2020 QCCQ 2014, 2020 QCCQ 2014

R. c. Tizfahm 2020 QCCQ 2014 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF GATINEAU “Criminal Division” N°: 550-01-098277-173 DATE : May 1, 2020 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE ANOUK DESAULNIERS, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ THE QUEEN Prosecutrix v.

MATIN TIZFAHM Applicant ______________________________________________________________________ RULING ON DEFENCE MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE ( Rendered orally on January 29, 2020 ) ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Applicant was intercepted by the police while driving his father’s car early in the morning. [ 2 ] According to the police, the interception was performed for the purpose of a routine road check, during which police officers noticed cannabis residue near the car’s shift stick.

They arrested the Applicant for possession of cannabis and proceeded to search him and his car. They found six grams of cannabis in the car’s middle compartment, as well as a prohibited firearm and ammunition in a backpack located on the front passenger seat.

They also found approximately $2,000 in cash on the Applicant. [ 3 ] The Applicant was brought to the police station, where he was strip-searched. [ 4 ] The Applicant is charged with the following offences: - Possession of cannabis contrary to section 4(1)(5) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA); - Being an occupant of a motor vehicle which he knew contained a prohibited weapon contrary to paragraph 94(1)

(2) b) of the Criminal Code ; - Possessing an unloaded prohibited weapon. [ 5 ] The Applicant submits that his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were breached. He is seeking the exclusion of all the evidence against him pursuant to sections 8 , 9 and 24(2) of the Charter . [ 6 ] In particular, the Applicant submits the following: - He was intercepted for oblique motives and his detention was therefore arbitrary and contrary to

section 9 of the Charter ; - The police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for possession of cannabis; therefore, his detention continued to be arbitrary and contrary to

section 9 of the Charter ; - The vehicle he was driving was illegally searched, contrary to

section 8 of the Charter ; - The Applicant’s strip search at the police station was in breach of

section 8 of the Charter ; - All evidence obtained by the police should be excluded at trial because its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. ANALYSIS

[ 7 ] Let us examine the first of these submissions. 1. Was the car driven by the Applicant illegally intercepted FoR oblique motives? [ 8 ] Both Officers Boucher and Leduc, who intercepted the car driven by the Applicant, testified that they ran a random check on its licence plate. They were informed that the car’s owner, born in 1970, did not have a driver’s licence in Quebec. While their patrol car was stopped at a red light next to the car, however, they could tell that the Applicant, being in his twenties, was too young to be the owner of the car. They decided to intercept the vehicle to check the Applicant’s driver’s licence. [ 9 ]

Section 636 of the Highway Safety Code provides: Every peace officer recognizable as such at first sight may, in the performance of his duties under this Code, … require the driver of a road vehicle to stop his vehicle.

The driver must comply with this requirement without delay. [ 10 ] It is settled law that this provision grants a police officer the discretion to intercept a vehicle completely at random for the purpose of requiring its driver to produce their driver’s licence, registration and proof of insurance, as well as to check the driver’s sobriety. [1] [ 11 ] Therefore, in the case at bar, Officers Boucher and Leduc were not required to have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the driver had committed an offence under the Highway Safety Code prior to intercepting the vehicle.

They acted legally, pursuant to the Highway Safety Code, when they stopped the vehicle driven by the Applicant for the purpose of checking his driver’s licence. [ 12 ] Furthermore, while it is possible that the two officers may have been informed, prior to the interception, that the owner of the vehicle held a valid driver’s licence in Ontario, this information was not relevant as they had noticed that the driver, i.e. the Applicant, was too young to be the owner of the car. [ 13 ] The Applicant alleges that the police officers used their power under

section 636 of the Highway Safety Code as a pretext to conduct a criminal investigation. This claim is not supported by the evidence. Officers Boucher and Leduc encountered the Applicant’s car by pure coincidence. They did not know the Applicant and were meeting him for the first time. They did not have any reason to want to investigate him or any crime in particular. [ 14 ] The situation may have been different when the Applicant was intercepted for a second time by the same police officers approximately one month later. These post-facto events, however, do not change the circumstances of the first interception.

