2020 QCCQ 8802, 2020 QCCQ 8802

R. c. McBride 2020 QCCQ 8802 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU TOWN OF GATINEAU «Criminal Division» No: 550-01-095905-164 DATE: November 6 th , 2020 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE ROSEMARIE MILLAR, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecutor/Respondent v.

DONALD LUKE MCBRIDE Accused/Applicant ______________________________________________________________________ DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTIONS 11b) AND 24(1) OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Is the Applicant’s right to be tried in a reasonable time has been infringed? [ 2 ] The Tribunal concludes that the net delay exceeds the ceiling of 30 months established by the Supreme Court in Jordan [1] and is presumptively unreasonable. [ 3 ] Furthermore, the Respondent did not rebut the presumption by establishing the presence of exceptional circumstances. [ 4 ] Accordingly, a stay of proceedings is the only remedy.

FACTS [ 5 ] The facts are described in the Respondent’s submissions and they are the following. [ 6 ] On May 10 th 2016, an investigation concerning Donald Luke McBride (the Applicant) started with the Service de Police de la Ville de Gatineau (SPVG). The starting point of the investigation was information provided by an informant (source

A) in April 2016 to the effect that 2 men were trafficking drugs (cocaine) from 56 Papineau Street in Gatineau. [ 7 ] On the same date, SPVG started surveillance on the Applicant and his residence (56 Papineau). In total, 46 days of surveillance were done between May 10 th 2016 and October 3 rd 2016. During the course of those surveillances, the Applicant’s address changed to 218 #1 Kent Street in Gatineau. [ 8 ] On October 4 th 2016, the Honourable Christine Lafrance granted search warrants for the following addresses: • 218 Kent #1, Gatineau; • 260 boul.

Maisonneuve #404, Gatineau; • 6 Mount Pleasant, Ottawa . [ 9 ] The search warrants were executed on October 4 th 2016 and the SPVG arrested the Applicant and 2 other persons related to this file: Liam Farrell and Khalil Mansour. [ 10 ] The Applicant appeared detained on October 5 th 2016 on the following charges : 1. Between October 1 st 2011 and October 4 th 2016, in Gatineau, district of Gatineau and Ottawa, district of Ottawa-Carleton, did traffic in a substance included in Scheduled I (Cocaine) or represented to be held out as such, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(1)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 2. Between October 1 st 2011 and October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau and Ottawa, district of Ottawa-Carleton, did traffic in a substance included in Scheduled I (Methamphetamines) or represented to be held out as such, committing thereby the indictable

offence provided by section 5 (1)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 3. Between October 1 st 2011 and October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau and Ottawa, district of Ottawa-Carleton, did traffic in a substance included in Scheduled II (Cannabis) or represented to be held out as such, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5 (1)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 4. Between October 1 st 2011 and October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau and Ottawa, district of Ottawa-Carleton, did traffic in a substance included in Scheduled I (MDMA) or represented to be held out as such, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5 (1)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 5. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, Cannabis, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(2)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 6. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, Cocaine, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(2)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 7. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, MDMA, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(2)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 8. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, Methamphetamines, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(2)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 9. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession for the purpose of trafficking, Xanax, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by section 5(2)

(3) a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . 10. On or about October 4 th 2016 in Gatineau, district of Gatineau, did have in his possession an amount of money of a value not exceeding 5000.00$ knowing that this thing was obtain by

an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an offence punishable by indictment, committing thereby the indictable offence provided by

section 355b) (

i) of the Criminal Code . [ 11 ] The Applicant was then released with the consent of the Crown on October 18 th 2016 upon signing a recognizance. [ 12 ] On April 16 th 2018, a preliminary hearing proceeded after which the Applicant was sent for trial. [ 13 ] On August 3 rd 2018, the Applicant filed an application to leave cross-examination of the affiant ( Garofoli ). [ 14 ] On March 8 th 2019, the Applicant withdrew his Garofoli application and announced an application under

section 8 of the Canadian Charter of rights and Freedoms ( Charter ). [ 15 ] On April 10 th 2019, the Applicant filed a motion under

section 8 of the Charter seeking to quash the search warrant obtained for 218 Kent #1, Gatineau, the residence of the Applicant and to exclude the evidence seized at that address. [ 16 ] On June 15 th 2020, the Tribunal dismissed the motion presented by the Applicant under

section 8 of the Charter and declared the warrant valid. [ 17 ] On July 22 nd 2020, the Applicant filed a motion for a stay of proceedings on the basis of unreasonable delays. [ 18 ] The Applicants’ motion is based on the following calculation of delays: • 1436 days (47 months and 6 days) total on September 11 th 2020; • 278 days (9.2 months) to be deducted; • Remaining of 1140 days (38 months) to the charge of the Respondent. [ 19 ] According to the Applicant, the remainder net delays of 38 months exceeds the Jordan ceiling by 8 months and the Respondent cannot rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay. [ 20 ] The Respondent pleads that its total attributable delay is 893 days (29.7 months) and accordingly the ceiling of 30 months has not been breached.

PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY [ 21 ] The following tab is a

summary prepared by the Respondent of all court dates in the file using the Respondent’s file, the minutes and the recording provided by the Applicant. This tab will be used to overview the case’s procedures and dates and to compare the parties’ arguments.

Date Procedure Delay between that date and the next date October 5 th 2016 Information is sworned in. Me Dupéré appears for the applicant and receives initial disclosure. There is an objection to the applicant’s release. File is remanded to October 6 th . 1 day (neutral) October 6 th 2016 Additional disclosure is handed over to defence. Case is remanded for bail hearing pro forma. 5 days (Crown) October 11 th 2016 Bail pro forma. Me Dupéré cease to occupy. Me Labrosse acts as a friend of the court.

The case is remanded. 7 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant October 13 th 2016 Me Deslauriers appears for Me Adelman. The case is remanded for Bail hearing with investigator. 2 days (Crown) October 18 th 2016 Me Deslauriers appears. Bail hearing starts. Towards the end, Crown consents to release of the accused under recognizance. Case is remanded. 23 days (Crown) November 11 th 2016 Me Lemieux represents Me Deslauriers.

The case is remanded for orientation. 33 days (Crown) December 15 th 2016 The file is remanded to the request of the defence. 46 days (Crown) January 26 th 2017 Redacted affidavits are disclosed to defence. The case is remanded to April 3 rd 68 days (Crown) April 3 rd 2017 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Lemieux. Option for judge alone with possibility of a preliminary inquiry. Justice Millar asks if defence wants to fix a date immediately.

Me Lemieux says “no” and asks for the case to be remanded to April 21 st in management court. 18 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant April 21 st 2017 Case is remanded to May 5 th in management court. 14 days (Crown)

May 5 th 2017 Me Labrosse represents Me Deslauriers in managing court. Me Morin just ended a jury trial on the prior day. The case is remanded to May 19 th 2017. 14 days (Crown) May 19 th 2017 Me Deslauriers is present. The Crown suggests the following week. The case is remanded to June 9 th 2017. 20 days (Crown) June 9 th 2017 Case is set for preliminary inquiry, November 7 th 2017. 152 days (Crown) November 7 th 2017 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin.

Crown provides defence with new disclosure and the case is remanded to December 18 th . 41 days (Crown) December 18 th 2017 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. Crown have not provided defence with new disclosure. Case is remanded. 30 days (Crown) January 18 th 2018 Case is set for preliminary inquiry for 5 hours. 88 days (Crown) April 16 th 2018 Preliminary inquiry. 549 after 1 witness. 44 days (Crown) May 30 th 2018 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. Defence has the transcripts.

Ready to fix but has to go to managing court for a long duration trial to be fixed. 22 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant June 22 nd 2018 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. Crown is ready to fix for trial. Case is remanded at the request of the defence for final position on whether or not defence will file an application on the charter. 14 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant July 6 th 2018 Defence wishes to think about additional admissions. Me Deslauriers wants to make further verifications.

Case is remanded to July 13 th . 7 days (Defence) July 13 th 2018 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. An application under Garofoli will be filed on August 3 rd . Case is remanded in order to receive the motion. 41 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant

August 24 th 2018 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. Case is remanded at the request of the defence because defence does not have the availabilities of Me Legendre to fix for trial. 14 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant September 7 th 2018 Case is set for application to leave for cross examination of the affiant. It is decided that the case will be divided in different steps. Defence is offered September 28 th or November 23 rd . Both dates are not suitable for both parties. Crown (Morin) is not available but it is mentioned that Me Desharnais could act for Me Morin if needed to.

In the afternoon, the case is called back and the case is set for 4 hrs in December 19 th . Defence announced its intention of producing other applications. The court mentions concerns about delays and wanting things to move forwards. From September 7 th to September 28 th : 11 days, Crown Remaining: 51 days Defence. Contested by Applicant December 19 th 2018 Application for leave cross examination of the affiant. Me Deslauriers is sick. The Crown is ready to proceed. February 14 th is offered but defence isn’t available.

