2019 NBCA 77, 2019 NBCA 77

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 41-19-CA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL APPLICANT TRIBUNAL D’APPEL DES ACCIDENTS AU TRAVAIL REQUÉRANT - and - - et - PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK and WORKPLACE HEALTH, SAFETY AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION RESPONDENTS PROVINCE DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK et COMMISSION DE LA SANTÉ, DE LA SÉCURITÉ ET DE L’INDEMNISATION DES ACCIDENTS AU TRAVAIL INTIMÉES Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal v. Province of New Brunswick and Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, 2019 NBCA 77 Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail c.

Province du Nouveau-Brunswick et Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail, 2019 NBCA 77 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Drapeau l’honorable juge Quigg Application for the Court’s opinion pursuant to s. 23(7.1) of the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act Requête demandant l'avis de la Cour en vertu du par. 23(7.1) de la

Loi sur la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et le Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail History of Case: Historique de la cause : Preliminary or incidental proceedings: [2019] N.B.J. No. 120 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : [2019] A.N.-B. n o 120 Application heard: October 23, 2019 Requête entendue : le 23 octobre 2019

Opinion rendered: October 24, 2019 Opinion communiquée : le 24 octobre 2019 Counsel at hearing: For the applicant: Daniel Peter Laurent Leger For the respondent Province of New Brunswick: Isabel-Renée Lavoie Daigle and Rachelle Lisa Standing For the respondent Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission: James F. LeMesurier, Q.C.

Avocats à l’audience : Pour le requérant : Daniel Peter Laurent Leger Pour l’intimée la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick : Isabel-Renée Lavoie Daigle et Rachelle Lisa Standing Pour l’intimée la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail : James F. LeMesurier, c.r. The following is the judgment delivered by THE COURT [ 1 ] The Appeals Tribunal established under the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Worker’s Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act , S.N.B. 1994, c.

W-14 (the Act ), seeks, by way of stated case, this Court’s opinion on the following questions: 1. Do ss. 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5), 21(9.6) of the Act preclude the Appeals Tribunal from granting Charter remedies in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate? (Question 1) 2.

If Charter remedies may be granted by the Appeals Tribunal in relation to Charter issues raised in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate, in what circumstances, if any, would ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) of the Act apply to a Charter remedy granted by the Appeals Tribunal? (Question 2) 3.

Are decisions and determinations under ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) by the Board of Directors of the Respondent, Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, decisions, orders, or rulings of the Appeals Tribunal under s. 21(12) of the Act ? (Question 3) 4. May an employer, worker, dependent, or the Commission name the Appeals Tribunal as a Respondent to an Appeal under s. 21(12) of the Act ? (Question 4)

5. Who is the Respondent to an Appeal under ss. 22.1(1) and 22.1(2) of the Act ? (Question 5) 6.

When may the Appeals Tribunal properly seek intervenor status to an Appeal of its own decision? (Question 6) [ 2 ] In the Court’s opinion the following answers, some admittedly incomplete, are warranted: Questions 1 and 2 : Sections 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , and 21(9.6) of the Act do not preclude the Appeals Tribunal from declining to enforce an unlawful or unconstitutional Commission policy in the course of exercising its appellate jurisdiction over the specific dispute at issue, and those provisions are inapplicable in that event.

Question 3 : Those decisions and determinations by the Board of Directors become components of the Appeals Tribunal’s decision, order or ruling for purposes of appeal under s. 21(12) . Question 4 : No. Question 5 : The Commission and any affected party may be identified as respondents, but not the Appeals Tribunal. Question 6 : The Appeals Tribunal may seek intervention on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the pertinent jurisprudence. [ 3 ] In reasons to follow, the Court will, where appropriate, refine, flesh out and expand upon those answers.

Version française du jugement rendu par LA COUR [1] Le Tribunal d’appel constitué en vertu de la

Loi sur la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et le Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail , L.N.-B. 1994, ch. W-14 (la Loi ), sollicite, par voie d’exposé de cause, l’opinion de la Cour sur les questions suivantes : 1. Les par. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) et 21(9.6) de la Loi empêchent-ils le Tribunal d’appel d’accorder réparation sur le fondement de la Charte relativement à des questions se rapportant à celle-ci soulevées dans le cadre de l’exécution de son mandat conféré par la loi? (Question 1) 2.

Si le Tribunal d’appel peut accorder réparation sur le fondement de la Charte relativement à des questions se rapportant à celle-ci soulevées dans le cadre de l’exécution de son mandat conféré par la loi, dans quelles circonstances, s’il en est, les par. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) et 21(9.6) de la Loi s’appliquent-ils à une réparation accordée sur le fondement de la Charte par le Tribunal d’appel? (Question 2) 3.

Les décisions rendues en vertu des par. 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5) et 21(9.6) par le conseil d’administration de l’intimée, la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail, constituent-elles des décisions du Tribunal d’appel visées au par. 21(12) de la Loi ? (Question 3) 4. Un employeur, un travailleur, une personne à charge ou la Commission peuvent-ils désigner le Tribunal d’appel comme

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL APPLICANT TRIBUNAL D’APPEL DES ACCIDENTS AU TRAVAIL REQUÉRANT intimé dans un appel interjeté en vertu du par. 21(12) de la Loi ? (Question 4) 5. Qui est l’intimé dans un appel interjeté en vertu des par. 22.1(1) et 22.1(2) de la Loi ? (Question 5) 6.

Dans quelles circonstances le Tribunal d’appel peut-il demander la qualité d’intervenant dans un appel de sa propre décision? (Question 6) [2] La Cour donne les réponses suivantes, dont certaines – il faut le reconnaître – sont incomplètes : Questions 1 et 2 : Les par. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) et 21(9.6) de la Loi n’empêchent pas le Tribunal d’appel de refuser d’appliquer une politique illégale ou inconstitutionnelle de la Commission dans l’exercice de sa compétence en matière d’appel sur la question particulière qui est en litige, et, dans ce cas, ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables.

Question 3 : Les décisions du conseil d’administration deviennent des éléments de la décision du Tribunal d’appel pour les besoins d’un appel interjeté en vertu du par. 21(12) . Question 4 : Non. Question 5 : La Commission ou toute

partie touchée peuvent être désignées comme intimées, mais pas le Tribunal d’appel. Question 6 : Le Tribunal d’appel peut demander la qualité d’intervenant au cas par cas, conformément à la jurisprudence pertinente. [3] Dans des motifs qui seront rédigés ultérieurement, la Cour, le cas échéant, raffinera, étoffera et développera ces réponses. COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 41-19-CA

- and - - et - PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK and WORKPLACE HEALTH, SAFETY AND COMPENSATION COMMISSION RESPONDENTS PROVINCE DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK et COMMISSION DE LA SANTÉ, DE LA SÉCURITÉ ET DE L’INDEMNISATION DES ACCIDENTS AU TRAVAIL INTIMÉES Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal v. Province of New Brunswick and Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, 2019 NBCA 77 Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail c.

Province du Nouveau-Brunswick et Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail, 2019 NBCA 77 CORAM: The Honourable Chief Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Drapeau The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : l’honorable juge en chef Richard l’honorable juge Drapeau l’honorable juge Quigg Application for the Court’s opinion pursuant to s. 23(7.1) of the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act Requête demandant l’opinion de la Cour en vertu du paragraphe 23(7.1) de la Loi sur la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et le Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail History of Case: Historique de la cause : Preliminary or incidental proceedings: [2019] N.B.J.

No. 120 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : [2019] A.N.-B. n o 120 Application heard: October 23, 2019 Requête entendue : le 23 octobre 2019 Preliminary opinion rendered: October 24, 2019 Opinion préliminaire communiquée : le 24 octobre 2019

Final opinion and reasons delivered: January 30, 2020 Counsel at hearing: For the applicant: Daniel Peter Laurent Leger For the respondent Province of New Brunswick: Isabel-Renée Lavoie Daigle and Rachelle Lisa Standing For the respondent Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission: James F. LeMesurier, Q.C.

