R. v. Sangha, 2017 BCPC 459

Citation: R. v. Sangha 2017 BCPC 459 Date: 20170619 File No: 39409-2-C Registry: Duncan IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. KEHAR GARRY SANGHA BAN ON PUBLICATION – SECTIONS 486.3 and 517 C.C.C. ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT RE JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE HEARING OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. P. MacCARTHY Counsel for the Crown: S. Richards Appearing for the Accused: S. Sheets Place of Hearing: Duncan , B.C. Dates of Hearing: May 4, 19, 30, 2017 Date of Judgment: June 19, 2017 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] THE COURT: Kehar Garry Sangha (the "Accused") seeks his judicial interim release from custody.

He faces a series of seven, serious indictable charges. Crown opposes his judicial interim release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

[ 2 ] The judicial interim release hearing was conducted on May 4, May 19 and May 30, 2017. My decision was reserved to this date. The following is my decision and my reasons for that decision. THE CHARGES [ 3 ] Crown has proceeded by way of indictment on the seven-count Information referenced as court file 39409-C-2. That Information is sworn April 24, 2017. All of the charges under the Criminal Code arise from events alleged to have occurred between on or about April 7 and April 11, 2017, inclusive, at or near Duncan, BC. [ 4 ] The Complainant in each of the charges is W.H. (the "Complainant"). [ 5 ] The specific indictable charges and maximum sentences upon conviction are as follows:

a) Count 1: Committing aggravated assault contrary to s. 268(2) of the Criminal Code which has a maximum sentence of 14 years.

b) Count 2: Committing assault using a weapon, namely a conducted energy weapon or Taser, contrary to s. 267(

a) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of 10 years.

c) Count 3: Committing assault using a weapon, namely an imitation firearm, contrary to s. 267(

a) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of 10 years.

d) Count 4: Committing an assault using a weapon, namely a bat, contrary to s. 267(

a) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of 10 years.

e) Count 5: Committing unlawful, forcible confinement contrary to s. 279(2) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of 10 years.

f) Count 6: Use of an imitation firearm while committing or attempting to commit the indictable offence of unlawful confinement contrary to s. 85(2) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of 14 years and a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for a first offence.

g) Count 7: Knowingly uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm contrary to s. 254.1(1)(

a) of the Code which has a maximum sentence of five years. OVERVIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES [ 6 ] All of the events giving rise to these charges are alleged to have occurred at the farm and the residence of the Accused located in a rural area east of Duncan, BC, at [omitted for publication] (hereinafter “S.” Road), Duncan, BC (hereinafter referred to as the "Farm"). [ 7 ] At the time of the alleged offences, the Accused resided in a large, multi-storey residence located on the Farm (hereinafter referred as the "Residence").

On the Farm are a number of barns and outbuildings and a swimming pool located in the immediate vicinity of the Residence. [ 8 ] A long driveway services the Farm and, apparently, runs off of S. Road which, in turn, connects to [omitted for publication] (hereinafter “L. Road”). The Farm also consists of a number of fields and pastures adjacent to the driveway. [ 9 ] There are neighbouring properties and residences in the areas adjacent to the Farm. One neighbour is [“T.B.”].

He has an outbuilding on his acreage property, located in the proximate vicinity of the Residence and the surrounding outbuildings located on the Farm. The T.B. outbuilding is, apparently, federally licenced for the legal production of marihuana. [ 10 ] Another neighbour, [“B.S”.], resides in a residence located behind a hedge adjacent to the long driveway that services the Farm. I understand that B.S.’s residence [the “S. Residence”] to be in an area near the corner of [omitted for publication] (hereinafter “H. Road”) and L. Road. [ 11 ] The Accused and the Complainant are known to each other.

At the time of the alleged offences, the Complainant was a tenant of the Accused and had been such for some months. The Complainant lived in a self-contained suite located on the top floor of a barn outbuilding. [ 12 ] On Tuesday, April 11, 2017, a woman, later identified as the Complainant, appeared unexpectedly at the S. Residence, ran up to and requested help from Ms. B.S. and two contractors who were completing work on the S. Residence. That woman was described as suffering from severe bruising and swelling to her facial area with several apparent injuries to her face. She had half a handcuff on her wrist.

She told the contractors that she was fearful, thought she was going to be killed and asked for their assistance to get away. [ 13 ] She implored the contractors not to call the police and said that she did not want to go to the hospital. Notwithstanding this plea, the contractors did phone 9-1-1, left the phone line open and then drove this female in their truck in a southerly direction to the corner of L. Road and [omitted for publication] (hereinafter “B. Street”) where the RCMP were waiting and intercepted them.

The Complainant was thereafter taken by ambulance to the Victoria General Hospital for treatment of her multiple injuries. [ 14 ] The RCMP were initially not able to identify the Complainant who had multiple visible injuries to her face, head, arms, wrists, and, apparently, to other parts of her body. Her face was extremely bruised and swollen making any visual recognition very difficult. She provided them with a name, apparently, other than her own. Initially, she did not provide a statement to the police nor specifically name the Accused as her attacker.

That did occur later while the Complainant was still in hospital being treated for her numerous injuries including a fractured orbital bone.

[ 15 ] Based upon information obtained from the Complainant, from other individuals and from their investigations, the RCMP apparently started to conduct surveillance of the Residence, obtained a search warrant, and arrested the Accused around 6 p.m. on April 12, 2017, while he was driving his dark blue Ford F350 pickup truck, which bore a distinctive winged crest on the front passenger doors, and while driving away from the Residence. Some 30 hours after the Complainant appeared at the S. Residence, the RCMP executed the search warrant and conducted a search of the Farm and the Residence.

That was sometime after 10 p.m. on April 12, 2017. [ 16 ] On the basis of a number of statements eventually made to the police by the Complainant, she identified the Accused as the person who had confined and tortured her for a period of some three days in the Residence, and from which she escaped on foot on two separate occasions. [ 17 ] She stated that she was recaptured by the Accused on her first escape attempt. He pursued her in his pickup truck into the field adjacent to the driveway, where he caught her and put her back into the truck.

Thereafter, he took her back to the Residence where her confinement and torture continued. She finally escaped and ran to the neighbour's residence. [ 18 ] Following his arrest, the Accused provided the police with a detailed statement in which he denied any involvement in these alleged crimes. He has been detained in custody since that time. SOURCES OF CROWN'S INFORMATION [ 19 ] Crown has relied on a number of statements provided by civilian witnesses as well as police reports including forensic investigation reports and a large number of photographs.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE The Complainant's Statements to the Police [ 20 ] Primary reliance is placed by Crown upon the Complainant's multiple statements provided to the RCMP. [ 21 ] Based upon those police statements, the Complainant says that her confinement and the assaults against her started on Friday, April 7, 2017. Preceding the assault, the Complainant described that the Accused had attended at her suite and banged loudly on the door.

