2014 QCCA 722, 2014 QCCA 722

Droit de la famille — 14774 2014 QCCA 722 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-09-023960-131 (500-12-284938-069) DATE: APRIL 9, 2014 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE JACQUES CHAMBERLAND, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. J. S. APPELLANT – plaintiff v. D. Z.

RESPONDENT – defendant JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellant appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal (the Honourable Madam Justice Michèle Monast) rendered on September 30, 2013, that granted Respondent's Exception to dismiss and dismissed Appellant's Motion for variation of a support order and for a provision for costs, without costs. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Chamberland J.A., with which Dufresne and St-Pierre JJ.A. agree, THE COURT : [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeal, each party paying its own costs. JACQUES CHAMBERLAND, J.A. JACQUES DUFRESNE, J.A. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. Mrs. J. S.

Personally Appellant Mr. D. Z. Personally Respondent Date of hearing: March 13, 2014 REASONS OF CHAMBERLAND, J.A. [ 4 ] This appeal marks just the latest milestone in the long-lasting dispute opposing the parties since the institution of the divorce proceedings by the Appellant on June 8, 2006.

[ 5 ] The divorce judgment was rendered by Alary J. on July 2, 2010. [1] Pursuant to this judgment, the Appellant was awarded spousal support for a period of two years, expiring on July 2, 2012. The Appellant's request for a provision for costs was dismissed. [ 6 ] Both parties appealed from the judgment.

The Court record indicates that the file in appeal progressed very slowly, so slowly that Appellant's factum was filed after the expiry of the two-year term fixed by Alary J. for spousal support. [ 7 ] On September 18, 2012, while the appeal was still progressing, the Appellant petitioned for a safeguard order to obtain support during the appeal as well as for a provision for costs.

Her motion was dismissed on both counts in a judgment rendered from the bench. [2] [ 8 ] Regarding the continuation of the spousal support during the appeal, beyond the two-year term fixed by Alary, J., the Court wrote this: [5] The petition to continue spousal support during the appeal is dismissed. Ms. S.'s arguments impugn the justification for placing a term on the alimentary order at the time of the judgment on appeal. This is one of the substantive issues on appeal and is not properly the object of a safeguard order.

While it is true that the alimentary order is subject to provisional execution notwithstanding appeal, the order was executed and has now expired. It is unfortunate to see that the parties have not pursued their appeal diligently. Had they done so, the appeal would most likely have been heard by now. [6] Ms. S. may have grounds to sue for arrears or for support based on changed circumstances.

We express no opinion upon this matter, except to observe that the question properly belongs before the Superior Court where, as with comparable alimentary claims, evidence of changed circumstances can properly be considered. [ 9 ] Regarding the provision for costs, the Court wrote this: [7] The petition for a provision for costs is also dismissed. Provision for costs in this setting is indeed alimentary in character, as Ms. S. argues, and may well be available on appeal.

It is, however, a well-established principle that a petition for provision for costs, even for an appeal, should be brought before the Superior Court where it may be decided based on her needs and current circumstances. [ 10 ] On October 4, 2012, while the file in appeal was still progressing, the Appellant filed before the Superior Court a ''Motion and Interim demand in Revision of Alimony and Request for Provision for Costs''.