Opinion définitive et motifs déposés : le 30 janvier 2020 Avocats à l’audience : Pour le requérant : Daniel Peter Laurent Leger Pour l’intimée la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick : Isabel-Renée Lavoie Daigle et Rachelle Lisa Standing Pour l’intimée la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail : James F. LeMesurier, c.r. THE COURT This proceeding arises from an application by the Appeals Tribunal established under the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act , S.N.B. 1994, c.

W-14 , for the Court’s opinion regarding a host of questions, including the impact of recent amendments to the Act on the Appeals Tribunal’s adjudicative jurisdiction. In the immediate aftermath of the application hearing, the Court published preliminary opinions on the issues raised. The Court’s final opinion and supporting reasons are set out in the accompanying text. LA COUR La présente instance découle d’une demande du Tribunal d’appel établi en vertu de la

Loi sur la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et le Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail , L.N.-B. 1994, c. W-14 , pour obtenir l’ opinion de la Cour sur une foule de questions, notamment l’incidence des récentes modifications apportées à la Loi sur la compétence juridictionnelle du Tribunal d’appel. Immédiatement après l’audition de la requête, la Cour a publié des opinions préliminaires sur les questions soulevées. L’opinion définitive de la Cour et les motifs à l’appui sont exposés dans le texte ci-joint.

The following is the opinion delivered by THE COURT I. Introduction and Overview [ 4 ] There are three key players in the lawful application of the Province’s workers’ compensation regime: the respondent Commission, the appellant Appeals Tribunal and this Court. Each contributes, directly or indirectly and in different ways, to the merits-based and fair treatment of compensation claims. [ 5 ] Needless to say, the Commission carries the heaviest burden in the efficient and cost-effective delivery of

workers’ compensation services in accordance with the Legislature’s dictates. To that end, it is authorized to determine all questions, whether of fact or law, pertaining to a worker’s claim for compensation benefits and has been attributed exclusive jurisdiction to establish policies consistent with the Workers’ Compensation Act , R.S.N.B 1973, c. W-13 and the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal Act , S.N.B. 1994, c. W-14 (the “ WHSCC and WCAT Act ”).

Policies properly approved by the Commission are binding upon its Board of Directors, its officers and employees as well as the Appeals Tribunal. In the text that follows, we occasionally refer to the aforementioned Acts collectively as the “enabling statutes” or the “enabling legislation”. [ 6 ] For its part, the Appeals Tribunal hears and determines appeals from compensation-related decisions, orders or rulings of a Commission officer. In exercising its jurisdiction, the Appeals Tribunal is required to make decisions on a case-by-case basis based on “the real merits and justice” of the particular case.

Correlatively, the Appeals Tribunal has all the authority of the Commission, subject to a few exceptions, the critical one being the Appeals Tribunal is bound by a policy approved by the Commission “under” the WHSCC and WCAT Act “that is applicable in the case” even though the Appeals Tribunal considers it “patently unreasonable”. The decisions of the Appeals Tribunal do not constitute binding precedents: s. 21(9)(

c) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act . [ 7 ] As for this Court, it hears appeals, on questions of law and jurisdiction, from dispositions by the Appeals Tribunal. It may also provide its opinion on a stated case by either the Commission or the Appeals Tribunal as to their respective jurisdictions or a question of law. The enabling statutes do not make Commission policies binding on this Court. The Court’s decisions are binding precedents (see VSL Canada Ltd. v.

Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Duguay et al. , 2011 NBCA 76 , 376 N.B.R. (2d) 292 , para. 34 ). [ 8 ] In this proceeding, the Appeals Tribunal s eeks the Court’s opinion regarding jurisdictional and legal questions it contends arise from amendments to the WHSCC and WCAT Act brought about by An Act Respecting Addressing Recommendations in the Report of the Task Force on WorkSafeNB , S.N.B. 2018, c. 18 (“Bill 2”). On December 12, 2018, the WHSCC and WCAT Act was amended by adding ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) and 21(9.6) , among others.

Those provisions stand to be interpreted in light of s. 21(9)(a), which requires the Appeals Tribunal make its decision “based on the real merits and justice” of the particular case. They may be summarized as follows. [ 9 ] Section 21(9.1) prescribes that, pending the Commission’s approval of a replacing or amending policy, any policy in place approved by the Commission “under this Act ” is binding on its Board of Directors and the Appeals Tribunal.

Section 21(9.2) states that, where the Appeals Tribunal considers a Commission policy is “patently unreasonable”, it must refer the policy, with supporting written reasons, to the Board for a determination of that issue. The proceedings before the Appeals Tribunal are then suspended until the Board makes its determination regarding patent unreasonableness. Section 21(9.3) directs the Board to make its determination as soon as possible.

Under s. 21(9.4), supporting written reasons are to be forwarded and the matter referred back to the Appeals Tribunal if the Board determines the policy at issue is not patently unreasonable. The Appeals Tribunal is then bound by the Board’s determination. [ 10 ] Section 21(9.5) adds that, if the Board of Directors determines the policy at issue is patently unreasonable, it must review and amend the policy accordingly.

Section 21(9.6) provides that, following the policy review required by s. 21(9.5), the Board must provide written reasons for its decision and the amended policy, and refer the matter back to the Appeals Tribunal, which is bound by the Board’s determination. [ 11 ] The key feature of the amendments, at least for the purposes of the present proceeding, is this: in making its decision based on the real merits and justice of the particular case, the Appeals Tribunal must apply any policy approved by the Commission “under” the WHSCC and WCAT Act that is “applicable in the case” even though it considers the policy to be “patently unreasonable” if, following referral, the Board determines it is not. [ 12 ] Broadly speaking, the Task Force whose report led to Bill 2 had been e stablished to address the desire by workers’ representatives for increased benefits and concerns by employers about rising compensation premiums.

To that end, the Task Force was directed to review the workers’ compensation system “focusing on short term solutions and long-term sustainability”. In its Report, the Task Force saw fit to make recommendations bearing upon the jurisdiction of the Appeals Tribunal and the Commission. Of particular interest for our present purposes, it recommended the Appeals Tribunal decide appeals based on the policies of the Commission and that it “not have jurisdiction to alter, vary, reverse or amend” any.

However, it also recommended the Tribunal’s decisions be compliant with the WHSCC and WCAT Act . [ 13 ] At any rate, the Appeals Tribunal requests the Court’s opinion with respect to the effect of the legislative amendments in Bill 2 on: (1) the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant policy-related declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter , which, as is now well known at least in legal circles, authorizes anyone whose Charter rights have been infringed or denied to apply to

“a court of competent jurisdiction” for an appropriate remedy; (2) the jurisdiction of the Commission’s Board of Directors in the event the Appeals Tribunal declares a policy invalid; and (3) this Court’s jurisdiction on appeal against dispositions that are the product of the application of policies the Appeals Tribunal considers patently unreasonable.

Clarification is also sought regarding the appropriateness of joining the Appeals Tribunal as a respondent on an appeal to this Court and the Appeals Tribunal’s entitlement, if any, to participate in any such appeal. [ 14 ] As might be discerned, the interpretative controversy concerns the contextual meaning of the expression “patently unreasonable” found in ss. 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) and 21(9.5). The Appeals Tribunal contends the expression “patently unreasonable” refers to the substantive reasonableness of the policy at issue, and not its lawfulness or constitutionality. The Province agrees. If that

interpretation carries the day, the Appeals Tribunal could not decline to apply a Commission policy simply because it found the policy was patently unreasonable from a substantive standpoint.

However, it would be required to decline the application of a policy – without having to refer the issue of its validity to the Board of Directors – if it was unlawful (e.g. unauthorized by or inconsistent with the enabling legislation) or unconstitutional. [ 15 ] The Commission takes an antipodal position: “patently unreasonable” encompasses substance, lawfulness and constitutionality, so that, as a result of the 2018 amendments, the Appeals Tribunal has lost jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of any policy provision, which, in turn, precludes the Appeals Tribunal from granting any related declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter . [ 16 ] The interpretative uncertainty prompted the Appeals Tribunal to seek and obtain directions from the Chief Justice regarding the procedure to be followed for the purposes of a stated case.

