2012 QCCA 2066, 2012 QCCA 2066

Droit de la famille — 123278 2012 QCCA 2066 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC REGISTRY OF MONTRÉAL N o : 500-09-022488-126 (500-04-045599-074) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: November 16, 2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE ANDRÉ ROCHON, J.A. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE , J.A. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. APPELLANT ATTORNEY L. K. Mtre Robert Brankin RESPONDENT ATTORNEY N. E. Mtre Stéphane Poulin IMPLEADED PARTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY OF QUEBEC Mtre Amal Saleh DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES AFF. JUR. ET LÉGIS.

On appeal from a judgment rendered on February 29 th 2012 by the Honourable Justice Marc St-Pierre of the Superior Court, district of Montreal. NATURE OF THE APPEAL : Child support – Access rights Clerk: Linda Chau Courtroom: Pierre-Basile-Mignault HEARING Following of the hearing of November 15th, 2012. Judgment – See page 3. Linda Chau Clerk BY THE COURT JUDGMENT

[ 1 ] The parties are the parents of a five-year-old child. On November 13, 2007, they agreed that custody of this child would be granted to the mother, with access rights to the respondent, who would pay child support in the amount of $4,310 per year ($359.17 per month). This agreement was approved by the Superior Court on November 14, 2007. [ 2 ] The respondent apparently showed little interest in his child, whom he has not seen since late 2008 or early 2009.

At trial, he testified that the appellant was interfering with his access rights, but this explanation is undermined by proof of his lack of any serious efforts to re-establish contact with the child in the last four years (even though we now know that there would have been opposition from the appellant, who does not think that the respondent is a good role model). [ 3 ] In addition, the respondent, who was gainfully employed at the time of the signing of the agreement, was laid off in 2008 and has remained unemployed ever since.

He received financial assistance under the Individual and Family Assistance Act , R.S.Q., c. A- 13.1.1, since September 2009, except for a short period of time in 2010-2011, during which he went back to school in order to improve his employment perspectives.

The consequence of this unfortunate financial situation is that after 2008, he was basically unable to pay any child support to the appellant (although he volunteered some payments in 2009, 2010 and 2011, through the collector of support payments ), which reinforced the appellant's impression that he is not interested in their child. [ 4 ] In May 2011, the respondent filed a motion to annul the child support order of 2007 for the future, to cancel all arrears and to determine new access rights to the child.

The appellant, needless to say, contested the motion. [ 5 ] On February 29, 2012, the trial judge rendered the following judgment : Sur la demande d'annulation de la pension alimentaire et des arrérages : VU que le défendeur ne gagne plus depuis septembre 2008 un revenu équivalent au revenu minimum pour payer une pension alimentaire selon les règles de fixation de pension alimentaire pour enfants; CONSIDÉRANT toutefois que le défendeur n'était pas dans l'impossibilité d'agir depuis cette date jusqu'à l'institution des procédures en annulation; VU d'autre

part la convention intervenue le 29 février 2012 entre la demanderesse, le défendeur et le procureur général du Québec mis en cause que les parties demandent au Tribunal d'entériner; Sur la demande du défendeur de droits d'accès : CONSIDÉRANT que le défendeur n'a pas vu son fils depuis novembre 2008 ou février 2009; CONSIDÉRANT aussi qu'il n'a pas fait d'efforts sérieux pour reprendre contact avec lui depuis; CONSIDÉRANT le témoignage de la demanderesse à l'effet que l'enfant ne manifeste aucun intérêt pour son père; VU toutefois que le refus d'accorder au défendeur des droits d'accès ne pourrait résulter en l'absence d'une preuve de comportement pouvant compromettre le développement de l'enfant que d'un constat d'abandon par lui qu'il est prématuré de considérer; CONSIDÉRANT également l'intérêt de tout enfant de développer les liens les plus significatifs possible avec ses deux parents en l'absence de contre-indication majeure; POUR CES MOTIFS, LE TRIBUNAL : ACCUEILLE en

