R. v. W.F.G., 2022 BCSC 1394

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. W.F.G., 2022 BCSC 1394 Date: 20220810 Docket: 39559 Registry: Port Alberni Between: Regina v. W.F.G. Restriction on Publication: Permanent Order in Respect of the Complainant Pursuant to Criminal Code , s. 486.4(1) (a)(

i) and

(2) Before: The Honourable Justice Fitzpatrick Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: C.S. Proteau Counsel for the Accused: C. L. Hodson F. Wallace Place and Date of Hearing: Port Alberni, B.C. July 19, 2022 Place and Date of Judgment: Port Alberni, B.C. August 10, 2022 Introduction [ 1 ] On March 28, 2022, following trial, Mr. G. was convicted of one count of sexual assault of L.M., contrary to s. 271(1) of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46): R. v. W.F.G. , 2022 BCSC 519 [ Trial Reasons ]. [ 2 ] The present hearing is to determine the sentence to be imposed on Mr. G.

Circumstances Of The Offence [ 3 ] On January 31, 2019, L.M. was an 18-year old Aboriginal woman. She had returned to the Ty-Histanis community outside of Tofino, BC to visit relatives who lived there. L.M. had a large group of extended family who lived in Ty-Histanis. One of those persons was Mr. G, a 49-year old man, who L.M. knew. Mr. G was related to L.M. by marriage and L.M. called him “uncle”. [ 4 ] On that evening, L.M. was drinking with some of her relatives. She became very intoxicated. At some time in the evening, the group arrived at her grandmother’s house. Her grandmother is Mr. G’s mother.

L.M. passed out or fell asleep in the back seat of her grandmother’s vehicle. [ 5 ] Early the next day, L.M. woke up in the vehicle. Her cousin was in the front driver’s seat and asleep or passed out. Mr. G was in the front passenger seat. L.M. says that she woke and found Mr. G in the process of placing his fingers in her vagina and licking her vagina and the surrounding area. Her brassiere was pushed over her breasts. L.M. began telling Mr. G to stop. She said that she was his niece and what he was doing was wrong.

She also kicked him to stop the assault. [ 6 ] L.M. has provided a victim impact statement for this sentencing. This statement is consistent with L.M.’s testimony at trial when she described that the sexual assault had a significant and continuing impact on her. In the Trial Reasons , I stated: [117] L.M. was clearly attempting to recall what she considered to be a very traumatic event, one that she says she still lives with to this day. In my view, there was nothing in her evidence to suggest that she was fabricating her recall of the events. L.M. did not display any animus or malice toward [Mr.

G] that might ground such an accusation—to the contrary, L.M. considered that [Mr. G] was a close family member, no doubt leading to her emotional devastation by what she perceives as a violation of the trust in their prior relationship. … [148] When considered in context, L.M. was not shaken on the “core” of the facts asserted by her—that she was sexually assaulted by [Mr. G], her “uncle”, in the backseat of her grandmother’s vehicle. She was very familiar with [Mr. G], having known him her whole life.

She describes being traumatized by the violation of her body while she was severely intoxicated and in a vulnerable position and I

consider that she sincerely conveyed her trauma during this trial. Circumstances Of The Offender [ 7 ] In addition to defence submissions, I have had the benefit of receiving and reviewing a variety of reports in relation to Mr. G:

a) Pre-Sentence Report dated July 17, 2022 (the “PSR”);

b) BC Mental Health and Substance Use Services Report dated July 11, 2022 (the “Mental Health Report”); and

c) a Gladue Report filed July 18, 2022. [ 8 ] Mr. G is currently 53 years old. He was born in Port Alberni, BC. Mr. G is a member of the Ahousaht First Nation. He has four children and two step-children. He also maintains a relationship with his mother, and his father until his recent death. [ 9 ] Mr. G graduated from high school. He has been gainfully employed from an early age in the fishing industry. Most recently, he has acquired two commercial fishing boats. [ 10 ] Mr. G was in a previous long-term relationship that ended in 2015. Just after this incident in 2019, Mr. G began a relationship with D.P. Mr.

