Minister of Citizenship v. Immigration, 2019 SCC 65

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA Citation: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.

Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 Appeal Heard: December 4, 5, 6, 2018 Judgment Rendered : December 19, 2019 Docket: 37748 Between: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Appellant and Alexander Vavilov Respondent - and - Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Canadian Council for Refugees, Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario - Tenant Duty Counsel Program, Ontario Securities Commission, British Columbia Securities Commission, Alberta Securities Commission, Ecojustice Canada Society, Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (Ontario), Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (Northwest Territories and Nunavut), Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (Nova Scotia), Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (New Brunswick), British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre Foundation, Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals, National Academy of Arbitrators, Ontario Labour-Management Arbitrators’ Association, Conférence des arbitres du Québec, Canadian Labour Congress, National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities, Queen’s Prison Law Clinic, Advocates for the Rule of Law, Parkdale Community Legal Services, Cambridge Comparative Administrative Law Forum, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Community & Legal Aid Services Programme, Association québécoise des avocats et avocates en droit de l’immigration and First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada Interveners Coram: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ.

Joint Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 197) Joint Concurring Reasons: (paras. 198 to 343) Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ. Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. canada v. vavilov Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Appellant v.

Alexander Vavilov Respondent and Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Saskatchewan, Canadian Council for Refugees, Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario - Tenant Duty Counsel Program, Ontario Securities Commission, British Columbia Securities Commission, Alberta Securities Commission, Ecojustice Canada Society, Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (Ontario), Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (Northwest Territories and Nunavut), Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (Nova Scotia), Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (New Brunswick),

British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre Foundation, Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals, National Academy of Arbitrators, Ontario Labour-Management Arbitrators’ Association, Conférence des arbitres du Québec, Canadian Labour Congress, National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities, Queen’s Prison Law Clinic, Advocates for the Rule of Law, Parkdale Community Legal Services, Cambridge Comparative Administrative Law Forum, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Canadian Bar Association, Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Community & Legal Aid Services Programme, Association québécoise des avocats et avocates en droit de l’immigration and First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada Interveners Indexed as: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.

Vavilov 2019 SCC 65 File No.: 37748. 2018: December 4, 5, 6; 2019: December 19. Present: Wagner C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ. on appeal from the federal court of appeal Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of review — Proper approach to judicial review of administrative decisions — Proper approach to reasonableness review. Citizenship — Canadian citizens — Registrar of Citizenship cancelling certificate of Canadian citizenship issued to Canadian-born son of parents later revealed to be Russian spies — Decision of Registrar based on

interpretation of statutory exception to general rule that person born in Canada is Canadian citizen — Exception stating that Canadian-born child is not citizen if either parent was representative or employee in Canada of foreign government at time of child’s birth — Whether Registrar’s decision to cancel certificate of citizenship was reasonable — Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, s. 3(2) (a). V was born in Toronto in 1994. At the time of his birth, his parents were posing as Canadians under assumed names.

In reality, they were foreign nationals working on assignment for the Russian foreign intelligence service. V did not know that his parents were not who they claimed to be. He believed that he was a Canadian citizen by birth, he lived and identified as a Canadian, and he held a Canadian passport. In 2010, V’s parents were arrested in the United States and charged with espionage. They pled guilty and were returned to Russia. Following their arrest, V’s attempts to renew his Canadian passport proved unsuccessful. However, in 2013, he was issued a certificate of Canadian citizenship.

Then, in 2014, the Canadian Registrar of Citizenship cancelled V’s certificate on the basis of her

interpretation of s. 3(2) (

a) of the Citizenship Act . This provision exempts children of “a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in Canada of a foreign government” from the general rule that individuals born in Canada acquire Canadian citizenship by birth. The Registrar concluded that because V’s parents were employees or representatives of Russia at the time of V’s birth, the exception to the rule of citizenship by birth in s. 3(2) (a), as she interpreted it, applied to V, who therefore was not, and had never been, entitled to citizenship.

V’s application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision was dismissed by the Federal Court. The Court of Appeal allowed V’s appeal and quashed the Registrar’s decision because it was unreasonable. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration appeals. Held : The appeal should be dismissed. Per Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ.: The Registrar’s decision to cancel V’s certificate of citizenship was unreasonable, and the Court of Appeal’s decision to quash it should be upheld. It was not reasonable for the Registrar to interpret s. 3(2) (

a) of the Citizenship Act as applying to children of individuals who have not been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities at the time of the children’s birth. More generally, this appeal and its companion cases ( Bell Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 SCC 66 , [2019] 4 S.C.R. 845) provide an opportunity to consider and clarify the law applicable to the judicial review of administrative decisions as addressed in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, and subsequent cases.

The submissions presented to the Court have highlighted two aspects of the current framework which need clarification. The first aspect is the analysis for determining the standard of review. The second aspect is the need for better guidance from this Court on the proper application of the reasonableness standard. It has become clear that Dunsmuir ’s promise of simplicity and predictability has not been fully realized. Certain aspects of the current standard of review framework are unclear and unduly complex.

The former contextual analysis has proven to be unwieldy and offers limited practical guidance for courts attempting to determine the standard of review. The practical effect is that courts struggle in conducting the analysis, and debates surrounding the appropriate standard and its application continue to overshadow the review on the merits, thereby undermining access to justice. A reconsideration of the Court’s approach is therefore necessary in order to bring greater coherence and predictability to this area of law.

A revised framework to determine the standard of review where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision is needed. In setting out a revised framework, this decision departs from the Court’s existing jurisprudence on standard of review in certain respects. Any reconsideration of past precedents can be justified only by compelling circumstances and requires carefully weighing the impact on legal certainty and predictability against the costs of continuing to follow a flawed approach.