The Court finds that the evidence in that regard, i.e. the testimony of the two police officers, is reliable and credible. It also bears mentioning that their evidence was not contradicted. [ 15 ] The Applicant bears the burden of demonstrating, on a balance of probabilities, that he was illegally intercepted and that his detention was therefore arbitrary. The Applicant has failed to meet this burden and his submission in this regard is dismissed. [ 16 ] Let us now turn to the second issue. 2.

Did the police have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the Applicant for possession of cannabis? [ 17 ] When they first approached the Applicant’s car after its interception, Officer Boucher went to the driver’s window while Officer Leduc went to the front passenger’s window. Both police officers used their flashlight to light the inside of the car. [ 18 ] With respect to the visual inspection of the inside of a vehicle with the aid of a flashlight, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously stated, in R. v. Mellenthin : There can be no quarrel with the visual inspection of the car by police officers.

At night the inspection can only be carried out with the aid of a flashlight and it is necessarily incidental to a check stop program carried out after dark. The inspection is essential for the protection of those on duty in the check stops. [2] [ 19 ] Officer Leduc testified that, while lighting the inside of the car, he observed crumbs of cannabis residue on the middle compartment, near the stick shift. He had, while on duty, encountered similar crumbs on many occasions in the past. He was convinced that the substance was cannabis.

He immediately conveyed his observation to Officer Boucher, who had also noticed the substance. [ 20 ] Officer Boucher immediately asked the Applicant to exit the vehicle. Once the Applicant was outside of his car, Officer Boucher placed him under arrest right away for possession of cannabis. This arrest took place approximately one minute, or two minutes at the most, after the Applicant was intercepted in his car. [ 21 ] The Applicant submits that the two officers could not have seen the crumbs of cannabis before Officer Boucher asked him to step out of the car.

The Applicant, a fairly bulky man, argues that his size prevented Officer Boucher from seeing the car’s middle compartment from where he was standing. Moreover, Officer Leduc told Officer Boucher that he noticed crumbs of cannabis near the stick shift, whereas photos taken by Officer Leduc at the outset of his search of the car, filed under VDD-2, show crumbs around the cup holder rather than the stick shift. [ 22 ] However, the Court is satisfied that both officers did indeed see the crumbs of cannabis inside the Applicant’s car.

The photos filed into evidence show that the cup holder is located right next to the stick shift, which would explain why Officer Leduc referred to the latter instead of the former. It also bears mentioning that Officer Leduc, standing on the passenger’s side, had an unobstructed view of both the cup holder and the stick shift.

[ 23 ] Officer Boucher did not need to personally see the crumbs of cannabis to have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the Applicant for possession of cannabis. To form these grounds, it was sufficient that Officer Boucher was informed by Officer Leduc that he had observed crumbs of cannabis inside the car. [ 24 ] There are two fundamental requirements for a lawful arrest. First, a peace officer who arrests a person must subjectively believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence.

Second, the grounds upon which the peace officer arrests the person must be objectively justifiable in the sense that a reasonable person in the position of the peace officer, with all of their training and experience, must also be able to come to the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest or detention. [3] [ 25 ] Reliable and credible information from a partner will often be sufficient to provide a police officer with reasonable and probable grounds, subjectively and objectively, to believe that someone has committed an offence. [4] [ 26 ] That being said, the Court is satisfied that both Officers Boucher and Leduc did indeed see the crumbs of cannabis near the stick shift or cup holder before Officer Boucher asked the Applicant to step out of his car.

Officer Boucher, standing close to the window of the small Honda Civic, had a downward view into the inside of the car. The angle shown on the photo in VDD-3 does not accurately reflect this positioning. Furthermore, in these photos, the Applicant has his right arm raised with his hand on the steering wheel.

Because the Applicant did not testify, the Court does not have any particular reason to believe that is how he was positioned during his interaction with Officer Boucher. [ 27 ] There is also uncontradicted evidence that Officer Boucher arrested the Applicant immediately after having asked him to exit the car. He wrote “3h38” in his notes.

