2019 QCCA 960, 2019 QCCA 960

Amoriggi c. St. Clair 2019 QCCA 960 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No.: 500-09-027063-171 (500-17-083622-145) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: May 31, 2019 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH , J.A. MANON SAVARD , J.A. JOCELYN F. RANCOURT , J.A. APPELLANT COUNSEL HELEN AMORIGGI Mtre JAMIE BENIZRI Mtre ZOË ALEXANDRA FORTIN (Legal Logik inc.) RESPONDENTS COUNSEL RALF ST. CLAIR MCGILL UNIVERSITY Mtre ANDRÉ SASSEVILLE M tre KATHLEEN HOULIHAN (Langlois Lawyers LLP)

On appeal from a judgment rendered on August 24 th , 2017 by the Honourable Mr. Justice David R. Collier of the Superior Court, District of Montreal. DESCRIPTION : Labour Law – Contract of Employment – Dismissal – Contract for an Indeterminate Term Clerk: Philippe Charette Courtroom: Antonio-Lamer HEARING 9:30 Continuation of the hearing held on May 28, 2019. Counsel’s attendance is not mandatory. BY THE COURT : Judgment – see page 3. Conclusion of the hearing.

Philippe Charette Clerk BY THE COURT JUDGMENT [ 1 ] After an 8-day trial, the judge of the Superior Court dismissed the appellant’s action for damages for wrongful dismissal. He concluded that the respondent had discharged his burden to establish a just and sufficient cause for the appellant’s termination.

His findings may be summarized as follows: - The appellant knew the standards of performance expected from tenured professors; - The appellant’s performance in research and teaching (which were at the core of her functions) had been substandard for many years, compared with that of the other professors in the same department, a situation of which she could not have been unaware;

- In the circumstances, the appellant was given sufficient assistance in order to correct the situation and, as a tenured professor, had all the necessary latitude to fulfill the requirements of her position; - The appellant was warned and knew of the consequences that would ensue if her performance did not improve or showed signs that it would likely improve in the short or medium term, despite which her performance continued to decline or, at the very least, did not show any progress; - The employer acted in good faith throughout the whole process. [ 2 ] The appellant offers numerous grounds of appeal against this judgment, all of which raise only questions of fact.

In essence, she asks the Court to review and reassess the evidence and come to a conclusion that would differ from that of the trial judge. [ 3 ] In a recent case, the Court wrote that: [11] Both the Supreme Court of Canada and this Court have often explained that an appeal is not a new trial, meaning the occasion to conduct a de novo analysis and a re-evaluation of the evidence already examined and assessed by the trial judge, whose fact-finding mission is at the core of our judicial system.

Thus, as far as findings of fact are concerned, an appellate court may intervene only if there is a palpable and overriding (i.e. obvious, patent) error in the trial judge’s decision, an error which may figuratively be defined as one that “is in the nature not of a needle in a haystack, but of a beam in the eye.” As my colleague Morissette explained at length in Nadeau : [75] Les erreurs dans l’appréciation de la preuve demeurent révisables en appel, cela va de soi. Elles le sont cependant à certaines conditions.

Aussi paraît-il opportun, avant d’aborder ce volet du pourvoi, de rappeler ce qu’il en est et pourquoi cela est ainsi. [76] Quelles que soient les questions de fait soulevées en appel, la norme d’intervention qui leur est applicable et qui fut constamment réitérée dans la jurisprudence [reference omitted] est celle de l’erreur « manifeste et dominante » ou « manifeste et déterminante » (en anglais, « palpable and overriding »).

Cette norme contraignante a pour assise un principe fermement ancré en droit judiciaire, celui selon lequel il n’appartient pas à une cour d’appel de refaire les procès [reference omitted].

Le passage ci-dessous, tiré d’un arrêt de la Cour maintes fois cité et suivi, explicite la raison d’être de ce principe [reference omitted] : […] Il doit donc s’agir d’une erreur identifiable avec une grande économie de moyens, sans que la chose ne provoque un long débat de sémantique, et sans qu’il soit nécessaire de revoir des pans entiers d’une preuve documentaire ou testimoniale qui est partagée et contradictoire, comme c’est très généralement le cas dans les dossiers litigieux de quelque difficulté qui se rendent à procès. [77] Bien que les idées qui précèdent soient dénuées de complexité, et qu’elles soient même limpides à plusieurs égards, on peut se demander si elles sont bien comprises par tous les membres du Barreau.

En effet, il demeure trop fréquent en appel que les juges saisis d’un pourvoi soient invités par une

partie à réexaminer dans le menu détail la majeure

partie de la preuve versée au dossier afin d’y déceler une prétendue erreur « manifeste et dominante ».

Étayée de cette façon, la prétention apparaît instantanément suspecte, car elle contrevient à la règle de conduite que j’énonçais dans les dernières lignes du précédent paragraphe. […] [12] Absent such an error, the demonstration of which rests squarely on the appellant’s shoulders, an appellate court must and will defer to the conclusions of the trial judge and “[t]he fact that an alternative factual finding could be reached based on a different ascription of weight does not mean that a palpable and overriding error has been made.” [13] Such standard of review is a stringent one, needless to say, the burden of which – and I say so respectfully – the appellant failed to discharge. [1] [References omitted] [ 4 ] These principles are entirely applicable to the present case and the Court has no choice but to conclude that the appellant failed to discharge her burden to establish any palpable and overriding error in the judgment of the Superior Court. [ 5 ] In fact, a review of the evidence shows, on a balance of probabilities (which is the applicable standard pursuant to art. 2804 C.C.Q. ), that the appellant’s performance was indeed well below average, had been so for many years and was still deteriorating, and that it did not meet the minimum requirements of her position.

It was also clear that, at this stage of her career, she would be unable to redress the situation, despite her efforts. In the circumstances, the best option would have been for the parties to settle the matter in a mutually satisfactory manner, but they were unable to do so. Her dismissal was thus, unfortunately, inevitable. [ 6 ] This is certainly a regrettable dénouement, especially in light of the appellant’s long service. The respondent, however, had a serious reason to terminate the contract of employment, pursuant to art. 2094 C.C.Q. , and that it did so in the present case is no cause for liability.

FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED REASONS, THE COURT: [ 7 ] DISMISSES the appeal, with legal costs. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.

MANON SAVARD, J.A. JOCELYN F. RANCOURT, J.A.