Although adhering to the established jurisprudence will generally promote certainty and predictability, in some instances doing so will create or perpetuate uncertainty. In such circumstances, following a prior decision would be contrary to the underlying values of clarity and certainty in the law. The revised standard of review analysis begins with a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in all cases.

Where a legislature has created an administrative decision maker for the specific purpose of administering a statutory scheme, it must be presumed that the legislature also intended that decision maker to fulfill its mandate and interpret the law applicable to all issues that come before it. Where a legislature has not explicitly provided that a court is to have a more involved role in reviewing the decisions of that decision maker, it can safely be assumed that the legislature intended a minimum of judicial interference.

Respect for these institutional design choices requires a reviewing court to adopt a posture of restraint. Thus, whenever a court reviews an administrative decision, it should start with the presumption that the applicable standard of review for all aspects of that decision will be reasonableness. As a result, it is no longer necessary for courts to engage in a contextual inquiry in order to identify the appropriate standard. Conclusively closing the door on the application of a contextual analysis to determine the applicable standard streamlines and simplifies the standard of review framework.

As well, with the presumptive application of the reasonableness standard, the relative expertise of administrative decision makers is no longer relevant to a determination of the standard of review. It is simply folded into the new starting point. Relative expertise remains, however, a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness review. The presumption of reasonableness review can be rebutted in two types of situations. The first is where the legislature has indicated that it intends a different standard to apply. This will be the case where it has explicitly prescribed the applicable standard of review.

Any framework rooted in legislative intent must respect clear statutory language. The legislature may also direct that derogation from the presumption is appropriate by providing for a statutory appeal mechanism from an administrative decision to a court, thereby signalling the legislature’s intent that appellate standards apply when a court reviews the decision. Where a legislature has provided a statutory appeal mechanism, it has subjected the administrative regime to appellate oversight and it expects the court to scrutinize such administrative decisions on an appellate basis.

The applicable standard is therefore to be determined with reference to the nature of the question and to the jurisprudence on appellate standards of review. Where, for example, a court hears an appeal from an administrative decision, it would apply the standard of correctness to questions of law, including on statutory

interpretation and the scope of a decision maker’s authority. Where the scope of the statutory appeal includes questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law, the standard is palpable and overriding error for such questions. Giving effect to statutory appeal mechanisms in this way departs from the Court’s recent jurisprudence. This shift is necessary in order to bring coherence and conceptual balance to the standard of review analysis and is justified by weighing the values of certainty and correctness.

First, there has been significant and valid judicial and academic criticism of the Court’s recent approach to statutory appeal rights and of the inconsistency inherent in a standard of review framework based on legislative intent that otherwise declines to give meaning to an express statutory right of appeal. Second, there is no satisfactory justification for the recent trend in the Court’s jurisprudence to give no effect to statutory rights of appeal in the standard of review analysis, absent exceptional wording.

More generally, there is no convincing reason to presume that legislatures mean something entirely different when they use the word “appeal” in an administrative law statute. Accepting that the legislature intends an appellate standard of review to be applied also helps to explain why many statutes provide for both appeal and judicial review mechanisms, thereby indicating two roles for reviewing courts.

Finally, because the presumption of reasonableness review is no longer premised upon notions of relative expertise and is now based on respect for the legislature’s institutional design choice, departing from the presumption of reasonableness review in the context of a statutory appeal respects this legislative choice. The second situation in which the presumption of reasonableness review will be rebutted is where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness be applied.

This will be the case for certain categories of legal questions, namely constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies. First, questions regarding the division of powers between Parliament and the provinces, the relationship between the legislature and the other branches of the state, the scope of Aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 , and other constitutional matters require a final and determinate answer from the courts.

Second, the rule of law requires courts to have the final word with regard to general questions of law that are of central importance to the legal system as a whole because they require uniform and consistent answers. Third, the rule of law requires courts to intervene where one administrative body has interpreted the scope of its authority in a manner that is incompatible with the jurisdiction of another since the rule of law cannot tolerate conflicting orders and proceedings where they result in a true operational conflict between two administrative bodies.

The application of the correctness standard for such questions therefore respects the unique role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution and ensures that courts are able to provide the last word on questions for which the rule of law requires consistency and for which a final and determinate answer is necessary. The general rule of reasonableness review, when coupled with these limited exceptions, offers a comprehensive approach to determining the applicable standard of review.

The possibility that another category could be recognized as requiring a derogation from the presumption of reasonableness review in a future case is not definitively foreclosed. However, any new basis for correctness review would be exceptional and would

need to be consistent with this framework and the overarching principles set out in this decision. Any new correctness category based on legislative intent would require a signal of legislative intent as strong and compelling as a legislated standard of review or a statutory appeal mechanism. Similarly, a new correctness category based on the rule of law would be justified only where failure to apply correctness review would undermine the rule of law and jeopardize the proper functioning of the justice system in a manner analogous to the three situations described in this decision.

For example, the Court is not persuaded that it should recognize a distinct correctness category for legal questions on which there is persistent discord within an administrative body. A lack of unanimity within an administrative tribunal is the price to pay for decision-making freedom and independence. While discord can lead to legal incoherence, a more robust form of reasonableness review is capable of guarding against such threats to the rule of law.