She alleged a change in the circumstances since the judgment rendered on July 2, 2010 based on four factors: the death of her father on June 14, 2010, the proceedings in damages she instituted against a psychologist which had preoccupied her for more than two years, the stress resulting from the divorce proceedings and, finally, her own health issues. [ 11 ] On October 18, 2012, the Respondent replied with a Motion to dismiss Appellant's Motion on the basis that there was res judicata because of the judgment rendered on July 2, 2010 (art. 165(1) CCP ) or that the motion was unfounded in law, even if the facts alleged therein were true, because they did not amount to a change in the circumstances of the parties within the meaning of ss. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act (art. 165(4) CCP ) or, finally, that the motion constituted an improper use of procedure justifying the Superior Court to order that ''any new request concerning spousal support'' be submitted for authorization to the Associate Chief Justice of the Superior Court (art. 54.1 CCP). [3] [ 12 ] With regard to the provision for costs, the Respondent argued that in light of the expenses incurred by the Appellant since 2010 and the inheritance she received from her father's estate in 2011, there was no reason for a provision for costs being granted to the Appellant. [ 13 ] Before these two motions could proceed before the Superior Court, the Appeal from Alary J.'s judgment was heard on May 8, 2013. [ 14 ] Less than three weeks later, on May 27 and 28, 2013, the two motions proceeded before Monast J. who, being informed of the hearing before the Court of Appeal, indicated to the parties that the matter would be taken under advisement as of the date the judgment of the Court of Appeal would be rendered. [ 15 ] The judgment of the Court of Appeal was rendered on June 13, 2013 (corrected on July 3, 2013). [4] Alary J.'s decision was revised regarding certain financial aspects pertaining to the partition of the partnership of acquests but confirmed regarding the issues of support and provision for costs. [ 16 ] The judgment a quo was rendered on September 30, 2013. [5] Monast J. accurately described the issues to be decided as follows: [23] À la lumière de ce qui précède, il s’agit de déterminer si la requête en modification de pension alimentaire, qui est présentée aujourd’hui devant la Cour supérieure, est recevable. [24] Il faut vérifier s’il y a litispendance ou chose jugée à l’égard de la demande et, si cela n’est pas le cas, il faut poursuivre l’analyse et décider si elle est fondée en droit.

Cette analyse doit être faite à la lumière de l’

article 17 de la

Loi sur le divorce . [25] Finalement, il faut analyser la requête dans son contexte afin de déterminer s’il s’agit ou non d’une procédure abusive et, si c’est le cas, il faut décider s’il est opportun d’obliger désormais Madame à soumettre toutes nouvelles procédures dans ce dossier au juge en chef avant de les présenter au Tribunal. [ 17 ] Respondent's argument regarding the issue of res judicata was dismissed:

[98] À première vue, la demande présentée par Madame ne vise pas la révision de l’ordonnance initiale, mais plutôt sa modification. Dans ce contexte, le jugement rendu par la Cour d’appel en juin 2013 est pertinent, mais il n’a pas l’autorité de la chose jugée. [ 18 ] Turning to Respondent's second ground for dismissal, the judge of first instance summarized the issue as follows: [99] Cela dit, s’il n’y a aucun changement important dans la situation des parties depuis que l’ordonnance initiale a été rendue, la demande de modification est en réalité un appel déguisé et non une véritable demande de modification.

Dans un tel cas, la demande est irrecevable parce qu’elle a déjà été jugée ou, alternativement, parce qu’elle n’est pas fondée en droit. [100] Qu’en est-il dans la présente affaire? [101] Madame recherche la modification d’une ordonnance alimentaire à durée déterminée après l’échéance de son terme. [102] Elle allègue qu’au moment du procès, en janvier 2010, elle avait réellement l’intention de trouver un emploi rémunérateur et qu’elle a envoyé son curriculum vitae à des firmes de comptables et d’avocats tout en essayant de développer sa propre pratique. [103] Elle poursuit en disant que, malgré les efforts qu’elle a déployés, elle a été incapable de devenir autonome financièrement depuis juillet 2010, notamment parce que : 1) elle a été forcée d’entreprendre des procédures en mars 2010 afin de rétablir sa réputation, 2) son père est décédé tragiquement en juin 2010, et 3) elle a vécu de l’anxiété et du stress à cause des procédures de divorce. [ 19 ] Monast J. then concluded that the allegations made by the Appellant, even if they were true, could not justify a revision of the initial spousal support order inasmuch as they did not amount to a change in the circumstances of the parties: [105] Ces allégations, même si elles sont tenues pour avérées, ne permettent pas au Tribunal de modifier l’ordonnance alimentaire rendue en juillet 2010 parce qu’ils ne font pas état d’un changement important lié au mariage depuis que l’ordonnance alimentaire a été rendue. [106] L’omission de travailler ne constitue pas en soi un changement.

Le fait de ne plus recevoir de pension alimentaire et d’avoir un déficit plus élevé entre ses revenus et ses dépenses ne constitue pas non plus un changement. [107] Madame a fait des choix personnels. La situation dans laquelle elle se trouve actuellement est la même qu’en février 2009, en janvier 2010 et en juillet 2010. Il est possible que ses choix aient eu un impact sur sa situation financière.

