice one’s religious beliefs . . . anticipated conclusions which were reached by thisCourt in the Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case”: R. v.

Edwards Books and Art Ltd., (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at p. 735.Later, in Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at p. 349, DicksonC.J. proposed, as Tarnopolsky J.A. had done, that the Charter be presumed to provide at least as great a level of protection as is found inCanada’s international human rights obligations. The Court has since adopted this interpretive presumption: Health Services and Support— Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 70; Divito v.

Canada (PublicSafety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 157, at paras. 22-23 and 25; India v. Badesha, 2017 SCC 44,[2017] 2 S.C.R. 127, at para. 38.

[ 66 ] The two aspects of freedom of religion enunciated in the UDHR and ICCPR are also found in international human rights instruments to which Canada is not a party. Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights , 213 U.N.T.S. 221, recognizes everyone’s right to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” including “freedom . . . to manifest [one’s] religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”.

The American Convention on Human Rights , 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, provides, at art. 12(1), that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion” including “freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs”, while art. 12(3) indicates that the “[f]reedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs” may be subject only to lawful limitations.

While these instruments are not binding on Canada and therefore do not attract the presumption of conformity, they are nevertheless important illustrations of how freedom of religion is conceived around the world. [ 67 ] The scope of freedom of religion in these instruments is expressed in terms of the right’s two aspects: the freedom to believe and the freedom to manifest belief. This Court’s definition from Big M Drug Mart , consistently applied in later cases, is in keeping with this conception of the right’s scope. The question, then, is whether the Ktunaxa’s claim falls within that scope.

(3) Application to This Case [ 68 ] To establish an infringement of the right to freedom of religion, the claimant must demonstrate (1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion, and (2) that the impugned state conduct interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief: see Multani , at para. 34 . [ 69 ] In this case, it is undisputed that the Ktunaxa sincerely believe in the existence and importance of Grizzly Bear Spirit.

They also believe that permanent development in Qat’muk will drive this spirit from that place. The chambers judge indicated that Mr. Luke came to this belief in 2004 but whether this belief is ancient or recent plays no

part in our s. 2(

a) analysis. The Charter protects all sincere religious beliefs and practices, old or new. [ 70 ] The second part of the test, however, is not met in this case. This stage of the analysis requires an objective analysis of the interference caused by the impugned state action: S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Ch ênes , 2012 SCC 7 , [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235, at para. 24 . The Ktunaxa must show that the Minister’s decision to approve the development interferes either with their freedom to believe in Grizzly Bear Spirit or their freedom to manifest that belief. But the Minister’s decision does neither of those things.

This case is not concerned with either the freedom to hold a religious belief or to manifest that belief. The claim is rather that s. 2(

a) of the Charter protects the presence of Grizzly Bear Spirit in Qat’muk. This is a novel claim and invites this Court to extend s. 2(

a) beyond the scope recognized in our law. [ 71 ] We would decline this invitation. The state’s duty under s. 2(

a) is not to protect the object of beliefs, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit. Rather, the state’s duty is to protect everyone’s freedom to hold such beliefs and to manifest them in worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. In short, the Charter protects the freedom to worship, but does not protect the spiritual focal point of worship. We have been directed to no authority that supports the proposition that s. 2(

a) protects the latter, rather than individuals’ liberty to hold a belief and to manifest that belief.

Section 2(

a) protects the freedom to pursue practices, like the wearing of a kirpan in Multani or refusing to be photographed in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony , 2009 SCC 37 , [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567. And s. 2(

a) protects the right to freely hold the religious beliefs that motivate such practices. In this case, however, the appellants are not seeking protection for the freedom to believe in Grizzly Bear Spirit or to pursue practices related to it. Rather, they seek to protect Grizzly Bear Spirit itself and the subjective spiritual meaning they derive from it. That claim is beyond the scope of s. 2( a ). [ 72 ] The extension of s. 2(

a) proposed by the Ktunaxa would put deeply held personal beliefs under judicial scrutiny. Adjudicating how exactly a spirit is to be protected would require the state and its courts to assess the content and merits of religious beliefs. In Amselem , this Court chose to protect any sincerely held belief rather than examining the specific merits of religious beliefs: In my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma.

Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of religious requirement, “obligation”, precept, “commandment”, custom or ritual.

