2020 QCCA 1172, 2020 QCCA 1172

R. c. Foster 2020 QCCA 1172 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-007207-192 (500-01-125898-152) DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 2020 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE PATRICK HEALY, J.A. STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A. STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN APPELLANT - Prosecutrix v.

QUINTIN FOSTER RESPONDENT - Accused JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is an appeal by the prosecution against an intermittent sentence of ninety days, to be followed by supervised probation for three years, that was imposed by the Honourable Joëlle Roy of the Court of Quebec, district of Montreal, on 25 October 2019. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Healy J.A., with which Hamilton and Sansfaçon JJ.A. concur, THE COURT: [ 3 ] GRANTS leave to appeal; [ 4 ] ALLOWS the appeal in part; [ 5 ] QUASHES the order for an intermittent sentence; [ 6 ] SUBSTITUTES a term of imprisonment for fifteen months, from which will be subtracted ninety days already served that will be calculated at a ratio of 1.5 for a total of 135 days; [ 7 ] ORDERS the respondent to surrender to prison authorities not later than noon on 22 September 2020; [ 8 ] ORDERS that the remainder of the sentence remains unchanged except that the term of probation be reduced to account for the period of probation already served PATRICK HEALY, J.A.

STEPHEN W. HAMILTON, J.A. STÉPHANE SANSFAÇON, J.A. Mtre Marianna Ferraro DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL AND PENAL PROSECUTIONS For Appellant Mtre Andrew Barbacki For Respondent

Date of hearing: 7 July 2020 REASONS OF HEALY, J.A. [ 9 ] This is an appeal by the prosecution against an intermittent sentence of ninety days, to be followed by supervised probation for three years, [1] after the respondent pleaded guilty in the Court of Quebec, District of Montreal, to one count of aggravated assault. [2] The appellant submits that the nature and duration of an intermittent sentence are unfit for the offence and the offender in this case.

Facts [ 10 ] The uncontested facts are that at the closing of a bar on 23 May 2015 the respondent punched the victim in the face and caused him to lose consciousness and fall to the ground. The respondent walked away from the victim but then returned and kicked him in the head. As a result, the victim suffered severe cranial trauma, a broken nose and cerebral oedema. He required hospital treatment for eleven days.

He later had to relearn how to speak and walk and years latter continued to have difficulties with speech and recurring headaches. [ 11 ] The victim was unknown to the respondent and the attack was not preceded by any exchange between the respondent and the victim. Reports [ 12 ] The sentencing judge received a report from the respondent’s psychiatrist and a pre-sentence report (PSR). [ 13 ] The psychiatrist observed that the respondent’s behavioural problems are closely related to the condition of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) that he has had since childhood.

He stopped taking necessary medication for this condition and this in turn caused the development of personality disorders, including compulsive behaviour, that are exacerbated by the consumption of alcohol. On the psychiatrist’s recommendation the respondent completed a programme of anger management. The psychiatrist reported that this programme appeared to produce some improvement but that in his opinion the best protection against recidivism would be the resumption of medication for ADHD.

He added that the respondent appeared resistant to the deterrent effect of incarceration, given his impulsive and impetuous behaviour. [ 14 ] The PSR also notes the respondent’s ADHD and his failure to take the medication that was prescribed for this condition when the respondent was in secondary school. It too notes persistent immaturity in the respondent, a tendency to impulsive behaviour and an inability to control his emotions. At the time that the PSR was prepared the respondent had been employed full-time for several months and expressed remorse and regrets with respect to the victim.

He acknowledged that he consumes cannabis almost daily. The report observes that as a result of his difficulties with impulsive behaviour and the control of his emotions the risk of recidivism must be considered high. Like the psychiatrist, the PSR concludes that the respondent would benefit from supervised treatment for the control of his emotions and the ADHD. [ 15 ] The respondent testified at the sentencing hearing and said that he did not wish to take the medication for ADHD because it affected his personality and made him more introverted.

He confirmed that he had consumed alcohol at weekends and cannabis almost daily. He said that at the time of the offence had consumed large quantities of alcohol and regretted his actions and their consequences for the victim. He also acknowledged two breaches of conditions after the incident.