In accordance with his directions, the Appeals Tribunal filed a Notice of Application naming the Province and the Commission as respondents, and requesting the Court’s opinion with respect to six questions, the first two of which were amended at the hearing to confirm their focus was limited to the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter : 7.

Do ss. 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5), 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act preclude the Appeals Tribunal from granting [declaratory relief under the Charter ] in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate? (Question 1) 8.

If [declaratory relief under the Charter ] may be granted by the Appeals Tribunal in relation to Charter issues raised in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate, in what circumstances, if any, would ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act apply to a Charter remedy granted by the Appeals Tribunal? (Question 2) 9.

Are decisions and determinations under ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) by the Board of Directors of the Respondent, Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, decisions, orders, or rulings of the Appeals Tribunal under s. 21(12) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act ? (Question 3) 10. May an employer, worker, dependent, or the Commission name the Appeals Tribunal as a Respondent to an Appeal under s. 21(12) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act ? (Question 4) 11. Who is the Respondent to an Appeal under ss. 22.1(1) and 22.1(2) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act ? (Question 5) 12.

When may the Appeals Tribunal properly seek intervener status to an Appeal of its own decision? (Question 6) [ 17 ] In its written submission, the Appeals Tribunal advised that, as of the filing of the Notice of Application, it was seized of four appeals in which a Charter remedy is sought, and that the fate of those appeals hinged on the Court’s answers to the stated case’s remedy-related questions.

Given the demonstrated need for prompt action, the Court published, through the Registrar’s office, the following abridged and admittedly incomplete disposition within a few days after the hearing: Questions 1 and 2 : Sections 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5), and 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act do not preclude the Appeals Tribunal from declining to enforce an unlawful or unconstitutional Commission policy in the course of exercising its appellate jurisdiction over the specific dispute at issue, and those provisions are inapplicable in that event.

Question 3: Those decisions and determinations by the Board of Directors become components of the Appeals Tribunal’s decision,order or ruling for purposes of appeal under s. 21(12). Question 4: No. Question 5: The Commission and any affected party may be identified as respondents, but not the Appeals Tribunal. Question 6: The Appeals Tribunal may seek intervention on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the pertinent jurisprudence. [18] We indicated at the time that the preliminary answers might be refined, fleshed out and expanded upon, whereappropriate, in reasons to follow. Here are those reasons. II.

Analysis and Final Opinion [19] The answer to each question pertaining to the effect of ss. 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5) and21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act turns on their

interpretation in accordance with the approach espoused in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.(Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2 (QL), where the Court observed “the words of

an Act are to beread in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,and the intention of Parliament” (para. 21). The required interpretative approach is also informed by the

Interpretation Act, R.S.N.B.1973, c. I-13, notably s. 17, which provides as follows: 17 Every Act and regulation and everyprovision thereof shall be deemed remedial,and shall receive such fair, large and liberalconstruction and

interpretation as bestensures the attainment of the object of theAct, regulation or provision. 17 Toute loi, tout règlement et toutedisposition de ceux-ci sont réputésréparateurs et doivent faire l’objet del’interprétation large, juste et libérale, laplus propre à assurer la réalisation de leursobjets. [20] In our respectful view, a principled approach to the

interpretation of the provisions referenced in the stated casefavors the position of the Province with respect to the three key lines of inquiry: Questions 1, 2 and 3. In the text that follows, we set outeach of the six questions, the respective positions of the parties, as articulated in both their written and oral submissions, and the Court’sopinion.

Question 1: Do ss. 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4), 21(9.5), 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act preclude the Appeals Tribunalfrom granting declaratory relief under the Charter in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutorymandate? A. Position of the Appeals Tribunal [21] The December 2018 amendments to the WHSCC and WCAT Act make clear the Commission’s Board ofDirectors is the final arbiter, subject only to intervention by this Court, of whether its policies are “patently unreasonable”. However, theWHSCC and WCAT Act does not define that expression.

Nor does it explicitly or by necessary implication grant to the Board final say onquestions of law, such as the

interpretation of the Act, the lawfulness of Commission policies or their compliance with the Charter. Whilethe Commission and its Board are subject to the limits on government action imposed by the Charter (Eldridge v. British Columbia(Attorney General), (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, [1997] S.C.J.

No. 86 (QL)), neither is an administrative tribunalauthorized to determine, exclusively and finally, the lawfulness and constitutionality of Commission policies. [22] The Appeals Tribunal asserts its statutory mandate involves the determination of questions of law, includingthe lawfulness of any Commission policy, and the authority to make appropriate declarations. In the Appeals Tribunal’s submission, it is

therefore fully authorized to grant declaratory relief pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter . The Tribunal’s case on the point rests on the following pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Conway , 2010 SCC 22 , [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 : Building on the jurisprudence, therefore, when a remedy is sought from an administrative tribunal under s. 24(1), the proper initial inquiry is whether the tribunal can grant Charter remedies generally. To make this determination, the first question is whether the administrative tribunal has jurisdiction, explicit or implied, to decide questions of law.

If it does, and unless it is clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter from the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction and can consider and apply the Charter – and Charter remedies – when resolving the matters properly before it. Once the threshold question has been resolved in favour of Charter jurisdiction, the remaining question is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy sought, given the relevant statutory scheme. Answering this question is necessarily an exercise in discerning legislative intent.

On this approach, what will always be at issue is whether the remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature intended would fit within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal.

Relevant considerations in discerning legislative intent will include those that have guided the courts in past cases, such as the tribunal’s statutory mandate, structure and function [ R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. , 2001 SCC 81 , [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 (“ Dunedin ”) ] . [paras. 81-82] [ 23 ] The Appeals Tribunal contends the current state of the law is as follows: an administrative tribunal clothed with jurisdiction to determine issues of law and to make declarations in discharging its mandate is presumed to have jurisdiction to hear and determine Charter issues and to grant declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter unless legislation provides otherwise.

There is no such legislation here. [ 24 ] The Appeals Tribunal underscores rulings on questions of law are an integral part of its decision-making. In its view, that is the Legislature’s understanding having regard to s. 21(12) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act : 21

(12) Any decision, order or ruling of the Appeals Tribunal shall be final, subject only to an appeal to the Court of Appeal involving any question as to its jurisdiction or any question of law . [Emphasis added.] 21

(12) Toute décision du Tribunal d’appel est définitive, sujet seulement à un appel devant la Cour d’appel concernant toute question de compétence ou de droit . [Nous avons souligné.] [ 25 ] Relatedly, the Appeals Tribunal underscores it is comprised of barristers and solicitors and that it must make any decision based “on the real merits and justice” of the particular case. [ 26 ] The Appeals Tribunal takes the position that the 2018 amendments and their emphasis on the need for deference to the Commission’s exclusive policy-making authority do not exclude, explicitly or implicitly, its review of those policies for their lawfulness and constitutionality.

Compelling language to that effect would be required, and it is nowhere to be found in the amendments. B. Position of the Province [ 27 ] It is the Province’s position that, under the enabling legislation as it currently reads, the Appeals Tribunal has the same jurisdiction over Charter issues and constitutional challenges that it has had since its creation, which includes jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the Charter . [ 28 ] The Province relies on Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v.

Laseur , 2003 SCC 54 , [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 , where claimants argued provisions of the Nova Scotia workers’ compensation legislation infringed their equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter . The Supreme Court restated the law concerning the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to apply the Charter as follows:

[…] Administrative tribunals which have jurisdiction – whether explicit or implied – to decide questions of law arising under a legislative provision are presumed to have concomitant jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of that provision. This presumption may only be rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter issues from the tribunal’s authority over questions of law. [para. 3] [ 29 ] In Martin , the legislation expressly conferred authority on the Appeals Tribunal to decide questions of law.