G and D.P. remain in that relationship today and both state that they have made positive efforts to abstain from alcohol and drugs. Mr. G states that he has been sober now for almost two years. [ 11 ] Unfortunately, Mr. G’s history and the history of his family is rife with the usual life experiences that have marred BC’s Aboriginal communities for years, if not decades. Both his parents attended residential schools and he reports that over 13 family members, in total, attending such facilities. His home life involved witnessing both physical and alcohol abuse on a regular basis.

He began using drugs and alcohol from a young age. He attended residential day school in Ahousaht, where he reports both verbal and physical abuse. Mr. G also states that he was sexually abused in his teens. [ 12 ] After a sexual assault conviction in 2013 (discussed below), Mr. G lost his hereditary status within the First Nation, although he purports to still hold a “high rank” in that culture. [ 13 ] Mr.

G has provided various letters of support from many persons in his life, namely, his mother, his sister, D.P., his counsellor and another First Nations person who has known him for about two years. [ 14 ] I have also considered Mr. G’s criminal record. Mr. G’s record includes: a dated mischief conviction (1989) and various driving offence convictions (2009, 2012 and 2014). The most recent driving offence (2014) was driving while prohibited, which prohibition was imposed in April 2013. In March 2015, this conviction resulted in a 14-day jail term and probation.

Although the details of the driving offences were not disclosed, the clear inference is that they are alcohol related to a degree. [ 15 ] Of some significance is that, in March 2012, Mr. G committed a sexual assault. The Crown has provided details of this matter, some aspects of which bear some similarity to the circumstances of the present conviction. [ 16 ] The victim was Mr. G’s step-daughter, whose age is unknown. A young relative in the house entered a bedroom and saw Mr. G lying on top of his step-daughter, whose pants were around her ankles.

At the time, the step-daughter was lying on her stomach and not awake; Mr. G was inserting his penis into her anus. This relative told another young person in the house that Mr. G was “raping” the step-daughter. The person who saw this incident yelled for Mr. G to get off the step-daughter. Mr. G did and left the room. The step- daughter did not wake up until sometime later. [ 17 ] In October 2013, Mr. G was convicted for this sexual assault; he received a 12-month jail term and probation.

The Crown submits that the sentence was “low”, although it is uncertain whether the conviction arose from a trial or a guilty plea and whether there was a joint submission on sentence. [ 18 ] The author of the Mental Health Report states that Mr. G has various diagnoses, being Alcohol Use Disorder, Stimulant Use Disorder, both in sustained remission, and Other Psychotic Disorder, arising from auditory hallucinations that Mr. G states he experiences. [ 19 ] The author of the Mental Health Report opines that Mr. G presents a “moderate risk” for sexual offending.

He notes the similarities between the sexual assault on his step-daughter and the assault on L.M.: both involved a breach of trust; Mr. G and the victim were drinking heavily prior to the offence; and Mr. G sexually assaulted the victims while they were unconscious. The author further states that any repetition of these “offence pathways” present future risk scenarios. [ 20 ] Future recommendations for Mr. G’s treatment include participation in a sexual offender treatment program, relapse prevention treatment, aggressive psychotherapy and ongoing psychiatric care.

The author of the Mental Health Report also reports some concern about Mr. G’s participation in some support groups for sexual assault victims in the local community, a concern that I share, as there is no independent confirmation that these groups knew of Mr. G’s past, as he states. Principles Of Sentencing [ 21 ] A conviction of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code allows a maximum sentence of ten years. [ 22 ] The Crown and defence agree on the relevant statutory provisions effective at the time of the offence:

Purpose 718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and themaintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community. Objectives — offence against vulnerable person 718.04 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personalcircumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectivesof denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

Fundamental principle 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Other sentencing principles 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to theoffence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, … (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, …. shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders,with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. [Emphasis added.] [23] As is evident from the above statutory provisions, a tension exists here between the principle of primarily focussing ondenunciation and deterrence where there is an Aboriginal female victim (L.M.) (s. 718.04) and considering the availability of arestorative approach in respect of an Aboriginal offender (Mr. G) (s. 718.2(e)). [24] Both sentencing principles apply here, and no provision is paramount to the other: R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para. 22. [25]