This immediate arrest is consistent with the proposition that Officer Boucher formed his grounds to arrest the Applicant for possession of cannabis prior to asking him to exit the car. [ 28 ] Finally, the Court notes that there is uncontradicted evidence that crumbs of cannabis were indeed present near the cup holder in the car driven by the Applicant at the time of his interception. [ 29 ] The fact that Officer Boucher observed crumbs of cannabis near the Applicant, in the car he was driving, provided him with reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the Applicant was in possession of cannabis, be it the crumbs in question or as yet undiscovered cannabis in the Applicant’s possession. [ 30 ] The Applicant bears the burden of demonstrating, on the balance of probabilities, that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained.

The applicant has not met this burden and this portion of his submissions is also dismissed. [ 31 ] Let us turn to the third issue. 3. Was the vehicle driven by the Applicant illegally searched? [ 32 ] The search of the vehicle driven by the Applicant was conducted without prior judicial authorization. A warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter .

The Crown bears the onus of rebutting this presumption of unreasonableness. [5] [ 33 ] It is settled law that the police were lawfully authorized to search the cockpit of the car incidental to the Applicant’s arrest for possession of drugs. In R. v. Caslake , [6] the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that a police search of a car for the purpose of finding evidence is well within the scope of the power to search incident to arrest. [ 34 ] Thus, the police lawfully searched the Applicant’s car, where six grams of cannabis were found in the cavity near the armrest.

The police also lawfully searched a backpack located on the front passenger seat. A firearm was found and seized. [ 35 ] The Crown has successfully established that the search was reasonable and legal. This submission is also dismissed. [ 36 ] Let us examine the fourth issue. 4. Was the Applicant’s strip search at the police station in breach of

section 8 of the Charter? [ 37 ] Once at the police station, the two officers proceeded to strip-search the Applicant in the admission room (“la salle d’écrou”). This search started around 4:30 AM. [ 38 ] The two officers ordered the Applicant to remove all of his clothes and do a 360-degree turn so that they could observe his buttocks.

The Applicant complied, after which he was allowed to put his clothes back on. [ 39 ] This search was conducted without prior judicial authorization and is presumed unreasonable. [ 40 ] Officer Boucher testified that the decision to strip-search the Applicant was made by his superior, Sergeant Caron. Sgt Caron did not testify, so his grounds for making this decision are not known. Officer Boucher did mention, however, that, as far as he was concerned, the strip search was conducted because the Applicant was found in possession of a firearm.

He said that the purpose of the search was to ensure that the Applicant was not hiding any additional firearm or ammunition on his person and to ensure the safety of the officers in the cellblock and that of the Applicant himself. [ 41 ] In R. v. Golden , a police officer conducted a “pat down” search incident to an arrest and did not find any weapons or narcotics. The officer then decided to conduct a visual inspection of the person’s buttocks and pulled down his pants and underwear, revealing a plastic bag lodged between the person’s buttocks.

[ 42 ] The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated: In addition to searching for evidence related to the reason for the arrest, the common law also authorizes police to search for weapons as an incident to arrest for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the police, the detainee and other persons. However, a “frisk” or “pat- down” search at the point of arrest will generally suffice for the purposes of determining if the accused has secreted weapons on his person.

Only if the frisk search reveals a possible weapon secreted on the detainee’s person or if the particular circumstances of the case raise the risk that a weapon is concealed on the detainee’s person will a strip search be justified.

Whether searching for evidence or for weapons, the mere possibility that an individual may be concealing evidence or weapons upon his person is not sufficient to justify a strip search. [7] [ 43 ] The Court added: In order to meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness that will justify a strip search, the police must establish that they have reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search is necessary in the particular circumstances of the arrest. [8] [ 44 ] The Applicant was frisk-searched at the time of his arrest and no weapons or ammunition were found.