As a result, the Tribunal was presumed to have authority to consider the constitutional validity of its constituent legislation. The Court identified the following main reasons for this presumptive authority: 1. As the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, any inconsistent laws are invalid. Neither courts, nor administrative tribunals (nor any branch of government), may apply invalid laws. 2.

Administrative tribunals have a thorough understanding of the legislative scheme, as well as the practical constraints and the consequences of a remedy, which makes their findings as experts in their field invaluable to a reviewing court. 3. Allowing administrative tribunals to decide Charter issues does not undermine the role of the courts as final arbiters of constitutional validity since these decisions are subject to judicial review on a correctness standard. 4.

Tribunals have limited authority to grant constitutional remedies; they cannot make general declarations of invalidity, and their findings that provisions are invalid do not bind future decision makers. 5. People are entitled to assert their constitutional rights in the most accessible forum, without commencing parallel court proceedings. [ 30 ] Administrative tribunals, like the Appeals Tribunal, are creatures of statute. As such, a review of the Appeals Tribunal’s enabling legislation is necessary to determine if it has jurisdiction to consider Charter issues.

First, the court will determine if there is an explicit grant of jurisdiction. Second, in the absence of an explicit grant, the court must decide whether the Legislature intended to confer upon the tribunal implied jurisdiction to decide questions of law.

In Martin , the Court identified the following factors in deciding whether the Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction to settle questions of law: • the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and whether the ability to decide questions of law is necessary to fulfill this mandate; • the interaction of the tribunal with other parts of the administrative system; • whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and • practical considerations that include the tribunal’s capacity to consider questions of law.

Once presumptive jurisdiction to decide Charter issues is found, the burden is on the opposing party to rebut the presumption.

This may only be accomplished “by an explicit withdrawal of authority to decide constitutional questions or by a clear implication to the same effect, arising from the statute itself rather than from external considerations” (para. 42). [ 31 ] In Conway , the Supreme Court held that an administrative tribunal with authority to decide questions of law was a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of s. 24(1), unless the determination of Charter issues had been explicitly removed from the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Following Martin and Conway , the Province submits there is a strong presumption that tribunals with authority to decide questions of law are empowered to grant remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter . [ 32 ] It is the Province’s primary position that the enabling legislation grants explicit authority over questions of law to the Appeals Tribunal. As such, it has concomitant authority to determine constitutional issues that arise in the exercise of its jurisdiction and to grant declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter .

It is the Province’s fallback submission that the Appeals Tribunal’s authority to determine questions of law is implied. [ 33 ] Section 21(3) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act confers upon the Appeals Tribunal all of the Commission’s

authority, which includes the power to determine “questions of fact and law necessary to be determined in connection with compensation payments”: s. 31(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act . Moreover, under s. 21(9) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act , the Appeals Tribunal is required to make decisions “based on the real merits and justice” of the particular case.

That adjudicative duty compels decisions that reflect compliance with the law. [ 34 ] The purpose of the 2018 amendments was to return the power to make policy to the Commission, the entity to which government delegates the oversight and implementation of the workers’ compensation regime in this province.

The evidence adduced by the Province on the application confirms the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction in connection with constitutional questions was not targeted by the recommendations of the Task Force and, accordingly, was not addressed by the amendments. [ 35 ] Significantly, and contrary to the position it expressed in its written submission, the Province confirmed at the hearing that the authority of the Appeals Tribunal to declare a policy of the Commission statutorily invalid has not been removed by the 2018 amendments.

The amendments were meant to re-establish the Commission as the policy-maker, not to transform the Commission into the final arbiter, as between it and the Appeals Tribunal, of questions of law. The amendments create a new process requiring a referral to the Board of Directors in the event the Appeals Tribunal finds a pertinent Commission policy is patently unreasonable.

The determination by the Board as to whether the policy is, in fact, patently unreasonable, does not alter the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address the question of constitutional soundness of specific portions of its enabling legislation, the lawfulness of any policy or whether the application of a policy to a particular set of facts results in an infringement of a claimant’s Charter rights.

The Appeals Tribunal remains authorized to determine the lawfulness and constitutionality of Commission policies. [ 36 ] The Province submits the Appeals Tribunal could consider a Commission policy to be patently unreasonable from a substantive point of view without any infringement or violation of a claimant’s Charter rights. In that event, the Appeals Tribunal must refer the question to the Board of Directors. The Province emphasizes the WHSCC and WCAT Act mandates the Appeals Tribunal give effect to a policy that is “applicable” in the case.

A Commission policy’s legal validity depends on its enabling legislation. An unlawful or unconstitutional policy would not be “applicable” within the meaning of the WHSCC and WCAT Act . [ 37 ] The Province closes with a reference to VSL Canada where the Court endorsed a broad

interpretation of s. 21(12) and the right of appeal it provides: The object of the WHSCC Act and the WC Act as well as the jurisprudence emanating from this Court since the enactment of s. 21(12) militate strongly against a narrow

interpretation of the phrase “involving any question as to its jurisdiction or any question of law”. After all, the Legislature granted the right of appeal on questions of law and jurisdiction, without any words of limitation. The stakeholders, including employers and the working men and women of this Province, would be ill-served by reading into s. 21(12) restrictions on the broadly formulated right of appeal that would limit the range of permissible error-correcting intervention by this Court. As Bell J.A. observed in Certainteed Gypsum Canada, Inc. v.

Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission and Dyer , 2011 NBCA 45 , [2011] N.B.J. No. 168 (QL) “[g]iven that this matter comes to the Court by way of appeal rather than judicial review it would be inappropriate to restrict questions of law as proposed in [ Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 ]”.

The Legislature surely did not intend to afford illusory rights of appeal via the enactment of s. 21(12) . [para. 24] In the Province’s submission, the 2018 amendments have not narrowed this Court’s jurisdiction on appeal, which might well be the result of interpreting those amendments as removing from the Appeals Tribunal jurisdiction to pass upon the lawfulness or constitutionality of Commission policies. C.

Position of the Commission [ 38 ] It is the position of the Commission that any authority the Appeals Tribunal had prior to Bill 2 to determine the legal validity and constitutionality of Commission policies was implicitly removed by the amendments to s. 21(3) and s. 21(9) and the addition of s. 21(9.1). We reproduce those provisions for ease of reference:

(3) Despite any other provision of this Act , the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act , but subject to subsections 21(9) and (9.1) of this Act , the Appeals Tribunal shall have all of the authority conferred on the Commission under this Act , the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act to examine into, hear and determine all matters affecting an employer, a worker or a dependent that arise in any appeal to it under subsection (1). […] 21

(9) In an appeal, the Appeals Tribunal shall (

a) make its decision on a case-by-case basis based on the real merits and justice of the particular case, (

b) apply a policy approved by the Commission that is applicable in the case, and (

c) not be bound to follow precedent. 21

(9.1) Until a different policy is approved by the Commission or a policy is amended by the Commission, every policy approved by the Commission under this Act is binding on the board of directors, every officer and employee of the Commission and on the Appeals Tribunal. [Emphasis added.] 21

(3) Par dérogation à toute autre disposition de la présente loi, de la

Loi sur les accidents du travail et de la Loi sur l’hygiène et la sécurité au travail , mais sous réserve des paragraphes 21(9) et (9.1) de la présente loi , le Tribunal d’appel jouit de tous les pouvoirs que la présente loi, la

Loi sur les accidents du travail et la

Loi sur l’hygiène et la sécurité au travail confèrent à la Commission pour instruire, entendre et trancher toutes les affaires et questions qui touchent un employeur, un travailleur ou une personne à charge soulevées au cours d’un appel dont il est saisi en vertu du paragraphe (1). […] 21

(9) Dans le cadre d’un appel, le Tribunal d’appel :

a) rend sa décision au cas par cas en toute justice et sur le bien-fondé de l’espèce;

b) est lié par les politiques qu’a approuvées la Commission et qui sont applicables en l’espèce;

c) n’est pas tenu de suivre les précédents. 21

(9.1) Tant qu’elle ne [l’a] pas modifiée ou tant qu’elle n’en a pas approuvé une autre, chaque politique qu’approuve la Commission en vertu de la présente loi lie le conseil d’administration, les dirigeants et employés de la Commission ainsi que le Tribunal d’appel. [Nous avons souligné.] [ 39 ] While the Appeals Tribunal previously had jurisdiction to determine questions of law, including constitutional law, with respect to Commission policies, the purpose and effect of Bill 2 was to carve out the policies of the Commission from the jurisdiction of the Appeals Tribunal to make determinations pursuant to its powers under s. 21(3) .