The sentencing judgment [ 16 ] The sentencing judge accepts and adopts the psychiatrist’s report and the PSR, as seen in these observations: [13] Le Tribunal tient à souligner que la condition médicale de l’accusé existe depuis sa tendre enfance, qu’elle lui est connue et que des comportements violents y sont associés au fil des ans. [14] Il ne s’agit pas d’un développement soudain d’agressivité due à une psychose ou une condition médicale inconnue du sujet, mais exacerbée par une situation dont on n’a pas le contrôle qui pousse à l’agir délictuel. [15] De plus, l’accusé, bien qu’ayant réduit sa consommation d’alcool depuis les événements, continue de consommer du cannabis quasi quotidiennement, amenant le criminologue à considérer une problématique de consommation. [16] Ce qui diffère aujourd’hui demeure sa sphère occupationnelle.

Il occupe un emploi à temps plein dans une poissonnerie, malgré sa condition psychiatrique non prise en charge et l’ayant mené devant le Tribunal. [17] Ce qui place le Tribunal devant le dilemme suivant : l’absence de motivation de l’accusé à enrayer ses problèmes est directement liée à sa condition médicale.

Son manque de jugement également. [18] L’on ne peut extraire de l’eau d’une roche, le Tribunal doit faire avec la personnalité propre de l’accusé ainsi qu’avec le triste constat d’un cercle vicieux de mode de vie. [ 17 ] The sentencing judge then enumerates the salient objectives of sentencing found in sections 718 and following of the Code. She

makes specific mention of the fundamental principle in

section 718.1 that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility for its commission and adjusted to account for relevant factors of mitigation or aggravation. [ 18 ] The sentencing judge then proceeds to her conclusion as follows: [22] Quant aux facteurs atténuants, le Tribunal considère les éléments suivants : ❖ le plaidoyer de culpabilité qui demeure toujours, peu importe le moment où il est enregistré, ou la qualité de la preuve, un facteur à considérer, voir l’arrêt Lacelle Belec c. R.

Il constitue un indice de réhabilitation et une reconnaissance de ses torts envers la victime et la société; ❖ le jeune âge de l’accusé; ❖ l’absence d’antécédents judiciaires au moment de la commission de l’infraction; ❖ la condition mentale de l’accusé; ❖ la thérapie en gestion de la colère en 2016; ❖ l’accusé démontre des remords. [23] Le Tribunal prend en compte les facteurs aggravants suivants : ❖ la gratuité du geste, complètement disproportionné à la situation, même celle perçue par l’accusé au moment du coup de poing au visage; ❖ l’acharnement, par un coup de pied à la tête, alors que la victime gît étendue au sol, inconsciente. [24] La nature des blessures fait

partie intégrante de l’infraction de voies de fait graves et ne doit pas être évaluée comme facteur aggravant. On parle ici d’un traumatisme crânien sévère, nez cassé et œdème cérébral nécessitant 11 jours d’hospitalisation. La victime a dû réapprendre à parler et à marcher. [25] Aux termes de l’arrêt Lacelle Belec , au paragraphe 35 , qui reprend l’arrêt R. c.

Lacasse , le juge commet une erreur de principe en considérant un élément de l’infraction comme facteur aggravant. [26] L’état d’ébriété avancé de l’accusé au moment de la commission de l’infraction, facilite le passage à l’acte et peut-être l’explique en partie, mais ne saurait constituer un facteur atténuant. [27] Les différents cas de figure jurisprudentiels fournis au Tribunal, tant par la défense que par la poursuivante sur le plan sentenciel, varient grandement. [28] En matière de voies de fait graves, le prisme des peines demeure très élargi et demande une analyse ponctuelle et non générale.

L’individualisation de la peine y trouve particulièrement toute sa pertinence. [29] Cependant, ce qui demeure constant, s’avère le besoin de dénonciation et de dissuasion pour ce genre de crime et il est question de peines d’emprisonnement. [30] Par contre, la sévérité d’une peine n’est pas l’apanage de l’emprisonnement, tout dépend des circonstances. [31] Ce principe est repris récemment par le juge Marc David dans l’affaire R. c.

Dubuc , dans un dossier d’homicide involontaire où l’accusé s’est vu imposer un sursis de peine assorti d’une probation d’une durée de trois ans. [32] Également, il ne faut pas minimiser les effets du processus judiciaire lui-même en regard de l’analyse globale des critères de dénonciation et de dissuasion, tant collectives qu’individuelles. Notre système est mis en place, justement pour ce besoin collectif de réprouver le crime. [33] À l’instar du juge Vauclair, dans l’arrêt R. c.