He was then left alone in the patrol car for some time while the two officers searched his car. Officer Boucher testified that he was not concerned for his safety at that time, despite the fact that the Applicant was handcuffed in the front and had some range of movement to access objects he may have been hiding on his person. Later, both officers rode in the patrol car with the Applicant to the police station, without any concern for their safety. [ 45 ] Why then did the police feel the need to strip-search the Applicant at the police station? He was calm and cooperated fully with the officers.

On the surveillance video taped at the police station during the Applicant’s admission, one can observe that both officers turned their back on the Applicant while talking to Sgt Caron. What is more, Officer Boucher left his partner alone with the Applicant for a short time. All of this was done, it seems, without either officer having any concern whatsoever about his safety or the possibility that the Applicant may have been hiding something dangerous on his person.

So why strip-search the Applicant? [ 46 ] The only justification provided is that such a step is standard procedure every time someone is found in possession of a concealed firearm. This is so because, in the past, a person arrested with a firearm was found to be hiding another small weapon or ammunition on their person. But no details were provided to support this risk. How often has this been observed in the past? How long ago? In what context? No information was provided other than the blanket statement that this has happened before.

Nothing more than a vague, unsubstantiated possibility that the Applicant may be concealing a weapon on his person was invoked to justify his strip search. [ 47 ] The Court concludes that the police have not established that they had reasonable and probable grounds for concluding that a strip search was necessary in the circumstances. The Applicant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search under

section 8 of the Charter was breached. [ 48 ] This brings us to the fifth issue raised by the Applicant. 5.

Should all evidence obtained by the police be excluded at trial because its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute? [ 49 ] Section 24(2) of the Charte r provides: Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter , the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 50 ] In order to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), the Applicant must establish the following three elements on a balance of probabilities:

i) his Charter right was violated; ii) the evidence , i.e. the firearm and the cannabis, was “obtained in a manner” that violated this right; and iii) the admission of evidence could “bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. [ 51 ] As discussed earlier, the Applicant’s right under

section 8 of the Charter was breached when he was strip-searched at the police station. Therefore, the first criterion under s. 24(2) is met. [ 52 ] Let us turn to the second criteria: Has the Applicant established that the evidence, i.e. the firearm and the cannabis, was “obtained in a manner” that violated his

section 8 right? [ 53 ] The strip search took place around 4:30 AM at the police station. The firearm and drugs were found inside the Applicant’s car, at the roadside, approximately one hour earlier. Can it be said that this evidence was obtained in breach of the Applicant’s

section 8 right? [ 54 ] For his motion to succeed, the Applicant must establish a connection, a clear temporal, causal or contextual nexus, between the breach and the evidence he seeks to have excluded. [ 55 ] In R. v . Wittwer , the Supreme Court of Canada stated: In considering whether a statement is tainted by an earlier Charter breach, the courts have adopted a purposive and generous approach.

It is unnecessary to establish a strict causal relationship between the breach and the subsequent statement. The statement will be tainted if the breach and the impugned statement can be said to be part of the same transaction or course of conduct: The required connection between the breach and the subsequent statement may be “temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the three. [9] [ 56 ] In R. c . Blais , [10] our Court of Appeal quoted, with approval, the following excerpt from the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in R. v .

Manchulenko : To determine whether the nexus requirement has been met, the trial judge must undertake a contextual and case-specific analysis. Courts have adopted a purposive and generous approach to the nexus requirement: … An accused need not establish a strict causal relationship between the breach and the subsequent evidence. The subsequent evidence will be tainted if the breach and the evidence can be said to the part of the same transaction or course of conduct…. The essential nexus between the breach and the evidence acquired later may be temporal, contextual, causal or the three in combination….

Remote or tenuous connections fall short of establishing the necessary nexus: …. [11] [ 57 ] This excerpt mentions situations where the evidence was acquired following the Charter violation. Indeed, when the Charter breach preceded the time when the evidence was obtained, it may be easier to establish a nexus between the two.

For example, a causal connection may be easily identified where the police obtain a statement from a detained person after having breached their right to counsel. [ 58 ] This does not mean that there must necessarily always be a prominent causal connection between the Charter breach and the evidence. [ 59 ] Furthermore, there is a growing trend in the case law recognizing that the required connection may be established even where the evidence was obtained prior to the Charter breach. [ 60 ] In R. v .