Thus, it is submitted, the Appeals Tribunal may not make determinations with respect to the legal validity and constitutionality of the Commission’s policies and is bound to follow the legislative mechanism for policy referral and review set out in s. 21 of the WHSCC and WCAT Act . D. Opinion of the Court [ 40 ] Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that the “Constitution […] is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the […] Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect”.

It is common ground that a binding policy approved by a state agent is captured by the word “law” for s. 52(1) purposes. It follows, as indicated in our post- hearing disposition, that the Appeals Tribunal may not apply a purportedly binding Commission policy that is inconsistent with the Constitution. That said, Question 1 goes further: it asks whether the specified provisions of the WHSCC and WCAT Act preclude the Appeals Tribunal from granting declaratory relief under the Charter in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate.

The unstated focus of Question 1 is declaratory relief under the Charter with respect to Commission policies.

[ 41 ] Unless the Legislature has excluded the determination of Charter issues from an adjudicative tribunal’s jurisdiction, it is a “court of competent jurisdiction” entitled to grant declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter if: (1) it has explicit or implied jurisdiction to decide questions of law; and (2) it is authorized under the enabling legislation to grant declaratory relief. [ 42 ] There is no doubt the Appeals Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide questions of law.

If it were otherwise, there would be no purpose to the Appeals Tribunal’s statutory right to apply to this Court for its opinion regarding questions of law. Several other provisions of the enabling statutes buttress this conclusion. Here is a sampling: (1) the Appeals Tribunal is a “tribunal”: s. 20(1) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act .

This descriptor may be contrasted with the Commission’s status as a “body corporate and politic”: s. 2(1); (2) the skills and qualifications of appointees to the Appeals Tribunal include being a barrister and solicitor in good standing: s. 20.2(2) (a)(i); (3) the Appeals Tribunal hears and determines appeals, albeit by way of de novo hearings and determinations: s. 21(1).

Tribunals tasked with hearing and determining appeals are expected to determine questions of law that arise in the course of the proceedings; (4) the Appeals Tribunal has all the authority of the Commission under the enabling statutes, which includes, pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act , jurisdiction to determine all questions of law “necessary to be determined in connection with compensation payments”; (5) the Appeals Tribunal must make its decisions on the basis of the real merits and justice of the case: s. 29(1)(a).

That mandate necessarily includes the determination of pertinent questions of law; (6) the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to interpret the WHSCC and WCAT Act – indisputably a question of law – is expressly acknowledged in s. 21(8.1); and (7) dispositions by the Appeals Tribunal may be appealed to this Court on any question of law : s. 21(12) .

This brings us to the question of whether the Appeals Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the enabling statutes. [ 43 ] While an affirmative answer is arguably implied by virtue of the statutory provisions invoked in the previous paragraph, the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make declarations is explicitly recognized by s. 21(10). It reads as follows: 21

(10) The Appeals Tribunal shall issue written reasons, signed by a member of the Appeals Tribunal hearing the appeal, for any decision, determination, direction, declaration , order, interim order or ruling of the Appeals Tribunal, (

a) if the appeal proceeds by oral hearing, within 90 days following the last hearing day, and (

b) if the appeal proceeds by written submission, within 90 days following the filing of all required documents. [Emphasis added.] 21

(10) Le Tribunal d’appel rend sa décision appuyée sur des motifs écrits que signe le membre chargé de l’appel pour chacune de ses décisions, déterminations, directives, déclarations , ordonnances ou ordonnances provisoires et pour chacun de ses ordres ou arrêts, et ce, dans le délai suivant :

a) s’agissant d’un appel instruit sous forme d’audience, dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent le dernier jour d’audience;

b) s’agissant d’un appel instruit sous forme d’observations écrites, dans les quatre-vingt- dix jours qui suivent le dépôt de tous les documents exigés. [Nous avons souligné.] [ 44 ] We now turn to the crux of the Commission’s submission: the Legislature has excluded the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter in connection with Commission policies.

That is so because it is the Commission’s Board of Directors, and not the Appeals Tribunal, that now has jurisdiction to determine, finally and exclusively as between them, the legal validity and constitutionality of its policies, subject only to any supervisory authority this Court might have on appeal under s. 21(12) .

This view is tethered to: (1) a narrow understanding of the phrases “based on the real merits and justice of the particular case” ( s. 21(9) (a)) and “a policy approved by the Commission that is applicable in the case” ( s. 21(9) (b)); and (2) a broad reading of the phrase “every policy approved by the Commission under this Act ” (s. 21(9.1)) and the expression “patently unreasonable” found in ss. 21(9.2), 21(9.3), 21(9.4) and 21(9.5), one that extends its reach beyond issues of substantive reasonableness and into the realm of the lawfulness and constitutionality of Commission policies.

For the sake of convenience, it may be timely to reproduce ss. 21(9) , 21(9.1), 21(9.2), 21(9.3) and 21(9.4):

(9) In an appeal, the Appeals Tribunal shall (

a) make its decision on a case-by-case basis based on the real merits and justice of the particular case, (

b) apply a policy approved by the Commission that is applicable in the case, and (

c) not be bound to follow precedent. 21

(9.1) Until a different policy is approved by the Commission or a policy is amended by the Commission, every policy approved by the Commission under this Act is binding on the board of directors, every officer and employee of the Commission and on the Appeals Tribunal. 21

(9.2) If, in an appeal, the Appeals Tribunal considers that a policy approved by the Commission is patently unreasonable, the Appeals Tribunal shall refer the policy, with written reasons, to the board of directors for a determination, and the appeal proceedings shall be suspended until the board of directors makes the determination. 21

(9.3) As soon as possible after a policy is referred to it under subsection (9.2), the board of directors shall determine whether the policy is patently unreasonable. 21

(9.4) If the board of directors determines that a policy referred to it under subsection (9.2) is not patently unreasonable, the board of directors shall provide written reasons to the Appeals Tribunal for its decision and refer the matter back to the Appeals Tribunal, and the Appeals Tribunal is bound by that determination. 21

(9) Dans le cadre d’un appel, le Tribunal d’appel :

a) rend sa décision au cas par cas en toute justice et sur le bien-fondé de l’espèce;

b) est lié par les politiques qu’a approuvées la Commission et qui sont applicables en l’espèce;

c) n’est pas tenu de suivre les précédents. 21

(9.1) Tant qu’elle ne [l’a] pas modifiée ou tant qu’elle n’en a pas approuvé une autre, chaque politique qu’approuve la Commission en vertu de la présente loi lie le conseil d’administration, les dirigeants et employés de la Commission ainsi que le Tribunal d’appel. 21

(9.2) Si, lors d’un appel, le Tribunal d’appel considère que la politique qu’a approuvée la Commission est manifestement déraisonnable, il la renvoie au conseil d’administration, motifs écrits à l’appui, pour une décision, auquel cas l’instruction de l’appel est suspendu jusqu’à ce que le conseil d’administration rende une décision. 21

(9.3) Dès que possible après le renvoi d’une politique en vertu du paragraphe (9.2), le conseil d’administration décide si elle est manifestement déraisonnable. 21

(9.4) S’il est d’avis que la politique faisant l’objet d’un renvoi au paragraphe (9.2) n’est pas manifestement déraisonnable, le conseil d’administration fournit au Tribunal d’appel une décision motivée par écrit et lui renvoie l’affaire, le Tribunal d’appel étant lié par cette décision. [ 45 ] The first issue is whether an Appeals Tribunal decision based on a Commission policy that is unlawful or offends a claimant’s rights under the Charter can ever be a decision “based on the real merits and justice” of the particular case.