Section 718.04 recognizes that all of the protections of our criminal law apply equally to Aboriginal woman and children: R. v.R.R.M., 2009 BCCA 578 at paras. 22–23. This provision also recognizes that such persons have a vulnerability and that such victimssuffer disproportionate rates of oppression and violence in our communities: R. v. West, 2020 BCSC 352 at paras. 34–37. [26]

Section 718.2(

e) also applies here, as the systemic factors affecting Aboriginal people in our communities are clearly relevant toMr. G’s circumstances, both in terms of that general heritage and his own personal history. They include racism, discrimination,substance abuse, violence, and family and community dislocation. [27] I am aware of the principles outlined in R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC13. In summarizing the principles from Gladue, the Court in Ipeelee stated: [59] The Court held, therefore, that s. 718.2(

e) of the Code is a remedial provision designed to ameliorate the serious problem ofoverrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorativeapproach to sentencing (Gladue, at para. 93). It does more than affirm existing principles of sentencing; it calls upon judges to use adifferent method of analysis in determining a fit sentence for Aboriginal offenders.

Section 718.2 (

e) directs sentencing judges to payparticular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique and different from those of non-

Aboriginal offenders (Gladue, at para. 37). When sentencing an Aboriginal offender, a judge must consider: (

a) the unique systemic orbackground factors which may have played a

part in bringing the particular Aboriginal offender before the courts; and (

b) the types ofsentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particularAboriginal heritage or connection (Gladue, at para. 66).

Judges may take judicial notice of the broad systemic and background factorsaffecting Aboriginal people generally, but additional case-specific information will have to come from counsel and from the pre-sentencereport (Gladue, at paras. 83-84). [28] In Wells, at paras. 36-42, the Court emphasized that, within the scope of s. 718.2(e), the court must still consider the matter on acase-by-case basis, considering the offence, the offender, the victim and the community.

The fact that an offender is Aboriginal does notdictate that a restorative approach is appropriate or should be given priority over other sentencing objectives, such as are relevant here. [29] In Wells, the Court stated: [44] Let me emphasize that s. 718.2(

e) requires a different methodology for assessing a fit sentence for an aboriginal offender; it doesnot mandate, necessarily, a different result.

Section 718.2(

e) does not alter the fundamental duty of the sentencing judge to impose asentence that is fit for the offence and the offender. Furthermore, in Gladue, as mentioned the Court stressed that the application ofs. 718.2(

e) does not mean that aboriginal offenders must always be sentenced in a manner which gives greatest weight to the principles ofrestorative justice and less weight to goals such as deterrence, denunciation, and separation (at para. 78). As a result, it will generally bethe case, as a practical matter, that particularly violent and serious offences will result in imprisonment for aboriginal offenders as oftenas for non-aboriginal offenders (Gladue, at para. 33).

Accordingly, I conclude that it was open to the trial judge to give primacy to theprinciples of denunciation and deterrence in this case on the basis that the crime involved was a serious one. [Emphasis in original.] [30] In Wells at para. 43, the Court stated that the more serious the crime, the more likely that the sentence will be same forAboriginal offenders as for non-Aboriginal offenders. This statement has been applied countless times since: see R. v.

Ladue, 2011BCCA 101 at para. 45 and West at para. 43. [31] The matter is then to balance these two seemingly competing sentencing principles—along with other relevant sentencingprinciples that apply. In doing so, the Court must recognize the harm to the victim and the seriousness of the crime—yet recognize thesystemic or background factors that may have led to this offence in terms of an offender’s moral blameworthiness: West at paras. 41-42. Positions of Crown/Defence [32] Both Crown and defence agree that a jail term is appropriate here.

However, they disagree as to what length of jail sentenceshould be imposed. [33] The Crown seeks a jail sentence of 3–4 years. The Crown says that the range of sentence, discussed below, is 2–6 years and thatits recommendation is in the middle of the range. But for Mr. G’s previous criminal record and the similar sexual assault conviction, theCrown would have sought 2–3 years jail time. [34] The defence contends that the applicable range is 12–30 months jail time. Counsel contend that Mr. G should receive a jailsentence of two years less a day, plus probation for two years.