Pino , [12] the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that, in appropriate cases, the courts may exclude evidence in regard of a Charter breach that occurred after this evidence was discovered. [ 61 ] The Court did not find any reported case where our Court of Appeal directly addressed this issue or referred to this aspect of Pino . However, the Superior Court has, on at least one occasion, referred approvingly to Pino . In R. c. Latour , [13] the Superior Court had to decide whether a blood sample taken at 5:54 AM should be excluded in light of a Charter breach that occurred 38 minutes later.

The Superior Court ultimately ruled that a sufficient nexus had not been established, but it came to that conclusion not because the evidence was obtained before the Charter violation, but rather because said evidence was obtained from the accused for medical reasons, without any police involvement. [ 62 ] In the case at bar, the Court concludes that the mere fact that the evidence was obtained prior to the Charter violation does not preclude an examination of whether this evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter . [ 63 ] However, the Court finds that the Applicant has failed to establish the required nexus between the acquisition of the evidence, i.e. the firearm and cannabis, and the Charter violation, i.e. the Applicant’s strip search conducted at the police station. [ 64 ] Indeed, these two events were not part of the same police transaction or course of conduct.

They were completely separate and distinct. [ 65 ] As discussed earlier, the evidence was discovered legally by the police in the Applicant’s car at the side of the road, pursuant to the police power to search incident to arrest. As for the strip search, it occurred approximately one hour later, in another location, i.e. the police station, as part of the Applicant’s admission into the cellblock. [ 66 ] The testimony from both officers shows that their involvement in the investigation of the Applicant had just about wrapped up at this point.

When they arrived at the police station with the Applicant, they knew that he would be subsequently interrogated by detectives, who would take over the case. The two officers conducted the strip search of the Applicant strictly as part of his admission into the cellblock. Both officers testified that the strip search was performed for safety reasons, to make sure that the Applicant did not carry a hidden weapon into his cell. [ 67 ] As mentioned earlier, the Court finds that these safety concerns were not substantiated in this case and could not justify the strip search.

However, the purpose of the strip search is relevant as it establishes that this search was not performed as part of a continuum of the police operation during which the evidence was acquired. The acquisition of the evidence by the police and the strip search of the Applicant were two separate transactions, performed at separate times, in different locations, in a different context and for different purposes. [ 68 ] In addition, there is absolutely no causal connection between the acquisition of the evidence and the strip search.

It cannot be said that the strip search of the Applicant in any way influenced the earlier discovery of the firearm and cannabis in his car. [ 69 ] The Court therefore concludes that the Applicant has not met one of the criteria under s. 24(2): the evidence (i.e. the cannabis and firearm) was not obtained in a manner that breached his

section 8 right. His application for exclusion should therefore be dismissed. [ 70 ] It bears mentioning that, should the Court be mistaken on this issue and should the Applicant have successfully established that the evidence was obtained in a manner that breached his

section 8 right, the Court would nonetheless dismiss his application for exclusion because admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. [ 71 ] In R. v. Grant , [14] the Supreme Court of Canada stated that three factors must be balanced to determine whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: (

a) The seriousness of the Charter -infringing state misconduct;

(

b) The impact on the Charter -protected interests of the accused; and (

c) Society's interest in an adjudication of the alleged criminal misconduct on the merits. [ 72 ] The first line of inquiry involves an evaluation of the seriousness of the state conduct. The more serious the state conduct constituting the Charter breach, the greater the need for courts to distance themselves from that conduct by excluding evidence linked to the conduct. [ 73 ] In the case at bar, the strip search of the Applicant by the police was a very serious violation of his privacy and dignity.

The Court must firmly distance itself from such conduct. [ 74 ] While in no way wishing to trivialize this message, the Court must also note that, in the case at bar, the police did take some steps to mitigate the humiliation caused to the Applicant as much as possible. The strip search was performed in a small room where only the two officers were present. They shut all the windows and doors to block the view into this room before asking the Applicant to remove his clothes. The Applicant was given the opportunity to remove his own clothes, which he did.