In our opinion, the answer is obvious: it cannot. [ 46 ] The Legislature has made it clear beyond debate that the Commission may not adopt policies that are inconsistent with the enabling statutes: s. 7(f.1) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act . In VSL Canada , which was published in 2011, the Court observed:

(1) Commission policies must be “formulated, interpreted and applied in a manner that is harmonious with the [ Workers’ Compensation ] Act , as interpreted by this Court”; and (2) the Commission is without jurisdiction to alter the Workers’ Compensation Act through policy initiatives (para. 48). Needless to say, those observations also apply to the WHSCC and WCAT Act . A year later, the Court determined the Appeals Tribunal’s statutory obligation to make decisions based on “the real merits of the case” (as s. 21(9) (

a) read at the time) compelled it to disregard Commission policies that were “untenable” by reason of their inconsistency with the Workers’ Compensation Act (see J.D. Irving, Limited (Sussex Sawmill) v. Wayne Douthwright and Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation

Commission , 2012 NBCA 35 , 386 N.B.R. (2d) 24 , paras. 44-45 ). [ 47 ] We note s. 21(9) (

a) was amended in 2014, two years after J.D. Irving, Limited v. Wayne Douthwright , to require the Appeals Tribunal make its decision “based on the real merits and justice of the case, including whether a policy approved by the Commission is consistent [with the enabling statutes]” (see S.N.B. 2014, c. 49 ; emphasis added). Given the prior jurisprudence of this Court, the phrase “including whether a policy approved by the Commission is consistent [with the enabling statutes]” was redundant.

However, and significantly, the word “including” confirmed the Legislature’s understanding that the determination of policy consistency with the enabling statutes was inherent in the adjudicative standard set by the phrase “the real merits and justice of the case”. It follows that the 2018 amendment to s. 21(9) (

a) deleting the phrase “including whether a policy approved by the Commission is consistent [with the enabling statutes]” may fairly be understood as no more than a pruning of inconsequential wording, and not as manifesting an intention to atrophy the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction. [ 48 ] It is against this jurisprudential and legislative background that the provisions referenced in Question 1 were adopted and must be interpreted. By retaining in s. 21(9) (

a) the Appeals Tribunal ’s adjudicative mandate of making decisions “based on the real merits and justice” of the case, the Legislature signaled its intention to maintain the Tribunal’s settled obligation to disregard Commission policies that are “untenable” by reason of inconsistency with the enabling statutes. We cannot bring ourselves to conclude the Legislature intended the Appeals Tribunal be bound by policies the Legislature expressly prescribed the Commission could not lawfully adopt.

Nor is it conceivable the Legislature intended the “merits” of the case would no longer include respect for and compliance with the Charter (see Vautour v. Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission , 2019 NBCA 82 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 374 (QL) , at para. 13 , Baird J.A. for the Court, admittedly in obiter ). Moreover, in amending s. 21(9) (

a) in 2014, the Legislature chose to add to the Appeals Tribunal’s adjudicative mandate the requirement that its decision be also based on “the justice” of the case. On any reasonable view of the matter, justice would not be served by decisions based on statutorily impermissible or unconstitutional Commission policies.

In our view, the Appeals Tribunal’s adjudicative duty, as defined in s. 21(9) (a), compels decisions that are rendered according to law, fairness and a logically defensible assessment of the facts. [ 49 ] As well, a Commission policy is only subject to referral to the Board of Directors if it is “applicable in the case” (under s. 21(9) (b)) and has been approved by the Commission “under this Act ” (s. 21(9.1)). We agree with the Province that a Commission policy which is impermissible under the enabling statutes or offends rights under the Charter is not “applicable in the case”.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that any such policy was approved by the Commission under the WHSCC and WCAT Act for the simple reason that only policies consistent with the enabling legislation can be lawfully approved under the WHSCC and WCAT Act .

In our view, this understanding is in synch with the object of the 2018 amendments, which, as the Province contends, was to confirm the Commission’s expertise and exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the substance of policies, without affecting the Appeals Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine questions of law, including the lawfulness of Commission policies and their constitutionality.

Finally, it bears pointing out that other pre-2018 legislative schemes provided explicitly for referral back in cases where the appeal tribunal concluded a policy “is inconsistent with, or not authorized by” the enabling legislation (see s. 126(4) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 , S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sch.

A , which was considered in Decision No. 794/97, 2004 ONWSIAT 1046 ). [ 50 ] All things considered, we conclude the better view is that ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) and 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act do not preclude the Appeals Tribunal from granting declaratory relief under the Charter in relation to Charter issues arising in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate. That said, we emphasize decisions of the Appeals Tribunal do not constitute binding precedents and any policy-related declaratory relief can only bear upon the particular case under consideration.

As indicated, the answer to Question 1 is, in our respectful opinion, “no”. Question 2: If Charter remedies may be granted by the Appeals Tribunal in relation to Charter issues raised in the course of carrying out its statutory mandate, in what circumstances, if any, would ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act apply to a Charter remedy granted by the Appeals Tribunal? A.

Position of the Appeals Tribunal [ 51 ] The Commission and its Board of Directors are “experts” in the administration of the workers’ compensation regime by virtue of the Legislature’s delegation of authority on the subject. However, neither can demonstrate expertise in determining questions of law. Neither the Commission nor its Board is established as a tribunal to finally determine questions of law, including the legal validity and constitutionality of a Commission policy.

Neither the Commission nor its Board conducts hearings or adheres to procedural fairness safeguards in the same manner as the Appeals Tribunal. [ 52 ] It is the submission of the Appeals Tribunal that the December 2018 amendments serve to fortify the Commission’s delegated authority to administer its enabling legislation and to set the substantive content of its policies. The amendments do not require the Appeals Tribunal to refer back to the Board of Directors any policy it finds is unlawful or unconstitutional. Those

legislative amendments require a referral back where the Appeals Tribunal finds a policy is lawful and constitutional but patently unreasonable from a substantive point of view. Sections 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) and 21(9.6) do not, in any circumstance, compel the Appeals Tribunal to refer back to the Board the determination of legal and constitutional issues. B. Position of the Province [ 53 ] The Province agrees with the Appeals Tribunal. C.

Position of the Commission [ 54 ] The Commission submits it, and its Board of Directors, are experts not only in the administration of the workers’ compensation regime by virtue of the Legislature’s delegation of authority, but also in determining questions of law by virtue of s. 31(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act : 31

(1) The Commission has jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine all matters and questions of fact and law necessary to be determined in connection with compensation payments under this Part and the administration thereof, and the collection and management of the funds therefor; but no decision or ruling of the Commission is binding upon it as a precedent for any other decision or ruling, and each case shall be decided upon its own merits. [Emphasis added.] 31

(1) La Commission a compétence pour instruire, entendre et juger toutes les affaires et les questions de fait et de droit qu’il est nécessaire de juger au sujet des paiements d’indemnités en application de la présente

Partie et de l’administration de ces paiements, et au sujet de la perception et la gestion des fonds à cette fin; mais aucune décision ou ordonnance de la Commission ne constitue un précédent liant la Commission pour toute autre décision ou ordonnance, et chaque affaire doit être jugée au fond. [Nous avons souligné.] [ 55 ] The Commission is therefore at least as equipped as the Appeals Tribunal to conduct an analysis of the legal validity and constitutionality of its policies.

Prior to Bill 2, the Commission had equal authority to consider the appropriate adjudicative and legislative facts and to make a determination regarding the legal validity and constitutionality of its policies.

However, the exceptions to the Appeals Tribunal’s authority provided in ss. 21(9) and 21(9.1) have the effect of removing the Appeals Tribunal’s authority to make the necessary inquiries and gather the necessary adjudicative and legislative facts to make a determination of legal validity and constitutionality with regard to Commission policies. [ 56 ] It was the intention of the Legislature in enacting Bill 2 to stop the Appeals Tribunal’s practice of unilaterally refusing to apply Commission policies.