As well, jurisdictional questions should no longer be recognized as a distinct category subject to correctness review; there are no clear markers to distinguish such questions from other questions related to interpreting an administrative decision maker’s enabling statute. A proper application of the reasonableness standard will enable courts to ensure that administrative bodies have acted within the scope of their lawful authority without having to conduct a preliminary assessment on jurisdictional issues and without having to apply the correctness standard.

Going forward, a court seeking to determine what standard of review is appropriate should look to this decision first in order to determine how the general framework applies. Doing so may require the court to resolve subsidiary questions on which past precedents will often continue to provide helpful guidance and will continue to apply essentially without modification, such as cases concerning general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole or those relating to jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies.

On other issues, such as the effect of statutory appeal mechanisms, true questions of jurisdiction or the former contextual analysis, certain cases will necessarily have less precedential force. There is also a need for better guidance from the Court on the proper application of the reasonableness standard, what that standard entails and how it should be applied in practice. Reasonableness review is meant to ensure that courts intervene in administrative matters only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process.

Its starting point lies in the principle of judicial restraint and in demonstrating respect for the distinct role of administrative decision makers. However, it is not a “rubber-stamping” process or a means of sheltering decision makers from accountability. While courts must recognize the legitimacy and authority of administrative decision makers and adopt a posture of respect, administrative decision makers must adopt a culture of justification and demonstrate that their exercise of delegated public power can be justified.

In conducting reasonableness review, a court must consider the outcome of the administrative decision in light of its underlying rationale, to ensure that the decision as a whole is transparent, intelligible and justified. Judicial review is concerned with both the outcome of the decision and the reasoning process that led to that outcome. To accept otherwise would undermine, rather than demonstrate respect toward, the institutional role of the administrative decision maker. Reasonableness review is methodologically distinct from correctness review.

The court conducting a reasonableness review must focus on the decision the administrative decision maker actually made, including the justification offered for it . A court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have made in place of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the range of possible conclusions, conduct a new analysis or seek to determine the correct solution to the problem.

Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the decision maker, including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led, was unreasonable. In cases where reasons are required, they are the starting point for reasonableness review, as they are the primary mechanism by which decision makers show that their decisions are reasonable.

Reasons are the means by which the decision maker communicates the rationale for its decision: they explain how and why a decision was made, help to show affected parties that their arguments have been considered and that the decision was made in a fair and lawful manner, and shield against arbitrariness. A principled approach to reasonableness review is therefore one which puts those reasons first. This enables a reviewing court to assess whether the decision as a whole is reasonable. Attention to the decision maker’s reasons is part of how courts demonstrate respect for the decision-making process.

In many cases, formal reasons for a decision will not be given or required. Even without reasons, it is possible for the record and the context to reveal that a decision was made on the basis of an improper motive or for another impermissible reason. There will nonetheless be situations in which neither the record nor the larger context sheds light on the basis for the decision. In such cases, the reviewing court must still examine the decision in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints on the decision maker in order to determine whether the decision is reasonable.

It is conceptually useful to consider two types of fundamental flaws that tend to render a decision unreasonable. The first is a failure of rationality internal to the reasoning process. To be reasonable, a decision must be based on an internally coherent reasoning that is both rational and logical. A failure in this respect may lead a reviewing court to conclude that a decision must be set aside. Reasonableness review is not a line-by-line treasure hunt for error. However, the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic.

Because formal reasons should be read in light of the record and with due sensitivity to the administrative regime in which they were given, a decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail to reveal a rational chain of analysis or if they reveal that the decision was based on an irrational chain of analysis. A decision will also be unreasonable where the conclusion reached cannot follow from the analysis undertaken or if the reasons read in conjunction with the record do not make it possible to understand the decision maker’s reasoning on a critical point.

Similarly, the internal rationality of a decision may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies. The second type of fundamental flaw arises when a decision is in some respect untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it.

Although reasonableness is a single standard that already accounts for context, and elements of a decision’s context should not modulate the standard or the degree of scrutiny by the reviewing court, what is reasonable in a given situation will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under review. These contextual constraints dictate the limits and contours of the space in which the decision maker may act and the types of solutions it may adopt. The governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or common law, the principles of statutory

interpretation, the evidence before the decision maker and facts of which the decision maker may take notice, the submissions of the parties, the past practices and decisions of the administrative body, and the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies, are all elements that will generally be relevant in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable. Such elements are not a checklist; they may vary in significance depending on the context and will necessarily interact with one another.

Accordingly, a reviewing court may find that a decision is unreasonable when examined against these contextual considerations. Because administrative decision makers receive their powers by statute, the governing statutory scheme is likely to be the most salient aspect of the legal context relevant to a particular decision. A proper application of the reasonableness standard is capable of allaying the concern that an administrative decision maker might interpret the scope of its own authority beyond what the legislature intended. Whether an

interpretation is justified will depend on the context, including the language chosen by the legislature in describing the limits and contours of the decision maker’s authority. Both statutory and common law will also impose constraints on how and what an administrative decision maker can lawfully decide. Any precedents on the issue before the administrative decision maker or on a similar issue, as well as international law in some administrative decision making contexts, will act as a constraint on what the decision maker can reasonably decide.

