R v CD, 2023 MBPC 65

CITATION: R v CD , 2023 MBPC 65 THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA Winnipeg Centre BETWEEN His Majesty the King ) ) L. Carson and M. Bodner for the Crown – and – ) ) C. D. (Young person) ) ) R. Gupta for the Young person/Applicant ) ) ) ) Decision delivered: November 30, 2023 RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION Pursuant to section 110(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act , no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act . C.A. DEVINE, P.J.

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The young person CD pleaded guilty (on April 4, 2023) to several offences that occurred over one year ago, including three serious offences: aggravated assault, September 29, 2022; robbery, October 18, 2022; and discharge firearm, October 20, 2022. His lawyer has brought an application alleging breaches of several of CD’s Charter rights (sections 7, 9, 10(

b) and 11(e)), arising after his arrest and up to the time of his bail application. Originally, he sought a Charter remedy in the form of a judicial stay, pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter , or a sentence reduction, alleging there is a systemic bail problem in Manitoba. The young person will be sentenced pursuant to an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, which is a treatment sentence provided for in subsections 42(2)(

r) and 42(7) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act ( YCJA ). The defence is no longer pursuing a stay of proceedings, because the treatment aspect of an IRCS sentence for CD would be highly beneficial to the young person, given his special needs including Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD).

A sentencing conference will occur on December 5, 2023 with his IRCS team and other collaterals involved in his case and his life. [ 2 ] Although defence counsel is no longer seeking the remedy of a stay of proceedings, he wishes the Court to determine and decide that a stay would be appropriate in this case. [ 3 ] He is also requesting a reduction in CD’s IRCS sentence. [ 4 ] The Crown is seeking a three-year IRCS sentence going forward, while the defence is seeking a two-year IRCS sentence going forward, in light of the Charter breach allegations and in light of the fact that CD has been in custody for some time. [ 5 ] CD has been in custody for over one year, since his arrest on October 20, 2022. [ 6 ] The Crown has conceded that CD’s right to reasonable bail protected by

section 11(

e) of the Charter was violated when his bail hearing did not occur within three clear days after his initial detention. [ 7 ] As for the other alleged Charter breaches, the Crown argues that there was no breach of CD’s

section 9 Charter rights or failure to comply with

section 503 of the Criminal Code , which requires that police take a person they have arrested before a justice within 24 hours or as soon as possible. The Crown has noted that

section 11(

e) of the Charter is broad enough to encompass the bail rights arising upon CD’s initial detention and right to be brought before a judge or judicial justice of the peace (JJP) within 24 hours. I agree, and so will be dealing with both aspects of the bail issues under

section 11(

e) of the Charter . [ 8 ] The Crown also argues that there was no breach of CD’s right to counsel protected by

section 10(

b) and, given that he has now pleaded guilty to the offences, the remedy of an exclusion of evidence, specifically his statement, is moot. At the same time, the Crown

recognizes that section 24(1) of the Charter is broad enough to allow for a remedy as a result of a

section 10(

b) breach. [9] The Crown has asked that I decline to determine or decide if a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter would be anappropriate remedy in this case, given that the defence is no longer seeking the remedy of a stay, on the basis that it is a moot issue. TheSupreme Court has been very clear that it is not beneficial or desirable for trial courts to determine moot issues, on the basis of judicialeconomy and restraint.

An important consequence of the abandonment of the remedy of a stay of proceedings is that all the evidence asto whether there was a systemic bail problem in Manitoba is now irrelevant. A stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy, meant to fixproblems going forward, not to right a past misconduct. [10] I am declining to determine the issue of whether a stay of proceedings would be an appropriate remedy on the basis that ismoot.

The doctrine of mootness provides that courts will only hear cases or decide issues that will have the effect of resolving a livecontroversy that will or may affect the rights of the parties. The doctrine was succinctly defined in Borowski v Canada (AttorneyGeneral), (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342: The doctrine of mootness is an aspect of a general policy or practice that a Court may decline to decide a case which raises merely ahypothetical or abstract question.

The general principle applies when the decision of the Court will not have the effect of resolving somecontroversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision of the Court will have no practical effect on such rights,the Court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commencedbut at the time when the Court is called upon to reach a decision.