Mitigating/Aggravating Factors [35] The relevant aggravating and mitigating factors are as follows. [36] Aggravating factors include that L.M. was considered “family” to Mr. G and therefore, he was in a position of trust and authorityin relation to her, which was breached. He was a 49-year man who L.M. called “uncle”. Further, L.M. was barely 18-years old at thetime of the offence, having reached the age of majority just before the assault. Finally, Mr. G’s assault of L.M. took place when she wasin a particularly vulnerable state, being unconscious and intoxicated or asleep. [37] The mitigating aspect is Mr.

G’s significant Gladue factors, evident from the various reports submitted at this sentencing. Mr. Gappears to be making real progress in his life on many fronts, including achieving sobriety, and he has the support of his family and somemembers of his community. [38] The reports indicate that Mr. G does not accept responsibility for the assault and continues to deny his guilt. I accept withouthesitation that this is not an aggravating factor; it is simply a lack of a mitigating factor if, for example, Mr. G had expressed remorse forthe offence: R. v. Pouce Coupe, 2014 BCCA 255 at para. 24.

Discussion [39] The disagreement between the Crown and defence largely arises from a different position as to what range of sentence applies tothese circumstances, as noted above. Ranges are just that and are to be considered within the specific circumstances before the Court or,as is usually stated, the individualized sentencing process. A “substantial and marked departure” of a sentence outside of the range willinevitably be questioned as unfit: R. v.

M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at paras. 90–92. [40] The Crown refers to the following cases [41] Wells involved similar facts where there was a sexual assault of an 18-year old Aboriginal woman who was unconscious at thetime. There were vaginal abrasions but no evidence of penetration. The Court upheld a 20-month jail term. [42] R. v. Williams, 2011 BCCA 194 is a case that also involved similar facts where there was a sexual assault of a 14-year old

Aboriginal girl who was unconscious at the time. The offender was found with his hand in her vagina. There was a vaginal tear and white fluid in the victim’s vagina. As in Wells , the court recognized the seriousness of the offence (para. 10) and the significant impact on the victim (para. 4). The court upheld a two-year jail term and three years probation. [ 43 ] Pouce Coupe involved a sexual assault by a 19-year old Aboriginal man against a 15-year old Aboriginal girl. Distinguishing facts from this case were that the attack was particularly violent, and also that the offender did not have a criminal record.

Like Mr. G, the offender had begun to address his alcohol abuse and had stopped drinking. At para. 31, the court stated that the range for sexual assault involving intercourse was 2–6 years. A sentence of three-years imprisonment was upheld. [ 44 ] In R. v. Hume , 2016 BCCA 230 , the offender was found guilty of sexual assault and unlawful confinement with respect to an intoxicated victim. The offender had no criminal record and was not Aboriginal. At paras. 35–40, the court stated that a sexual assault can still be described as “serious” even without forced intercourse or penetration.

A sentence of 3-years imprisonment was upheld. [ 45 ] In R. v. Ramzan , 2022 BCSC 222 , the non-Aboriginal offender plead guilty to two counts of sexual assault on two separate victims. Both victims were in their late teens. The offender had no criminal record and was remorseful. Justice Duncan stated: [75] [The Crown] notes that the range of sentence for sexual assault involving forced penile intercourse is between two and six years.

Forced digital penetration and fellatio are also serious violations of a victim’s sexual integrity and cause significant harm. … [ 46 ] At para. 99 of Ramzan , Duncan J. accepted that the range for serious sexual assault was 2–6 years, as set out in R. v. G.M. , 2015 BCCA 165 .

Further, in Ramzan , she stated: [97] The circumstances in G.M. involved forced anal intercourse, I can find no principled reason to regard the sexual violation in this case as less serious because it was digital rather than penile, except to say that the complainants were spared the worry of sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy by Mr. Ramzan’s modus operandi . [98] The Yukon Court of Appeal in Rosenthal observed that there is no logical basis on which to exclude sexual assault by digital penetration from the range applicable to cases involving sexual intercourse: at paras. 7-8.