Harbour , le Tribunal croit que le principe de dissuasion générale demeure un concept flou, dont les ramifications sont difficiles à identifier.

Cette assertion est également reprise dans l’arrêt Lacelle Belec , au paragraphe 31 . [34] Il ne faut pas oublier l’effet de la probation, avec suivi de surcroît, qui « permet de réagir promptement et de prononcer les peines appropriées selon les circonstances ». [35] Ainsi, l’accusé qui ne se conforme pas aux exigences de la probation commet une infraction criminelle et encourt une peine maximale de quatre ans. [36] Dans le cas qui nous occupe, les deux parties s’entendent afin de suggérer une probation. [37] Le Tribunal partage cette option qui ne saurait que bénéficier à l’accusé, par une structuration de son schème de vie, l’accompagnement d’un agent de probation et des ressources appropriées afin de traiter son état médical, soit la source de ses ennuis. [38] Et au final, la société gagne à la réhabilitation des délinquants et le Tribunal a l’obligation de la favoriser, selon l’

article 718 C.cr .

[39] Depuis les événements qui datent de plus de quatre ans, l’accusé n’a pas commis d’autres infractions violentes, mais deux bris de conditions. [Références omises] [ 19 ] It will be noted that the sentencing judge says little of the range of sentences that are typical for offences of aggravated assault except that it is wide. Discussion [ 20 ] The scope for appellate intervention in the review of sentencing decisions is restrictive, as has been repeatedly emphasised for at least twenty-five years.

The approach may be summarised briefly: Put simply, absent an error of principle that had an impact on the sentence, including the overstatement or understatement of a relevant factor, the court of appeal should not intervene unless the sentence is otherwise demonstrably unfit. [3] It might be that this doctrine can be “put simply” but a great volume of jurisprudence proves that it cannot be applied “simply.” [ 21 ] A sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the degree of the offender’s responsibility for its commission is, by definition, demonstrably unfit.

Within this limitation, however, there is a margin of possible disparity among sentences that not only allows but requires the individualisation of sentences to determine a proportionate and otherwise fit sentence for each offence and each offender. In this case these principles provide several grounds on which to conclude that the sentence was disproportionate and unfit.

The injuries to the victim [ 22 ] The sentencing judge observes that the elements of an offence cannot themselves be characterised as aggravating factors and claims to support this assertion by isolating a single phrase from this court’s judgment in Lacelle Belec . [4] This broad proposition must be considered with caution because it is misleading and, without more sophisticated elaboration, it is inaccurate for two reasons.

First, the jurisprudence has consistently held that in cases of aggravated assault the nature and extent of injuries sustained by the victim are relevant both to the determination of liability and to the determination of a proportionate and fit sentence. Second, the jurisprudence has held that the nature and extent of any injury must be considered in conjunction with other relevant factors and objectives in the determination of a fit sentence because the extent of injuries, and therefore denunciation and deterrence, cannot be the sole objectives in determining an appropriate sentence.

Thus it is accurate to assert that the nature and extent of injuries sustained in a case of aggravated assault cannot be invoked to aggravate further what are already aggravating elements in the definition of the offence. But the jurisprudence does not support the broad proposition asserted by the sentencing judge, as illustrated recently in Lacelle Belec : [84] Dans sa décision, il est indéniable que le juge mentionne le jeune âge de l’appelant au moment de l’accident, qu’il était sans antécédents judiciaires, avait un bon emploi et bénéficiait d’un bon encadrement.

Le juge mentionne également la situation actuelle de l’appelant, soit sa vie familiale avec sa conjointe et un enfant de deux ans. [85] Il est aussi indéniable que les blessures et les conséquences pour la victime représentent un facteur pertinent : Brais c. R ., 2016 QCCA 356 , par. 27 ; Silbande c. R ., 2014 QCCA 1952 ; R. c. Michaud , 2012 QCCA 891 , par. 20 . Le Code criminel façonne d’ailleurs la sévérité de la peine en rapport avec la présence de blessures.