Case is remanded to March 5 th . 79 days (Defence) January 15 th 2019 Defence asks for the case to be push back on March 8 th instead. March 8 th 2019 Application for leave to cross examination of the affiant #2. The Accused is late. Defence withdraw its application for Garofoli. Defence mentions that they want to file an application under 8 of the Charter . Court asks defence how long they need and indicates that the file has to proceed as soon as possible. Defence mentions he’s already “booked solid” for the next months.

The application is to be file on April 1 st and the case is remanded on May 1 st . 52 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant May 1 st 2019 Me Deslauriers is represented by Me Sabourin. Crown is ready to set a trial date but due to the number of days a “facilitation” is suggested. Case is remanded to try to avoid 40 days (Crown)

June 11 th 2019 “Conférence de facilitation”. Case is remanded. Defence needs to think about it. 9 days (Defence) Contested by Applicant June 20 th 2019 No settlement. Case remanded still for facilitation. 76 days (Crown) September 6 th 2019 The court sets different dates for the matter to go forward: January 10 th is day #1 for hearing of

section 8 . Decision on January 28 th . Day #2 is February 7 th . . 124 days (Crown) January 10 th 2020 Me Deslauriers is not present due to sickness. The whole day is lost and the case is remanded. Crown suggests written submissions in order to be able to proceed on February 7 th . 27 days (Defence) February 7 th 2020 Set to proceed on

section 8 . Accused is not present. Bench warrant. 3 days (Defence) February 10th 2020 Accused appears and warrant is suspended. Defence admits it is by their fault: no letter was sent to the accused for him to be present. Remanded in front of justice Millar for adjudication. 8 days (Defence) February 18th 2020 Adjudication. Warrant quashed. Agenda for written submissions. Defense admits that delays are caused by their conduct. Crown insists on written submissions. Justice Millar agrees and a calendar is established. 87 Days (Defence) May 15th 2020 Written submissions are due. Defense asks for an additional delay. 30 days May 15th – June 15th 2020 Advisement delays June 15th 2020 Ruling on

section 8 . Application dismissed. Remanded. 25 days (Defence)

July 10th 2020 Defence announces motion on delays. 61 days (Crown) July 17th 2020 11b) motion is due. Defense asks for an extension due to particular circumstances. July 22nd 2020 Crown is served with the application of Defence. September 11th 2020 Hearing 11b). LAW [ 22 ] On July 8 th 2016, the Supreme Court rendered judgment in the Jordan [2] case and ended the delays’ framework of analysis established in Morin [3] for the application of

section 11

b) of the Charter . [ 23 ] The Supreme Court in Jordan [4] set out a new framework to assess whether delay is unreasonable. [ 24 ] What is this new framework of analysis? [ 25 ] C eilings are established beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable: 18 months for cases going to trial in provincial court and 30 months for cases going to trial in superior court or cases going to trial in provincial court after a preliminary inquiry [5] . [ 26 ] If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial (minus defence delay) exceeds the ceiling, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. [ 27 ] The Crown can rebut this presumption by establishing the presence of exceptional circumstances.

If not, the delay is unreasonable. [ 28 ] According to the Supreme Court, the presence of exceptional circumstances is the only basis upon which the Crown can discharge its burden to justify a delay exceeding the ceiling [6] . [ 29 ] Exceptional circumstances are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the Crown cannot reasonably remedy the delays. [ 30 ] These exceptional circumstances fall under two categories: discrete events and particular complex cases. [ 31 ] First, calculation of the delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial has to be done, followed by the subtraction of the delay attributable to the defence either waived or caused solely by its conduct. [ 32 ] If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial is above the ceiling, then, the delay is presumptively unreasonable and, if the Crown cannot rebut the presumption by the establishment of exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal shall stay the proceedings. [ 33 ] If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial falls below the ceiling, then the onus is on the accused to show that the delay is unreasonable.

To do so, the accused must establish: • He took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings; • The case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. ANALYSIS [ 34 ] Before analyzing the delays contested in issue, it is important to emphasize that the Court of appeal decided that this “(…) analysis is not fixed and it is necessary to “rely on the good sense of trial judges to determine the reasonableness of the delay in the circumstance of each cases [7] ” .