partie la requête du défendeur; ANNULE rétroactivement au 30 novembre 2010 la pension alimentaire payable par le défendeur à la demanderesse au bénéfice de leur enfant déterminée dans la convention des 10 et 13 novembre 2007 entérinée par la greffière spéciale le 14 novembre 2007; ENTÉRINE la convention intervenue entre la demanderesse, le défendeur et le Procureur général du Québec le 29 février 2012 et ORDONNE aux parties de se conformer aux engagements y souscrits; MODIFIE la convention entérinée le 14 novembre 2007 par la greffière spéciale valant jugement de cette Cour en ce qui concerne les droits d'accès du défendeur à son fils X de façon à ce qu'il obtienne dorénavant les accès suivants à son fils : - quatre (4) heures, une (1) fois par deux semaines le samedi de 11 heures à 15 heures, à compter du 10 mars 2012, pour trois mois; - de 9 heures à 17 heures un (1) samedi sur deux, à compter du 9 juin 2012, pour trois mois; - de 9 heures le samedi au dimanche 17 heures, une (1) fin de semaine sur deux, à compter des 8 et 9 septembre 2012, par la suite; avec droit de sortie, l'échange s'effectuant à la résidence de la demanderesse; LE TOUT, sans frais.

[6] The appellant seeks to reverse all the findings of the trial judge, to re-establish the child support and to cancel all access rights ofthe respondent. [7] It should be noted that the appellant did not permit the exercise of the respondent's access rights pending the appeal, since shewas under the impression, says her lawyer, that the judgment of the Superior Court, having been appealed, was without force (contrary toart. 547 C.C.P., which provides for the provisional execution of such orders).

The appellant's lawyer also conceded that, had his clientknown of art. 547, she would have opposed any exercise of the respondent's access rights during the appeal. [8] The appellant argues that child support should not have been cancelled since the respondent, who is well-qualified, has not madeany effort to find employment and is actually trying to evade his responsibilities towards his child.

In addition, the judge should not havecancelled the child support retroactively to November 30, 2010 (i.e. six months before the date of the filing of the respondent's motion,pursuant to art. 596 C.C.Q.) because it entails that the appellant will have to reimburse the collector of support payments for part of theamount received in 2010-2011.

The judge should also have ordered the respondent to inform the appellant of any change in his financialsituation or work situation. [9] As far as access rights are concerned, the appellant argues that they should not have been re-established : the respondent is acomplete stranger to his child, and the latter does not need the former. He is developing well in the absence of such a poor father figure,and would be traumatized if the respondent, after having re-established contact, were to disappear again from his life.

The appellantsuggests that all access rights should be suspended until the respondent changes his ways and acts as a responsible father, to hersatisfaction.

According to the appellant, she has been the sole parental figure known to the child since his birth and she is well-placed toevaluate his best interest. * * [10] The appeal must fail, except on matters of detail on which the parties appear to agree. * * [11] In Droit de la famille — 10342[1], the Court explained the role of a court of appeal in matters of child support and custody oraccess rights and wrote that : [8] The appellant seems to have brought his case under the false belief that our Court could consider facts that were not put asevidence in first instance, or review those which were, in order to decide anew upon the Court’s own findings.

Unfortunately, this is notthe Court's role. Speaking for the unanimous Supreme Court, Bastarache J. wrote in Van de Perre v. Edwards [renvoi omis]: 11 In reviewing the decisions of trial judges in all cases, including family law cases involving custody, it is important that the appellatecourt remind itself of the narrow scope of appellate review. L'Heureux-Dubé J. stated in Hickey v. Hickey, (SCC),[1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, at paras. 10 and 12: [Trial judges] must balance the objectives and factors set out in the Divorce Act or in provincial support statutes with anappreciation of the particular facts of the case.