He complained to her about the Residence having been broken into and $10,000 worth of heroin, together with some jewellery and his cell phone, having been stolen by somebody. He asked to borrow the Complainant's new cell phone so that he could make some calls. She provided him with that cell phone. [ 22 ] The Accused then departed and the Complainant stayed in her suite. Later, the Complainant wished to get her cell phone back, therefore, she went to the front of the Residence where she spoke to a female companion of the Accused, identified as "Lori".

The Complainant was standing near a set of French doors located at the front of the Residence which provided access into a room containing a pool table (the "pool table room"). At that point, she stated that she overheard the Accused's truck being "fired up" in an area behind the Residence. From her location she was able to observe the Accused moving at a very fast pace and in her direction, carrying a wooden baseball bat. The Accused came around the corner of the Residence.

The Complainant said to the Accused "Garry, Garry, it's me, [W.H.]." [ 23 ] The Accused then proceeded to strike the Complainant on the head with the wooden baseball bat. She indicated that he struck her with such force that she ended up falling through the French doors and landing inside the Residence, specifically, in the pool table room. [ 24 ] The Accused followed after her into the Residence.

She said that the Accused repeatedly hit her with the baseball bat and dragged her further into the interior of the pool table room placing her under the pool table. [ 25 ] He instructed Lori to get some zap straps, being a type of nylon cable used for tying or bundling tubes or hosing. While in the pool room, the Accused continued to beat the Complainant with the baseball bat, and he continued to accuse her of "ripping him off." She stated that the Accused also choked her with his hands while continuing to yell at her. [ 26 ] The Complainant described that Lori brought some zap straps to the Accused.

He used them to bind both the ankles and feet of the Complainant. She also described how the Accused took a long piece of cloth-type material and wrapped it around her head and neck three times. The Accused then instructed Lori to bring him a bucket of water. While the Complainant lay bound on the floor with her head and face covered with the material, the Accused poured water from the bucket into her nose and throat that were covered by the cloth material. This caused her to choke on the water and she was unable to breathe properly.

She was fearful of drowning. [ 27 ] She stated that she was in and out of consciousness as she lay bound under the pool table. The Complainant describes how she regained consciousness and, while bound and laying under the pool table, was able to overhear the Accused and Lori, who were in the adjacent kitchen eating and discussing the quality of their fruit salad meal. [ 28 ] Crown concedes that the timelines and the timeframes relayed by the Complainant in her statements are "fuzzy" because of the numerous injuries sustained by the Complainant.

However, as I understand it, what is described above is referred to by Crown as the first incident and that it occurred on the first day of the Complainant's confinement. [ 29 ] The Complainant also describes that thereafter the Accused punched her with his fist while she was bound and that Lori stepped on her head with her thick heeled boots and kicked the Complainant on her back and body with those boots. [ 30 ] The Complainant provided a description of Lori as being smaller, thinner and a lighter individual than the Complainant, and that Lori was possibly of mixed race and possibly part aboriginal.

She observed that Lori appeared to only be able to walk slowly, which the Complainant assumed was as a result of an injury. She overheard the Accused and Lori speaking, and Lori indicating that if the Complainant were to run that Lori would not be able to stop her from doing so.

[ 31 ] The Complainant made plans to attempt an escape based on that information. As part of that plan, she was able to break the zap straps which bound her feet but she kept her feet together to avoid detection of the fact that her feet were no longer restrained by the zap straps. The Complainant's opportunity to escape arose when the Accused left the presence of the Complainant in the pool room which allowed the Complainant to get up and run through the French doors. Her hands were still bound behind her by the zap straps.

She did not know where she intended to go but was concerned that if she kept to the paved driveway or a paved roadway, then the Accused would be able to follow her in his pickup truck and recapture her or possibly run over her.

Therefore, she decided to run through the muddy pasture, believing that there were better odds that the pickup truck would get stuck in the pasture. [ 32 ] However, the Accused did pull up behind her in his pickup truck in the field where she was running and told her to get back in the truck or that he would "take her up the mountain," which she took to mean that he would take her up the mountain and kill her.

Therefore, she returned into the truck and was driven back to the Residence. [ 33 ] Thereafter, she was taken by the Accused into the Residence and up to a second-floor bedroom (the "upstairs bedroom"), which overlooked the three-gabled hay storage barn across from the front of the Residence, and which barn was visible through the upstairs bedroom window. The upstairs bedroom was near a bathroom. It was sparsely furnished with only some empty boxes, large plants and some white tubes.

Also situated in it was a large, old black leather office chair on rollers, with a seat and arms which were quite worn, especially the left arm. [ 34 ] It was in that upstairs bedroom that she was again zap strapped on her wrists and her ankles by the Accused but also the Accused placed a handcuff on her wrist and attached it to the arm of the chair. He also used zap straps to tether her legs that were spread apart to the chair legs. She was also bound with some electrical cord.

She felt her circulation was being cut off. [ 35 ] The interior door of the room was closed, and even though she was able to shimmy the chair towards the door, she was unable to open it because her hands and wrists were bound. [ 36 ] She heard two trucks approaching the Residence, apparently heading for the hay barn that was visible through the upstairs bedroom window. She was able to shimmy the chair towards the window from the door and observe the trucks which were being loaded with hay.

With her hair in her face and blood dripping down her face, she called "help me, help me" in the hope that she could attract attention of the individuals at the trucks but did not think anybody heard or saw her. [ 37 ] The trucks departed and the Accused returned to the upstairs bedroom, at which point he observed that the Complainant had been able to move the chair, and noted that there was blood on the windowsill.

The Accused observed that the Complainant had been able to move the chair because her feet were not tightly restrained to the chair. [ 38 ] He made statements to her to the effect that he was tiring of having to keep coming up and tying her up, that he was tired and hungry, he wanted to eat and to go to bed, he did not feel safe in his own house and he suggested she was preventing him from doing so.

He asked her if she was going to apologize to him, presumably about the break and enter and loss of the heroin and other personal property. [ 39 ] The Accused then re-strapped the Complainant more tightly to the chair, which caused her to lose feeling in her feet and arms. She was overcome with a feeling of helplessness. She tried unsuccessfully to pull and twist her wrists to free them, but that only resulted in part of her skin coming off. She strategized about being able to knock a large screw off of the windowsill and use it to cut through the zap straps.

That hope was dashed when the Accused moved her chair away from the window. [ 40 ] The Complainant stated to the police that she believed that she was confined in the upstairs bedroom for a couple of days. During that period of time, the Accused continued to beat her. He put a hand gun into her mouth and he threatened to kill her and harm her family.