À tout événement, même en supposant qu’elle pourra faire la preuve d’une certaine précarité économique, la situation dans laquelle elle se trouve actuellement ne résulte pas du mariage ou de sa rupture. [108] Puisque la requête ne contient aucune allégation susceptible de permettre au Tribunal de conclure à l’existence d’un changement significatif dans la situation des parties depuis que l’ordonnance initiale a été rendue et, encore moins à l’existence d’un changement lié au mariage, elle est irrecevable. [ 20 ] Monast J. then turned her attention to the issue of whether or not Appellant's motion amounted to an improper use of procedure.

She concluded that the object of the motion was clearly to obtain a revision of the divorce judgment (par. 113) and that, in the circumstances, it appeared prima facie to constitute an improper use of procedure (par. 116).

However, being of the view that the measures proposed by the Respondent were unjustified, she concluded that the dismissal of the Appellant's motion constituted an appropriate sanction in the circumstances. [ 21 ] Finally, dismissing Appellant's request for a provision for costs, Monast J. wrote: [119] La requête de Madame ne distingue pas la provision demandée pour les procédures devant la Cour d’appel et celle demandée devant la Cour supérieure. [120] Puisque la demande de modification de pension alimentaire qui est présentée par Madame est manifestement vouée à l’échec, la provision pour frais qui est demandée ne sera pas allouée. [121] Il importe de rappeler que la provision pour frais ne doit pas être utilisée pour favoriser une guérilla judiciaire en alimentant des procédures abusives et des débats futiles. [ 22 ] The issues in Appeal may be summarized as follows: 1.

Did Monast J. err in deciding that the circumstances alleged by the Appellant did not constitute a material change related to the marriage, rather than simply deciding whether the motion rested on new circumstances and leaving to the trial judge the issue of whether these circumstances constituted a change warranting the variation of the initial support order? 2. Did Monast J. err in dismissing the request for a provision for costs on the basis that the Appellant had not differentiated the costs relevant to the appeal from those relevant to the proceedings before the Superior Court?

The variation of the initial support order [ 23 ] In L.M.P. v. L.S. [6] , the Supreme Court of Canada reminds us that the threshold to be met before a court may vary a prior spousal support order is articulated in ss. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act .

There must have been a change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse since the making of the prior spousal support order. [7] The onus is on the party seeking a variation to establish such a change. [8] [ 24 ] The change in the conditions, means, needs or other circumstances has to be a material one (as opposed to a trivial or insignificant one), that is to say a change that, if known at the time of the prior order, would likely have resulted in different terms to the prior order. [9] The corollary to this being that if the circumstances relied on as constituting a change were known they cannot be relied

on as the basis for variation. [10] [ 25 ] Once the threshold for variation of a spousal support order is met, the court must determine what variation to the order is required in light of the change in the circumstances.

The court then takes into account the material change and limits itself to making only the variation justified by that change. [11] [ 26 ] In the case at bar, the position of the Respondent in first instance was that, even if the circumstances alleged by the Appellant in her motion were true, they did not amount to a material change of circumstances justifying a variation of the prior spousal support order. [ 27 ] The judge of first instance agreed with the Respondent. [ 28 ] The Appellant contends that Monast J. erred in deciding that the circumstances alleged in her motion did not constitute a change in the situation of the parties justifying the variation of the prior support order; she should have left this determination to the trial judge. [ 29 ] It is true that it is generally preferable to leave the issue pertaining to a change in the situation of the parties in the context of a motion under s. 17 of the Divorce Act to the judge hearing the motion on the merit. [12] However, there are cases where it is possible for a judge to summarily dismiss a motion for revision of a prior spousal support.

In such exceptional situations, it falls on the respondent on the Motion for revision to ''démontrer, tenant les faits allégués pour avérés, qu'il n'en ressort clairement pas un changement significatif au sens de la

Loi sur le divorce et de la jurisprudence''. [13] [ 30 ] Such is the case here. [14] [ 31 ] The fact that the Appellant was not working, or at least not enough to attain her economic self-sufficiency, was nothing new.