It is a difficult but important determination, which is critical to the lives of the parties andto their children. Because of its fact-based and discretionary nature, trial judges must be given considerable deference by appellate courtswhen such decisions are reviewed. […] There are strong reasons for the significant deference that must be given to trial judges in relation to support orders. This standard ofappellate review recognizes that the discretion involved in making a support order is best exercised by the judge who has heard theparties directly.

It avoids giving parties an incentive to appeal judgments and incur added expenses in the hope that the appeal court willhave a different appreciation of the relevant factors and evidence. This approach promotes finality in family law litigation and recognizesthe importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial judge.

Though an appeal court must intervene when there is a material error, aserious misapprehension of the evidence, or an error in law, it is not entitled to overturn a support order simply because it would havemade a different decision or balanced the factors differently. [Emphasis added.] 12 Hickey involved the appellate review of support orders, but the principles related to appellate review discussed therein are equallyapplicable to orders concerning child custody. In the case at bar, no palpable and overriding error justify our Court to review the judgesfindings and conclusions. […] See also: V.F. c.

T.D., 2005 QCCA 907, J.E. 2005-1847, para. 3 and ff.; K. J. v.

N.P., 2006 QCCA 1054, [2006] R.J.Q. 2023, para. 39;Droit de la famille — 111373, 2011 QCCA 889, J.E. 2011-925, para. 6-10. [12] In the present case, the appellant seeks a re-trial of all the issues that were before the trial judge, but fails to establish theexistence of a palpable and overriding error in the latter's findings of fact or in the exercise of his discretionary power to adjudicate thematters before him. [13] The respondent is without means to pay any child support and, as unfortunate as this situation is, the trial judge had no choice butto cancel support payments for the future.

Of course, as soon as the appellant will be financially able to pay child support, he will have toinform the appellant. Although the judge did not order him to do so, which might have been a reasonable precautionary measure in thecircumstances, the respondent must now comply with

article 596.1 C.C.Q., in force as of June 15, 2012:

596.1. Afin de maintenir à jour la valeur des aliments dus à leur enfant, les parents doivent, à la demande de l'un d'eux et au plus une fois l'an, ou selon les modalités fixées par le tribunal, se tenir mutuellement informés de l'état de leurs revenus respectifs et fournir, à cette fin, les documents prescrits par les règles de fixation des pensions alimentaires pour enfants édictées en application du Code de procédure civile (chapitre C-25 ).

L'inexécution de cette obligation par l'un des parents confère à l'autre le droit de demander, outre l'exécution en nature et les dépens, des dommages-intérêts en réparation du préjudice qu'il a subi, notamment pour compenser les honoraires et débours extrajudiciaires qu'il a engagés. 596.1.

In order to update the amount of support payable to their child, parents must, on the request of one of them and no more than once a year, or as required by the court, keep each other mutually informed of the state of their respective incomes and provide, to that end, the documents determined by the rules for the determination of child support payments adopted under the Code of Civil Procedure (chapter C-25 ).

Failure by one parent to fulfill that obligation confers on the other parent the right to demand, in addition to the specific performance of the obligation and payment of the costs, damages in reparation for the prejudice suffered, including the professional fees and extrajudicial costs incurred. [ 14 ] An order to that effect, enforceable against both parties [2] , will appear in the conclusions of the present judgment. [ 15 ] As far as the retroactive cancellation of the child support is concerned, the parties agree that, in order to avoid burdening the appellant with the obligation to reimburse the collector, the judge should have cancelled the last six months of arrears, instead of cancelling the child support per se .

The Court will modify the Superior Court order accordingly, since there is no reason why the child should retroactively lose the alimony that was willingly paid by his father. [ 16 ] As far as access rights are concerned, the situation, admittedly, is delicate. Certainly, the appellant's reluctance and her lack of trust in the respondent is understandable, but, considering the evidence and the nature of the motion before the Superior Court, this Court, in accordance with the trial judge's finding, cannot conclude that depriving the child of any contact with his father would be in his best interest.