More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 resoundingly rejected the relevance of distinguishing between digital and penile penetration in the context of sexual offences against children. [ 47 ] The defence concedes that the range is 2–6 years jail time for sexual assault cases involving penile penetration: Pouce Coupe at para. 31 , citing R. v. B.S.B. , 2008 BCSC 1526 . However, the defence suggests that a lower range applies where there is digital penetration. The defence refers to the following cases. [ 48 ] In R. v.

Yamelst , 2013 BCSC 1689 , the offender was Aboriginal and, like Mr. G, had significant Gladue factors in his past. The offender also had no relevant criminal record. The victim of the sexual assault was asleep and also, intoxicated (as was the offender). At para. 45, the Court accepted that the appropriate range on the circumstances was 16–30 months jail time, noting in particular that there was no breach of trust, as there is here. The sentence imposed was 18 months jail time plus 18 months probation. [ 49 ] In R. v. Eustache , 2014 BCCA 337 , the sentence was 12 months incarceration and two-years’ probation.

The circumstances were similar to those here in that the Aboriginal offender’s sexual assault (which did not involve penile penetration) was in respect of an unconscious victim who had just turned 18-years old. The sentence was upheld, with the court noting that the Crown and defence were in agreement that the upper range was three years (para. 15). [ 50 ] In R. v. Rosenthal , 2015 YKCA 1 , the court referred to the range in Yukon—involving non-consensual sexual intercourse with a sleeping or unconscious victim—as being 12–30 months jail time.

The suspended sentence in the court below was found to be unfit and a 14-month jail term was imposed. As was noted in Ramzan , above, the relevant passage from Rosenthal is: [8] There is no logical basis on which to exclude assault by digital penetration from the range, it being a serious and invasive form of sexual assault, as recognized by the trial judge. [ 51 ] In West , the Aboriginal offender with significant Gladue factors plead guilty to a sexual assault and sexual touching of that victim’s nine-year old daughter, both Aboriginal. Like Mr.

G, the offender had a previous conviction for sexual assault for which he received an 18-month jail term and 18 months probation. The Court accepted the joint submission for a sentence of 33.5 months jail time and 18 months probation. [ 52 ] In R. v. L.J.P. , 2020 BCPC 270 , the Aboriginal offender with significant Gladue factors plead guilty to a sexual assault in similar circumstances to those here. As with L.M., the victim was devastated by the offence since she trusted him “like a brother”. The offender had a lengthy record but not involving any sexual assaults.

Another mitigating factor was the offender’s serious health condition. [ 53 ] At para. 54 of L.J.P. , the court stated that the range of sentence was 12–33.5 months. The sentence imposed was 17 months jail time and two years probation. On the issue of penile versus non-penile penetration, the court stated: [46] L.J.P. put his finger up D.R.’s vagina. This is about as invasive as it gets. It is a horrible affront to her dignity and sexual integrity. An offence involving digital penetration is no less serious than penile penetration.

L.J.P. denies that there was any penile penetration, but given that he had his pants down and was on top of D.R. when she awakened and pushed him off, I find that the lack of penile penetration is more a matter of timing than intention. Ancillary Orders [ 54 ] The Crown seeks various ancillary orders, which are not opposed by the defence. Accordingly, the following ancillary orders are granted:

a) a DNA order in respect of the offence, which is mandatory in the circumstances, in light of this being a “primary designated offence”: Criminal Code , ss. 487.04 (

a) and 487.051(1) ;

b) a mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition in respect of the offence: Criminal Code , ss.109(1) and (3) ;

c) a lifetime SOIRA in respect of the sexual assault conviction, which is mandatory as being a “designated offence”: Criminal Code , ss. 490.011(1) (a), 490.012(1) and 490.013 ;

d) a non-communication order with respect to L.M. while Mr. G is in custody: Criminal Code , s. 743.21(1) ; and

e) an order that Mr. G pay a victim surcharge in respect of the offence, being $200: Criminal Code , s. 737 . Sentence [ 55 ] As is evident above, the range of potential sentences is large. This is not surprising given the unique circumstances that are usually involved, particularly as it relates to Aboriginal victims and Aboriginal offenders. [ 56 ] Was this offence serious? Yes. [ 57 ] Mr. G was in a position of trust and authority in relation to L.M. and he abused that position.