According to the Supreme Court, the analysis must always be contextual [8] . [ 35 ] The parties agree that the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial is 1436 days (47 months and 6 days) total [9] . [ 36 ] Once the total delay is determined, delay attributable to the defence must be subtracted. [ 37 ] The defence’s delay can be either waived or caused solely by its conduct. The defence’s delay

[ 38 ] According to the Applicant, 278 days may be deducted from the total net delay bringing the net delay to 1158 days : • 14 days implicitly waived by the Applicant; • 28 days caused by the abandonment of the Garofoli ; • 107 days due to distinct events (sickness of counsel); • 129 days caused by the absence of the Applicant; [ 39 ] The Respondent claims the following delays should also be attributed to the Applicant : • October 11 th 2016 to October 18 th 2016 (7 days); • April 3 rd 2017 to April 21 st 2017 (18 days); • May 30 th 2018 to June 22 nd 2018 (22 days); • June 22 nd 2018 to July 6 th 2018 (14 days); • July 13 th 2018 to August 24 th 2018 (41 days); • August 24 th 2018 to September 7 th 2018 (14 days); • September 7 th 20118 to December 19 th 2018 (51 days); • March 8 th ,019 to May 1 st 2019 (52 days); • June 11 th 2019 to June 20 th 2019 (9 days). [ 40 ] With regards, for the following reasons, the Tribunal disagrees with most of the Respondent’s qualification for these delays.

October 11 th 2016 to October 18 th 2016 [ 41 ] On October 11 th 2016, Me Dupéré asked to cease to occupy for the Applicant and a new defence lawyer appeared for the Applicant, Me Joe Addelman. The case was set for bail hearing on October 13 th despite the Respondent asking for October 18 th for the bail hearing to follow the co-accused. [ 42 ] On October 13 th 2016, Me Deslauriers appears for Me Addelman. Me Deslauriers just received the disclosure and the case was remanded to October 18 th for bail hearing. [ 43 ] The Tribunal finds that the delay of 7 days should not be attributed to the Applicant.

The Applicant’s change of lawyer did not caused the delay. The Respondent wanted to proceed for the bail hearing on October 18 th 2016. April 3 rd 2017 to April 21 st 2017 [ 44 ] The remand from April 3 rd to April 21 st 2017 was asked by Me Lemieux who was representing Me Deslauriers for the Applicant. Me Lemieux said that Me Deslauriers proposed to remand in management court on April 21 st 2017 and the Crown agreed. [ 45 ] This delay, even if asked by the Applicant, is part of the inherent time requirements of the case and should not be attributed to the Applicant.

May 30 th 2018 to June 22 nd 2018 [ 46 ] On May 30 th 2018, the parties were ready to set a date for the trial but both agreed to remand the case in management court since it is long trial. June 22 nd 2018 is a date proposed by the Respondent and the defence lawyer said it was the date she wanted to suggest. [ 47 ] The Tribunal finds that this delay, again, is part of the inherent time requirements of the case and should not be attributed to the Applicant.

June 22 nd 2018 to July 6 th 2018 [ 48 ] On June 22 nd 2018, the Applicant had verifications to make with respect to the possibility of presenting a Charter motion and asked for a one week remand to June 29 th 2018. Because the docket was complete on June 29 th 2018, the presiding judge suggested to postpone to July 6 th 2018 instead. [ 49 ] The Tribunal finds that only 7 days can be attributed to the Applicant. These 7 days were already counted in the delays subtracted by the Applicant.

July 13 th 2018 to August 24 th 2018 [ 50 ] The Court recording shows that the Applicant asked for a delay to August 3 rd 2018 to file an application under the Charter then the Respondent asked for a delay to analyze the application.

Both parties agree to set the matter to August 24 th 2018. [ 51 ] The Tribunal finds that there is no reason to attribute this delay to the Applicant. [ 52 ] According to the Supreme Court in Jordan [10] : “All steps that are reasonably necessary to make full answer and defence are properly part of the inherent time requirements of the case and do not count against either the Crown or the accused”. [ 53 ] For that reason, this delay is part of the inherent time requirements of the case and should not be attributed to the Applicant.

August 24 th 2018 to September 7 th 2018 [ 54 ] According to the Respondent, the delay should be attributed to the Applicant who’s counsel asked to remand the matter at the return of Me Legendre’s holydays because the Crown did not have the dates of availability of Me Legendre (counsel for the co-accused).

