2014 QCCA 1311, 2014 QCCA 1311

O'Reilly c. R. 2014 QCCA 1311 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL N o : 500-10-005612-146 ( 500-01-002508-080 ) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: July 4, 2014 THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE MARIE-FRANCE BICH PETITIONER ATTORNEY GERALD O’REILLY Mtre isabel j. schurman Mtre VALENTINA CORSETTI ( Schurman Longo Grenier ) RESPONDENT ATTORNEY HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Mtre ISABELLE DORAY (absent) ( Criminal and Penal Prosecutor ) Motion for release pending determination and for suspension of sentence ( S. 679 (1) (

a) Criminal code ) Clerk: Linda Côté Court Room: RC.18

HEARING Continuation of the hearing of July 3, 2014. 10:14 Commencement of the hearing. 10:15 Judgment rendered – see page 3. 10:21 End of the hearing. Linda Côté Clerk JUDGMENT [ 1 ] On February 24, 2014, the Honourable Judge Louise Bourdeau, of the Court of Quebec, Criminal and Penal Division, District of Montreal, found the petitioner guilty of two counts (1 and 2) of fraud against the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia (ss. 380(1) Cr.C . ), one count (3) of conspiracy to commit fraud against said governments (ss. 465(1)

c) Cr.C. ), one count (4) of association with a criminal association ( s. 467.12 Cr.C. ) and one count (5) of laundering the proceeds of crime ( s. 462.31 Cr.C. ), all pertaining to cigarettes smuggling, which deprived the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia of more than 5 million dollars in taxes. [ 2 ] The petitioner appealed his conviction.

On March 26, 2014, he filed a notice of appeal on grounds involving questions of law only and, on April 16, 2014, he obtained leave to appeal on grounds involving questions of mixed law and fact. [1] [ 3 ] On July 2, 2014, he was sentenced to five years of imprisonment ( i.e. four years on counts 1, 2 and 3; one year, to be served consecutively, for count 4, and two years, to be served concurrently, for count 5). [ 4 ] The petitioner now seeks to be released pending the determination of his appeal, pursuant to ss. 679(1) and (3) , Cr.C . :

(1) A judge of the court of appealmay, in accordance with this section,release an appellant from custodypending the determination of his appealif, (

a) in the case of an appeal to the court ofappeal against conviction, the appellanthas given notice of appeal or, where leaveis required, notice of his application forleave to appeal pursuant to

section 678; […]

(3) In the case of an appeal referred to inparagraph (1)(

a) or (c), the judge of thecourt of appeal may order that theappellant be released pending thedetermination of his appeal if theappellant establishes that (

a) the appeal or application for leave toappeal is not frivolous; (

b) he will surrender himself into custodyin accordance with the terms of the order;and (

c) his detention is not necessary in thepublic interest. 679.

(1) Un juge de la cour d’appel peut,en conformité avec le présent article,mettre un appelant en liberté en attendantla décision de son appel :

a) si, dans le cas d’un appel d’unedéclaration de culpabilité interjeté devantla cour d’appel, l’appelant a donné unavis d’appel ou, lorsqu’une autorisationest requise, a donné un avis de sademande d’autorisation d’appel enapplication de l’article 678; […]

(3) Dans le cas d’un appel mentionné àl’alinéa

(1) a) ou c), le juge de la courd’appel peut ordonner que l’appelant soitmis en liberté en attendant la décision deson appel, si l’appelant établit à la fois :

a) que l’appel ou la demanded’autorisation d’appel n’est pas futile;

b) qu’il se livrera en conformité avec lestermes de l’ordonnance;

c) que sa détention n’est pas nécessairedans l’intérêt public. [5] I am satisfied that the first two conditions set out in ss. 679(3) are met here. [6] Indeed, not only are the petitioner's grounds of appeal not frivolous, but a number of them are of a serious nature. Furthermore,nothing indicates that he will not surrender himself into custody when ordered. On the contrary, he was at liberty during the proceedingsin first instance, which lasted more than six years, and he never breached any of the stringent release conditions that were imposed uponhim.

With the authorization of the respondent's representatives – which certainly shows a fair amount of trust – he also traveledextensively outside Canada during that time, for both business and personal reasons, and never failed to return and to attend all courtproceedings. He is gainfully employed and operates his own company, which employs seven other persons. He convinces me that, in thecircumstances, he presents no risk of flight and will surrender himself into custody if and when ordered to do so.

The fact that he wouldbe under the close surveillance of the police force and under strict release conditions reinforces this conclusion. [7] I am also satisfied that the petitioner's motion for interim release meets the third condition set out in ss. 679(3) in that hisdetention is not necessary in the public interest, which is to be measured according to the possibility of a threat to public security and thenecessity to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice: [12] Ainsi que l'enseigne une jurisprudence constante, cette condition « vise à la fois la protection et la sécurité du public, de mêmeque la confiance du public envers l'administration de la justice, eu égard à l'ensemble des circonstances du dossier » (Takri c.

R., 2010QCCA 1064, paragr. 11). Dans le même sens, voir par exemple : Divito c. Canada (Ministre de la Justice), (QCCA), J.E. 2004-2034 (C.A.); Chevreuil c. R., 2005 QCCA 978; El Morr c. R., 2007 QCCA 1362; Girard c. R., 2008 QCCA 1267;Marleau c. R., 2008 QCCA 1804; Rochon c. R., 2008 QCCA 2142; Samoisette c. R., 2008 QCCA 2521; Kyling c. R., 2011 QCCA 1359(requête pour autorisation de pourvoi à la Cour suprême rejetée (C.S. Can., 2012-04-12), 34504); L.G. c. R., 2011 QCCA 634; Corriveauc. R., 2013 QCCA 401, 2013EXP-1001; Richer c. R., 2013 QCCA 692, J.E. 2013-768; Des Châtelets c.