Accordingly if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding,events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties,the case is said to be moot. The general policy or practice is enforced in moot cases unless the Court exercises its discretion to departfrom its policy or practice. (At para 15; emphasis added.) [11] The doctrine is not absolute; it allows discretion for courts to decide moot issues where it would be in the interest of justice.

The Supreme Court provided guidance for courts in determining whether to exercise their discretion to decide moot cases in Borowski.

Justice Sopinka for the Court set out three broad guidelines: (1) the presence of an adversarial context; (2) the concern for judicial economy; and (3) the need for the Court to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework. (as summarized in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Department of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 18) [12] Abandonment of the judicial stay remedy and the request to nonetheless decide if it would be appropriate did not arise until theapplicant’s oral argument after a protracted hearing involving the examination of several witnesses, filing of voluminous affidavitevidence, lengthy case briefs and books of authorities, an adjournment for the applicant to file an amended Notice of Application with anadditional Charter breach allegation of

section 10, and additional case briefs and books of authorities. [13] Because the issue of deciding the moot issue of a stay did not arise until oral argument, it was not addressed in any of thematerials filed. The Crown asked me to not decide the issue of the basis of judicial economy. In response, the defence argued thatbecause it involves a bail issue and bail decisions are often evasive of review, due to their temporary nature, I ought to decide it. Theapplicant referred to several cases in which moot issues regarding bail were decided by the Supreme Court, including R v Penunsi, 2019SCC 39.

Justice Rowe, writing for the Court, stated the following at paragraph 11: This Court has recently held in R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18 (S.C.C.) , and R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 250 (S.C.C.) , thatissues of judicial interim release can be evasive of review due to their temporary nature. Both the appellant and the respondent urge thisCourt to reconcile the divide in the jurisprudence on the issue central to this appeal despite the fact that the determination will have noimmediate impact on Mr. Penunsi.

I agree with the parties that this is an occasion where the significance of the issue and theinconsistency in the appellate jurisprudence merits the expenditure of resources to decide the moot issue (R. v. Smith, 2004 SCC 14,[2004] 1 S.C.R. 385 (S.C.C.) , at para. 50; Borowski ). (Emphasis added.) [14] The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to hear those matters in order to reconcile a divide in the jurisprudence because ofinconsistent appellate decisions on the issues. There is no inconsistency in the law on the issues raised by the applicant in this case.

The law with respect to the particular issues raised in this case, involving sections 503 and 516 of the Criminal Code and sections 10(b)and 11(

e) of the Charter are matters of settled law. [15] Moreover, the context in which the remedy of the stay has arisen is no longer adversarial. The applicant has abandoned aparticular remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter and the Crown agrees with defence that the most appropriate sentence for theyoung person will be an IRCS sentence. [16] My primary reason for not deciding the issue of whether a judicial stay would be appropriate in this case is on the basis ofjudicial economy. As long ago as 1989 when the Supreme Court declined to determine one of the issues raised in Borowski, Justice

Sopinka referred to the fact that judicial resources are scarce: It is an unfortunate reality that there is a need to ration scarce judicial resources among competing claimants. The fact that in this Court the number of live controversies in respect of which leave is granted is a small percentage of those that are refused is sufficient to highlight this observation. ( Borowski at para 34 ) [ 17 ] Unlike the Supreme Court of Canada, the Provincial Court of Manitoba does not have the ability to grant leave to hear only some matters and decline to hear other matters.

We must hear and decide all of the tens of thousands of Informations [1] that come before this court each year. [ 18 ] In that regard, more recently, although it was dealing with the issue of the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum sentence in R v Lloyd , 2016 SCC 13 , the Supreme Court reiterated that a provincial court judge should not decide issues that are not required of it: To be sure, it does not follow that a provincial court judge is obligated to consider the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum provision where it can have no impact on the sentence in the case at issue.