It would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature to exclude from the referral back requirement any finding of policy invalidity, whether by reason of inconsistency with the enabling statutes or unconstitutionality. It is the Commission’s submission that the Appeals Tribunal is bound to follow the new mechanism for referral back to the Board of Directors of all questionable Commission policies. D.

Opinion of the Court [ 57 ] For the reasons articulated in answering Question 1 , we are of the opinion that the referral back process adopted by virtue of Bill 2 does not apply to determinations of policy unlawfulness or unconstitutionality. That process only applies to determinations that a Commission policy is patently unreasonable from a substantive point of view. As indicated, the answer to Question 2 is “never”.

Question 3: Are decisions and determinations under ss. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) , 21(9.6) by the Board of Directors of the Respondent, Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission, decisions, orders, or rulings of the Appeals Tribunal under s. 21(12) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act?

A. Position of the Appeals Tribunal [ 58 ] Recall that s. 21(12) provides for a right of appeal to this Court, on questions of jurisdiction or law, from any decision of the Appeals Tribunal. [ 59 ] The provisions referenced in Question 3 confirm it is the Board of Directors that finally determines if a Commission policy is patently unreasonable and the Appeals Tribunal is bound by that determination.

This “bifurcation” of decision- making authority raises questions regarding the forum for judicial oversight of the Board’s determinations. [ 60 ] The Appeals Tribunal in any given matter will issue reasons for which there is a statutory right of appeal to this Court under s. 21(12). [ 61 ] The Board of Directors will issue reasons for its determination regarding patent unreasonableness, but there is no express statutory right of appeal from that determination. In the Appeals Tribunal’s submission, any legal challenge to that determination must proceed by way of judicial review in the Court of Queen’s Bench.

The Appeals Tribunal explains it raises this problem because of a genuine concern that litigants will assume they have a right to appeal the Board’s determination to this Court under s. 21(12). [ 62 ] The Appeals Tribunal takes the position that s. 21(12) has no application and that all legal challenges to Board determinations regarding patent unreasonableness must proceed in the Court of Queen’s Bench in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court . B.

Position of the Province [ 63 ] Where the Appeals Tribunal is of the view that a policy is patently unreasonable from a substantive point of view (but not unlawful or unconstitutional), and the Board of Directors is of the contrary view, the Appeals Tribunal is bound by that policy. In that scenario, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal should properly reflect the determination of the appellant’s claim based on the policy it is bound to apply. Under s. 21(12), it is the decision of the Appeals Tribunal that is subject to appeal to this Court and not any Board determination under s. 21(9.4) .

On appeal, this Court would determine if a contested decision by the Appeals Tribunal that is rooted in a Commission policy made binding by s. 21(9.4) raises a question of law or jurisdiction. Under this framework, there is no need for a Board determination under s. 21(9.4) to be subject to an alternate form of review and remedy, nor is there a need for a bifurcated hearing. The existing statutory framework provides the necessary avenues of relief. C.

Position of the Commission [ 64 ] The Commission agrees with the Appeals Tribunal there is no right of appeal under s. 21(12) from determinations by its Board of Directors. In the Commission’s view, those determinations become components of the Appeals Tribunal’s decision, which is appealable under s. 21(12). D. Opinion of the Court [ 65 ] We agree with the positions taken by the Province and the Commission, as adumbrated hereinabove.

Bill 2 did not intend to detrimentally affect the right of appeal to this Court provided under s. 21(12), nor did it mean to open the door to judicial review under Rule 69 of determinations by the Board of Directors regarding patent unreasonableness. In our opinion, those determinations, which bind the Appeals Tribunal, become components of the decision challenged by way of appeal under s. 21(12), thereby opening the door to a consideration of their sustainability as a matter of law and, correlatively, excluding the application of Rule 69. [ 66 ] Subject to the foregoing, the answer to Question 3 is “no”.

Question 4: May an employer, worker, dependent, or the Commission name the Appeals Tribunal as a Respondent to an Appeal under s. 21(12) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act? A. Position of the Appeals Tribunal [ 67 ] The provision referenced in Question 4 reads as follows: 21

(12) Any decision, order or ruling of the Appeals Tribunal shall be final, subject only to an appeal to the Court of Appeal involving any question as to its jurisdiction or any question of law. 21

(12) Toute décision du Tribunal d’appel est définitive, sujet seulement à un appel devant la Cour d’appel concernant toute question de compétence ou de droit. [ 68 ] T he Appeals Tribunal’s position is that, in any appeal to this Court under s. 21(12), no appellant may identify the Appeals Tribunal as a respondent. That is so because the Appeals Tribunal is not a party to the underlying dispute. B. Position of the Province [ 69 ] The Province does not advocate a position. C. Position of the Commission [ 70 ] The Commission agrees with the Appeals Tribunal.

It would not be appropriate for an appellant to identify the Appeals Tribunal as a respondent. D. Opinion of the Court [ 71 ] The WHSCC and WCAT Act does not allow an appellant to identify the Appeals Tribunal as a respondent to an appeal under s. 21(12). This is hardly surprising given that the Appeals Tribunal is not a party to the litigation, but the decision-maker. In our opinion, the answer to Question 4 is “no”. Question 5: Who is the Respondent to an Appeal under ss. 22.1(1) and 22.1(2) of the WHSCC and WCAT Act ? A.

Position of the Appeals Tribunal [ 72 ] The provisions referenced in Question 5 , which relate to reconsideration decisions by the Appeals Tribunal, read as follows:

22.1

(1) The Appeals Tribunal may reconsider a decision, order or ruling it previously made or rescind, alter or amend the decision, order or ruling if it is satisfied that new evidence has become available or has been discovered that is substantial and material to the decision, order or ruling, and the evidence (

a) did not exist at the time of the hearing before the Appeals Tribunal, or (

b) did exist at that time but was not discovered and could not through the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered. 22.1

(2) Any decision, order or ruling under subsection (1) shall be final, subject only to an appeal to the Court of Appeal involving any question as to jurisdiction or any question of law, and

section 23 applies with the necessary modifications. 22.1

(1) Le Tribunal d’appel peut considérer de nouveau toute décision ou ordonnance qu’il a rendue antérieurement ou annuler, changer ou modifier cette décision ou cette ordonnance s’il est convaincu que de nouveaux éléments de preuve sont maintenant disponibles ou ont été découverts et que ces éléments sont importants ou pertinents à la décision ou à l’ordonnance et, selon le cas :

a) n’existaient pas au moment où le Tribunal d’appel a tenu l’audience;

b) existaient à ce moment-là mais n’avaient pas été découverts et n’auraient pu l’être par l’exercice d’une diligence raisonnable. 22.1

(2) Toute décision ou ordonnance rendue en vertu du paragraphe (1) est définitive, sous la seule réserve d’un appel interjeté à la Cour d’appel portant sur toute question de compétence ou de droit, et l’article 23 s’y applique avec les adaptations nécessaires. [ 73 ] The Appeals Tribunal takes the position that it is a proper respondent to statutory appeals of the threshold determination required under s. 22.1(1). The Appeals Tribunal advises its process for reconsideration involves two distinct steps.

The first consists of a threshold determination by the Chair as to whether the preconditions of s. 22.1(1) are satisfied. No hearing is held. The second step, if required, involves a hearing where the new evidence is tested and a determination is made as to whether the previous decision, order or ruling will be rescinded, altered, or amended. [ 74 ] The Appeals Tribunal submits appeals of the Chair’s determination under the first step will only relate to the issue of whether the preconditions of s. 22.1(1) have been met and, in that scenario, the Appeals Tribunal is a proper respondent.