She also described how the Accused had used what she initially called a Taser but later described as a cattle prod to jolt her on her legs, arms and head, thereby causing her excruciating pain from this electrical shocking, such that she could feel it deep into her bones. [ 41 ] Crown noted that the existence and availability of a cattle prod to the Accused is consistent with the fact that the Accused told the police that he had previously owned a cattle farm and his family was in the cattle industry. [ 42 ] While she continued her confinement in the upstairs bedroom and received beatings from the Accused, the Accused told her that he was "going to make an example of her" to "send out a message." [ 43 ] The Complainant also described that during the course of her confinement, a "well-dressed" man, whom she took to be from outside of the local community and who was a stranger to her, attended at the Residence.

The suggestion is that the Accused had called or texted this individual on the Complainant's cell phone which was in his possession. After this well-dressed stranger had arrived at the Residence, she overheard some of the discussions between them, which referenced an individual by the name of "Collin".

The Accused said that Collin would be proud or impressed with the way that the Accused had dealt with the Complainant. [ 44 ] Crown says that the police theorize that this may be a reference to a known drug dealer and drug enforcer who is presently serving a custodial sentence. [ 45 ] Crown says that the police further theorize that the Accused is involved in some middle level in the drug trade. Nothing other than this broad police theory, unsupported by any specific evidence to which Crown has made reference, is before the court in this hearing.

Crown only makes reference to some very general, and what appears to be, rumours and unsubstantiated observations made by certain, mostly unidentified, persons. [ 46 ] For the most part, no sources are referenced other than one [“L.B.”], being the son of the Accused's neighbour, T.B. L.B. has been described in this hearing as being known to be involved in the drug culture.

The rumours and suggestions that have been passed along to the police involve a regular stream of a number of different unknown vehicles and individuals, including different young women, driving to and attending at the Residence and partying at the Residence and then departing from it.

[ 47 ] There is, of course, the Complainant's statement about the Accused's losing $10,000 of heroin in a break in of the Residence which may be regarded as consistent with the police theory. [ 48 ] What is of importance is the Complainant's recounting to the police of a discussion that she overheard between the well-dressed stranger and the Accused that took place in front of her, during which the well-dressed stranger instructed the Accused not to kill the Complainant. [ 49 ] The Accused suggested to the Complainant that he was sending messages to her son on the Complainant's own cell phone, then still possessed by the Accused.

The cell phone has not been recovered. The police are recovering the available cell phone records. [ 50 ] At some point, the Accused removed the zap straps binding the Complainant but she was still wearing the handcuff on her one wrist.

He, apparently, intended to leave her briefly to get something to remove the handcuff. [ 51 ] The Accused threatened her and said that she had to promise that she was going to stay where she was, that she dare not run, and that if she tried to leave, it would be worse when she was recaptured and brought back to the Residence. [ 52 ] The Accused departed the upstairs bedroom and the Complainant used the opportunity to escape out of the Residence, and to "run for her life" and to head to her rental suite, in order to find an old cell phone and to make a 9-1-1 call. She could not find the old cell phone.

Her rental suite appeared to have been ransacked and cigarette butts had been left around. [ 53 ] She changed some of her blood-soaked clothing, grabbed some other clothes, and then ran through the yard, climbed over a stone fence and fled to safety by heading down to the neighbour's yard. At that point, she encountered the neighbour, B.S., and the two contractors. This occurred, apparently, between noon and 1 p.m. She asked them to call a taxi for her.

The Accused never came after her nor pursued her. [ 54 ] It was at that point that she was transported away by the two contractors, namely, [“J.J.”] and [“G.D.”], who had been working at the S. Residence and thereafter encountered the police who arranged to have the Complainant taken to the Victoria General Hospital. [ 55 ] Crown introduced some photographs of the Complainant which showed the serious injuries sustained by her which are consistent with the injuries that she recorded in her police statement. The photographs are extremely disturbing.

The facial injuries that the Complainant sustained are particularly horrendous. Among the photographs is a picture of the Complainant taken prior to the incidences that gave rise to her horrendous facial injuries. It would be understating it other than to say that as a result of the horrendous facial injuries, the Complainant is totally unrecognizable in the before and after photographs. [ 56 ] The female companion referred to as Lori has not been located nor spoken to by the police. The well-dressed stranger has not been located nor spoken to by the police. Witness Statements to the Police B.

S.’s Statement [ 57 ] The neighbour, B.S., to whose residence the Complainant ran to on her final and successful escape, confirmed in her statement to the police that an unknown woman, later identified as the Complainant, arrived at the S. Residence, rang the doorbell, and Ms. B.S. answered the door. She understood that the female wanted a taxi and mentioned something about Cowichan Bay. [ 58 ] From the direction of her arrival, and although uncertain, Ms. B.S. had surmised that the Complainant had come from the neighbouring Accused's Farm and Residence. She described the Residence as being yellow in colour.

She stated that the neighbour on the other side was T.B. [ 59 ] Ms. B.S. observed the two contractors successfully convincing the Complainant to get into their truck and travel with them away from the S. Residence. She also relayed information to the police from another neighbour, [“K.B.”], who indicated that at the time the Complainant was running to the B.S. property, he had observed a pickup truck leaving the property owned by the Accused. [ 60 ] She told the police that she was terrified of her neighbour, the Accused, and considered him to be a "loose cannon." G. D.’s Statement [ 61 ] Mr.

G.D. told the police that he was at the S. Residence, with his co-worker J.J., when the doorbell rang and the door was answered by Ms. B.S. He then observed the unknown female subsequently identified as the Complainant. She was shaking, crying and he observed her significant facial injuries, including the facial swelling. Her eyes were swollen shut, her lips were inflamed and her feet were covered in mud. [ 62 ] He inquired whether or not she was all right and whether or not she wanted to go to the hospital. She indicated that she did not want to do so. She said something that Mr.

G.D. took to mean that this female wished to go to Cowichan Bay to see her mother. In a subsequent explanation the Complainant indicated her mother was deceased, and this was actually a reference to her wanting to see her cousin. Mr. G.D. inquired as to where she had come from and she pointed to and indicated the neighbouring yellow house. She explained that it was not her boyfriend's house but that the occupant of it was going to kill her and because of that she did not want the police to be called. [ 63 ] She described to Mr. G.D. how she had taken the opportunity to sneak out of the house and to run to the S.

Residence. He observed the remaining handcuff on the Complainant's wrist. The Complainant was asking for bolt cutters to remove the handcuff. J.J.’s Statement [ 64 ] Mr. J.J. also provided a statement to the police. He confirmed his belief that based on the direction of her arrival, the female at

the door, later identified as the Complainant, had come from the neighbouring farm and residence owned by the Accused. [ 65 ] He also observed the extensive facial injuries to the Complainant and the fact that she had a handcuff on her left wrist. Mr. J.J. called the police despite the Complainant's wishes to the contrary, and he then left his cell line open. [ 66 ] He and Mr. G.D. then drove together with the Complainant until such time as they were intercepted by the RCMP.