En d’autres termes, la présence de lésions corporelles est déjà un élément de l’infraction et cela ne peut pas, en principe, devenir un élément aggravant distinct. [86] Néanmoins, pour déterminer la peine appropriée à la faute, elle-même aggravée par la présence de lésions, la logique veut qu’il faille tenir compte de la nature et de l’étendue des lésions corporelles causées. Cela ne demeure toutefois qu’un facteur parmi d’autres.

Il ne doit pas devenir déterminant au point d’occulter les autres, plus favorables. [87] Avec égards pour le juge, l’appelant a raison et, en donnant à ce facteur un poids déterminant au détriment d’autres facteurs, le juge commet une erreur dont la portée est évidente au vu de ses motifs. [5] [ 23 ] Among the essential elements of aggravated assault is an assault that “wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.” There is some overlap among these elements but they are not synonymous or interchangeable. All of them distinguish aggravated assault from other forms of assault in the Code.

It is also imperative to note that all of them allow for varying degrees of seriousness. For example, not all wounds are equally serious. It follows that these varying degrees of seriousness must be taken into consideration by a sentencing judge when determining a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility. [6] A sentence that fails to reflect these degrees of difference might be challenged on the basis that it is disproportionate.

This point has been repeated recently by the Court: [45] Il est entendu qu’un élément essentiel de l’infraction reprochée ne devrait pas être considéré comme une circonstance aggravante, puisqu’il participe déjà de la gravité objective de l’infraction et qu’il faut éviter de « punir doublement » l’accusé . D’autre part, la gravité des blessures subies par la ou les victimes est constamment retenue comme circonstance aggravante par la jurisprudence, incluant celle en matière de voies de fait graves, et la doctrine .

De toute évidence, il y a des blessures plus ou moins graves qui répondent également à la définition des éléments de l’infraction. L’importance des blessures est hautement pertinente à la pondération de la gravité de l’infraction et le degré de responsabilité du délinquant. C’est l’essence de la proportionnalité . [46] L’argument de l’appelant est fondé sur une prémisse erronée. Une blessure permanente n’est pas un élément essentiel de l’infraction de voies de fait graves. Celle-ci comprend par définition une blessure, une mutilation, une défiguration de la victime ou la mise en danger de sa vie.

Si ces termes réfèrent tous à un niveau de gravité passablement élevé, rien n’exige des séquelles permanentes. Chaque infraction de voies de fait comprend des éléments distincts, mais chacune couvre une large variété de comportements et de conséquences qui justifieront des peines plus ou moins sévères selon le cas . La jurisprudence recèle d’exemples de voies de fait graves commises sans qu’il y ait de séquelles permanentes et même sans qu’il y ait de lésions corporelles quand l’application de la force crée un risque pour la vie.

[47] La nature, la gravité et les conséquences à long terme des blessures subies par la ou les victimes sont des considérations hautement pertinentes, parmi toutes les autres, pour déterminer quelle est la peine appropriée à imposer à un délinquant déclaré coupable d’une infraction qui implique une atteinte à l’intégrité physique. [7] [ 24 ] In short, it is an error of principle to exclude categorically an assessment of the relative seriousness of the conduct of the respondent, including the gravity of the injuries sustained.

Denunciation and deterrence [ 25 ] The jurisprudence of this court is clear that the consequence of specific or general deterrence is uncertain but it is equally clear that in cases of aggravated assault these are objectives that should be taken into account by the sentencing judge in an evaluation of the various objectives of sentencing, especially in a case of unprovoked violence against another. But denunciation and deterrence, like other objectives, can be given too much or too little weight in the determination of a proportionate and fit sentence.

In this case the judge made reference to these two objectives but there is no indication of the weight attributed to either of them except in the judge’s assertion that hopes of rehabilitation should be privileged. In this respect there is a patent difference between giving measured consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence and giving none at all. [8] [ 26 ] Denunciation and deterrence are often mentioned together, as they were in the present case, but they are not the same.

Even if the deterrent effect of a sentence might be uncertain, especially general deterrence, the jurisprudence has consistently affirmed that cases of aggravated assault require a sufficient expression of denunciation that is proportionate to the gravity of the case and the offender’s responsibility. [9] In view of the respondent’s conduct and its effect on the victim, it is exceedingly difficult to find in an intermittent sentence an expression of denunciation that is commensurate with the gravity of the offence or the culpability of the offender. [10] This too is not only an error of principle but an understatement of a relevant factor that had a direct bearing on the determination of the sentence.