Such was the situation when the parties proceeded before Alary J. in January 2010, the Appellant having been unemployed since February 2009. [ 32 ] The fact that the Appellant was deprived of any alimentary assistance from the Respondent since the expiry of the two-year term fixed by the Superior Court on July 2, 2010 did not constitute a change in the situation of the parties within the ambit of s. 17 of the Divorce Act inasmuch as the issue of the term to the support order constituted one of the very questions put before Alary J., and her decision in that regard was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. [ 33 ] The fact that Appellant's father passed away on June 14, 2010 is extremely unfortunate.

That said, it has nothing to do with the marriage and could not justify revising a support order which had come to its term in July 2012. [ 34 ] Similarly, the fact that the Appellant decided to institute proceedings against psychologist Paule Lamontagne has nothing to do with the marriage.

It was the Appellant's decision to institute those proceedings and she cannot base a revision of the support order on this decision, nor on the stress associated with the institution of such proceedings. [ 35 ] Finally, the Appellant's state of health and the stress associated with the divorce proceedings could constitute a change in the situation of the parties. In an affidavit dated September 27, 2012, the Appellant declared, however, that she was experiencing stress and anxiety since 2003, and even more so since 2007, well before the divorce judgment. [ 36 ] In

summary, I am of the opinion that Monast J. did not commit any error of law in her assessment of the allegations made by the Appellant to justify a revision of the spousal support order rendered by Alary J. The provision for costs [ 37 ] Monast J. dismissed Appellant's request for a provision for costs. [ 38 ] Appellant contends that the judge of first instance was in the error when she wrote that her motion did not differentiate the costs relevant to the appeal from those relevant to the proceedings before the Superior Court.

Appellant refers the Court to an invoice/estimate prepared by her counsel at the time, dated September 27, 2012 (exhibit P-3), which comprises two sections, one for the work done, and to be done, in appeal and the other, for the work done, and to be done, in the Superior Court. The details of the work and disbursements relevant to each of the instances thus appear to have been available to the judge of first instance.

It is possible that, by writing what she wrote in par. 119 of the judgment, Monast J. was merely referring to the fact that, in the conclusions of her motion, Appellant referred to a lump sum of $30,000 without differentiating between the appeal and the first instance. Be that as it may, I am of the view that this error, if an error there is, is not an overriding one. [ 39 ] The possibility for a party to be awarded provisional support to cover the costs of proceedings of this nature is governed by articles 502 and 588 CCQ .

The awarding of a provision for costs depends on the circumstances of each case which the judge must analyze in the light of six criteria: ''1) la nécessité pour le créancier de l'attribution de la provision pour frais, 2) les besoins et les moyens de la

partie qui la requiert, 3) les ressources du débiteur, du créancier et leur disparité, 4) la nature, la complexité et l'importance du litige, 5) la protection des droits des enfants ou une demande de nature alimentaire, et 6) le comportement respectif des parties''. [15] [ 40 ] The awarding of a provision for costs is discretionary by nature and thus requires a substantial degree of deference on appeal. [ 41 ] The evidence filed before Monast J. reveals that the Appellant purchased a house in 2009 for $450,000, she had a swimming pool installed at a cost of more than $42,000 in June 2010 (exhibit I-14, filed with the consent of both parties on May 27, 2013) and, finally, she purchased a luxury car worth more than $83,000 on March 17, 2011 (exhibit I-16, filed with the consent of both parties on May 27, 2013).

It is also in evidence that the Appellant inherited a substantial amount of money from her father. In this context, I fail to see how the judge of first instance could have been wrong in dismissing Appellant's request for provisional support to cover the costs of her proceedings in appeal and in Superior Court.

[ 42 ] One final word before concluding. In his factum, the Respondent contends that this appeal constitutes yet another improper use of procedure on the part of the Appellant and he asks us to declare her a quarrelsome or vexatious litigant, with all the consequences associated with such a declaration. In my view the appeal filed by the Appellant did not constitute an improper use of procedure. Her grounds of appeal may have failed to convince us to intervene, but they were not, in my view, frivolous. [ 43 ] I propose that the appeal be dismissed, with each party paying its own costs given the nature of the proceedings. JACQUES CHAMBERLAND, J.A.