Whether an administrative decision maker has acted reasonably in adapting a legal or equitable doctrine involves a highly context-specific determination. Matters of statutory

interpretation are not treated uniquely and, as with other questions of law, may be evaluated on a reasonableness standard. Where this is the applicable standard, the reviewing court does not undertake a de novo analysis of the question or ask itself what the correct decision would have been. But an approach to reasonableness review that respects legislative intent must assume that those who interpret the law, whether courts or administrative decision makers, will do so in a manner consistent with the modern principle of statutory

interpretation. Administrative decision makers are not required to engage in a formalistic statutory

interpretation exercise in every case. But whatever form the interpretive exercise takes, the merits of an administrative decision maker’s

interpretation of a statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision. Furthermore, the decision maker must take the evidentiary record and the general factual matrix that bears on its decision into account, and its decision must be reasonable in light of them. The reasonableness of a decision may be jeopardized where the decision maker has fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it.

The reasons must also meaningfully account for the central issues and concerns raised by the parties, even though reviewing courts cannot expect administrative decision makers to respond to every argument or line of possible analysis. While administrative decision makers are not bound by their previous decisions, they must be concerned with the general consistency of administrative decisions.

Therefore, whether a particular decision is consistent with the administrative body’s past decisions is also a constraint that the reviewing court should consider when determining whether an administrative decision is reasonable. Finally, individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves the potential for significant personal impact or harm. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes.

The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention. The question of the appropriate remedy — specifically, whether a court that quashes an unreasonable decision should exercise its discretion to remit the matter to the decision maker for reconsideration with the benefit of the court’s reasons — is multi-faceted.

The choice of remedy must be guided by the rationale for applying the reasonableness standard to begin with, including the recognition by the reviewing court that the legislature has entrusted the matter to the administrative decision maker, and not to the court, concerns related to the proper administration of the justice system, the need to ensure access to justice and the goal of expedient and cost-efficient decision making.

Giving effect to these principles in the remedial context means that where a decision reviewed by applying the reasonableness standard cannot be upheld, it will most often be appropriate to remit the matter to the decision maker for reconsideration with the benefit of the court’s reasons. However, there are limited scenarios in which remitting the matter would stymie the timely and effective resolution of matters in a manner that no legislature could have intended.

An intention that the administrative decision maker decide the matter at first instance cannot give rise to endless judicial reviews and subsequent reconsiderations. Declining to remit a matter to the decision maker may be appropriate where it becomes evident that a particular outcome is inevitable and that remitting the case would therefore serve no useful purpose.

Elements like concern for delay, fairness to the parties, urgency of providing a resolution to the dispute, the nature of the particular regulatory regime, whether the administrative decision maker had a genuine opportunity to weigh in on the issue in question, costs to the parties, and efficient use of public resources may also influence the exercise of a court’s discretion to remit the matter. In the case at bar, there is no basis for departing from the presumption of reasonableness review. The Registrar’s decision has come before the courts by way of judicial review, not by way of a statutory appeal.

Given that Parliament has not prescribed the standard to be applied, there is no indication that the legislature intended a standard of review other than reasonableness. The Registrar’s decision does not give rise to any constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole or questions regarding the jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies. As a result, the standard to be applied in reviewing the Registrar’s decision is reasonableness. The Registrar’s decision was unreasonable. She failed to justify her

interpretation of s. 3(2)(

a) in light of the constraints imposed by s. 3 considered as a whole, by international treaties that inform its purpose, by the jurisprudence on the

interpretation of s. 3(2)(a), and by the potential consequences of her

interpretation. Each of these elements — viewed individually and cumulatively — strongly supports the conclusion that s. 3(2) (

a) was not intended to apply to children of foreign government representatives or employees who have not been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. Though V had raised many of these considerations, the Registrar failed to address those submissions in her reasons and did not do more than conduct a cursory review of the legislative history of s. 3(2) (

a) and conclude that her

interpretation was not explicitly precluded by its text. First, the Registrar failed to address the immediate statutory context of s. 3(2) (a), which provides clear support for the conclusion that all of the persons contemplated by s. 3(2) (

a) must have been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in some form for the exception to apply. Second, the Registrar disregarded compelling submissions that s. 3(2) is a narrow exception consistent with established principles of international law and with the leading international treaties that extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to employees and representatives of foreign governments. Third, it was a significant omission to ignore the relevant cases that were before the Registrar which suggest that s. 3(2) (

a) was intended to apply only to those individuals whose parents have been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. Finally, there is no evidence that the Registrar considered the potential consequences of expanding her

interpretation of s. 3(2)(

a) to include all individuals who have not been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities. Rules concerning citizenship require a high degree of interpretive consistency in order to shield against arbitrariness. The Registrar’s

interpretation cannot be limited to the children of spies — its logic would be equally applicable to other scenarios. As well, provisions such as s. 3(2) (

a) must be given a narrow

interpretation because they potentially take away rights which otherwise benefit from a liberal and broad

interpretation. Yet there is no indication that the Registrar considered the potential harsh consequences of her

interpretation, or whether, in light of those potential consequences, Parliament would have intended s. 3(2)(

a) to apply in this manner. Although the Registrar knew her

interpretation was novel, she failed to provide a rationale for her expanded

interpretation. It was therefore unreasonable for the Registrar to find that s. 3(2) (

a) can apply to individuals whose parents have not been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in Canada. It is undisputed that V’s parents had not been granted such privileges and immunities. No purpose would therefore be served by remitting this matter to the Registrar. Given that V was born in Canada, his status is governed only by the general rule of citizenship by birth. He is a Canadian citizen. Per Abella and Karakatsanis JJ.: There is agreement with the majority that the appeal should be dismissed.

The Registrar’s decision to cancel V’s citizenship certificate was unreasonable and was properly quashed by the Court of Appeal. There is also agreement with the majority that there should be a presumption of reasonableness in judicial review. The contextual factors analysis should be eliminated from the standard of review framework, and “true questions of jurisdiction” should be abolished as a separate category of issues subject to correctness review.