J.P.’s Statement [ 67 ] Mr. [“J.P.”] stated to police that on Monday, April 10, 2017, at approximately 2:30 p.m., he and his co-worker, [“J.T.”], were at their place of employment on the property owned by T.B., working inside a shop area which I understand is used in the licenced marihuana grow operation being conducted on the T.B. property. [ 68 ] He and Mr. J.T. heard a loud, large diesel truck engine noise, went outside and observed a dark pickup truck "ripping along" the fence line and then cutting into the adjacent field.

From a distance of about 150 yards away he observed a female in the field running with her hands apparently tied behind her back. The truck stopped. He observed a male yelling at the female to get into the pickup truck and then he saw the male pulling the female into the driver's side rear door. The truck then proceeded and got stuck in the mud in the field, but powered its way out and then drove back towards the Residence later identified as belonging to the Accused. [ 69 ] Mr. J.P. provided a description for the pickup truck as a Ford 350-style truck, four-wheel drive, diesel engine, with four doors.

He believed it to be a 2007 to 2008 vintage and bearing a distinctive large winged company logo on the driver's side door. Ultimately, this description was a match to the pickup truck being driven at the time of the Accused's arrest. [ 70 ] Because of the distance, Mr. J.P. could provide only a few details about the description of the female and some more but limited details about the male, describing him as having darker hair, not large in size, possibly being about six feet and possibly being about 40 years of age. [ 71 ] The observed incident took approximately four minutes.

Following the incident, they packed up their tools, and he and Mr. J.T. left the T.B. property. [ 72 ] They did not call the police. However, Mr. J.P. apparently did tell his former girlfriend about the incident. She then, in turn, left an anonymous message about the incident on a community police line. Ultimately, the call was traced back to her and she provided a statement with similar details to the statements provided by Mr. J.P. J.T.’s Statement [ 73 ] Mr. J.T. provided a similar recounting to the police of the incident observed by Mr.

J.P., but recalled the incident as occurring earlier on the Monday morning around 10 or 10:30 a.m. He told the police that he had heard a yell or scream and the loud roar of a vehicle. He then observed the blue Ford 350 diesel truck, which he described in similar details to those of Mr. J.P., pulling into the adjacent field. [ 74 ] He observed a female running in the field with her hands either tied or tethered behind her back. The driver of the truck cut her off and she, unsuccessfully, tried to deke around him.

He was yelling at her to get into the truck, and he appeared to be forcing her to do so into the open rear door of the driver's side. After he got her into the vehicle, the male got back into the truck and had to spin the wheels in the field to get the vehicle unstuck and then it left the field and proceeded up the driveway to the Residence where he and Mr. J.P. lost sight of it because of the tree line. [ 75 ] Mr.

J.T. provided a description of the female as being approximately five foot five inches tall, with orange, bleached, dyed hair and described that her hands were tied and "flopping around.” He described the male as an inch or two taller than the female, with black hair and "possibly Caucasian" with a thin build. He was unsure whether he could identify the female again and possibly might be able to identify the male. [ 76 ] He stated that he made his observations from approximately 150 to 200 feet away.

He stated that they did not intervene but that J.P. did make some calls and they did not know what to do. [ 77 ] Crown entered the aerial photographic evidence of the Farm and indicated that the pictures of the field showed tire marks and ruts that were consistent with the location of the vehicle in the field when it was observed by Messrs. J.T. and J.P. [ 78 ] Crown says that the statements of Messrs. J.T. and J.P. corroborate the account provided by the Complainant of her first attempt at escaping, and her subsequent recapture by the Accused.

C.W.’s Statement [ 79 ] Ms. [“C.W.”] is a six to eight year tenant of the Accused. She resides in a separate suite which, from the photograph exhibits, appears to be part of the main part of the Residence but is located at the far end of the Residence, away from the main entrance and the pool table room, and also is not below the upstairs bedroom. She is a friend of the Accused's former spouse. [ 80 ] Ms.

C.W. indicated that she had observed the Accused and a female companion in or around the Residence over the weekend between April 7 to April 11, 2017, and, specifically, says that she made those observations on the Monday. At one time during that period, she heard the Accused's pickup truck leave, describing it as having "screeched out of here," and went out and "did donuts in the pasture" and then returned to the Residence. Her recollection was that it was Monday or Tuesday and possibly around midnight.

Crown suggests this observation is tied in with the first escape attempt and recapture of the Complainant. [ 81 ] Ms. C.W.’s police statement indicates that she had neither heard nor observed any of the events that were reported by the

Complainant. In her statement, she did indicate that she was able to make certain observations into the main part of the Residence. I take that to mean when she is passing by to gain entrance into her ground level suite entrance which faces in a different direction away from the front door and the French doors.

I also understand that from time to time she has been inside the main part of the Residence and at times is responsible for feeding the Accused's dog. [ 82 ] It is also apparent from her statement that she keeps to herself, stays in her suite, and chooses to ignore and to distance herself from activities that take place around the Residence, including a lot of traffic in the form of vehicles and individuals visiting the premises.

She offered the opinion that these individuals looked like they do drugs. [ 83 ] She also indicated that from her suite, she could hear things that occur in the main portion of the Residence. Furthermore, that there are areas within the Residence from which she cannot hear any activity, those include the pool room, the kitchen and the Accused's bedroom. Treena Sangha [ 84 ] Ms. Sangha is the estranged spouse of the Accused.

They have, apparently, been separated for a couple of years and, generally, have limited contact. [ 85 ] According to information provided by her to the RCMP, she received information on social media and by way of a telephone call regarding an alleged assault of a woman at the Accused's residence. [ 86 ] All of this occurred prior to the arrest of the Accused. This information prompted her to attempt to contact the Accused. She was unable to do so, therefore, she attended at the Residence. At that point, she observed a younger female who Crown has assumed to be "Lori" at the Residence. Ms.

Sangha is presently residing at the Residence, as I understand it, to look after farming business activities at the Farm. POLICE SEARCH AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE [ 87 ] It is evident that there was a significant time lapse between the discovery of the Complainant, the police intervention to assist her and the execution of the search warrants. The search warrants allowed the police to conduct a search of the Residence and the Farm, including the Complainant's rental suite.

It is the opinion of the police that during that period of delay, steps were taken in order to clean the Residence of blood and other forensic evidence which would tie the Complainant's presence in the Residence during the period of time that the alleged offences took place. [ 88 ] The Complainant's rental suite had the appearance of having been ransacked, as had been described by the Complainant in her police statements. [ 89 ] Upon reaching the Residence, the police were able to view the pool table room and the upstairs bedroom where the Complainant says the assaults, torturing and confinement took place.

Those areas matched the descriptions provided by the Complainant. In particular, the upstairs bedroom overlooked the hay barn as described by the Complainant. [ 90 ] On the Farm property, the police were able to locate a chair matching the description of the chair used to confine the Complainant as described by her. It was located along with a number of other discarded items outside of the Residence and these items had been subject to the elements.