The sentencing judge was right to repeat that sentences of imprisonment should be used with restraint and even avoided if other options can adequately satisfy the principles and objectives of sentencing imposed by the Code and affirmed by the jurisprudence. But here too there is a matter of degree. Even the most hopeful consideration of an offender’s rehabilitation cannot be given such importance as to displace the application of other principles and objectives that are essential for a proportionate sentence.

In the present case this is clear in view of the respondent’s recalcitrant unwillingness to follow medical treatment that in the view of his psychiatrist and the PSR would reduce the risk of recidivism.

The sentencing judgment fails to consider in any depth the risk of recidivism, which together with other factors lends a distorted and exaggerated weight to the objective of rehabilitation. [11] Parity [ 27 ] While the principles of individualised sentencing exclude uniformity between and among sentences, a permissible degree of disparity militates against the imposition of sentences that are radically dissimilar for offences that are comparable and offenders that are similarly placed. This is the utility of ranges that have been established for various types of offences.

Such ranges are guidelines that indicate the trend of relevant jurisprudence and they provide markers by which to avoid sentences that are disproportionately severe or lenient.

A deviation from a typical range does not permit appellate intervention unless that deviation is so exaggerated that it can be characterised as an error of principle, such as a deviation from the principle of proportionality, or the sentence is otherwise demonstrably unfit. [12] [ 28 ] This court has consistently recognised that while the range of sentencing options in aggravated assault is wide the general run of cases will attract a term of imprisonment that may be in the range of fifteen to twenty-four months and a penitentiary term of three to five years for more serious cases. [13] An intermittent sentence is unusual even if it is legally possible in an appropriate case but the imposition of such a sentence would require a clear demonstration that it is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s responsibility.

The sentence in the present case provides no such demonstration. [ 29 ] There are factual elements in the present case that could justify a reduction of the quantum of the sentence, including the respondent’s age at the time of the offence, his medical difficulties, his guilty plea and his continuing employment. These cannot easily be characterised as mitigating circumstances to the extent that they are somewhat remote from an assessment of the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility for the offence.

To the degree that these factors might be relevant in some measure to the final determination of a fit sentence, they cannot diminish or displace factors that are central to the determination of a proportionate sentence. [ 30 ] The assault in this case was an unprovoked and severe act of personal violence against a stranger. Its severity was magnified and aggravated when the respondent returned to inflict an unrestrained kick to the head of the victim as he lay unconscious on the ground.

The attack on the victim wounded, maimed, disfigured or endangered him not because it had lasting permanent consequences but because the inherent viciousness of the attack and its consequences were apparent at the moment it occurred and for this reason calls for a more serious sentence. Further, the sentence must reflect the heightened risk of recidivism reported by the respondent’s psychiatrist and the PSR. A fit sentence [ 31 ] In this case the sentence cannot be reconciled with the principle of proportionality and as a result it is also demonstrably unfit.

Accordingly, the Court must intervene for these two reasons. [ 32 ] The respondent has already served the intermittent sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. This raises a question whether the imposition by this court of a fit sentence that includes an extended term of imprisonment would be abusive or oppressive. This question was addressed by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in Veysey : [31] In sum, we are left with divergent approaches to the question of whether a jail sentence should be stayed on appeal in circumstances where the offender has served the sentence imposed at trial.

One approach is based on the rule that it is unjust (“harsh and oppressive”) to reincarcerate an offender who has served fully the sentence imposed at trial. We assume that the rule is a general one and, therefore, an exceptional circumstances category exists. Hence, under this approach the onus would be on the Attorney General to

establish that reincarceration of the offender would not amount to harsh or oppressive treatment. Another approach is to accept that thereis nothing inherently unjust, harsh or oppressive in requiring an offender to serve the sentence that should been imposed at first instance.This leaves us with the question of whether the rule should be absolute or provide for exceptions. The weight of authority favorsrecognition of a rule that provides for exceptions.

Under this approach, the onus is on the offender to establish that his or her casequalifies as an exception to the rule under the rubric of “special circumstances”. [32] We find nothing inherently harsh or oppressive in jailing a person who has served a sentence that was demonstrably unfit. Thefact that the original sentence has been fully served does not, by itself, warrant special consideration. At the same time, we are left withthe Supreme Court’s caution that to require an accused to serve a fit sentence after having completed an unfit one may lead to aninjustice.