The police officers did not touch the Applicant during the search but stood a few feet away from him, and the search lasted only for a very short time. [ 75 ] The Applicant submits that, apart from the Charter -infringing strip search, many aspects of the police work in the case at bar were deficient. While this is true, the Court finds that these shortcomings had little impact in the present case. For example: - The two police officers did not take ample notes during the course of the investigation.

They did, however, prepare a full report in the hours following their involvement in the case; - The arresting officer asked the Applicant a question before he had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. The Crown, however, did not tender into evidence the Applicant’s answer to this question, if any. Thus, this element was without consequence for the Applicant; - The two officers consulted each other’s notes, while they knew they should not.

The Applicant had ample opportunity, however, to cross-examine them on this issue and make appropriate submissions as to the reliability of these witnesses. [ 76 ] The second line of inquiry, as outlined in R. v. Grant , deals with the seriousness of the impact of the Charter violation on the Charter -protected interests of the Applicant. [ 77 ] In R. v . Grant , the Supreme Court of Canada examined the doctrine of “discoverability” in assessing the actual impact of a breach on the protected interests of the accused.

The doctrine of “discoverability” has been developed in order to distinguish those cases in which the accused’s conscription was necessary to the collection of the evidence, from those cases where the evidence would have been obtained in any event. [ 78 ] The Supreme Court stated: Discoverability retains a useful role, however, in assessing the actual impact of the breach on the protected interests of the accused. It allows the court to assess the strength of the causal connection between the Charter-infringing self-incrimination and the resultant evidence.

The more likely it is that the evidence would have been obtained even without the statement, the lesser the impact of the breach on the accused’s underlying interest against self-incrimination. [15] [ 79 ] Where, as in the case at bar, it can be said that the Charter -infringing conduct did not cause the evidence to become available, the impact of the state action is very much minimized. [16] [ 80 ] The third inquiry in determining whether admission of the evidence would bring the administration into disrepute relates to society’s interest in having the case adjudicated on its merits. [ 81 ] Pursuant to this line of inquiry, three factors in particular favour admission of the evidence. [ 82 ] First, the firearm and cannabis are real evidence, and there is no reason to have any concern as to its reliability. [17] Excluding reliable evidence may undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and render the trial unfair from the public’s perspective. [18] [ 83 ] Second, this evidence is key to the prosecution’s case.

Excluding highly reliable evidence such as this may more negatively affect the truth-seeking function of the criminal law process where the effect is to “gut” the prosecution’s case. [19] [ 84 ] Finally, the seriousness of the offence is a consideration. As the Supreme Court stated in Grant , the “public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence charged is serious”. [20] In the case at bar, the Applicant is charged with possessing a prohibited handgun capable of being discharged, with readily accessible ammunition (referring to the 13 bullets found in the gun’s charger).

The Applicant is also charged with being an occupant in a vehicle which he knew to contain these items. [ 85 ] Although the Crown elected to proceed by way of

summary conviction for both these offences, which are therefore punishable by a maximum of twelve and six months of imprisonment respectively, these offences and the prima facie facts of the case are, subjectively, of utmost concern for public safety. Thus, the public has a strong interest in having this matter proceed to a determination on its merits.

The negative effect of excluding the evidence would outweigh any negative repercussions the use of this evidence may have on the reputation of the administration of justice. [ 86 ] In conclusion, the Court must balance these three lines of inquiry to determine whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Weighing all these concerns, the Court concludes that the admission of the evidence would not, on balance, bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

CONCLUSION [ 87 ] For all the above reasons, the Court finds that:

a) The evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by the Charter , and alternatively;

b) The admission of this evidence in the proceedings would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. THEREFORE, THE COURT: DISMISSES the defence motion to exclude the evidence. __________________________________ ANOUK DESAULNIERS, J.C.Q. Mtre Jennifer Morin For the Crown Mtre Michel Swanston For the Applicant Date of hearing: November 20, July 10 and April 10, 2019