Judicial economy dictates that judges should not squander time and resources on matters they need not decide. (at para 18; emphasis added) [ 19 ] The issue of whether the section 24(1) Charter remedy of a stay of proceedings would otherwise be appropriate in this case will therefore not be decided. [ 20 ] That leaves the remaining issues of whether the young person’s sections 10(

b) and 11(

e) Charter rights were breached and if so, what remedy other than a stay of proceedings would be appropriate. There are two times frames involved. The first involves the period after CD was arrested and interviewed by the police and waiver of his right to appear before a justice within 24 hours, provided for in s. 503 of the Criminal Code . The second time period involves the delay past the three clear days time limit before he had his bail hearing, contrary to s. 516 of the Criminal Code , which as I indicated, the Crown concedes was a breach of his 11(

e) Charter right to reasonable bail. [ 21 ] Notwithstanding the lengthy case briefs and books of authorities filed in this matter, the facts alone are clearly dispositive of the issues. THE INITIAL PERIOD [ 22 ] CD was arrested by police at 4:51 a.m. on October 20, 2022 in Winnipeg. He was extremely intoxicated; a 13-ounce bottle of vodka, mostly consumed, was in his pocket, and a sawed-off rifle and improvised firing device (“zip gun”) and loose ammunition were in his possession. He had the smell of liquor on his breath, and glossy eyes. He resisted arrest and a taser had to be deployed.

Paramedics were called to the scene, examined him and medically cleared him. [ 23 ] At 5:01 a.m. when he was advised of his notice of arrest and right to counsel he answered that he wanted to speak with counsel. [ 24 ] He was transported to police headquarters (HQ) between 5:29 and 5:33 a.m. [ 25 ] He went through the sally port, viewing in, Prisoner Log Sheet, Central Processing Unit (CPU) and paramedic process and was taken into an interview room with recording capabilities. He was provided his right to counsel and other rights at 6:11 a.m. and requested to speak with a lawyer again when asked.

There was some confusion about the name of the lawyer, CD referring to him as Brohit, then Mr. Brohit, but police did some checking and advised him he had spoken to Rohit Gupta in the past. Police told him twice that he had a right to have his lawyer present and that he should tell Mr. Gupta if he wanted him present. He spoke with his lawyer Mr. Gupta between 6:32 and 6:38 a.m. [ 26 ] At 6:41 a.m., CPU advised the arresting officers that Mr.

Gupta wanted a call back after CD was given an opportunity to sleep and sober up. [ 27 ] At 6:46 a.m., the officers attempted to provide all requirements under the YCJA with CD, including advising him several times of his right to counsel, his right to have his counsel present and they also attempted to review the youth waiver form with him. At 6:50 a.m. the officer advised CD he could speak to his lawyer Mr. Gupta whenever he wished; he could knock on the door and they would call Mr. Gupta for him. The police had to abandon further interaction with CD at that point because he was falling asleep.

They let him sleep. [ 28 ] Hours later, after letting him sleep, different officers woke and spoke to CD. [ 29 ] They reviewed with him when he was arrested, when he came to police HQ, that he had spoken to Mr. Gupta, that police had received a call from CPU advising that Mr. Gupta wanted a call back when CD had sobered up, and that the officers in the morning had tried to go over the youth waiver form with him but that he was falling asleep. CD told officers he remembered speaking with Mr. Gupta and acknowledged that he was listening now. He said he felt alright after his sleep.

The officers provided his notice of arrest on several charges. They provided him his right to counsel, specifically Mr. Gupta, and told him that they would call Mr. Gupta and he would have an opportunity to speak with Mr. Gupta in private. He was provided his charge and caution. He was provided all the requirements set out

in

section 146 of the YCJA, including that he had a right to speak with a parent or other appropriate adult person in private and that if hespoke to his lawyer and a parent or other adult they would be present when he spoke to the police unless he did not want them there. Atall stages officers explained the rights in terms CD could understand and they made sure he understood them, by getting him to repeat ortell them what he understood them to mean. [30] When asked, CD said he wanted to speak to a lawyer, the same one as before. Officers confirmed it was Mr. Gupta. They triedcalling Mr.

Gupta, left a message and advised CD. They came back and had Mr. Gupta on the phone. CD said he just wanted to sleep. Police tried to ascertain why he was saying he did not want to speak with a lawyer and make sure he understood his call with a lawyerwould be in private. He clarified with officers he did not say he did not want to talk to his lawyer “anymore”, just that he did not want totalk to him at that time because he was so tired. Police asked if he wanted Mr. Gupta present and after equivocating, he said he did.