The hearings under the second step only occur once there is no outstanding issue regarding the propriety of the new evidence as contemplated in s. 22.1(1). In essence, these are appeal hearings in the normal course and the Appeals Tribunal would not be a proper respondent to any appeal to this Court arising therefrom. B. Position of the Province [ 75 ] The Province does not advocate a position. C. Position of the Commission [ 76 ] Appropriate respondents on an appeal from a reconsideration decision under s. 22.1 include the Commission and any other successful party who participated in the hearing.

It would be inappropriate for the Appeals Tribunal to advocate for its Chair’s determination regarding the sufficiency of the proffered new evidence. After all, reversal by this Court on appeal might well entail a referral back to the Appeals Tribunal. [ 77 ] There is nothing in the enabling statutes or about the nature of reconsideration decisions which would justify the Appeals Tribunal being entitled to participate as of right in an appeal to this Court.

D. Opinion of the Court [ 78 ] We agree with the Commission’s position as articulated hereinabove. [ 79 ] As indicated in our post-hearing disposition, we are of the opinion that the answer to Question 5 is: “The Commission and any affected party may be identified as respondents, but not the Appeals Tribunal”. Question 6: When may the Appeals Tribunal properly seek intervener status to an Appeal of its own decision? A.

Position of the Appeals Tribunal [ 80 ] The Appeals Tribunal submits it should not be a respondent to an appeal to this Court of one of its decisions, except for appeals of threshold determinations by its Chair under the first step of its reconsideration process for s. 22.1(1) purposes. Subject to that exception, the Appeals Tribunal would require standing before the Court as an intervener. B. Position of the Province [ 81 ] The Province does not advocate a position. C. Position of the Commission [ 82 ] The Court should not provide directions in advance with regard to this issue.

The right of a tribunal to intervene in an appeal of its own decision should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and in the particular circumstances of the case at bar. The existing case law provides sufficient guidance to the Appeals Tribunal should it seek leave to intervene.

The Appeals Tribunal’s role is to adjudicate disputes between employers and workers; concerns regarding the fairness of the process weigh against granting standing in appeals of its decisions. [ 83 ] Moreover, the Commission would not allow an appeal under s. 21(12) to go unopposed, and it has the necessary knowledge and expertise to fully make, and respond to, submissions on appeal. D. Opinion of the Court [ 84 ]

Section 23 of the WHSCC and WCAT Act applies to appeals to this Court. Section 23(8) states the Rules of Court , “as far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with this section, apply to every proceeding before the Court of Appeal under this section”. Rule 15 deals with interventions by non-parties in appeals to this Court, and there is an abundant jurisprudence pertaining to its

interpretation. As we indicated in the post-hearing disposition, the Appeals Tribunal “may seek intervention on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the pertinent jurisprudence”. We have nothing to add to that opinion. IV. Disposition [ 85 ] The Court’s answers to the questions submitted for its opinion are set out in the preceding text. [ 86 ] There will be no order of costs.

Version française de l’opinion rendue par LA COUR I. Introduction et aperçu [1] Il y a trois acteurs clés qui interviennent dans l’application légale du régime d’indemnisation des travailleurs de la province : la Commission intimée, le Tribunal d’appel appelant et notre Cour.

Chacun contribue, directement ou indirectement et de différentes façons, au traitement équitable et reposant sur le bien-fondé des demandes d’indemnisation. [2] Il va sans dire que la Commission porte le plus lourd fardeau dans la prestation efficace et économique des services d’indemnisation des travailleurs, conformément aux préceptes du législateur. À cette fin, elle a compétence pour trancher toutes les questions aussi bien de fait que de droit relatives à la demande d’indemnisation d’un travailleur et s’est vu attribuer la compétence exclusive pour établir des politiques qui sont compatibles avec la

Loi sur les accidents du travail, L.R.N.-B. 1973, ch. W-13, et avec la

Loi sur la Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et le Tribunal d’appel des accidents au travail , L.N.-B. 1994, ch. W-14 (la Loi ). Les politiques dûment approuvées par la Commission lient son conseil d’administration, ses dirigeants et ses employés ainsi que le Tribunal d’appel.

Dans le texte qui suit, nous faisons parfois référence aux lois susmentionnées collectivement sous l’appellation « lois habilitantes » ou « loi habilitante ». [3] Pour sa part, le Tribunal d’appel entend et tranche les appels des décisions en matière d’indemnisation rendues par les dirigeants de la Commission. Dans l’exercice de sa compétence, le Tribunal d’appel est tenu de rendre ses décisions au cas par cas « en toute justice et sur le bien-fondé » de l’espèce.

Corrélativement, le Tribunal d’appel jouit de tous les pouvoirs de la Commission, sous réserve de quelques exceptions, la plus importante étant que le Tribunal d’appel est lié par les politiques approuvées par la Commission « en vertu » de la Loi « qui sont applicables en l’espèce » même s’il les estime « manifestement déraisonnable[s] ». Les décisions du Tribunal d’appel ne constituent pas des précédents ayant force obligatoire : al. 21(9)

c) de la Loi . [4] Quant à notre Cour, elle connaît des appels interjetés contre les décisions du Tribunal d’appel concernant les questions de droit et de compétence. Elle peut également donner son opinion sur un exposé de cause formulé par la Commission ou le Tribunal d’appel concernant leur compétence respective ou une question de droit. Selon les lois habilitantes, les politiques de la Commission ne lient pas notre Cour. Les décisions de la Cour sont des précédents ayant force obligatoire (voir VSL Canada Ltée c.

Commission de la santé, de la sécurité et de l’indemnisation des accidents au travail et Duguay et autres , 2011 NBCA 76 , 376 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 292 , par. 34 ). [5] Dans la présente instance, le Tribunal d’appel demande l’opinion de la Cour concernant des questions de compétence et de droit qui, selon lui, découlent des modifications apportées à la Loi par la Loi concernant la mise en œuvre des recommandations du Rapport du Groupe de travail sur Travail sécuritaire NB , L.N.-B. 2018, ch. 18 (le « projet de loi 2 »).

Le 12 décembre 2018, la Loi a été modifiée par adjonction des par. 21(9.1) , 21(9.2) , 21(9.3) , 21(9.4) , 21(9.5) et 21(9.6) , entre autres. Ces dispositions doivent être interprétées à la lumière de l’ al. 21(9) a), qui exige que le Tribunal d’appel rende ses décisions « en toute justice et sur le bien-fondé » de l’espèce.

Elles peuvent se résumer de la façon suivante. [6] Le paragraphe 21(9.1) stipule que, tant que la Commission n’a pas approuvé une politique portant remplacement ou modification d’une politique existante, toute politique existante approuvée par la Commission « en vertu de la présente loi » lie son conseil d’administration ainsi que le Tribunal d’appel. Le paragraphe 21(9.2) prévoit que si le Tribunal d’appel considère qu’une politique de la Commission est « manifestement déraisonnable », il doit la renvoyer au conseil d’administration, motifs écrits à l’appui, pour qu’il se prononce sur la question.

L’instruction de l’instance devant le Tribunal d’appel est alors suspendue jusqu’à ce que le conseil d’administration rende sa décision concernant le caractère manifestement déraisonnable ou non de la politique. Le paragraphe 21(9.3) enjoint au conseil d’administration de rendre sa décision dès que possible. Selon le paragraphe 21(9.4), le conseil d’administration doit motiver sa décision par écrit et renvoyer l’affaire au Tribunal d’appel s’il est d’avis que la politique en question n’est pas manifestement déraisonnable. Le Tribunal d’appel est alors lié par la décision du conseil d’administration .

[7] Le paragraphe 21(9.5) ajoute que, si le conseil d’administration est d’avis que la politique en question est manifestement déraisonnable, il doit l’examiner et la modifier en conséquence. Le paragraphe 21(9.6) prévoit qu’une fois terminé l’examen visé au par. 21(9.5), le conseil d’administration doit fournir par écrit sa décision motivée ainsi que la politique modifiée et renvoyer l’affaire devant le Tribunal d’appel, celui-ci étant lié par la décision. [8] Le point-clé des modifications, du moins pour les besoins de la présente instance, est le suivant : en rendant sa décision en toute justice et s

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