Thus, one must be prepared to recognize that in certain instances reincarceration could work an injustice. The difficult task is toidentify the circumstances in which reincarceration would work such a result. In short: What constitutes special circumstances? Havingregard to the jurisprudence discussed above, we have isolated four factors that one could reasonably consider relevant to the issue ofwhether a stay should be granted. This is not to suggest that the list is exhaustive. Other pertinent factors may exist.

However, forpurposes of deciding this appeal, we are content to examine the following: (1) the seriousness of the offences for which the offender wasconvicted; (2) the elapsed time since the offender gained his or her freedom and the date the appellate court hears and decides thesentence appeal; (3) whether any delay is attributable to one of the parties; and (4) the impact of reincarceration on the rehabilitation ofthe offender. […] [34] In relative terms the conviction does not compare, for example, to a serious assault.

In the latter type of case, an appellate courtis unlikely to be sympathetic to the option of staying the fit sentence. Why? Because the stay order might well undermine, and seriouslyso, the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence. Indeed, when one looks to the cases where a stay of execution of a fit sentencehas been sought and denied, typically they involve crimes against the person: sexual assault, indecent assault and gross indecencyagainst children, aggravated assault involving young women or manslaughter.

On the other hand, the granting of a stay with respect to aconviction for a property offence does not instill the same sentiments when it comes to the question of whether a stay of executionshould issue.[14] [33] The approach adopted in Veysey has been followed in this court.[15] [34] The factors in Veysey are not exhaustive but at least three are relevant in the present case. First, the offence at issue was veryserious and the respondent was fully responsible for it.

Second, the respondent has served the intermittent sentence of ninety days and,for at least six months, is now serving the conditions of the probation order. Third, a lengthy term of further incarceration cannotenhance the chances of success for his rehabilitation and reintegration into society, especially in view of his employment at the time ofsentencing.

These factors support the proposition that the imposition of a fit sentence by this court should be in some measure attenuated.Conversely, the gravity of the offence and the offender’s responsibility for it cannot permit this court to alleviate the sentence to a degreethat would relegate the necessary objectives of denunciation and deterrence to unimportance and thus to allow an unfit sentence toremain in substance.

For this reason the Court will impose a fit sentence but award enhanced credit for time served at a ratio of 1:1.5.[16] Conclusion [35] I propose to grant leave to appeal; allow the appeal in part; quash the order for an intermittent sentence; substitute a term ofimprisonment of fifteen months, from which will be subtracted ninety days of time served at a ratio of 1:1.5 for a subtracted total of 135days; order the respondent to surrender to prison authorities not later than noon on 22 September 2020; order that the remainder of thesentence remain unchanged except that the term of probation be reduced to account for the period of probation already served.

PATRICK HEALY, J.A. [3] See, among others, R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, paras. 25-29; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v.Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6; R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, para. 36; R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, para. 90; R.v. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, para. 46. See also Lacelle Belec v. R., 2019 QCCA 711 (leave to appealrefused, SCC, No 38690, 12 December 2019), para. 37; R. v. Kravchenko, 2020 MBCA 30, paras. 29-30. 42 In R. v. Leclerc (1991), (ON CA), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 563 (Ont.

C.A.), Lacourcière J.A. wrote for the court, at pp.567-68: The case-law interpreting the sections quoted [ss. 265 and 268] makes it clear that the essential intent required for an assault, as defined,remains the same for all forms of assault, including aggravated assault. Parliament intended that the severity of the punishment shouldincrease to reflect the more serious consequences of the assault. [Emphasis added.] 43 In Godin, supra, Cory J. stated, at p. 485, “[t]he

section pertains to an assault that has the consequences of wounding, maiming ordisfiguring” (emphasis added) or (to complete the list) endangering life. “Endanger” means to “[p]ut in danger . . . put in peril . . . [i]ncurthe risk”: New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (1993), vol. 1, at p. 816. As to the focus on consequences,see generally R. v. Brodie (1995), (BC CA), 60 B.C.A.C. 153, at para. 4; R. v. Dewey (1999), 1999 ABCA 5, 132 C.C.C. (3d) 348 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 9; and R. v. Ross, [1998] O.J. No. 3427 (QL) (Gen. Div.), at para. 23. See also R. v.Vang (1999), (ON CA), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 12.