The Applicant pleads that the Court recording on September 7 th , 2018 shows that Me Legendre had given his availabilities to the Crown before leaving for his holidays which is actually what was said on that date. [ 55 ] For the reason explained in the above paragraph, this remand should be not qualified as defence delay. - September 7 th 2018 to December 19 th 2018 [ 56 ] According to the Respondent, the delay between September 28 th 2018 to December 19 th 2018 (51 days) should be attributed to the Applicant because of his unavailability, the Respondent (by Me Desharnais) being available from September 28 th 2018. [ 57 ] The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s argument and attributes 51 days to the Applicant that should be be subtracted from the net delay of 1158 days, the delay being now 1107 days. - March 8 th 2019 to May 1 st 2019 [ 58 ] On March 8 th 2019, the Applicant does not want to go ahead with the Garofoli Motion and needs time to file another application until April 1 st . [ 59 ] The Applicant said he was “ booked solid ” for the next month and the matter was remanded to May 1 st 2019. [ 60 ] The Respondent suggests that the remand of 52 days should be attributed to the Applicant. [ 61 ] The Applicant pleads that only the period between March 8 th to April 5 th 2019, date of the filing of the Motion under

section 8 of the Charter should be attributed to the defence delays (28 days). [ 62 ] With regards, the Tribunal disagrees with the Respondent. [ 63 ] The Tribunal finds that a delay of 28 days should be attributed to the Applicant because of his remand due to his abandonment of the Garofoli Motion. These 28 days were already counted in the defence already counted in the defence delays by the Applicant [11] .

June 11 th to June 20 th 2019 [ 64 ] This remand was asked by Me Deslauriers who wanted to think after a Facilitation Conference. [ 65 ] The Tribunal cannot attribute the delay to the Applicant. [ 66 ] This delay is part of the inherent requirements of the case as it is following an Facilitation Conference. [ 67 ] For these reasons, the net delay is 1107 days and is over the ceiling of 30 months.

Advisement delays [ 68 ] The Applicant seems to calculate advisement delays to the charge of the Respondent. [ 69 ] The Respondent submits that advisement delay should not be calculated in the delay. [ 70 ] In K.G.K . [12] , the Supreme Court decide that : “(…) I am of the view that the ceilings in Jordan , beyond which delay is presumed to be unreasonable under s. 11 ( b ), apply to the end of the evidence and argument at trial, and no further. They do not include verdict deliberation time.

[ 4 ] Those conclusions give rise to a further question, namely: how should the delay attributable to verdict deliberation time be assessed in determining whether an accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time has been infringed? The answer, in my view, is that an accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11 (

b) will have been infringed where the verdict deliberation time is found to have taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have in all of the circumstances. The burden on the accused is, as I will explain, a heavy one due to the operation of the presumption of judicial integrity.

This presumption presupposes that trial judges are best placed to balance the various considerations that inform verdict deliberation time, and that the verdict deliberation time taken by a judge in a particular case was no longer than reasonably necessary in the circumstances.” [ 71 ] Also, in Rice [13] , the Court of Appeal noted : [86] Although the question is not directly raised by these appeals, I note here that reserving judgment on interlocutory matters, which can put the brakes on a trial and, for this reason, render the court unavailable, may constitute discrete events as contemplated by the Supreme Court.

They may also be an expression of the complexity ot the issues raised, and the particular complexity of the case: R. v. Mamouni , 2017 ABCA 347 , para. 55 .

In such matters, we must rely on the good sense and experience of judges and counsel. [ 72 ] Accordingly, a delay of 28 days (advisement delay) is subtracted to the delay of 1107 days, the net delay being 1079 days. [ 73 ] It appears also that this file is far from its real conclusion but there were no representations to this subject by the parties. [ 74 ] The delay being over the ceiling of 30 months or 900 days, the delay is presumed unreasonable and the Respondent has the onus to rebut the presumption by establishing the existence of exceptional circumstances. [ 75 ] Were there exceptional circumstances in this matter? [ 76 ] The Tribunal finds that the Respondent did not show the existence of exceptional circumstances. [ 77 ] However, the Tribunal disagrees with the Applicant’s mention of the Respondent being reactive in the disclosure process which took more than 15 months as an explanation for a certain cause for the delay (referring to the fact that the preliminary inquiry set for November 7 th , 2017 was remanded because new disclosure was provided at that date). [ 78 ] The disclosure is an ongoing process.

The Tribunal does not blame the Respondent for the way the disclosure was done. [ 79 ] Also, contrary to the Applicant’s submission, the Respondent was proactive and shows concerns for the delays. [ 80 ] The Tribunal concludes that the delay is unreasonable. CONCLUSIONS THEREFORE, THE COURT : GRANTS the motion; ORDERS a stay of proceedings. __________________________________ ROSEMARIE MILLAR, J.C.Q. Mrs. Jennifer Morin Counsel for the Respondent Mr. Christian Deslauriers Counsel for the Applicant Date of hearing: September, 11 th , 2020