2011 NBCA 8, 2011 NBCA 8

COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK 120-10-CA 121-10-CA RODNEY TINGLEY, ROGER TINGLEY, MICHAEL TINGLEY and CHRISTOPHER TINGLEY (Respondents on the Motion) APPELLANTS RODNEY TINGLEY, ROGER TINGLEY, MICHAEL TINGLEY et CHRISTOPHER TINGLEY (Intimés dans la motion) APPELANTS - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Applicant on the Motion) RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE (Auteure de la motion) INTIMÉE Tingley et al. v. R., 2011 NBCA 8 Tingley et autres c.

R., 2011 NBCA 8 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Deschênes The Honourable Justice Richard The Honourable Justice Quigg CORAM : L’hon orable juge Deschênes L’honorable juge Richard L’honorable juge Quigg Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: September 9, 2010 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : Le 9 septembre 2010 History of case: Decision under appeal: Unreported Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : Inédite Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : S.O. Motion heard : November 9, 2010 Motion entendue : Le 9 novembre 2010

Decision on motion rendered: January 27, 2011 Décision sur la motion rendue : Le 27 janvier 2011 Counsel at hearing: For the appellants: Alison Ménard for Rodney Tingley Graham Sleeth, Q.C. for Roger Tingley David LeBlanc for Michael Tingley Brian Munro for Christopher Tingley For the respondent: Kathryn Gregory and Michel Bertrand Avocats à l’audience : Pour les appelants : Alison Ménard, pour Rodney Tingley Graham J.

Sleeth, c.r., pour Roger Tingley David LeBlanc, pour Michael Tingley Brian Munro, pour Christopher Tingley Pour l’intimée : Kathryn Gregory et Michel Bertrand THE COURT The appeals are adjourned to a dateto be set by the Chief Justice oncethe trial in the underlying criminalmatter has concluded. Thetranscripts or other documentsreproduced for the purposes of anappeal must be sealed and notprovided to anyone but the Court ofAppeal. LA COUR L’audition des appels est reportée à une date qui serafixée par le juge en chef une fois terminé le procès dansl’affaire criminelle sous-jacente.

Les transcriptions ouautres documents reproduits aux fins d’un appel serontscellés et ne seront fournis à personne d’autre qu’à laCour d’appel. The following is the judgment delivered by THE COURT [1] There are sound public policy reasons underlying the rule against interlocutory appeals in criminal matters(see R. v. Mills, (SCC), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL)).

Nonetheless, s. 37.1(1) of the CanadaEvidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-5, provides a right of appeal if a judge, pursuant to s. 37, either orders the disclosure of certain informationor prohibits disclosure on the grounds of a specified public interest. In the case at bar, the accused bring two s. 37.1(1) notices of appealregarding the oral and written decisions of a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, who, pursuant to s. 37, prohibited disclosure ofinformation on the grounds of informer privilege. The accused wish their appeals heard before their trial begins.

However, the AttorneyGeneral, by Notice of Motion, applies for an adjournment of the appeals until the conclusion of the trial. The Attorney General alsoseeks a direction that any evidence, which the Court of Queen’s Bench ordered be sealed, not be disclosed to anyone other than the Courtof Appeal. [2] According to the Attorney General, only in cases where the judge orders disclosure should an appeal under s.

37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act be allowed to proceed before trial. The rationale in support of this argument is that, if an interlocutory appeal is not allowed in such a situation, the matter will become moot once the disclosure is actually made. Evidently, no similar jeopardy exists in cases where disclosure is denied. [ 3 ] Several cases are cited in support of the Attorney General’s position: R. v. Archer , 1989 ABCA 38 , [1989] A.J. No. 131 (QL) , R. v. McCullough , 2000 SKCA 147 , [2000] S.J. No. 775 (QL) , Minisini c. R. , 2008 QCCA 264 , [2008] J.Q. No. 785 (QL) , and Canuel c.

R. , 2008 QCCA 1007 , [2008] J.Q. No. 4793 (QL) . [ 4 ] In all these cases, the Courts opined that the proper procedure under s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act , where the appeal is brought against a refusal to make a disclosure order, is that, absent exceptional circumstances, the trial should proceed. If the accused is acquitted, the appeal is moot. If the accused is convicted, the appeal can then be heard. [ 5 ] Only one of the accused challenged the approach of the Alberta, Saskatchewan and Quebec Courts of appeal.

All the other accused, in their response to the Attorney General’s motion, argued that this case presents exceptional circumstances. [ 6 ] In our view, the approach of the Alberta, Saskatchewan and Quebec Courts of appeal is sound and should be followed. While s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act provides for a right of appeal, it does not direct that the appeal should be heard immediately. There are sound public policy reasons underlying the rule against interlocutory appeals in criminal matters and these certainly apply in the present case.

Absent exceptional circumstances, the proper procedure, as stated in all the above-mentioned cases, is to wait until the conclusion of the trial to hear the appeal, in case the issue becomes moot. [ 7 ] None of the cases define exceptional circumstances. Courts are generally reluctant to do so because circumstances often vary greatly from case to case.

In the present case, the accused argue that exceptional circumstances are found in the fact that the trier of fact has not yet started hearing evidence, that the s. 37 proceeding under the Canada Evidence Act involved several days of ex parte hearings, and that a massive amount of information was not disclosed.

In our respectful view, none of these facts, taken individually or collectively, negate the public policy rationale that underlies either the approach now taken by four of this country’s appellate courts regarding appeals pursuant to s. 37.1, or the general rule that interlocutory appeals in criminal matters are undesirable. [8] For these reasons, the appeals are adjourned to a date to be set by the Chief Justice once the trial in the underlying criminal matter has concluded.

As for the Attorney General’s request for a direction that evidence reproduced for appeal purposes not be disclosed to anyone other than the Court of Appeal, the accused voiced no objection. A direction of this type would appear to us to be unnecessary, for it follows that if the Court of Queen’s Bench heard evidence ex parte or refused to order the disclosure of certain documents, the transcripts or other documents reproduced for the purposes of an appeal must be sealed and not provided to anyone but the Court of Appeal.

To the extent any direction is necessary, we so direct. ______________________________ ALEXANDRE DESCHÊNES, J.A.

______________________________ J.C. MARC RICHARD, J.A. _______________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A.