Nor can the Court conclude that the appellant be the sole judge of the child's best interest, as she would have it. [ 17 ] Considering, however, that the child has not seen his father in almost four years and considering that the appellant will have to prepare him for the reappearance of his father in his life, the trial judge order will also be modified in order to provide for a longer transition period. [ 18 ] The Court is keenly aware of the difficult path that lies ahead for the parents and their child, but hopes that, in the best interest of the latter, the former will act in a manner that will enable the establishment of a solid father-son relationship. [ 19 ] FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT : [ 20 ] GRANTS the appeal, in part; [ 21 ] REPLACES the second conclusion of the judgment of the Superior Court by the following : ANNULE rétroactivement au 30 novembre 2010, les arrérages de la pension alimentaire dus par le défendeur à la demanderesse au bénéfice de leur enfant déterminée dans la convention des 10 et 13 novembre 2007 et entérinée par la greffière spéciale le 14 novembre 2007, et, pour plus de certitude, DÉCLARE que tous les montants payés par le défendeur à

titre de pension alimentaire pour l'enfant avant ou après le 30 novembre 2010 demeurent à l'acquit de l'enfant; [ 22 ] MODIFIES in the following manner the fourth conclusion of the judgment of the Superior Court : MODIFIE la convention entérinée le 14 novembre 2007 par la greffière spéciale valant jugement de cette Cour en ce qui concerne les droits d'accès du défendeur à son fils X de façon à ce qu'il obtienne dorénavant les accès suivants à son fils : - deux (2) heures, une (1) fois par deux (2) semaines, le samedi, de 11 heures à 13 heures, à compter du samedi 1 er décembre 2012, en présence de la demanderesse et dans un endroit public choisi par celle-ci dans le voisinage de son domicile (par exemple : un restaurant); - deux (2) heures, une fois par deux (2) semaines, le samedi, de 11 heures à 13 heures, à compter du samedi 9 février 2013; - quatre (4) heures, une fois par deux (2) semaines, le samedi, de 11 heures à 15 heures, à compter du samedi 20 avril 2013 et jusqu'au samedi 27 juillet inclusivement; - de 9 heures à 17 heures, un (1) samedi sur deux, à compter du 10 août 2013 et jusqu'au samedi 2 novembre 2013 inclusivement; - de 9 heures le samedi au dimanche 17 heures, une(1) fin de semaine sur deux, à compter du samedi 16 novembre 2013 et par la suite. - à tout autre moment dont les parties pourront convenir.

Le défendeur aura l'obligation d'aller chercher et de ramener l'enfant au domicile de la demanderesse ou à l'endroit désigné par celle-ci

(dans ce dernier cas, pour les droits d'accès exercés du 1 er décembre 2012 au 26 janvier 2013 inclusivement). [ 23 ] REMINDS the parties of the following paragraph of their agreement of November 2007 : 4. Les parents reconnaissent qu'il est dans l'intérêt de l'enfant qu'il puisse voir ses deux parents et que les liens existants entre eux soient préservés et renforcés.

À cet égard, aucun des deux parents ne tentera de diminuer l'affection de l'enfant envers l'autre parent mais encouragera plutôt son développement, Chacun devra en tout temps faciliter à l'autre l'exercice de la garde. [ 24 ] ORDERS the respondent, at the latest on June 15 of every year, to provide the appellant with a copy of his federal and provincial income tax returns, and ORDERS the respondent to provide the appellant with a copy of his federal notices of assessment, within 30 days of their reception; [ 25 ] ORDERS the appellant, at the latest on June 15 of every year, to provide the respondent with a copy of her federal and provincial income tax returns, and ORDERS the appellant to provide the respondent with a copy of his federal notices of assessment, within 30 days of their reception; [ 26 ] The whole without costs.

ANDRÉ ROCHON, J.A. YVES-MARIE MORISSETTE, J.A. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.