Secular judicial determinations of theological or religious disputes, or of contentious matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the court in the affairs of religion. (para. 50, per Iacobucci J.) The Court in Amselem concluded that such an inquiry into profoundly personal beliefs would be inconsistent with the principles underlying freedom of religion (para. 49). [ 73 ] The Ktunaxa argue that the Big M Drug Mart definition of the s. 2(

a) guarantee has been subsequently enriched by an understanding that freedom of religion has a communal aspect, and that the state cannot act in a way that constrains or destroys the communal dimension of a religion. Grizzly Bear Spirit’s continued occupation of Qat’muk is essential to the communal aspect of Ktunaxa religious beliefs and practices, they assert. State action that drives Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk will, the Ktunaxa say, “constrain” or “interfere” with — indeed destroy — the communal aspect of s. 2(

a) protection. [ 74 ] The difficulty with this argument is that the communal aspect of the claim is also confined to the scope of freedom of religion under s. 2( a ). It is true that freedom of religion under s. 2(

a) has a communal aspect: Loyola ; Hutterian Brethren , at para. 89; Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village) , 2004 SCC 48 , [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650. But the communal aspects of freedom of religion do not, and should not, extend s. 2( a )’s protection beyond the freedom to have beliefs and the freedom to manifest them. [ 75 ] We conclude that s. 2(

a) protects the freedom to have and manifest religious beliefs, and that the Ktunaxa’s claim does not fall within these parameters. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the Minister’s decision represents a reasonable balance between freedom of religion and other considerations.

B. Was the Minister’s Decision That the Crown Had Met Its Duty to Consult and Accommodate Under

Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 Reasonable? [ 76 ] The Ktunaxa say that the Minister’s decision that consultation and accommodation had been sufficient to satisfy s. 35 was unreasonable, which in turn rendered his decision to approve the resort unreasonable and invalid. [ 77 ] The Minister’s decision that an adequate consultation and accommodation process occurred is entitled to deference: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) , 2004 SCC 73 , [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, at para. 62 .

The chambers judge was required to determine whether the Minister reasonably concluded that the Crown’s obligation to consult and accommodate had been met. A reviewing judge does not decide the constitutional issues raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, but asks rather whether the decision of the Minister, on the whole, was reasonable.

(1) The Legal Requirements of the

Section 35 Consultation and Accommodation Process [ 78 ] The constitutional guarantee of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is not confined to treaty rights or to proven or settled Aboriginal rights and title claims.

Section 35 also protects the potential rights embedded in as-yet unproven Aboriginal claims and, pending the determination of such claims through negotiation or otherwise, may require the Crown to consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests: Haida Nation , at paras. 25 and 27 . Where, as here, a permit is sought to use or develop lands subject to an unproven Aboriginal claim, the government is required to consult with the affected Aboriginal group and, where appropriate, accommodate the group’s claim pending its final resolution.

This obligation flows from the honour of the Crown and is constitutionalized by s. 35 . [ 79 ] The extent of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate in the case of an unproven Aboriginal claim varies with the prima facie strength of the claim and the effect the proposed development or use will have on the claimed Aboriginal right: Haida Nation , at paras. 43-44 . A strong prima facie claim and significant impact may require deep consultation. A weak claim or transient impact may attract a lighter duty of consultation. The duty is to consult and, where warranted, accommodate.

Section 35 guarantees a process, not a particular result. The Aboriginal group is called on to facilitate the process of consultation and accommodation by setting out its claims clearly ( Haida Nation , at para. 36 ) and as early as possible. There is no guarantee that, in the end, the specific accommodation sought will be warranted or possible.

The ultimate obligation is that the Crown act honourably. [ 80 ] The holdings of Haida Nation , as they pertain to this case, may be summarized as follows: • The duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate pending the resolution of claims is grounded in the honour of the Crown, and must be understood generously to achieve reconciliation (paras. 16-17). • The Crown, acting honourably, cannot “cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty negotiation”; it must consult and, if appropriate, accommodate the Aboriginal interest (para. 27). • The duty to consult is triggered by the Crown having “[k]nowledge of a credible but unproven claim” (para. 37). • The content of the duty to consult and accommodate varies with the strength of the claim and the significance of the potential adverse effect on the Aboriginal interest (para. 39).

Cases with a weak claim, a limited Aboriginal right, or a minor intrusion may require only notice, information, and response to queries. At the other end of the spectrum, a strong prima facie case with significant intrusion on an important right may require the Crown to engage in “deep consultation” and to accommodate the interest by altering its plans.

Between these extremes lie other cases (paras. 43-45). • When the consultation process suggests amendment of Crown policy, a duty to reasonably accommodate the Aboriginal interest may arise (para. 47). • The duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate the Aboriginal interest is a two-way street. The obligations on the Crown are to provide notice and information on the project, and to consult with the Aboriginal group about its concerns.

The obligations on the Aboriginal group include: defining the elements of the claim with clarity (para. 36); not frustrating the Crown’s reasonable good faith attempts; and not taking unreasonable positions to thwart the Crown from making decisions or acting where, despite meaningful consultation, agreement is not reached (para. 42). • The duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal interests may require the alteration of a proposed development. However, it does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over developments pending proof of their claims .