Thepolice went through all the questions again, including questions about calling and having a parent present, which he declined. AlthoughCD was asking police questions about his jeopardy, they explained that they would not discuss any of that with him until he spoke to hislawyer. They confirmed that he did not want to speak with Mr. Gupta on the phone, but wanted him present. [31] The officers got Mr. Gupta on the phone again. They advised CD that Mr. Gupta wanted to talk to him. They spoke. CD didnot know if Mr. Gupta may have hung up first. He said Mr.

Gupta was coming to police headquarters. [32] The officer then spoke to Mr. Gupta and then advised CD that Mr. Gupta said he was not coming. Police asked CD if hewanted them to call any other lawyer or Legal Aid to see if they could come. He said no. [33] Between 3:11 p.m. and 10:02 p.m. officers interviewed him. [34] He was turned over to CPU at 10:08 p.m. (October 20) and slept from 10:15 to 11:08 p.m. He was taken to Identification Unit.

He slept again, until 1:00 a.m. [35] The police were opposed to CD’s release and advised the on-duty “Detention” Crown, who then contacted Legal Aid dutycounsel, David Walker. [36] CD spoke to Mr. Walker in private at 1:15 a.m. and after that Mr. Walker advised the Crown that CD would not be seeking abail hearing before a JJP that night and would have his first bail appearance at the 2:00 p.m. bail court at Manitoba Youth Centre (MYC)before a judge that day. [37] Defence counsel argues that during this time frame CD’s right to counsel was breached. [38] I find that there is no breach of

section 10(

b) of the Charter in those circumstances. CD was provided with his informationalright to counsel immediately upon his arrest. In the time between being told of his right to counsel and having that right implemented, hewas being transported and processed and seen by a paramedic, and police had to clarify and look up who his lawyer was. This was areasonable period of time in those circumstances. Then he spoke with his lawyer. In the ensuing period, he spoke with Mr. Gupta twiceand a third time declined to speak with Mr. Gupta. Mr. Gupta spoke to police at least three times. CD wanted Mr.

Gupta to attend and itwas only after his lawyer advised police that he could not attend that police offered to contact another lawyer or Legal Aid for him andCD declined.

It was not through any lack of diligence on the part of police that CD eventually talked to a Legal Aid lawyer. [39] Defence also argued that there was a violation of CD’s bail rights at that juncture, arguing that he was not brought before ajustice without unreasonable delay (and within 24 hours), that police delayed matters precluding his appearance before a justice, and thatthere was not a valid waiver of his right to be brought before a justice.

He argues that CD was essentially “funnelled” to on-call LegalAid duty counsel who pre-emptively waived his appearance before a justice. [40] I will deal first with the constitutional requirement on police to take an accused person before a justice without unreasonabledelay and in any event, within 24 hours, if a justice is available, required by

section 503 of the Criminal Code and protected by section11(

e) of the Charter. [41] JJPs are available between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. as well as on an emergency basis outside these hours. In this case, clearlythe police did not initiate a potential JJP hearing before 10:00 p.m. The applicant argued that the police unreasonably delayed mattersand thereby precluded taking CD before a JJP while a JJP was available. [42] There were several factors justifying the elapsed time before the police were in a position to take CD before a justice.

First, CDrequired immediate medical attention at the time of his arrest because he was resisting arrest and combative, requiring police use of force(4:51 a.m. to 5:29 a.m.). Second, he was intoxicated and required several hours to sleep and sober up before he could be interviewed(6:48 a.m. and approximately 3:00 p.m.). Third, the police interview occurred between 3:11 and 10:02 p.m. It is recognized that policehave the authority to continue their investigation after a lawful arrest, including attempting to elicit a confession (R v Storrey, (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 241; and R v CK, 2005 ONCJ 462 at paras 36, 37, 42).