However, the elimination of these elements does not support the foundational changes to judicial review outlined in the majority’s framework that result in expanded correctness review. Rather than confirming a meaningful presumption of deference for administrative decision-makers, the majority strips away deference from hundreds of administrative actors, based on a formalistic approach that ignores the legislature’s intention to leave certain legal and policy questions to administrative decision-makers. The majority’s

presumption of reasonableness review rests on a totally new understanding of legislative intent and the rule of law and prohibits any consideration of well-established foundations for deference. By dramatically expandingthe circumstances in which generalist judges will be entitled to substitute their own views for those of specialized decision-makers who apply their mandates on a daily basis, the majority’s framework fundamentallyreorients the relationship between administrative actors and the judiciary, thus advocating a profoundly different philosophy of administrative law.

The majority’s framework rests on a flawed and incomplete conceptual account of judicial review, one that unjustifiably ignores the specialized expertise of administrative decision-makers and reads out thefoundations of the modern understanding of legislative intent. Instead of understanding legislative intent as being the intention to leave legal questions within their mandate to specialized decision-makers with expertise,the majority removes expertise from the equation entirely.

In so doing, the majority disregards the historically accepted reason why the legislature intended to delegate authority to an administrative actor. In particular,such an approach ignores the possibility that specialization and expertise are embedded into this legislative choice. Post-Dunsmuir, the Court has been steadfast in confirming the central role of specialization and expertise,affirming their connection to legislative intent, and recognizing that they give administrative decision-makers the interpretative upper hand on questions of law. Specialized expertise has become the core rationale fordeference.

Giving proper effect to the legislature’s choice to delegate authority to an administrative decision-maker requires understanding the advantages that the decision-maker may enjoy in exercising its mandate.Chief among those advantages are the institutional expertise and specialization inherent to administering a particular mandate on a daily basis. In interpreting their enabling statutes, administrative actors may have aparticularly astute appreciation for the on-the-ground consequences of particular legal

interpretations, of statutory context, of the purposes that a provision or legislative scheme are meant to serve, and of specializedterminology. The advantages stemming from specialization and expertise provide a robust foundation for deference. The majority’s approach accords no weight to such institutional advantages and banishes expertise fromthe standard of review analysis entirely. The removal of the current conceptual basis for deference opens the gates to expanded correctness review. In the majority’s framework, deference gives way whenever the rule of law demands it.

This approach, however, flows from a court-centric conception of the rule of law. The rule of law means thatadministrative decision-makers make legal determinations within their mandate; it does not mean that only judges decide questions of law with an unrestricted license to substitute their opinions for those of administrativeactors through correctness review. The majority’s approach not only erodes the presumption of deference; it erodes confidence in the fact that law-making and legal

interpretation are shared enterprises between courts andadministrative decision-makers. Moreover, access to justice is at the heart of the legislative choice to establish a robust system of administrative law. This goal is compromised when a narrow conception of the rule of lawis invoked to impose judicial hegemony over administrative decision-makers, which adds unnecessary expense and complexity. Authorizing more incursions into the administrative system by judges and permitting denovo review of every legal decision adds to the delay and cost of obtaining a final decision.

The majority’s reformulation of “legislative intent” invites courts to apply an irrebuttable presumption of correctness review whenever an administrative scheme includes a right of appeal. Elevating appealclauses to indicators of correctness review creates a two-tier system that defers to the expertise of administrative decision-makers only where there is no appeal clause. Yet appeal rights do not represent a differentinstitutional structure that requires a more searching form of review. The mere fact that a statute contemplates an appeal says nothing about the degree of deference required in the review process.

The majority’s positionhinges almost entirely on a textualist argument — i.e., that the presence of the word “appeal” indicates a legislative intent that courts apply the same standards of review found in civil appellate jurisprudence. Thisdisregards long-accepted institutional distinctions between courts and administrative decision-makers. The continued use by legislatures of the term “appeal” cannot be imbued with the intent that the majority ascribes to it.The idea that appellate standards of review must be applied to every right of appeal is entirely unsupported by the jurisprudence.

For at least 25 years, the Court has not treated statutory rights of appeal as a determinativereflection of legislative intent, and such clauses have played little or no role in the standard of review analysis. Moreover, pre-Dunsmuir, statutory rights of appeal were still seen as only one factor and not as unequivocalindicators of correctness review. Absent exceptional circumstances, a statutory right of appeal does not displace the presumption of reasonableness.

The majority’s disregard for precedent and stare decisis has the potential to undermine both the integrity of the Court’s decisions, and public confidence in the stability of the law. Stare decisis placessignificant limits on the Court’s ability to overturn its precedents. The doctrine promotes the predictable and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the integrityof the judicial process. Respect for precedent also safeguards the Court’s institutional legitimacy.

The precedential value of a judgment does not expire with the tenure of the panel of judges that decided it. When the Courtdoes choose to overrule its own precedents, it should do so carefully, with moderation, and with due regard for all the important considerations that undergird the doctrine of stare decisis. A nuanced balance must be struckbetween maintaining the stability of the common law and ensuring that the law is flexible and responsive enough to adapt to new circumstances and societal norms. Stare decisis plays a critical role in maintaining thatbalance and upholding the rule of law.

There is no principled justification for departing from the existing jurisprudence and abandoning the Court’s long-standing view of how statutory appeal clauses impact the standard of review analysis. Indoing so, the majority disregards the high threshold required to overturn the Court’s decisions. The unprecedented wholesale rejection of an entire body of jurisprudence is particularly unsettling.