Consent is required only for proven claims, and even then only in certain cases. What is required is a balancing of interests, a process of give and take (paras. 45 and 48-50). [ 81 ] The steps in a consultation process may be summarized as follows: 1. Initiation of the consultation process, triggered when the Crown has knowledge, whether real or constructive, of the

potential existence of an Aboriginal right or treaty right and contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it; 2. Determination of the level of consultation required, by reference to the strength of the prima facie claim and thesignificance of the potential adverse impact on the Aboriginal interest; 3. Consultation at the appropriate level; and 4. If the consultation shows it is appropriate, accommodation of the Aboriginal interest, pending final resolution of theunderlying claim. This

summary of the steps in a consultation process is offered as guidance to assist parties in ensuring that adequate consultation takesplace, not as a rigid test or a perfunctory formula. In the end there is only one question — whether in fact the consultation that took placewas adequate.

(2) Was the Minister’s Conclusion That the Consultation Process Satisfied

Section 35 Reasonable? [82] After an extensive regulatory process and negotiations with the Ktunaxa spanning two decades, the Ministerconcluded that the s. 35 duty of consultation and accommodation had been satisfied, and authorized the Glacier Resorts ski project. Asnoted, a court reviewing an administrative decision under s. 35 does not decide the constitutional issue de novo for itself. Rather, it mustask whether the administrative decision maker’s finding on the issue was reasonable.

The question before us is whether the Minister’sconclusion, that consultation and accommodation sufficient to satisfy s. 35 had occurred, was reasonable. [83] The s. 35 obligation to consult and accommodate regarding unproven claims is a right to a process, not to aparticular outcome. The question is not whether the Ktunaxa obtained the outcome they sought, but whether the process is consistentwith the honour of the Crown.

While the hope is always that s. 35 consultation will lead to agreement and reconciliation of Aboriginaland non-Aboriginal interests, Haida Nation makes clear that in some situations this may not occur, and that s. 35 does not giveunsatisfied claimants a veto over development. Where adequate consultation has occurred, a development may proceed without theconsent of an Indigenous group. [84] The Ktunaxa’s petition asked the chambers judge to issue a declaration that Qat’muk is sacred to the Ktunaxa andthat permanent construction is banned from that site.

In effect, they ask the courts, in the guise of judicial review of an administrativedecision, to pronounce on the validity of their claim to a sacred site and associated spiritual practices. This declaration cannot be made bya court sitting in judicial review of an administrative decision to approve a development. In judicial proceedings, such a declaration canonly be made after a trial of the issue and with the benefit of pleadings, discovery, evidence and submissions.

Aboriginal rights must beproven by tested evidence; they cannot be established as an incident of administrative law proceedings that centre on the adequacy ofconsultation and accommodation. To permit this would invite uncertainty and discourage final settlement of alleged rights through theproper processes. Aboriginal rights claims require that proper evidence be marshalled to meet specific legal tests in the context of a trial:R. v. Van der Peet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (SCC), [1997] 3S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 109 and 143; Mitchell v.

M.N.R., 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 26; Tsilhqot’in Nation v.

BritishColumbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, at para. 26. [85] Without specifically delegated authority, administrative decision makers cannot themselves pronounce upon theexistence or scope of Aboriginal rights, although they may be called upon to assess the prima facie strength of unproven Aboriginalclaims and the adverse impact of proposed government actions on those claims in order to determine the depth of consultation required.Indeed, in this case, the duty to consult arises regarding rights that remain unproven: Haida Nation, at para. 37. [86] The Ktunaxa reply that they must have relief now, for if development proceeds Grizzly Bear Spirit will fleeQat’muk long before they are able to prove their claim or establish it under the B.C. treaty process.

We are not insensible to this point.But the solution is not for courts to make far-reaching constitutional declarations in the course of judicial review proceedings incidentalto, and ill-equipped to determine, Aboriginal rights and title claims. Injunctive relief to delay the project may be available. Otherwise,the best that can be achieved in the uncertain interim while claims are resolved is to follow a fair and respectful process and work ingood faith toward reconciliation. Claims should be identified early in the process and defined as clearly as possible.

In most cases, thiswill lead to agreement and reconciliation. Where it does not, mitigating potential adverse impacts on the asserted right ultimatelyrequires resolving questions about the existence and scope of unsettled claims as expeditiously as possible. For the Ktunaxa, this mayseem unsatisfactory, indeed tragic. But in the difficult period between claim assertion and claim resolution, consultation andaccommodation, imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal tools in the reconciliat

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