R., 2013 QCCA 871, J.E. 2013-950 et jurisprudence y citée.[2] [8] As far as public security is concerned, it is worth noting that the very serious crimes of which the petitioner was convicted werenevertheless committed without any sort of violence. The sentencing judge recognized this fact when she expressly refused to delayparole until half of the sentence be served (s. 743.6 Cr.C.).

As mentioned earlier, the petitioner was free during the six years after hisarrest and until July 2, 2014, when sentence was passed, and, in the meantime, he complied with all the conditions of his judicial release.Were he to be released pending the appeal, there would be no threat to public security. [9] As far as public confidence in the administration of justice is concerned, two principles must be considered: judgments need tobe enforced, certainly, considering that the presumption of innocence does not apply at this stage; judgments, however, may beerroneous – this is why there is a right to appeal and why s. 679 Cr.C. exists – and need not be enforced precipitously, without regard tothe specific situation of the offender.[3] In the present case, the seriousness of the crimes and the length of the sentence of imprisonmentmust certainly be considered.

The age of the petitioner (81) is not irrelevant, but so are the facts that he decided to start his criminalcareer when he was in his seventies (thus fully aware of the risks of such an illegal undertaking), and that he was driven by greed alone.Considering, however, the seriousness of the grounds of appeal, the absence of violence in the commission of the offences, the fact thatthe sentence will largely have been served by the time the appeal is heard, and, more generally all the circumstances hereinabovedescribed, I believe that, on balance, detention is not necessary. [10] In Beugré v.

R.,[4] my colleague Kasirer J.A. wrote that: [8] L'intérêt public commande, aussi, le maintien de la confiance du public envers l'administration de la justice [renvoi omis]. Il

ne faut pas qu'une décision de remettre l'appelant en liberté banalise le sérieux des condamnations ou le tort que les victimes ont subi en l'espèce. Il ne faut pas, non plus, qu'une décision de remettre l'appelant en liberté soit comprise par le public comme une espèce d'absolution pour la peine que la Cour supérieure vient de lui imposer.

Je retiens le critère traditionnellement identifié par la jurisprudence à cette fin [renvoi o mis]: la confiance dans le système de justice pénale du citoyen raisonnable, bien informé du processus judiciaire et des circonstances de l'affaire, serait-elle ébranlée par la mise en liberté de l'appelant à ce stade-ci des procédures?

Je ne le pense pas. [9] Si l'opinion publique peut être secouée par le sérieux des condamnations, je crois que le citoyen bien informé comprendrait que la détention de l'appelant, avec des moyens d'appels non frivoles et une fiche de bonne conduite de 33 mois entre son arrestation et son incarcération, n'est pas nécessaire dans l'intérêt public. [ 11 ] These comments apply here, where we have a “fiche de bonne conduite” of six years.

I am of the view that the incarceration of the petitioner, in the eyes of a well-informed public, would not affect confidence in the administration of justice, considering 1° all the circumstances of the present case, 2° that the petitioner will be subject to strict conditions of release, and 3° that, should his appeal be dismissed, he will then serve his sentence in its entirety. FOR THESE REASONS, I: [ 12 ] GRANT the motion for release pending determination and for suspension of sentence; [ 13 ] ORDER the release of the petitioner, on the following conditions : i.

A recognizance in the amount of $300,000, without deposit, by a third party, Mr. Kevin O'Reilly (who has already signed a recognizance in the amount of $250,000 which will thus be increased to $300,000), as a guarantee that the petitioner will comply with the conditions set out hereinafter; ii. The petitioner shall keep the peace, be of good behaviour and attend court whenever required; iii. The petitioner shall reside at [...], Beaconsfield, Quebec, [...] and not change address without the prior permission of this Court or one of its judges; iv. The petitioner shall not leave the Province of Quebec; v.

The petitioner shall surrender his passport to the Registry of the Court of Quebec, Criminal and Penal Division, District of Montreal, before being released, and not retrieve it or attempt to obtain another passport or any other travel document ; he shall also abstain from having in his possession a passport or any other travel document; vi. The petitioner shall abstain from communicating in any manner with persons whom he knows to have a criminal record relating to fraud or cigarettes smuggling, or be in the presence of such persons, with the exception of Pierre Morel; vii.

The petitioner shall abstain from being at the workplace of Robin Thibault or communicating in any manner with him or being in his presence; viii. The petitioner shall abstain from communicating with his former co-accused and co-appellants, except Gail Côté, Pierre Morel and Louis Moreau, and except in the presence of their attorneys for the purpose of preparing their appeals or for legitimate work or business purposes; ix.

As of July 9, 2014, the petitioner shall report to the Sûreté du Québec (1701, Parthenais Street, Montréal), every two weeks, on Wednesday, between 9 am and 5 pm, and sign the register, this condition being suspended when a Wednesday coincides with a statutory holiday; x. The petitioner shall refrain from using, carrying or having in his possession any firearms or weapons of any sort; xi.

The petitioner shall surrender himself into the custody of the Centre régional de réception de Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines (246, Montée Gagnon, Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec, J0N 1H0) within 24 hours of the judgment of this Court dismissing his appeal or within any delay prescribed by this Court at any time; xii.

Should the petitioner discontinue his appeal, he shall immediately surrender himself into the custody of the Centre régional de réception de Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines. [ 14 ] ORDER that an undertaking of these conditions be given before a justice of the peace assigned to such matters, before the petitioner is released. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.