However, evidence of the prior existence of blood on the chair was detected, although samples could not be obtained. [ 91 ] The police were able to locate a matching half of the handcuff which had remained attached to the Complainant's wrist.

This other half was located on the driveway area leading up to the Residence but also within the vicinity of the outbuilding located on the T.B. property. [ 92 ] Police located the screw in the upstairs bedroom which the Complainant had described as being a possible device for cutting her restraints, but that proved impractical because of her hands being restrained. [ 93 ] Crown described a number of locations in the Residence where the presence of blood was detected, including in the pool table room, on the French doors, on wooden blinds in the pool table room, on the windowsill in the upstairs bedroom, on the upstairs bedroom wall and blinds, and on a laundry basket in that area, and also in the en suite bathroom sink connected to the upstairs bedroom. [ 94 ] A search of the Accused's Ford 350 pickup truck also located evidence of the existence of blood in various locations including in the rear seat area where it is alleged that the Complainant was pushed into when she was recaptured in the field during her first escape attempt. [ 95 ] As of the hearing dates, no DNA results had been received by the police which would link the blood that had been discovered with that of the Complainant.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCUSED [ 96 ] The Accused is 52 years of age. He was born in Vancouver but has lengthy and deep ties in the Cowichan Valley. He and his mother operated a family dairy farm which had been purchased from his uncle. His parents are now both deceased. The Accused remains involved in a business partnership which includes a dairy farming business in the interior of the Province of British Columbia. He is also involved in the hay business and cattle feed business. Locally, he has four employees. [ 97 ] He has resided at the Residence for approximately 10 years.

The Residence is heavily mortgaged to Farm Credit Corporation as security for business loans.

[ 98 ] According to defence counsel, the existence of this mortgage and also financing security held on dairy quota places limitations on the ability of the Accused to raise cash bail in excess of some $15,000. [ 99 ] The Accused has three children aged 23, 21 and 17. He and his spouse are separated. [ 100 ] He has been active in 4-H Club activities. He has been active in a local service club for a number of years including holding the position of both President and Vice-President of that service club.

He has coached lacrosse and hosted visiting foreign exchange students. [ 101 ] Defence counsel describes him as an excellent contributor to both the local community and to the farming community. [ 102 ] He has a very dated criminal record which includes two public mischief charges back in 1983 and an assault charge in 1988 which resulted in a $200 fine. He was subject to a spousal assault allegation that was resolved by way of a six-month peace bond in November 2001.

He has no charges or convictions for anything to do with respect to controlled drugs. [ 103 ] In defence counsel's submissions, it was stated that the Accused says that he did not perpetrate these offences against the Complainant, but further "he may know who did it." [ 104 ] The Residence has been assessed pursuant to an Electronic Supervision Technical Suitability Report (the "Technical Suitability Report").

The Technical Suitability Report which is required in order to determine whether or not the Corrections Branch can utilize electronic monitoring of the Accused in the community confirms that electronic monitoring can be considered, but subject to installation of either a landline or acquisition by the Accused of a cell phone in order that there be a reliable method to contact the central monitoring unit when required.

PROPOSED PLAN OF RELEASE [ 105 ] It is submitted on behalf of the Accused that the Accused should be released on a recognizance with a cash deposit of $15,000. [ 106 ] To address the various concerns that are raised by Crown, defence says that he can be made subject to an order for electronic supervision which essentially would be crafted to limit the Accused's presence only to the Residence and to the Farm. BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF PROOF [ 107 ] Crown bears the onus of proof on this application.

In order to succeed, it must show cause and establish on the balance of probabilities, that the detention of the Accused is necessary on any of the three grounds in s. 515(10). [ 108 ] Sections 518(1) and (2) deal with the inquiries to be made by a justice presiding over a judicial interim release hearing, and also deal with the evidence that may be adduced and considered at a release hearing. [ 109 ] The inquiry may be made "on oath or otherwise" of and concerning the accused person (see Code s. 518(1)(a)). [ 110 ] Crown may lead relevant evidence including previous convictions, outstanding charges, convictions for escape of lawful custody, being unlawfully at large and failure to comply with recognizance et cetera , as well as the "circumstances of the alleged offence" particularly as to the "probability of conviction" (see Code s. 518(1)(c)). [ 111 ] Section 518(1)(

e) also prescribes that a justice at a release hearing may receive evidence considered "credible or trustworthy" by the justice in the circumstances of the case, which includes evidence "ordinarily inadmissible" at trial, such as hearsay evidence, so long as the opposing party has fair opportunity to correct or contradict it. [ 112 ] Therefore, it is appropriate for Crown and defence counsel to "outline factual matters" to the court in order to assist the justice in his or her inquiries made under s. 518, and, in particular, pursuant to s. 518(1)(d.1), relevant matters "agreed to" by the prosecutor and the Accused or the Accused's counsel.

Where either counsel expressly disputes a particular factual matter, the opposing party may be required to call viva voce evidence in support of the disputed matter outlined in court (see E.G. Ewaschuk: Criminal Pleadings and Practice In Canada , Second Edition, Canada Law Book, at s. 6:1300). THE APPLICABLE LAW WITH RESPECT TO JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE [ 113 ] In R. v. Hall , 2002 SCC 64 , Mr. Justice Iacobucci said in his dissenting judgment: [47] At the heart of a free and democratic society is the liberty of its subjects.

Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, must place the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty. [48] In the context of the criminal law, this fundamental freedom is embodied generally in the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and further in the specific right to bail.

When bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed. This is the context of this appeal, one in which the "golden thread" that runs through our system of criminal law is placed in jeopardy. And this is the context in which laws authorizing pre-trial detention must be scrutinized. [49]

Section 11(

e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms calls particularly on courts, as guardians of liberty, to ensure that pre-trial release remains the norm rather than the exception to the norm, and to restrict pre-trial detention to only those circumstances where the fundamental rights and freedoms of the accused must be overridden in order to preserve some demonstrably pressing societal interest. [50] The duty to protect individual rights lies at the core of the judiciary's role, a role which takes on increased significance in the criminal law where the vast resources of the state and very often the weight of public opinion are stacked against the individual accused.

Courts must not, therefore, take lightly their constitutional responsibility to scrutinize the manner by which the legislature has authorizedthe detention of the accused in the absence of a conviction. [114] Mr. Justice Iacobucci said further at para. 128 as follows: Finally, I emphasize that the role of this Court, and indeed of every court in our country, to staunchly uphold constitutional standards is ofparticular importance when the public mood is one which encourages increased punishment of those accused of criminal acts and wheremounting pressure is placed on the liberty interest of these individuals.

Courts must be bulwarks against the tides of public opinion thatthreaten to invade these cherished values. Although this may well cost courts popularity in some quarters, that can hardly justify a failureto uphold fundamental freedoms and liberty. [115] In the recent case of R. v.