After that, he was processed in theIdentification Unit and then slept. I find that any delay in this case was reasonable, given the circumstances. [43] There is a detention review process in place, which was followed in this case. Police determined they were opposed toreleasing the young person on an appearance notice or undertaking. Accordingly, they sent over the court package to the detentionreview Crown to review their decision.

There is a detention review Crown attorney in place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to reviewpolice detention. [44] In this case, at 12:50 a.m., within one hour after all the required procedural elements of the investigation were complete, policeadvised the Crown attorney that they were opposed to the young person’s release. [45] The Crown attorney reviewed the court package and determined that the Crown was also opposed to his release.

At 1:02 a.m.,the Crown attorney forwarded a copy of the warrant, arrest report, and criminal record to Legal Aid duty counsel along with the reasonsthat the Crown was opposed to CD’s release.

[ 46 ] The process in place provides that Legal Aid duty counsel will speak with the accused person and refer them to their own lawyer or other private bar counsel if that is their request or obtain instructions from the accused, namely whether they wish to appear before a JJP or waive their appearance to apply for judicial interim release before the JJP or a judge. [ 47 ] At 1:15 a.m., CD spoke with Legal Aid duty counsel Mr.

Walker. [ 48 ] There is no information from that lawyer or the applicant as to what transpired during that call. [ 49 ] But after that call at 1:17 a.m., the Legal Aid duty counsel wrote to the detention review Crown advising that CD was waiving his appearance before a JJP and would appear before a judge at 2:00 p.m. at MYC, where the daily youth bail court is held. [ 50 ] The detention review Crown then advised the police and had the charges remanded to MYC for 2:00 p.m. This all occurred in under 22 hours. [ 51 ] CD’s charges appeared on that docket, along with the matters of four other young persons.

He was transported to the MYC that afternoon. [ 52 ] In light of the circumstances preceding this, where CD and police had spoken to Mr. Gupta several times, I am unable to find any violation of his right to reasonable bail at that juncture. CD was a young person who had a record and previously had Mr. Gupta as his lawyer, which the police learned by assisting in implementing his Charter s. 10(

b) right. Mr. Gupta would have been well-aware of the several charges at that point, which were even more numerous and serious than the number to which guilty pleas have now been entered. Mr. Gupta would have had every opportunity to communicate with his client and the police at any point during this period about being brought before the JJP or requiring the Crown to justify detention at a bail hearing before the JJP if that was what he advised his client and his client instructed him to do. [ 53 ] Instead, it is clear that the young person waived his right to be brought before a JJP.

He was represented by legal counsel who communicated that waiver to the Crown. [ 54 ] I infer from these facts that CD did not instruct Legal Aid duty counsel to call Mr. Gupta.

He chose to communicate his waiver to that lawyer and in turn that lawyer communicated it to the Crown. [ 55 ] Realistically, it is hard to imagine anyone running a bail hearing at that juncture, involving 29 charges from three separate offence dates including: aggravated assault, break and enter and assault with weapon, robbery with a firearm, discharge firearm with intent to endanger life, pointing a prohibited, sawed-off rifle at someone, in breach of two weapons prohibition orders, two counts of discharging a prohibited firearm into a building, possession of a prohibited, sawed off rifle with ammunition readily accessible, and possession of prohibited handgun with ammunition readily accessible.

In addition, there were several breaches of undertakings, including curfew breaches. [ 56 ] If it was the intent of counsel to run a bail, he would have advised police. [ 57 ] There are no breaches of CD’s sections 10(

b) or 11(

e) Charter rights during this initial period of his detention. [ 58 ] CD first appeared in court at MYC that afternoon for the 2:00 p.m. bail docket. The next period of his detention runs from this time to 10 days later when CD had his bail hearing. As indicated, the Crown has conceded that there was a violation of Criminal Code

section 516 and a breach of his

section 11(

e) Charter right during that period. THE “SPECIAL BAIL” PERIOD [ 59 ] Because CD was facing several serious charges (29 charges in total) from three separate offence dates, it was quickly determined by Crown counsel that a “special” bail would be required.

Contested bail hearings that are expected to be longer than 30 minutes are not usually heard on the regular bail docket, but rather, are scheduled, to ensure sufficient time is allotted to them, unless permission is granted by the sitting judge. [ 60 ] Section 516(1) of the Criminal Code (which applies to youth matters as well) requires that an accused person’s charges may not be remanded beyond three clear days without their consent.