The impact on L.M. has been significant and continues to be so, as I outlined in the Trial Reasons , quoted above, and L.M.’s recent statement. While there was no evidence of penile penetration, the course of the assault was extensive and a serious violation of L.M.’s personal and sexual integrity. As the above authorities make clear, this type of violation does not lessen the seriousness of the assault. In addition to Mr. G digitally penetrating L.M. and performing oral sex on her, Mr. G was also fondling her breasts. Mr. G. did not stop when L.M. told him to stop; he only stopped once L.M. was able to kick him.

At that time, Mr. G made attempts to protect himself—asserting that L.M. had consented —which was clearly a lie. [ 58 ] While this case does not attract a level of seriousness arising from an assault on a child, L.M. had just reached the age of maturity. The assault took place in a cowardly manner when L.M. was in a significantly vulnerable state, being unconscious and unable to defend herself. [ 59 ] In the above circumstances, s. 718.04 of the Criminal Code requires that I give primary consideration to the principles of denunciation and deterrence. [ 60 ] Mr.

G bears a high degree of moral blameworthiness arising from his assault of L.M. It is apparent—as counsel and the Court accept—that this blameworthiness can be linked to a degree from his extremely unfortunate background, although such a link is not strictly required. In that event, an application of s. 718.2 (

e) of the Criminal Code requires me to consider his significant Gladue factors and any avenues that are appropriate toward a rehabilitative and restorative approach. [ 61 ] There are no other mitigating factors, beyond that noted above, that might have been considered at this sentencing, such as a guilty plea, health issues or an expression of remorse. [ 62 ] Finally, I must acknowledge Mr. G’s previous conviction. The similarities between Mr. G’s assault of his step-daughter and the assault of L.M. cannot be ignored and must factor into Mr. G’s sentence.

Both involved attacks on vulnerable young women (or perhaps, a girl) who were part of Mr. G’s family and who were both unconscious at the time. Many of the cases cited by both Crown and defence involve these same scenarios, particularly in Aboriginal communities, as was noted in Rosenthal at paras. 12-13 (Yukon) and L.J.P. at para. 25 (BC).

These scenarios all typically involve the same toxic ingredients—namely, alcohol, intoxication, unconscious vulnerable females and male opportunity. [ 63 ] In that event, this previous sexual assault conviction can contribute toward a sentence toward the higher end of the range: West at paras. 20 and 46 . [ 64 ] I acknowledge that, at the time, Mr. G was very intoxicated or coming from such a state, although such a circumstance does not reduce his moral blameworthiness: R. v. Craig , 2005 BCCA 484 at para. 15 . In any event, Mr.

G does not advance any argument to that effect in an attempt to lessen his sentence for that reason. [ 65 ] In short, these types of offences are egregious and a message must be sent to the communities in which they are prevalent that such behavior is unacceptable. These women and children, including Aboriginal women and children, deserve no less from our justice system. [ 66 ] I acknowledge and commend Mr. G on his more recent efforts to achieve stability in his life, particularly his abstinence to address his alcohol and substance abuse issues. In addition, Mr.

G has undertaken positive steps in his life with his supportive relationship with D.P. and his new employment opportunities with his fishing boats. He has addressed some of his issues with some counselling but it is clear that he has a long way to go on that path. While in custody, I expect that Mr. G will undertake a sex offender program and also, address his other issues, including alcohol/substance abuse, mental health issues and past trauma. [ 67 ] As noted by the author of the Mental Health Report, Mr. G still stands as a “moderate” risk of offending, particularly if the “pathways” to offending are present.

I acknowledge that Mr. G has addressed his alcohol consumption issues to some degree. However, I remain concerned about ongoing risk and also, about Mr. G seeking out contact with vulnerable victims of sexual assault without having undertaken and completed the necessary programming. [ 68 ] Mr. G., please rise. I sentence you to a 28-month jail term in respect of this sexual assault conviction. “Fitzpatrick J.”