St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, at para. 70, the Supreme Court of Canada reconfirmed the fundamentalprinciples with respect to the constitutionally protected right to reasonable bail: Finally, it is important not to overlook the fact that, in Canadian law, the release of accused persons is the cardinal rule and detention, theexception: Morales, at p. 728. To automatically order detention would be contrary to the "basic entitlement to be granted reasonable bailunless there is just cause to do otherwise" that is guaranteed in s. 11(

e) of the Charter: Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 885, at p. 691. Thisentitlement rests in turn on the cornerstone of Canadian criminal law, namely the presumption of innocence that is guaranteed by s. 11(d)of the Charter (Hall, at para. 13).

These fundamental rights require the justice to ensure that interim detention is truly justified havingregard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. [116] Then in para. 75 of St-Cloud, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the following passage: [TRANSLATION] With respect to the perception of the public, as we know, a large part of the Canadian public often adopts a negativeand even emotional attitude towards criminals or [potential] criminals. The public wants to see itself protected, see criminals in prisonand see them punished severely. To get rid of a criminal is to get rid of crime.

It [unjustifiably] perceives the judicial system ... and theadministration of justice in general as too indulgent, too soft, too good to the criminal. This perception, almost visceral in respect ofcrime, is surely not the perception which a judge must have in deciding the issue of interim release. If this were the case, persons chargedwith certain types of offences would never be released because the perception of the public is negative with respect to the type of crimecommitted, while others, on the contrary, would almost automatically be released where the public's perception is neutral or moreindulgent....

Therefore, the perception of the public must be situated at another level, that of a public reasonably informed about oursystem of criminal law and capable of judging and perceiving without emotion that the application of the presumption of innocence, evenwith respect to interim release, has the effect that people, who may later be found guilty of even serious crimes, will be released for theperiod between the time of their arrest and the time of their trial. In other words, the criterion of the public perception must not be that ofthe lowest common denominator. [Emphasis added.] (R. v.

Lamothe (1990), (QCCA), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 530, at p. 541) LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK [117]

Section 515 of the Code deals with judicial interim release. Section 515(10) provides that the detention of an accused in custodyis justified on one or more of the following grounds: (

a) the primary ground - subsection (

a) indicates that where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in orderto be dealt with according to law; (

b) the secondary ground - subsection (

b) indicates that where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public,including a victim or witness of the offence, having regard to all the circumstances, including any substantial likelihood that the accusedwill, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and (

c) the tertiary ground - subsection (

c) indicates if detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice,having regard to all circumstances, including: (

i) the apparent strength of the prosecution's case, (ii) the gravity of the offence, (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and (iv) the fact that the accused is liable, upon conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offencethat involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

THE APPLICABLE LAW ON THE SECONDARY AND TERTIARY GROUNDS [118] The Primary Grounds are not being raised in this application but the Secondary and Tertiary Grounds are raised and requireconsideration. Secondary Ground [119] The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the secondary ground for detention in R. v. Morales, (SCC), [1992] 3S.C.R. 711 at para. 39, as follows: I am satisfied that the scope of the public safety component of s. 515(10)(

b) is sufficiently narrow to satisfy the first requirement under s.11(e). Bail is not denied for all individuals who pose a risk of committing an offence or interfering with the administration of justicewhile on bail. Bail is denied only for those who pose a "substantial likelihood" of committing an offence or interfering with the

administration of justice, and only where this "substantial likelihood" endangers "the protection or safety of the public". Moreover,detention is justified only when it is "necessary" for public safety. It is not justified where detention would merely be convenient oradvantageous. Such grounds are sufficiently narrow to fulfil the first requirement of just cause under s. 11(e). [120] The Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Perron, (1989) (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 518 at para. 530, wrote: Strong evidence, even overwhelming evidence, is only one factor to be considered among several other factors.

It alone must not lead thejudge to order the detention of the accused. The judge must, as our court did in Huard, [1987] Q.J. No. 1208, and in Montembeault,supra, take into evidence all the other indicia found in the evidence. If Parliament had wanted an Accused to be detained before trial inall cases where strong or even overwhelming evidence existed, it would have said so. Section 515(10) clearly says that detention beforetrial is limited to cases where it is necessary based on the criteria mentioned therein.

Tertiary Ground [121] In St-Cloud, (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the application of the tertiary ground and stated at paras. 87 and 88 asfollows: [87] I would summarize the essential principles that must guide justices in applying s. 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. as follows: • Section 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. does not create a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds fordetention ((

a) and (b)) are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of anaccused. • Section 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. must not be interpreted narrowly (or applied sparingly) and should not be applied only in rare cases orexceptional circumstances or only to certain types of crimes. • The four circumstances listed in s. 515(10)(

c) Cr. C. are not exhaustive. • A court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result. • The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed criteria. • The question whether a crime is "unexplainable" or "unexplained" is not a criterion that should guide the analysis. • No single circumstance is determinative. The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case todetermine whether detention is justified. • This involves balancing all the relevant circumstances.

At the end of this balancing exercise, the ultimate question to be asked bythe court is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. This is the test to be met under s.515(10)(c). • To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the "public", that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who isproperly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case.

However,this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused. • This reasonable person's confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to orderdetention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is notjustified. [88] In conclusion, if the crime is serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence against the accused and if the victim orvictims were vulnerable, pre-trial detention will usually be ordered.

POSITION OF CROWN ON THE JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE APPLICATION [122] Crown expresses no concerns on the primary ground. Crown admits that the Accused has strong ties to the community and is alow flight risk, and, therefore, it is not suggesting the Accused will not attend at court as required. [123] The major real concerns of Crown are, first of all, on the secondary ground. The Secondary Ground [124] In particular, Crown expresses concerns for the safety and wellbeing of the Complainant, who is an important Crown witnessand who has also sustained horrific injuries in the commission of the crime against her.

The Complainant has been the subject of verycruel, violent and relentless injuries, which can be characterized as very planned and deliberate and not in any way fleeting in nature. [125] She has been made the subject of very direct threats about her safety and even being murdered. Such threats have been backedup by the production of something that was at least an imitation firearm.

Therefore, the Complainant is extremely fearful for her safety. [126] Crown notes that all of the alleged crimes were committed in the "comfort of" the Accused's residence and involved theassistance of the female described as “Lori,” as well as the “well-dressed stranger.” The whereabouts of those two individuals ispresently unknown and their level of communication or contact with the Accused is also unknown. Thereby, the safety concerns for theComplainant, if the Accused is released, are heightened. [127] Therefore, Crown says detention of the Accused on the secondary ground is warranted

The Tertiary Ground [ 128 ] In submissions, Crown has gone through the essential principles that the Supreme Court of Canada identifies in St-Cloud and states that these must guide this court in this judicial interim release application when considering the tertiary ground.