I accept the Crown’s argument with respect to the meaning to be applied to “clear days” and applied in this case. “Clear days” do not include the day the person’s charges appear in court and the day of the bail application, nor do they include holidays, which include Sundays. [ 61 ] In this case, CD’s charges first appeared in youth court on a Friday, October 21. His charges were remanded to Monday, October 24, which constitutes one clear day. He remained in custody until the following Monday, October 31, which represents six clear days (Monday to Saturday).

He therefore spent four clear days in custody longer than permitted by the Criminal Code prior to his bail hearing on Monday, October 31. [ 62 ] It was conceded by the Crown that the Court was unable to hear the matter until October 31. It is recognized that insufficient resources cannot justify a remand beyond three clear days. [ 63 ] During this period, there was communication between the Crown, defence and court office and appearances in court.

On October 21 after 2:00 p.m., email correspondence shows that the Crown wanted a special sitting bail, the Crown believed it would be half a day, and the court website showed the first available date was October 31. [ 64 ] In bail court on October 21, defence counsel waived CD’s appearance before the judge. He advised that he was seeking disclosure from the federal Crown on pending charges that pre-existed the charges for which CD had just been arrested. Defence noted that the Crown had advised him they would be requesting a special sitting for his contested bail hearing, due to its expected length.

Defence requested that the judge remand the matter to October 24 or 25, to arrange for a special sitting and for him to receive disclosure.

The judge remanded the matter to October 24, with a waived appearance of CD, because it would be only to set the special sitting date,unless the defence advised the Crown otherwise. There were four other young people appearing in bail court that day, and there was onecontested bail application heard. [65] On October 24 at the 2:00 p.m. bail court, defence waived CD’s appearance. He told the judge the special sitting bail wasOctober 31, but he had not obtained a confirming email from the Youth Disposition Coordinator. The request was not made until 2:31p.m. on October 24.

The date of October 31 was still available and was booked. [66] On October 31 the special bail hearing proceeded. It was over two hours long. The youth court judge allowed the Crown’sapplication for CD’s continued detention, refusing him bail. [67] There was a breach of CD’s right to reasonable bail when his bail hearing did not take place for four clear days after the timepermitted by the Criminal Code. REMEDY [68] As indicated at the beginning of this decision, the applicant has abandoned the remedy of a stay of proceedings pursuant toCharter section 24(1). [69] He is seeking a sentence reduction.

The Crown argues that judicial condemnation by way of declaratory relief can be apowerful tool to effect change. Indeed, evidence filed and testified to by Crown witnesses in this application show that improvementshave been made to the youth court to address delays where special sitting bails are required. [70] It is important to note that the protocol for longer bail hearings cannot be seen as the reason for this or other violations.

TheOntario Court of Appeal rejected this argument in a similar case where the accused made such an argument: No case is an island to be treated as if it were the only case with a legitimate demand on court resources. The system cannot revolvearound any one case, but must try to accommodate the needs of all cases. When a case requires additional court resources the systemcannot be expected to push other cases to the side and instantaneously provide those additional resources. (R v Allen, (ON CA), [1996] OJ No 3175, at para 27.) [71] I will consider a measured sentence reduction at the time of sentencing.

Because CD’s sentence will be an IRCS sentence, it isnot possible at this time to simply subtract some period of time from the three-year maximum which the Crown is seeking. In that way,it is different from providing the remedy of a sentence reduction where a regular type of custodial sentence is imposed. An IRCSsentence is a treatment plan, the result of a complex and individualized therapeutic, rehabilitative and reintegrative plan formulated bythe IRCS treatment team and agreed to by the Crown and defence or ultimately, by the judge.

There is a sentencing conference involvingthe treatment team and other collaterals, as well as Corrections, the Crown, defence and the judge on December 5. At that time, the planwill be fully discussed. Following that, I will hear further from Crown and defence as to whether it is possible to reduce the length of theIRCS sentence to provide a remedy for this breach. Original signed by Judge Devine C.A. DEVINE, P.J.