The affected cases arenumerous and include many decisions conducting deferential review even in the face of a statutory right of appeal and bedrock judgments affirming the relevance of administrative expertise to the standard of reviewanalysis. Overruling these judgments flouts stare decisis, which prohibits courts from overturning past decisions that simply represent a choice with which the current bench does not agree. The majority’s approach alsohas the potential to disturb settled

interpretations of many statutes that contain a right of appeal; every existing

interpretation of such statutes that has been affirmed under a reasonableness standard will be open to freshchallenge. Moreover, if the Court, in its past decisions, misconstrued the purpose of statutory appeal clauses, legislatures were free to clarify this

interpretation through legislative amendment. In the absence of legislativecorrection, the case for overturning decisions is even less compelling. The Court should offer additional direction on reasonableness review so that judges can provide careful and meaningful oversight of the administrative justice system while respecting its legitimacy and theperspectives of its front-line, specialized decision-makers. However, rather than clarifying the role of reasons and how to review them, the majority revives the kind of search for errors that dominated the Court’s priorjurisprudence.

The majority’s multi-factored, open-ended list of constraints on administrative decision making will encourage reviewing courts to dissect administrative reasons in a line-by-line hunt for error. Theseconstraints may function in practice as a wide-ranging catalogue of hypothetical errors to justify quashing an administrative decision. Structuring reasonableness review in this fashion effectively imposes on administrativedecision-makers a higher standard of justification than on trial judges. Such an approach undercuts deference.

Reasonableness review should instead focus on the concept of deference to administrative decision-makers andto the legislative intention to confide in them a mandate. Curial deference is the hallmark of reasonableness review, setting it apart from the substitution of opinion permitted under correctness. Deference imposes three requirements on courts conducting reasonableness review. First, deference is the attitude a reviewing court must adopt towards an administrative decision-maker.

Deference mandatesrespect for the legislative choice to entrust a decision to administrative actors rather than to the courts, for the important role that administrative decision-makers play, and for their specialized expertise and the institutionalsetting in which they operate. Reviewing courts must pay respectful attention to the reasons offered for an administrative decision, make a genuine effort to understand why the decision was made, and give the decision afair and generous construction. Second, deference affects how a court frames the question it must answer and the nature of its analysis.

A reviewing court does not ask how it would have resolved an issue, but ratherwhether the answer provided by the decision-maker was unreasonable. Ultimately, whether an administrative decision is reasonable depends on the context, and a reviewing court must be attentive to all relevantcircumstances, including the reasons offered to support the decision, the record, the statutory scheme and the particular issues raised, among other factors. Third, deferential review impacts how a reviewing court evaluateschallenges to a decision.

The party seeking judicial review bears the onus of showing that the decision was unreasonable; the decision-maker does not have to persuade the court that its decision is reasonable. The administrative decision itself is the focal point of the review exercise. In all cases, the question remains whether the challenging party has demonstrated that a decision is unreasonable. Where reasons areneither required nor available, reasonableness may be justified by past decisions of the administrative body or in light of the procedural context.

Where reasons are provided, they serve as the natural starting point todetermine whether the decision-maker acted reasonably. By beginning with the reasons, read in light of the surrounding context and the grounds raised, reviewing courts provide meaningful oversight while respecting thelegitimacy of specialized administrative decision making. Reviewing courts should approach the reasons with respect for the specialized decision-makers, their significant role and the institutional context chosen by thelegislator.

Reviewing courts should not second-guess operational implications, practical challenges and on-the-ground knowledge and must remain alert to specialized concepts or language. Further, a reviewing court is notrestricted to the four corners of the written reasons and should, if faced with a gap in the reasons, look to other materials to see if they shed light on the decision, including: the record of any formal proceedings and thematerials before the decision-maker, past decisions of the administrative body, and policies or guidelines developed to guide the type of decision under review.

These materials may assist a court in understanding theoutcome. In these ways, reviewing courts may legitimately supplement written reasons without supplanting the analysis. Reasons must be read together with the outcome to determine whether the result falls within a rangeof possible outcomes. This approach puts substance over form where the basis for a decision is evident on the record, but not clearly expressed in written reasons.

As well, a court conducting deferential review must view claims of error in context and with caution, cognizant of the need to avoid substituting its opinion for that of those empowered and better equipped toanswer the questions at issue. Because judicial substitution is incompatible with deference, reviewing courts must carefully evaluate the challenges raised to ensure they go to the reasonableness of the decision rather thanrepresenting a mere difference of opinion. Courts must also consider the materiality of any alleged errors.

An error that is peripheral to the reasoning process is not sufficient to justify quashing a decision. The samedeferential approach must apply with equal force to statutory

interpretation cases. In such cases, a court should not assess the decision by determining what, in its own view, would be a reasonable

interpretation. Such anapproach imperils deference. A de novo

interpretation of a statute necessarily omits the perspective of the front-line, specialized administrative body that routinely applies the statutory scheme in question. By placing thatperspective at the heart of the judicial review inquiry, courts display respect for specialization and expertise, and for the legislative choice to delegate certain questions to non-judicial bodies. Conversely, by imposing theirown

interpretation of a statute, courts undermine legislative intent. In the instant case, there is agreement with the majority that the standard of review is reasonableness. The Registrar’s reasons failed to respond to V’s submission that the objectives of s. 3(2)(

a) of theCitizenship Act require its terms to be read narrowly. Instead, the Registrar interpreted s. 3(2)(

a) broadly, based on a purely textual assessment. This reading was only reasonable if the text is read in isolation from itsobjective. Nothing in the history of this provision indicates that Parliament intended to widen its scope. Furthermore, the judicial treatment of this provision also points to the need for a narrow

interpretation. In addition,the text of s. 3(2)(

c) can be seen as undermining the Registrar’s

interpretation of s. 3(2)(a), because the former denies citizenship to children born to individuals who enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities equivalentto those granted to persons referred to in the latter. This suggests that s. 3(2)(

a) covers only those employees in Canada of a foreign government who have such privileges and immunities, in contrast with V’s parents. Byignoring the objectives of s. 3 as a whole, the Registrar’s decision was unreasonable.Cases CitedBy Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Gascon, Côté, Brown, Rowe and Martin JJ. Considered: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács, 2018 SCC 2, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 6; Nova Tube Inc./NovaSteel Inc. v. Conares Metal Supply Ltd., 2019 FCA 52; Al-Ghamdi v.

Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 2007 FC 559, 64 Imm. L.R. (3d) 67; Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship andImmigration), 2008 FC 614, [2009] 1 F.C.R. 204; Hitti v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 294, 310 F.T.R. 168; explained: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. AlbertaTeachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; discussed: Dunsmuir v. NewBrunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; referred to: Bell Canada v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 66, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 845; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R.3; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 135; Canadian Artists’ Representation v. National Gallery of Canada, 2014 SCC 42, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 197; Smith v. AlliancePipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R.895; Edmonton (City) v.

Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31, [2018] 2S.C.R. 230; Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 770; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489;Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v. Bernard, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833; Queensland v.

Commonwealth (1977),139 C.L.R. 585; Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v. Ranville, (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518; R. v. B. (K.G.), (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740; Crevier v. Attorney Generalof Quebec, (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Pezim v.

British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of BritishColumbia, 2003 SCC 19, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226; Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue) v. Mattel Canada Inc., 2001 SCC 36, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100; Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC11, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539; R. v.

Owen, 2003 SCC 33, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 779; British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011SCC 52, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422; Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360; McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, 2014 SCC 39, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 108; British Columbia(Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal) v. Fraser Health Authority, 2016 SCC 25, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 587; British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk, 2017 SCC 62, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 795; Seneca College ofApplied Arts and Technology v. Bhadauria, (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181; Housen v.

Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; Québec (Procureure générale) v. Montréal (Ville), 2016 QCCA 2108,17 Admin. L.R. (6th) 328; Bell Canada v. 7262591 Canada Ltd., 2018 FCA 174, 428 D.L.R. (4th) 311; Garneau Community League v. Edmonton (City), 2017 ABCA 374, 60 Alta. L.R. (6th) 1; Nova Scotia (AttorneyGeneral) v. S&D Smith Central Supplies Limited, 2019 NSCA 22; Atlantic Mining NS Corp. (D.D.V. Gold Limited) v. Oakley, 2019 NSCA 14; R. v. Robinson, (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683; TervitaCorp. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 161; British Columbia Telephone Co. v.

Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd., (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739; Law Society of NewBrunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247; Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn., 2003 SCC 28, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476; Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of FinancialServices), 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152; Attorney General of Quebec v. Carrières Ste-Thérèse Ltée, (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 831; Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors andMusic Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 283; Westcoast Energy Inc. v.

Canada (National Energy Board), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322; Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12,[2012] 1 S.C.R. 395; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; Alberta (Information and PrivacyCommissioner) v. University of Calgary, 2016 SCC 53, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 555; Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, 2018 SCC 39, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 687; Canada (Canadian Human Rights

Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471; Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 29; Communications,Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458; Barreau du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2017 SCC 56, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 488; Nor-ManRegional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616; Regina Police Assn. Inc. v.

Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14, [2000] 1S.C.R. 360; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 39, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Guérin, 2017 SCC 42, [2017] 2S.C.R. 3; City of Arlington, Texas v. Federal Communications Commission, 569 U.S. 290 (2013); Green v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 360; West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. British Columbia(Workers’ Compensation Appeal Tribunal), 2018 SCC 22, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 635; Domtar Inc. v.

Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 756;Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2001 SCC 4, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 221; Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653; Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovahde St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 48, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650; R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1S.C.R. 3; Catalyst Paper Corp. v.

North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, (SCC), [1997] 3S.C.R. 3; Delios v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 117, 472 N.R. 171; Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364; Canada (Attorney General)v. Igloo Vikski Inc., 2016 SCC 38, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 80; Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293; Komolafe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),2013 FC 431, 16 Imm.

L.R. (4th) 267; Petro-Canada v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2009 BCCA 396, 276 B.C.A.C. 135; Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC750, 27 Imm. L.R. (4th) 151; Wright v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2017 NSSC 11, 23 Admin. L.R. (6th) 110; Sangmo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 17; Blas v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 629, 26 Imm. L.R. (4th) 92; Reid v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 2015 ONSC 6578; Lloyd v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 115, 2016 D.T.C. 5051;Taman v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 1, [2017] 3 F.C.R. 520; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 121; Montréal (City) v. Montreal Port Authority, 2010 SCC 14, [2010] 1 S.C.R.427; Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193, [2011] 4 F.C.R. 203; Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2013 SCC 64, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 810; Canada(Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) v. Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56, [2015] 2 F.C.R. 1006; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292; R. v.

Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754; Rizzo & Rizzo ShoesLtd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601;Construction Labour Relations v. Driver Iron Inc., 2012 SCC 65, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 405; IWA v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282; Chieu v. Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84; D’Errico v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 95, 459 N.R. 167; Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v.

Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202; Renaud v. Quebec (Commission des affaires sociales), (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 855; Groia v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 772;Sharif v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 205, 50 C.R. (7th) 1; Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2017 FCA 45, 411 D.L.R. (4th) 175; Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA319, 138 O.R. (3d) 52; MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6; GreCon Dimter inc. v. J.R.

Normand inc., 2005 SCC 46, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 401; B010 v. Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 704; India v. Badesha, 2017 SCC 44, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 127; Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 398; Benner v. Canada(Secretary of State), (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391; Brossard (Town) v. Quebec (Commissiondes droits de la personne), (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279.By Abella and Karakatsanis JJ. Considered: Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v.

New Brunswick Liquor Corp., (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2A.C. 147; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; Canada (Attorney General) v. Igloo Vikski Inc., 2016 SCC 38, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 80; Kisor v.Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019); discussed: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; referred to: Rasanen v. Rosemount Instruments Ltd. (1994), (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 267;Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796, (SCC), [1970] S.C.R. 425; Bell v.

Ontario Human Rights Commission, (SCC), [1971] S.C.R.756; Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R.1324; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654; Canada(Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 230; Domtar Inc. v.

Quebec (Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), (SCC),[1993] 2 S.C.R. 756; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd., (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316; Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission), (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722; Law Society of New Brunswick v.

Ryan, 2003 SCC20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247; Cartaway Resources Corp. (Re), 2004 SCC 26, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650; R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765; McLean v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 895; Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3; Edmonton (City) v.Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293; Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications, 2009 SCC 40, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 764; Smith v.

Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160; ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 SCC 45, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 219; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 53,[2011] 3 S.C.R. 471; Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226; Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003SCC 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708; Doré v.

Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1S.C.R. 395; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616; Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 S.C.R.770; Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; Crevier v. Attorney General of Quebec, (SCC), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220; Bell Canada v.Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 66, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 845; Canada v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489; Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S.

Ct. 2401 (2015); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. JohnFund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014); Fitzleet Estates Ltd. v. Cherry (1977), 51 T.C. 708; R. v. Taylor, [2016] UKSC 5, [2016] 4 All E.R. 617; Willers v. Joyce (No. 2), [2016] UKSC 44, [2017] 2 All E.R. 383; Knauer v.Ministry of Justice, [2016] UKSC 9, [2016] 4 All E.R. 897; Couch v. Attorney-General (No. 2), [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 N.Z.L.R. 149; Lee v. New South Wales Crime Commission (2013), 302 A.L.R. 363; Camps BayRatepayers’ and Residents’ Association v. Harrison, [2010] ZACC 19, 2011

(4) S.A. 42; Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality v. Asla Construction (Pty) Ltd., [2019] ZACC 15, 2019

(4) S.A. 331; Payne v. Tennessee,501 U.S. 808 (1991); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; R. v. Bernard, (SCC), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833; Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v.Ranville, (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782 (2014); Plourde v. Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2009 SCC 54, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 465; Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.

Florida Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147 (1981); Knick v.Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 2001 SCC 37, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132; Association descourtiers et agents immobiliers du Québec v. Proprio Direct inc., 2008 SCC 32, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 195; Nolan v. Kerry (Canada) Inc., 2009 SCC 39, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 678; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; Nishi v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., 2013 SCC 33, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 438; R. v.

Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; Binus v. The Queen, (SCC), [1967] S.C.R. 594; Bilski v. Kappos,Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Bowles, Price Administrator v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Auer v. Robbins,519 U.S. 452 (1997); Baker v. Campbell, [1983] HCA 39, 153 C.L.R. 52; R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401; Canada (DeputyMinister of National Revenue) v. Mattel Canada Inc., 2001 SCC 36, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100; Chieu v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84; Harvard College v. Canada(Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45; R. v. Salituro, (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd., 2000 SCC 34, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842; R. v.Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456; Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458; Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E.,Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; Volvo Canada Ltd. v.

U.A.W., Local 720, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 178; Mason v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2019 FC 1251; Williams Lake IndianBand v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 83; Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502; May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3S.C.R. 809; Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Communications Workers of Canada, (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 115; Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5; Blencoe v.British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307; Suresh v.

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Willes, John A. The Ontario Labour Court: 1943-1944 . Kingston, Ont.: Industrial Relations Centre , Queen’s University, 1979. APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Stratas, Webb and Gleason JJ.A.), 2017 FCA 132 , [2018] 3 F.C.R. 75, 52 Imm. L.R. (4th) 1, 30 Admin. L.R. (6th) 1, [2017] F.C.J. No. 638 (QL), 2017 CarswellNat 2791 (WL Can.), setting aside a decision of Bell J., 2015 FC 960 , [2016] 2 F.C.R. 39, 38 Imm. L.R. (4th) 110, [2015] F.C.J. No. 981 (QL), 2015 CarswellNat 3740 (WL Can.). Appeal dismissed. Michael H. Morris , Marianne Zorić and John Provart , for the appellant.

Hadayt Nazami , Barbara Jackman and Sujith Xavier , for the respondent. Sara Blake and Judie Im , for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario. Stéphane Rochette , for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec. J. Gareth Morley and Katie Hamilton , for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia. Kyle McCreary and Johnna Van Parys , for the intervener the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. Jamie Liew , for the intervener the Canadian Council for Refugees. Karen Andrews , for the intervener the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario - Tenant Duty Counsel Program. Matthew Britton and Jennifer M.

Lynch , for the interveners the Ontario Securities Commission, the British Columbia Securities Commission and

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