Crown says that on the basis of that consideration, the Accused must be detained. [ 129 ] At the foundation of Crown's submission is what it describes as the "extraordinary strength" of the Crown's case. [ 130 ] Crown goes on to submit that the significant number of charges against the Accused are each very serious offences and upon conviction, each may lead to very lengthy and substantial custodial sentences. [ 131 ] Crown points, as it did in submissions on the secondary ground, at the same very cruel, violent and relentless injuries inflicted upon the Complainant being characterized as very planned and deliberate, all continuing for an extended duration and not in any way fleeting in nature.

Crown further describes the actions and the attitudes surrounding the offences as being brutal, with little empathy and a high degree of callousness. CASE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY CROWN [ 132 ] The Case authorities relied upon by Crown, in addition to R. v. St-Cloud , are as follows: 1. R. v. S.D.G. , 2015 BCPC 460 , a decision of the Honourable Judge Flewelling of this Court; and 2. R. v. Natara , Duncan Registry file 37707-2-C, a decision of the Honourable Judge Rogers of this Court.

POSITION OF THE ACCUSED ON THE JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE APPLICATION [ 133 ] I do not understand defence counsel to be denying that the Complainant has been assaulted with the resulting injuries, but rather that the allegations that the Accused is responsible and that it occurred at the Residence are denied and those allegations must bear careful scrutiny. [ 134 ] The Accused's counsel says that little reliance can be placed upon the statements made by the Complainant to the police, citing inconsistencies and incorrect information. [ 135 ] Defence submits that the Complainant is a hard drug user and this was evident by a previous episode of the Complainant becoming unconscious on the Farm due to drug use and substantiated by the drug paraphernalia, including needles and pipes, found in her suite. [ 136 ] It is submitted that she was unreliable from the outset when she utilized the false name of "Amanda Bains" when dealing with the police.

Crown, in reply, noted that the Complainant's explanation was that her mouth injuries resulted in her being misunderstood which defence says is not believable. Further, defence does note that at the outset, she was most reluctant to provide information to the police. [ 137 ] The defence points to several parts of the Complainant's narrative about the alleged crimes which it contends defy logic or common sense.

Some examples include the Complainant's decision upon making her final escape not to run directly to some safe location, but to take time to return to her suite, to look for her old cell phone and to change her clothes before departing.

The defence questions why she would not have simply run directly to the neighbours on the T.B. property or have gone directly to the tenant C.W., whom it is suggested would have been present on the Farm. [ 138 ] Defence suggests that the Complainant is inaccurate and unreliable because she is attempting to deflect any suspicion away from herself for the alleged break-ins at the Residence to L.B. when she spoke to the police. [ 139 ] Furthermore, defence points to errors such as the Complainant’s saying, in her statement, that she resided in a basement suite on the Farm, when clearly she resided in a suite above one of the barn outbuildings. [ 140 ] Defence further suggests that the statements of Mr.

J.T. and Mr. J.P. are seriously weakened because they did not do the obvious thing and phone the RCMP when they allegedly observed a serious form of apprehension of a bound female taking place. [ 141 ] Defence points out that the half handcuff found on the driveway area was in an area that defence says was actually closer to the outbuilding on the T.B. property rather than the Residence. [ 142 ] Defence also suggests that notwithstanding the comprehensive search of the Residence, there were no zap straps located, no drugs or drug paraphernalia or other items that would link the Accused to the drug trade found.

Given the injuries of the Complainant, a "surprising absence" of blood was detected.

There was no evidence of cleaning of the Residence having taken place, and no forensic evidence of the Complainant to link her as having been present in the Residence. [ 143 ] Defence suggests that C.W. is a key independent witness who was apparently present at the Farm and in her portion of the Residence throughout the period of the alleged confinement, assaults and torture that took place in the Residence, close at hand in her suite, yet she heard nothing nor saw anything of that sort. [ 144 ] Defence submits that any concerns on either the secondary or tertiary grounds can be addressed by the release plan that has been proposed and, specifically, with the use of electronic monitoring.

Defence argues that proposition on the basis of several of the Ontario decisions which defence has put before the court. CASES AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY DEFENCE

[145] The Case authorities relied upon by the defence, in addition to R. v. St-Cloud, are as follows: 1. R. v. A.V.G., 2015 BCPC 438 , 2015 B.C.J. No. 3050; 2015 BCPC 438, a decision of the Honourable Judge Challengerof this Court; 2. R. v. A.B., (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 394; 3. R. v. Lesniak, [2012] O.J. No. 6687; 4. R. v. Muratore, 2013 ONCS 4594 , [2013] O.J. No. 6123; 5. R. v. N.J., [2012] O.J. No. 6532; 6. R. v. T.R., [2013] O.J. No. 470; and 7. R. v. Ascenzi, [2013] O.J. No. 6484.

OTHER USEFUL AUTHORITIES [146] I have reviewed some other useful case authorities that have been of assistance in reaching my decision, as follows: 1. R. v. Abdel-Rahman, [2010] B.C.J. No. 238; 2. R. v. MacDougal, 1999 BCCA 509 ; 3. R. v. Nadeau, 2017 BCPC 150; 4. R. v. Dixon, 2017 BCCA 192; and 5. R. v.

Des Roches, Victoria Registry docket 162124 (BCSC). [147] I wish to state that notwithstanding the fact that I may not make a specific reference to all of the cases placed before me, I havecarefully reviewed all of those authorities and taken them into account in making my decision on this judicial interim release application.

ANALYSIS Apparent Strength of the Crown's Case [148] Having carefully considered the information that has been presented to me both by Crown and by defence, and including theevidence of other witnesses and the circumstantial evidence that ties in with the version of events provided by the Complainant, I havereached the following conclusion. I have concluded that the Crown has a strong case against the Accused. I say that in recognition thatthe assessment of the strength of the Crown's case is always difficult at this stage.

The Crown's case may appear stronger than it actuallyis because the evidence has not been given under oath and has not been tested by cross-examination, either rigorously or otherwise. [149] In my view, the weaknesses of the Crown's case relied upon by defence are not compelling. [150] I am mindful that in the absence of any DNA evidence that flows from the blood recovered in the Residence, this case will turn,to a large extent, on the direct evidence of the Complainant in order to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

In my view, as notedabove, there appears to be strong circumstantial evidence and corroborating evidence that has been referred to in this judicial interimrelease hearing. CONSIDERATION OF AND CONCLUSION ON THE PRIMARY GROUND [151] Given the similar positions of the parties, and having regard to the personal circumstances of the Accused and his ties to thelocal community, I agree that there are no primary ground concerns and therefore the Accused's detention on the primary ground is notwarranted.

CONSIDERATION OF THE SECONDARY GROUND [152] The basis for detention of the Accused on the secondary ground requires the court to determine if it is necessary for theprotection or safety of the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including any substantial likelihood that the Accused will, ifreleased from custody, commit a criminal offence.

Protection of the public includes any victim or a witness to the offence which is animportant consideration in this case. [153] The court must decide whether the Accused does or does not pose a serious risk or likelihood of dangerousness (see R. vRondeau (1996), (QC CA), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Que. C.A.) at p. 478). [154] The British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. Wu, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2854 (C.A.) at para. 10, citing R. v.

Rondeau, said: The Court must consider the respondent's past behaviour and his behaviour at the time of the present offence in consideringdangerousness, in order to determine whether detention is justified under the secondary ground in considering whether to make anassessment of the likelihood of dangerousness. [155] The Court of Appeal followed R. v. Rondeau in R. v. Wu, and applied the following relevant factors in assessing thedangerousness of the accused in that case (see R. v. Rondeau at p. 478; and R. v. Wu at para. 10):

1. the nature of the offence; 2. the relevant circumstances of the offence; 3. the likelihood of a conviction; 4. the degree of participation of the accused; 5. the relationship between the accused and the victim; 6. the profile of the accused; 7. the conduct of the accused prior to the commission of the offence; and 8. the danger which the interim release of the accused represents for the community. [ 156 ] In R. v. Abdel-Rahman, supra, at para. 21, Mr. Justice Halfyard, relying on the statements in R. v.

Morales , supra , at para. 39 , adopted the principal that bail is denied on the secondary ground only for those who pose a "substantial likelihood" of committing an offence or interfering with the administration of justice, and only where this "substantial likelihood" endangers the "protection or safety of the public." Moreover, he noted that detention is justified only when it is "necessary" for public safety and it is not justified where detention would merely be convenient or advantageous. [ 157 ] Mr. Justice Halfyard then goes on to say as follows at paras. 22 to 24 inclusive: [22] In R. v.

Wilcox , 2005 BCSC 1785 , Mr. Justice Barrow (at para. 22) further clarified the limits of the secondary ground by stating that bail should not be denied unless "that risk cannot be adequately addressed by the imposition of appropriate terms of release".

I take this statement to refer to the "necessity" of detention, and to mean that even significant risks can be addressed by strict bail conditions, provided the risk to public safety does not amount to a "substantial likelihood." [23] In my opinion, the decisions that a judge must necessarily make in order to reach the conclusion that detention is justified on the secondary ground, are the following: (

a) First, that there is a risk that the accused will either commit an offence, or will interfere with the administration of justice, if he is released; (

b) Second, that this risk is of such magnitude that it amounts to a "substantial likelihood"; (

c) Third, that the said risk would constitute a danger to public safety (in general, or to a specific victim or witness) if the accused is released; and (

d) Fourth, that the detention of the accused is "necessary", because the identified danger to public safety cannot be prevented or reduced to an acceptable level by bail conditions (such as reporting to authorities, curfew, no-contact, mobility restrictions, sureties or cash bail). [24] In describing the foregoing decisions, I am relying on my

interpretation of the majority judgment of Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. Morales . [ 158 ] Following my consideration of the factors outlined in R. v.

Wu , I have concluded that on the whole of the circumstances presented to this Court that the factors enumerated from (1) to (5) weigh very heavily in favour of detention of the Accused. [ 159 ] These are serious offences, with highly alarming and horrendous circumstances, there is a high likelihood of conviction and a very high degree of apparent participation of the Accused in the offences, and they involve a Complainant well known to the Accused who was in very vulnerable circumstances. [ 160 ] With respect to relevant factors (6) and (7), I have concluded that the profile of the Accused, with a limited and very dated criminal record and with seemingly absent violent conduct prior to the commission of the offence, favours his release. [ 161 ] With respect to factor (8), namely the danger which the interim release poses to the community, I have concluded that the general public is not at risk but that there is a great concern for the safety of the Complainant and a reasonable possibility of interference with the administration of justice as it relates to the key witnesses for the Crown, specifically, Ms.

B.S, Ms.

C.W. and the Complainant. [ 162 ] In my view, the secondary ground concerns can be, for the most part, addressed and reduced to an acceptable level by the release plan put forward by defence but with some other notable features to it, as set forth below. [ 163 ] In my view, given all the circumstances in this case, a satisfactory release plan would require that the cash bail to be deposited would have to be no less than $50,000, it would require around-the-clock electronic monitoring of the Accused and a virtual house arrest by way of his confinement to the Residence or within a defined radius of the Residence, all with limited exceptions.

It would also be necessary that other very strict and broad conditions restraining the liberty of the Accused, including strict prevention of any possible contact or communication directly or indirectly with the Complainant and the key Crown witnesses, would all be necessary. CONCLUSION ON THE SECONDARY GROUND [ 164 ] Given all of the above, I would not detain the Accused on the secondary ground and would release him on such conditions were it not for the tertiary ground considerations.

CONSIDERATION OF THE TERTIARY GROUND [ 165 ] I turn now to the tertiary grounds. In doing so I must now consider the four circumstances as part of the assessment as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. St-Cloud . [ 166 ] First, for the reasons I have noted above, I have concluded that the Crown has a strong case against the Accused. [ 167 ] Second, the Accused faces a number of very serious offences as I have outlined at the outset.

The maximum penalties, and in one case the minimum penalty, that Parliament has determined for these offences informs that conclusion. [ 168 ] Third, the circumstances surrounding these offences are at the very least highly concerning, especially in view of the visible injuries inflicted upon the Complainant. [ 169 ] It is clear to me on the basis of the photographic evidence that a strong inference can be drawn that this Complainant was tortured in a manner consistent with her report to the police. [ 170 ] Torture, in my view, is a complete affront to our societal values.

The alleged threatening use of an imitation hand gun to cause fear, the use of a cattle prod to administer electric shocks to a human being, and the use of water in a manner designed to cause the Complainant serious interrupted breathing problems (which thereby meets the common definition of "waterboarding") are each, individually highly repugnant and collectively a sign of completely barbaric, sadistic and dehumanizing behaviour, more likely to be found in a failed nation state or a despotic, authoritarian regime. [ 171 ] Fourth, in this case, given the number and the type of offences and the serious nature of them, upon conviction the Accused faces a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment. [ 172 ] As noted in St-Cloud , a determination on the tertiary grounds requires a balancing of all the relevant circumstances.

At the end of that balancing exercise, the ultimate question that I must ask is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. [ 173 ] I must further adopt the perspective of the "public" being the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case.

That person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the Accused. [ 174 ] In my view, in these circumstances, that reasonable person's confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined if this court declines to order the detention of the Accused in this case. I am of the view that in all the circumstances, detention is justified on the tertiary ground. [ 175 ] In my view, even the imposition of a strict form of release that I have outlined in my consideration of the secondary ground would not satisfy tertiary ground concerns.

CONCLUSION ON THE TERTIARY GROUND [ 176 ] Therefore I order the Accused detained on the tertiary ground. [ 177 ] That concludes my reasons on this application. [REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED]