2021 NBCA 33, 2021 NBCA 33

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 7-21-CA ADAM JOSEPH BECK APPELLANT ADAM JOSEPH BECK APPELANT - and - - et - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE INTIMÉE Beck v. R., 2021 NBCA 33 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Beck c.

R., 2021 NBCA 33 CORAM : l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Provincial Court: November 10, 2020 (conviction) January 5, 2021 (sentencing) Appel d’une décision de la Cour provinciale : le 10 novembre 2020 (déclaration de culpabilité) le 5 janvier 2021 (détermination de la peine) History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: Unreported Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : aucune Appeal heard: June 16, 2021 Appel entendu : le 16 juin 2021

Judgment rendered: June 24, 2021 Reasons delivered: August 19, 2021 Jugement rendu : le 24 juin 2021 Motifs déposés : le 19 août 2021 Reasons for judgment: The Honourable Justice Quigg Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Ben Reentovich For the respondent: Patrick McGuinty Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Quigg Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Ben Reentovich Pour l’intimée : Patrick McGuinty THE COURT On June 24, 2021, with reasons to follow, the appeal was granted and the sentence was varied to be that upon which the parties agreed: three months’ incarceration (less time served prior to his interim judicial release), followed by 24 months’ supervised probation.

We determined the three months’ sentence is not to be served intermittently. Our reasons are set out in the accompanying text. LA COUR L’appel a été accueilli le 24 juin 2021, avec motifs à suivre, et la peine a été remplacée par la peine sur laquelle les parties se sont entendues : trois mois d’incarcération (moins la période purgée avant la mise en liberté provisoire par voie judiciaire), suivis de 24 mois de probation sous surveillance. Nous avons décidé que la peine de trois mois ne doit pas être purgée de façon intermittente. Nos motifs sont exposés dans le texte qui suit.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by QUIGG, J.A. I. Introduction

[ 1 ] The narrow issue before the Court is whether the trial judge erred when she departed from the joint submission on sentence proposed by the parties and did not follow the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court in R. v. Anthony-Cook , 2016 SCC 43 , [2016] 2 S.C.R. 204 . II. Facts [ 2 ] On November 10, 2020, Adam Joseph Beck pled guilty to assaulting a 14-month-old child. A pre-sentence report and victim impact statement were ordered. [ 3 ] At the time of the offence, Mr. Beck was the boyfriend of the child’s daycare provider.

He eventually admitted to intentionally dropping the child four times while the child was in his care resulting in bruising to the child’s face, head, back, legs, arms and stomach, as well as causing a tooth to fall out. [ 4 ] On January 5, 2021, Mr. Beck was sentenced. Crown counsel and Mr. Beck’s defence lawyer presented a joint submission recommending three months in jail followed by a lengthy period of 24 months’ supervised probation.

The parties did not agree whether the sentence could be served intermittently. [ 5 ] At the sentencing hearing, defence counsel specifically noted there were discussions between Crown counsel and himself with respect to the seemingly low sentence for the nature of the assault: Those were considerations that Mr. Erickson and I put our minds to when we came up with this submission. The biggest part of it again, we’re hoping for a long probation sentence on top of […] the jail sentence so that Mr.

Beck can get help for his mental health issues. [Transcript of January 5, 2021, at p. 21] [ 6 ] The sentencing judge made the following comments with respect to the joint submission: And although the lawyers have come together and they’re going to propose a certain sentence, I’m not bound by that sentence unless it’s reasonable and not against the public’s interest sir. [Transcript at p. 6] So, what I have before me is a joint recommendation of three months. [Transcript at p. 29] So, I have to look again at this joint recommendation. Is it reasonable and against the public interest?

Well on this particular fact situation, although I seldom you know go against a joint recommendation I feel that it would be against the public interest if I sentenced Mr. Beck to a three-month jail sentence. [Transcript of January 5, 2021, at pp. 31-32] [ 7 ] The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a 15-month jail sentence followed by 12 months’ probation. [ 8 ] On February 1, 2021, Mr. Beck filed a Notice of Appeal. On February 19, 2021, he was granted judicial interim release pending his appeal, by consent, with conditions that mirrored his probation order. III.

Grounds of Appeal [ 9 ] A review of the Notice of Appeal and the parties’ written submissions reveals/indicates the issues on appeal can be distilled as follows:

a) did the trial judge err in law in not following the guidelines set out in Anthony-Cook? If so, should the sentence imposed by the trialjudge be varied?

b) should this Court stay the execution of the sentence imposed? IV. Standard of Review [10] Recently, the Supreme Court, in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2019] S.C.J. No. 100 (QL), reaffirmed its decisionin R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, regarding the applicable standard of review in sentence appeals: Appellate courts must generally defer to sentencing judges’ decisions. The sentencing judge sees and hears all the evidence and thesubmissions in person (Lacasse, at para. 48; R. v. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, at para. 46).

The sentencingjudge has regular front-line experience and usually has experience with the particular circumstances and needs of the community wherethe crime was committed (Lacasse, at para. 48; R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 91). Finally, toavoid delay and the misuse of judicial resources, an appellate court should only substitute its own decision for a sentencing judge’s forgood reason (Lacasse, at para. 48; R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 261, at para. 70).

As this Court confirmed in Lacasse, an appellate court can only intervene to vary a sentence if (1) the sentence is demonstrably unfit(para. 41), or (2) the sentencing judge made an error in principle that had an impact on the sentence (para. 44). Errors in principle includean error of law, a failure to consider a relevant factor, or erroneous consideration of an aggravating or mitigating factor. The weighing orbalancing of factors can form an error in principle “[o]nly if by emphasizing one factor or by not giving enough weight to another, thetrial judge exercises his or her discretion unreasonably” (R. v.

McKnight (1999), (ON CA), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont.C.A.), at para. 35, cited in Lacasse, at para. 49). Not every error in principle is material: an appellate court can only intervene if it isapparent from the trial judge’s reasons that the error had an impact on the sentence (Lacasse, at para. 44). If an error in principle had noimpact on the sentence, that is the end of the error in principle analysis and appellate intervention is justified only if the sentence isdemonstrably unfit. [paras. 25-26] [11] Therefore, the window for appellate intervention on sentence appeals is narrow.

This Court may only intervenewhere:

a) the sentence is clearly unreasonable; or

b) the sentencing judge committed an error in principle (which includes an error of law, failure to consider a relevant factor, orerroneously considering an aggravating or mitigating factor), and such an error had an impact on the sentence (see R. Her Majesty theQueen v. Pond, 2020 NBCA 54, [2020] N.B.J. No. 181 (QL), at para. 29; R. v. LeBlanc, 2003 NBCA 75, 264 N.B.R. (2d) 341, at para.17; Friesen, at para 26). V. Analysis A. First Issue: did the trial judge err in law in not following the guidelines set out in Anthony-Cook? [12] Mr. Beck committed a serious, violent offence upon a toddler.

In my view, a three-month period ofincarceration followed by two years of probation is a low sentence. I agree with Crown counsel when he states in his written submissionthat, in reality, when the facts and circumstances of this case are considered, the proposed sentence can be said to be uncomfortably low.It is not surprising the trial judge was reluctant to follow the joint submission. Her reticence to accept the sentence jointly recommended,however, triggered a process set out by Moldaver J. in Anthony-Cook.

The trial judge did not engage that process, and this resulted in aprocedural error that undermined trial fairness.

[ 13 ] In Anthony-Cook , Moldaver J. provided guidance for trial judges on how to approach joint submissions that raise concern to ensure that joint submissions are properly considered and accused persons who have pled guilty are treated fairly. First, trial judges should “approach the joint submission on an ‘as-is’ basis”; trial judges should take this approach whether they are considering varying the proposed sentence or adding a new component, such as a probation period (para. 51).

Second, before changing the sentence suggested in the joint submission, trial judges should apply the public interest test (para. 52): Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. [para. 32] [ 14 ] Thirdly, trial judges should inquire about the surrounding circumstances that led to the parties putting forward the joint submission, considering in particular: […] any benefits obtained by the Crown or concessions made by the accused.

The greater the benefits obtained by the Crown, and the more concessions made by the accused, the more likely it is that the trial judge should accept the joint submission, even though it may appear to be unduly lenient. [para. 53] [ 15 ] If the trial judge is still not satisfied after hearing the circumstances surrounding the joint submission, the judge should notify counsel of his or her concerns and provide an opportunity for further submissions (para. 58).

If still unsatisfied with the joint submission after hearing counsels’ submissions, the trial judge should provide an opportunity for the accused to withdraw his or her guilty plea (para. 59). Finally, if the trial judge decides to depart from the joint submissions after the above steps have been exhausted, the judge should provide “clear and cogent reasons” for doing so (para. 60). [ 16 ] With that said, one point of clarification must be made: the issue on appeal is not whether there was a procedural defect in the sentencing hearing.

Rather, based on the appropriate standard of review, the issue is whether the trial judge committed an error in law and whether that error impacted the sentence imposed. In other words, a trial judge’s failure to follow the framework set out in Anthony-Cook is not, on its own, sufficient to warrant appellate intervention. There must be more.

(1) The trial judge committed legal errors that inevitably impacted the sentence imposed [ 17 ] It is clear the trial judge was aware she could not reject the joint submission unless she was satisfied it was contrary to the public interest. She concluded it was. This, of course, raises the question: despite the procedural errors committed by the trial judge, should the sentence be upheld given the trial judge nonetheless concluded the sentence was contrary to the public interest?

More specifically, did her error have any impact on the sentence ultimately imposed? [ 18 ] The Supreme Court’s treatment of the trial judge’s analysis in Anthony-Cook is instructive on this point as it addresses a situation such as the present one : The Crown submits that on any test, the trial judge was entitled to depart from the joint submission. Respectfully, I cannot agree.

Setting aside that the trial judge failed to apply the proper test – he asked only whether the joint submission was fit – he failed to take into account the important systemic benefits of joint submissions, and the corresponding need for them to be reasonably certain . In terms of the custodial sentence, it appears the trial judge treated the joint submission as though it was a conventional sentencing hearing. With respect, he erred in doing so. The parties made a clear and firm recommendation on the appropriate sentence .

Importantly, the Crown did not resile from the joint submission, but maintained his position that he was seeking a further period of 18 months in custody even after he learned of the calculation error. In my respectful view, there was no basis for the trial judge to substitute his opinion for the considered agreement of counsel. The custodial term proposed, while low, was not so low as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest.

It was close to the range of sentence identified by the trial judge, and, as I have said, joint submissions promote the smooth operation of the criminal justice system. The appellant gave up his right to a trial and any self-defence argument he may have had. In the end, the trial judge’s deviation from the recommended custodial sentence – by only six months – amounts to little more than tinkering.

[paras. 61-63] [Emphasis added] [19] In Steeves v. R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 N.B.R. (2d) 88, Drapeau C.J.N.B., as he then was, discussed the standardfor rejection of joint sentence recommendation: In this country and certainly in New Brunswick, courts are required to give considerable weight to a joint recommendation on sentence.While courts are not bound by an agreement arising from resolution discussions between the parties, including a negotiated plea andjoint recommendation on sentence, the latter’s rejection must be the by-product of a principled exercise of discretion. In R. v.

Guignard(2005), 282 N.B.R. (2d) 346, [2005] N.B.J. No. 132 (QL), 2005 NBCA 35, the Court made the following observations on point: In R. v. LeBlanc (G.A.) at para. 23, the Court recognized that joint recommendations on sentence “provide important guidance and carryconsiderable weight.” Joint recommendations express the views of those charged with the primary responsibility of furthering the bestinterests of the accused and those of society as a whole during the sentencing process.

As such, those recommendations, while not legallybinding, deserve serious consideration and ought not to be disregarded lightly by sentencing judges. In our view, a joint recommendation on sentence should be followed unless it is unreasonable. In that regard, we endorse the views ofFish, J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Douglas (2002), (QC CA), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (Que. C.A.) at paras. 42-43 and51: Canadian appellate courts have expressed in different ways the standard for determining when trial judges may properly reject jointsubmissions on sentence accompanied by negotiated admissions of guilt.

Whatever the language used, the standard is meant to be an exacting one.

Appellate courts, increasingly in recent years, have stated timeand again that trial judges should not reject jointly proposed sentences unless they are “unreasonable”, “contrary to the public interest”,“unfit”, or “would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. [paras. 17-18] That said, I would adopt the following formulation because it emphasizes the exacting nature of the standard that courts must apply incases such as the present one: a proposed disposition ought to be rejected only if it is so off the mark that its adoption by the court wouldbring the administration of justice into disrepute or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest.

That is the standard proposed inthe Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure and Resolution Discussions, chaired by TheHonourable G. Arthur Martin, the salient parts of which are referenced by Fish J.A., now a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, in R.v. Douglas (2002), (QC CA), 49 C.R. (5th) 188, [2002] Q.J. No. 418 (C.A.) (QL): The Ontario Court of Appeal has enunciated the applicable standard in terms proposed by the Report of the Attorney General’s AdvisoryCommittee on Charge Screening, Disclosure and Resolution Discussions, chaired by The Honourable G.

Arthur Martin (“MartinReport”). The policy purposes underlying the Court’s approach and its choice of terminology are well explained in the Martin Report. These arethe particularly relevant passages: The Committee has [...] concluded that resolution discussions are inherently desirable, and of considerable practical benefit to theadministration of criminal justice in Ontario.

Recognizing that the practice of resolution discussions, even though inherently desirable, isopen to some misuse and to some misunderstanding by the public at large, the Committee has formulated a series of recommendationsaimed at eradicating the problems, both real and perceived, that are associated with unrestrained resolution discussions [...] [T]heCommittee recommends that a sentencing judge should depart from the joint submission offered only where it would bring theadministration of justice into disrepute or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest.

The Committee recognizes that an important, sometimes the most important, factor in counsel's ability to conclude resolutionagreements, thereby deriving the benefits that such agreements bring, is that of certainty. Accused persons are, in the Committee’s

experience, prepared to waive their right to a trial far more readily if the outcome of such a waiver is certain, than they are for the purely speculative possibility that the outcome will bear some resemblance to what counsel have agreed to. And likewise, from the perspective of Crown counsel, agreed upon resolutions that have a stronger, rather than weaker sense of certainty to them are more desirable because there is less risk that what Crown counsel concludes is an appropriate resolution of the case in the public interest will be undercut.

Since certainty of outcomes facilitates resolution discussions and agreements, and since resolution agreements, as the Committee views them, are beneficial and fair, it follows, in the Committee’s view, that certainty in outcomes of resolution discussions should be promoted. Naturally, the outcomes of resolution discussions would be perfectly certain if there were a rule that a judge could not depart from them. As discussed above in the introduction to this chapter, other jurisdictions approach this state of affairs by permitting the plea to be struck if the sentencing judge does not accept the joint submission.

But this is not the law in Ontario, nor, in the Committee’s view, should it be. It is fundamental to our system of justice that the court, not the parties, have the last word. While the presiding judge cannot have his or her sentencing discretion removed by the fact of there being a joint submission, it is none the less appropriate, in the Committee’s view, for the sentencing judge to have regard to the interest of certainty in resolution discussions when faced with a joint submission.

Accordingly, where there is no reason in the public interest or in the need to preserve the repute of the administration of justice to depart from a joint submission, a sentencing judge should, in the Committee’s opinion, give effect to the need for certainty in agreed upon resolutions by accepting the joint submission of counsel. [...] The Committee is of the view that the record created in sentencing proceedings should not be sparse, but, rather, must always fully support the submissions made [...] In encouraging the sentencing judge to place appropriate emphasis upon a joint submission, the Committee is thereby placing a corollary obligation upon counsel to amply justify their position on the facts of the case as presented in open court. [...] The sentencing judge will not, in the Committee’s view, have committed any error in principle in accepting a joint submission, as recommended above, provided he or she arrives at the independent conclusion, based upon an adequate record, that the sentence proposed does not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and is otherwise not contrary to the public interest.

Indeed, this recommendation embodies the essence of the sentencing judge’s obligations in passing sentence. In so recommending, the Committee has endeavoured to define the discretion of the sentencing judge in sufficiently broad terms to ensure that the sentence imposed is ultimately just, but at the same time has accorded the parties as much assurance as can be had that their agreed-upon resolutions will find favour with the Court.

In this way, it is hoped that the justice system and the community as a whole can profit to the greatest extent possible from the benefits of resolution discussions [paras. 43-45]. [paras. 30-31] [Emphasis in original.] [ 20 ] Also in this case, the sentencing judge did not give weight to the fact that trial lawyers are presumed to be “highly knowledgeable about the circumstances of the offender and the offence and the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions” and, as such, are able to produce joint submissions that reflect the interests of both the public and the accused ( Anthony-Cook , at para. 44 ). [ 21 ] A review of the record indicates the trial judge did not have essential information regarding the circumstances surrounding the creation of the joint submission, nor did she request it.

The relevant information was necessary in order to conduct a proper sentencing analysis. [ 22 ] As DeWitt-Van Oosten J. recently concluded in R. v. Manca , 2019 BCCA 280 , [2019] B.C.J. No. 1386 (QL) , sentencing judges commit an error in principle when they do not give counsel the opportunity to make further submissions on the rationale behind their joint recommendation on sentence where the sentencing judges determine they are reluctant to accept the joint submission (paras. 34-35).

DeWitt-Van Oosten J.’s conclusion on this point is based on the requirement delineated in Anthony-Cook that trial judges follow this procedure once they conclude that they are having difficulty accepting the joint recommendation before them ( Manca , at para. 35 ).

[ 23 ] It is apparent from the record that neither counsel volunteered the relevant information. However, the necessary information could have been provided to the sentencing judge had she expressed her concerns regarding the joint submission. There was an obligation on the trial judge to inform the parties of her reluctance to accept the joint submission in order to allow them to properly respond.

Furthermore, if a trial judge is not satisfied with the sentence recommended by counsel, “fundamental fairness dictates that an opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further submissions in an attempt to address the […] judge’s concerns before the sentence is imposed” (see R. v. G.W.C. , 2000 ABCA 333 , [2000] A.J. No. 1585 (QL) , para. 26 ).

In Anthony-Cook , Moldaver J. said: “the judge should notify counsel that he or she has concerns, and invite further submissions on those concerns, including the possibility of allowing the accused to withdraw his or her guilty plea, as the trial judge did in this case” (para. 58). [ 24 ] Dickson J.A., writing for the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, made the following remarks in R. v. Cheema , 2019 BCCA 268 , [2019] B.C.J.

No. 1345 (QL) , which are relevant to the case at bar: Given the foregoing, a judge presented with a joint submission must approach the sentencing task differently than on a conventional sentence hearing. Under the conventional approach, the judge focuses on the circumstances of the offender and the offence, and the applicable sentencing principles.

However, when assessing a joint submission, the judge must consider factors beyond the typical sentencing principles and should not “reverse engineer” a joint submission by determining the sentence that would have been imposed after a trial and comparing it to the jointly proposed sentence. Rather, the analysis should begin with the basis for the joint submission, including the important benefits to the administration of justice, and ask whether there is something apart from the length of the sentence that engages the public interest or repute of the justice system: Anthony-Cook at paras. 32, 42, 44, 48 ; R. v.

Belakziz , 2018 ABCA 370 at para. 18 . This approach enables a full appreciation of the basis and justification of the jointly proposed sentence: R. v. McInnis , 2019 PECA 3 at para. 78 . […] However, in my view, while the judge stated the test in Anthony-Cook correctly, she did not apply it. Rather, she conducted her analysis as though she was dealing with a conventional sentencing proceeding.

Contrary to the Court’s direction in Anthony-Cook , she assessed what she saw as a “fit” sentence based on considerations of deterrence, denunciation and protection of the public and, in doing so, failed to consider the significant systemic benefits that flowed to the justice system and the Crown from the joint submission. As Crown counsel below acknowledged, there was a potential flaw in the Crown’s case in connection with the search warrant, which concern she identified as a factor in the agreement reached by counsel. In addition, Mr.

Cheema’s guilty pleas saved valuable time, resources and expenses from an administrative perspective despite the fact that it was not entered until the first day of the scheduled trial. However, the judge did not take these important factors into account. […] In my view, given the established range of sentences that applied, it cannot reasonably be argued that the joint submission was unhinged from the circumstances of the offences and the offender to an extent that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

As in Anthony-Cook , there was no basis for the judge to substitute her opinion as to an appropriate sentence for the considered agreement reached by counsel based on their knowledge and negotiations with respect to the guilty pleas. [paras. 22, 26 and 29] [ 25 ] In R. v. Nahanee , 2021 BCCA 13 , [2021] B.C.J.

No. 47 (QL) , the court referred to Anthony-Cook when it determined a sentencing judge erred in law by imposing a sentence greater than that sought by the Crown : The Supreme Court in Anthony-Cook emphasised the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions with respect to whether the public interest demands a departure from a joint submission. It held “fundamental fairness dictates that an opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further submissions in an attempt to address the ... judge’s concerns before the sentence is imposed” (at para. 58).

In doing so, the Court cited, as a precedent statement of that proposition, a decision of the Court of Appeal of Alberta that predated R. v. R.R.B.: R. v. G.W.C. , 2000 ABCA 333 . In the Alberta case, Berger J.A. for the majority wrote: [26] In addition to the foregoing, the procedure followed by the sentencing judge in rejecting the joint submission in this case is a matter of concern.

Once a sentencing judge concludes that he might not accede to a joint submission, fundamental fairness dictates that an opportunity be afforded to counsel to make further submissions in an attempt to address the sentencing judge’s concerns before the sentence is imposed. In this case, lengthy submissions were made by both counsel in support of a probationary term which evoked no expressions of concern by the sentencing judge. He then retired to consider the disposition of the case. It was only upon his return to the

courtroom, and in the course of giving reasons for rejecting the joint submission, that counsel had any indication of concern on his part. As a result, they were afforded no opportunity to address that concern. Indeed, had the sentencing judge made his concern known to counsel in a timely fashion, the foundation upon which the joint submission rested might well have been laid.

I do not suggest that any particular procedure is de rigueur; I say only that the principle of audi alteram partem should be followed. [para. 44] [ 26 ] A review of the record from the sentencing hearing reveals the judge did exactly what the Supreme Court of Canada warns against in Anthony-Cook .

She conducted a traditional sentencing hearing and did not take the necessary step to consider the weight to be given to an informed joint submission that was based on clear and relevant factors, prepared by counsel who were familiar with the offence and the offender, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases. [ 27 ] With respect to the errors in principle alleged to have been made by the trial judge, I can do no better than to reproduce the list found at para. 37 of the Crown counsel’s submission: a.

The sentencing judge failed to take into account the important systemic benefits of joint submissions, and the corresponding need for them to be reasonably certain ( Anthony-Cook , at para. 61 ); b. The sentencing judge treated the joint submission as though it was a conventional sentencing hearing and generally ignored the fact that the parties made a clear and firm recommendation on the appropriate sentence ( Anthony-Cook , at para. 62 ).

Her analysis should have begun with the basis for the joint submission, including the important benefits to the administration of justice, and she should have asked whether there is something apart from the length of the sentence that engages the public interest or repute of the justice system ( see Cheema , at para. 22 ; R. v. Belakziz , 2018 ABCA 370 , [2018] A.J. No. 1313 (QL) , at para. 18 ). Following this approach enables a full appreciation of the basis and justification of the jointly proposed sentence ( see R. v. McInnis , 2019 PECA 3 , [2019] P.E.I.J. No. 7 (QL) , at para. 78 ); c.

Similar to what took place in Cheema , and contrary to the Supreme Court direction in Anthony-Cook , the sentencing judge assessed what she saw as a “fit” sentence based on considerations of deterrence, denunciation and protection of the public and, in doing so, failed to consider the significant systemic benefits that flowed to the justice system and the Crown from the joint submission ( Cheema , at para. 26 ). d.

The sentencing judge substituted her opinion for the considered agreement of the trial lawyers without having taken into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances that are to be uniquely considered where a joint recommendation on sentence is in place ( Anthony-Cook , at para. 63 ; Cheema , at para. 29 ); e.

The sentencing judge did not give due weight to the fact that both trial lawyers are presumed to be “highly knowledgeable about the circumstances of the offender and the offence and the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions” and, as such, are able to produce joint submissions that reflect the interests of both the public and the accused ( Anthony-Cook , at para. 44 ); and f. The sentencing judge did not give counsel the opportunity to make further submissions on the rationale behind their joint recommendation on sentence.

The sentencing judge was obliged to do so ( Manca , at para. 35 ; Anthon-Cook, at para 58). As a result, the sentencing judge was not equipped with essential and necessary information which would have enabled her to properly address and consider the joint recommendation. [ 28 ] Once full consideration has been given to the guidelines set out in Anthony-Cook as well as other appellate authorities, the errors committed by the sentencing judge become evident. [ 29 ] As a result of the errors committed, the judge did not possess the information she required to conduct a proper analysis.

Further, she failed to conduct a sentencing analysis that took into consideration all the factors outlined in Anthony-Cook . When the cumulative effect of the errors is considered, it is apparent they impacted the sentence imposed. For this reason, the Court can intervene on appeal. We may either vary the sentence or dismiss the appeal ( s. 687(1) of the Criminal Code ).

(2) Should the sentence imposed by the trial judge be varied?

[30] There are many benefits to joint submissions. The lawyers considered applicable jurisprudence to determine afit sentence in the circumstances of the concessions made. Additionally, they believed the 24-month probationary period would greatlybenefit Mr. Beck’s rehabilitation. [31] Furthermore, the Crown counsel advises in its written submission, there were potential issues with theadmissibility of Mr. Beck’s statement to police and if it had been excluded, the case against him would have collapsed. Mr. Beck did notobject to this information being before us.

Therefore, based on the condition that the Crown would enter into a joint submission for alenient sentence, Mr. Beck made a concession. He pled guilty, gave up his right to a trial and waived his right to challenge theadmissibility of the statement.

The court was not aware of this. [32] In Anthony-Cook, Moldaver J. discusses these situations: From the Crown’s perspective, the certain or near certain acceptance of joint submissions on sentence offers several potential benefits.First, the guarantee of a conviction that comes with a guilty plea makes resolution desirable (Martin Committee Report, at pp. 285-86).The Crown's case may suffer from flaws, such as an unwilling witness, a witness of dubious worth, or evidence that is potentiallyinadmissible – problems that can lead to an acquittal.

By agreeing to a joint submission in exchange for a guilty plea, the Crown avoidsthis risk. Second, the accused may have information or testimony to offer the Crown that can prove invaluable to other investigations orprosecutions. But this information may not be forthcoming absent an agreement as to a joint submission. Third, the Crown may considerit best to resolve a particular case for the benefit of victims or witnesses. When an accused pleads guilty in exchange for a jointsubmission on sentence, victims and witnesses are spared the “the emotional cost of a trial” (R. v.

Edgar, 2010 ONCA 529, 101 O.R.(3d) 161, at para. 111). Moreover, victims may obtain some comfort from a guilty plea, given that it “indicates an accused'sacknowledgement of responsibility and may amount to an expression of remorse” (ibid.). [para. 39] [33] When the circumstances surrounding the making of the joint submission in this case are considered, it appearsthe joint submission is reasonable and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

As the Supreme Court explains, wherean accused pleads guilty despite a significant weakness in the Crown’s case, “a very lenient sentence might not be contrary to the publicinterest” (Anthony-Cook, at para. 53). This point is of particular applicability in this case. Therefore, I would not deviate from thesentence suggested in the joint recommendation. [34] Although Crown counsel who appeared at the appeal was not the same as the one at the trial, he acknowledgedthe Crown could not revoke the position it took at the time of sentencing.

It, therefore, supported the imposition of the proposed jointrecommendation on appeal. As stated earlier, the sentence in the joint recommendation was very low. Regardless, a review of thejurisprudence indicates the Crown is correct when it states it cannot revoke its position taken at the sentencing hearing except whereexceptional circumstances exist. In R. v. H.S., 2014 ONCA 323, [2014] O.J. No. 1974 (QL), the court stated Second, I am mindful of the fact that the Crown seeks a harsher sentence on appeal than that sought below.

While there is no rule orprinciple that precludes the Crown from repudiating its position taken at trial, jurisprudence has established that it may only be done inexceptional circumstances – where it can be shown that the public interest in the orderly administration of justice is outweighed by thegravity of the crime and the gross insufficiency of the sentence: See R. v. P.J.B. (1999), (NL CA), 141 C.C.C. (3d)290 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Marks (1994), (NL CA), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 421 (Nfld. C.A.); Attorney General of Canada v. Roy(1972), (QC CS), 18 C.R.N.S. 89 (Que. Q.B.).

The public’s interest in the orderly administration of justice requires a consideration of any potential unfairness to the offender resultingfrom the Crown’s change of position as to sentence on appeal. Appellate courts have refused to intervene in a sentence where the record demonstrated that the offender acted in reliance upon theCrown’s position below. Courts have been particularly reticent to give effect to increased Crown submissions on appeal where offendershave pleaded guilty after receiving sentencing assurances from the Crown, or where the parties have made a joint submission onsentence: See R. v.

Agozzino (1969) (ON CA), 6 C.R.N.S. 147 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Wood (1988), (ONCA), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 570, 29 O.A.C. 99 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Simoneau (1978), (MB CA), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 307 (Man.C.A); R. v. Dubien (1982), (ON CA), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 341 (Ont. C.A.); Attorney General of Canada v. Roy (1972) (QC CS), 18 C.R.N.S. 89 (Que. Q.B.); R. v. Edwards (2001), (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 737. In suchcases, appellate courts have found that it would prejudice the offender to allow the Crown to repudiate its position on appeal. See also: R.v. Fleury (1971), (QC CA), 23 C.R.N.S. 164 (Que. C.A.); R. v.

Wood (1975), 1975 ALTASCAD 33 , 26C.C.C. (2d) 100 (Alta. C.A.). [paras. 59-61]

[Emphasis added.] [35] In R. v. P.J.B., (NL CA), [1999] N.J. No. 290 (QL), Wells C.J.N.L. wrote: This Court has held in R. v. Marks (1994), (NL CA), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 421 that: There is no rule or principle which precludes the court from considering an appeal in which the Crown takes a position different fromthat taken by Crown counsel at the trial level and this is so whether or not there has been a joint submission as to sentence. However, acourt will only interfere with such a sentence in very exceptional circumstances and where not to do so would result in an injustice. InAttorney-General of Canada v.

Roy (1972), (QC CS), 18 C.R.N.S. 89 (Que. Q.B.), Hugessen J. said at p. 93: The Crown, like any other litigant, ought not to be heard to repudiate before an appellate court the position taken by its counsel in thetrial court, except for the gravest possible reasons. Such reasons might be where the sentence was an illegal one, or where the Crown candemonstrate that its counsel had in some way been misled, or finally, where it can be shown that the public interest in the orderlyadministration of justice is outweighed by the gravity of the crime and the gross insufficiency of the sentence.

O’Neill J.A., at p. 430, concluded: Even if I were to conclude that the sentence is lower than one which might have been imposed, and I make no such finding, this courtshould be loath to set it aside, imposed, as it was, after the respondent had pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of assault causing bodilyharm on the clear understanding that the sentence to be urged upon the sentencing judge by Crown counsel would be within a certainrange, and such a sentence was actually imposed.

That is not to say that this court should never interfere in any such circumstance whenthe sentence imposed is grossly insufficient to reflect the magnitude of the crime; it should not do so here. Clearly a court of appeal can, on appeal by the Crown, increase a sentence that reflects the sentence requested by the Crown at trial, butis found to be unfit. It should only do so however, where exceptional circumstances warrant. [paras. 23-24] [36] In this case, Mr.

Beck entered into a guilty plea on the basis the Crown agreed to a particular sentence.Although the sentence is low, it would be difficult for the Crown to resile from its original position. B. Second Issue: should this Court stay the execution of sentence? [37] Mr. Beck pled guilty to assaulting a child and causing the 14-month-old victim significant injuries. Followingthe imposition of his sentence, he was released pending appeal. However, Mr. Beck no longer wants to be incarcerated as part of hissentence for this offence.

In his view, the time he has served (that is from January 5 to February 19, 2021) is sufficient. He feels thisCourt should not reincarcerate him. He no longer wishes to serve the remaining portion of the sentence he agreed to serve at the triallevel. As such, he now asks us to stay the execution of any further sentence we may impose. The Crown does not agree. [38] Mr. Beck relies on no legal authority to support his request, nor does he reference this Court’s decision on thisissue (see R. v. Veysey, 2006 NBCA 55, 303 N.B.R. (2d) 290, at para. 32).

More problematic, he attempts to support his position bypositing that this Court should stay the execution of the sentence in order to send a “strong response” to the sentencing judge. Theprinciples of sentencing outlined in the Criminal Code do not permit such considerations, nor does Veysey (para. 32). [39] In Veysey, this Court had to determine whether to reincarcerate Mr. Veysey, given that he had already servedan unfit custodial sentence of seven months. On appeal, this Court imposed an 18-month sentence, denied his request to stay theexecution of the sentence and reincarcerated him.

In doing so, the Court made the following points:

We find nothing inherently harsh or oppressive in jailing a person who has served a sentence that was demonstrably unfit. The fact that the original sentence has been fully served does not, by itself, warrant special consideration. At the same time, we are left with the Supreme Court’s caution that to require an accused to serve a fit sentence after having completed an unfit one may lead to an injustice. Thus, one must be prepared to recognize that in certain instances reincarceration could work an injustice. The difficult task is to identify the circumstances in which reincarceration would work such a result.

In short: What constitutes special circumstances? Having regard to the jurisprudence discussed above, we have isolated four factors that one could reasonably consider relevant to the issue of whether a stay should be granted. This is not to suggest that the list is exhaustive. Other pertinent factors may exist.

However, for purposes of deciding this appeal, we are content to examine the following: (1) the seriousness of the offences for which the offender was convicted; (2) the elapsed time since the offender gained his or her freedom and the date the appellate court hears and decides the sentence appeal; (3) whether any delay is attributable to one of the parties; and (4) the impact of reincarceration on the rehabilitation of the offender. [para. 32] [Emphasis added.] [ 40 ] Unlike Mr. Veysey, Mr.

Beck has not served the entirety of his original sentence, nor the entirety of the sentence contemplated by the joint submission. He served a portion of it and was subsequently released pending appeal. [ 41 ] A further factor to consider are the comments in Veysey regarding the potential of staying a sentence where an offender has been convicted of a serious assault (Mr. Veysey had been convicted of numerous non-violent offences): […] However, for the sake of argument, we are willing to assess the seriousness of the offences from the perspective that Mr.

Veysey was convicted of a $3,800 theft for which he received a jail sentence of seven months. In relative terms the conviction does not compare, for example, to a serious assault. In the latter type of case, an appellate court is unlikely to be sympathetic to the option of staying the fit sentence. Why? Because the stay order might well undermine, and seriously so, the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence.

Indeed, when one looks to the cases where a stay of execution of a fit sentence has been sought and denied, typically they involve crimes against the person: sexual assault, indecent assault and gross indecency against children, aggravated assault involving young women or manslaughter. On the other hand, the granting of a stay with respect to a conviction for a property offence does not instill the same sentiments when it comes to the question of whether a stay of execution should issue. For this reason, we are willing to assume that the first factor weighs in Mr.

Veysey’s favour. [para. 34] [Emphasis added.] [ 42 ] As it relates to the Court’s comments regarding the fact that a stay “might well undermine, and seriously so, the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence,” s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code cannot be ignored: Objectives — offences against children 718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. [Emphasis added.] Objectif — infraction perpétrée à l’égard des enfants 718.01 Le tribunal qui impose une peine pour une infraction qui constitue un mauvais traitement à l’égard d’une personne âgée de moins de dix-huit ans accorde une attention particulière aux objectifs de dénonciation et de dissuasion d’un tel comportement . [C’est moi qui souligne.] [ 43 ] In other words, entering a stay in this case risks undermining the sentencing goals of denunciation and deterrence given that this is a case where Parliament has explicitly legislated that primary consideration shall be given to those important objectives. [ 44 ] Although there are many factual differences between this case and Veysey , the non-exhaustive factors set out in Veysey are applicable .

Crown counsel has asked us to consider adding a fifth factor: “having regard to all the facts and circumstances, would the staying of the execution of the sentence bring the administration of justice into disrepute? Or, would the reasonable person, apprised of Canadian Charter values and all the facts and circumstances of the offence and the offender, lose confidence in the administration of justice if the execution of the sentence were stayed?”

[ 45 ] With respect to the first Veysey factor ( the seriousness of the offence), this factor weighs heavily against granting a stay. This was a serious and violent offence committed upon a 14-month-old child. Denunciation and deterrence are paramount. This Court’s comments in Veysey clearly establish that the first factor, in this case, weighs heavily against a stay. [ 46 ] Regarding the second and third Veysey factors ( the time that has elapsed since Mr.

Beck’s release from prison and whether any delay is attributable to one of the parties), it is apparent this appeal has progressed in a straightforward and efficient manner. There have not been any unreasonable or unanticipated delays nor any delays that can be attributed to either of the parties. [ 47 ] Finally, with respect to the fourth factor (the impact of reincarceration on the rehabilitation of the offender), there is no evidence to support the notion that reincarceration would hinder or otherwise impact Mr. Beck’s rehabilitation.

In fact, the rehabilitative portion of his sentence has not even yet commenced. His probation is set to commence once he completes his jail term. [ 48 ] On that point, this case is not similar to R. v. Dunn , 2011 NBCA 19 , 369 N.B.R. (2d) 271 . In Dunn , this Court considered the Veysey factors in order to determine whether to reincarcerate Mr. Dunn. In particular, the Court considered the fact that, at the time the Court rendered its decision, Mr. Dunn had completed his jail term and was in the 11 th month of his 15-month probation period.

With that consideration in mind, the Court concluded that “there is no valid reason to abruptly interrupt his rehabilitative path to punish him at this late point in time” (para. 24). This is not the case here. Mr. Beck has not yet commenced the rehabilitative portion of his sentence. [ 49 ] Finally, we may wish to consider the reputation of the administration of justice when determining whether to stay the execution of any further sentence we may impose.

In particular, we may consider whether the reasonable person apprised of Canadian Charter values and all the facts and circumstances of the offence and the offender would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the execution of Mr. Beck’s sentence were stayed. [ 50 ] In my opinion, the reasonable person would be offended by the staying of the execution of the sentence. Mr. Beck pled guilty to a serious and violent offence upon a child. The joint recommendation was for a particularly lenient sentence.

He now seeks to avoid that sentence on appeal and asks this Court to stay the execution of his sentence in order to send a “strong response” to the trial judge. Such a position would not sit well with a reasonable member of the public. [ 51 ] Had Mr. Beck remained in custody, the length of time necessary to complete the appeal process would have far exceeded the 90-day sentence that he would potentially receive on appeal. Accordingly, fundamental fairness dictated that Mr.

Beck should be released to ensure that he was not put in a position where he would have to serve a greater sentence than would potentially be imposed on appeal. Mr. Beck was released pending appeal and has not had to serve the remainder of his sentence in custody (which would have exceeded the original joint submission). [ 52 ] To stay the execution of the sentence solely based on the fact that an appellant has been released pending appeal and should not be reincarcerated because it amounts to an inconvenience for the offender would create a dangerous precedent going forward.

This would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice as well as this Court’s conclusion in Veysey that there is nothing inherently harsh or oppressive in reincarcerating an individual on appeal. [ 53 ] The factors that arose from Veysey were in the context of an accused who had completed serving an unfit sentence. The question before the Court was whether he should be reincarcerated in order to serve the remainder of the new sentence imposed on appeal. In this case, Mr. Beck has not served the entirety of the sentence that was reflected in the joint submission.

That, in and of itself, would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. VI. Conclusion [ 54 ] It is for these reasons that, on June 24, 2021, I joined my colleagues in allowing the appeal.

For the reasons set out above and given the position taken by the Attorney General on appeal, as well as the Attorney General’s support of the joint recommendation on sentence at the time of the sentencing, we allowed the appeal, varied the sentence imposed in the court below and imposed the originally proposed joint submission of three months’ incarceration (less time served prior to his interim judicial release) followed by 24 months’ probation. We determined the three months’ sentence is not to be served intermittently. We dismissed the appeal to have the remainder of the sentence stayed.

Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE QUIGG I. Introduction [1] La question très précise dont la Cour est saisie est de savoir si la juge du procès a commis une erreur lorsqu’elle a dérogé à la recommandation conjointe sur la peine proposée par les parties et n’a pas suivi les lignes directrices énoncées par la Cour suprême dans R. c. Anthony-Cook , 2016 CSC 43 , [2016] 2 R.C.S. 204 . II. Faits [2] Le 10 novembre 2020, Adam Joseph Beck a plaidé coupable à la perpétration de voies de fait contre un enfant de 14 mois.

La production d’un rapport présentenciel et d’une déclaration de la victime a été ordonnée. [3] Au moment de l’infraction, M. Beck était le petit ami de la pourvoyeuse de services de garde de l’enfant. Il a fini par avouer qu’il avait laissé tomber l’enfant intentionnellement quatre fois pendant que celui-ci se trouvait sous sa garde, causant des ecchymoses au visage, à la tête, au dos, aux jambes, aux bras et au ventre de l’enfant et lui faisant tomber une dent. [4] La peine de M. Beck a été prononcée le 5 janvier 2021. L’avocat du ministère public et l’avocat de la défense de M.

Beck ont présenté une recommandation conjointe prévoyant trois mois d’incarcération suivis d’une longue période de 24 mois de probation sous surveillance. Les parties ne se sont pas entendues sur la question de savoir si la peine pouvait être purgée de façon intermittente. [5] Lors de l’audience de détermination de la peine, l’avocat de la défense a fait expressément remarquer qu’il y avait des discussions entre l’avocat du ministère public et lui-même relativement à la peine qui paraît légère au regard de la nature de l’agression : [TRADUCTION] Ce sont des éléments que nous avons considérés, M.

Erickson et moi-même, lorsque nous avons formulé cette recommandation. Encore une fois, le principal élément de la recommandation est que nous espérons une longue peine de probation en plus de […] la peine d’emprisonnement, pour que M.

Beck puisse recevoir de l’aide pour ses problèmes de santé mentale. [Transcription du 5 janvier 2021, p. 21] [6] La juge chargée de déterminer la peine a fait les observations suivantes à l’égard de la recommandation conjointe : [TRADUCTION] Et, bien que les avocats se soient entendus et proposeront une certaine peine, je ne suis pas tenue d’infliger cette peine, sauf si elle est raisonnable et ne va pas à l’encontre de l’intérêt public. [Transcription, p. 6] Alors, ce que j’ai devant moi est une recommandation conjointe de trois mois. [Transcription, p. 29]

Alors, je dois réexaminer cette recommandation conjointe. Est-elle raisonnable et contraire à l’intérêt public? Eh bien, au vu des faitsparticuliers de l’espèce, bien que, comme vous le savez, je déroge rarement à une recommandation conjointe, j’estime qu’il seraitcontraire à l’intérêt public d’infliger une peine carcérale de trois mois à M. Beck. [Transcription du 5 janvier 2021, p. 31 et 32] [7] La juge chargée de la détermination de la peine a rejeté la recommandation conjointe et infligé une peinecarcérale de 15 mois, suivie d’une période de probation de 12 mois. [8] M.

Beck a déposé un avis d’appel le 1er février 2021. Il a obtenu, par consentement, sa mise en libertéprovisoire le 19 février 2021, sous réserve de conditions qui reflétaient les conditions prévues dans son ordonnance de probation. III. Moyens d’appel [9] Un examen de l’avis d’appel et des observations écrites des parties montre que les questions en appel peuventse ramener à ce qui suit :

a) La juge du procès a-t-elle commis une erreur de droit en ne suivant pas les lignes directrices énoncées dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook?Si tel est le cas, y a-t-il lieu de modifier la peine infligée par la juge du procès?

b) Notre Cour devrait-elle surseoir à l’exécution de la peine infligée? IV. Norme de contrôle [10] Récemment, la Cour suprême, dans R. c. Friesen, 2020 CSC 9, [2019] A.C.S. no 100 (QL), a réaffirmé ladécision qu’elle a rendue dans R. c. Lacasse, 2015 CSC 64, [2015] 3 R.C.S. 1089, relativement à la norme de contrôle applicable auxappels contre la peine : Les cours d’appel doivent généralement s’en remettre aux décisions des juges chargés de déterminer la peine. Le juge de la peine voit etentend toute la preuve et les observations en personne (Lacasse, par. 48; R. c. Shropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 R.C.S. 227,par. 46).

Le juge de la peine est habitué au travail de première ligne et, en général, il connaît la situation et les besoins particuliers de lacollectivité où le crime a été commis (Lacasse, par. 48; R. c. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 R.C.S. 500, par. 91). Enfin,pour éviter les retards et l’utilisation abusive des ressources judiciaires, la cour d’appel ne peut substituer sa propre décision à celle dujuge de la peine que pour un motif valable (Lacasse, par. 48; R. c. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 261, par. 70).

Comme l’a confirmé notre Cour dans Lacasse, la cour d’appel ne peut intervenir pour modifier une peine que si (1) elle n’estmanifestement pas indiquée (par. 41) ou (2) le juge de la peine a commis une erreur de principe qui a eu une incidence sur ladétermination de la peine (par. 44). Parmi les erreurs de principe, mentionnons l’erreur de droit, l’omission de tenir compte d’un facteurpertinent ou encore la considération erronée d’un facteur aggravant ou atténuant.

La manière dont le juge de première instance a soupeséou mis en balance des facteurs peut constituer une erreur de principe seulement s’il a « exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire de façondéraisonnable, en insistant trop sur un facteur ou en omettant d’accorder suffisamment d’importance à un autre » (R. c. McKnight (1999), (ON CA), 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (C.A. Ont.), par. 35, cité dans Lacasse, par. 49).

Ce ne sont pas toutes les erreurs deprincipe qui sont importantes : la cour d’appel ne peut intervenir que lorsqu’il ressort des motifs du juge de première instance que l’erreura eu une incidence sur la détermination de la peine (Lacasse, par. 44). Si une erreur de principe n’a eu aucun effet sur la peine, cela metun terme à l’analyse de cette erreur et l’intervention de la cour d’appel ne se justifie que si la peine n’est manifestement pas indiquée. [par. 25 et 26] [11] Il y a donc peu de place pour l’intervention d’une cour d’appel dans les appels interjetés à l’encontre de lapeine.

Notre Cour ne peut intervenir que dans les circonstances suivantes :

a) la peine est manifestement déraisonnable;

b) le juge chargé de déterminer la peine a commis une erreur de principe (qui comprend une erreur de droit, l’omission de tenir compte d’un facteur pertinent ou encore la considération erronée d’un facteur aggravant ou atténuant), et l’erreur a eu une incidence sur la peine (voir Sa Majesté la Reine c. Pond , 2020 NBCA 54 , [2020] A.N.-B. n o 181 (QL) , par. 29 ; R. c. LeBlanc , 2003 NBCA 75 , 264 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 341 , par. 17 ; Friesen , par. 26 ). V. Analyse A. Première question : la juge du procès a-t-elle commis une erreur de droit en ne suivant pas les lignes directrices énoncées dans Anthony-Cook? [12] M.

Beck a commis une infraction grave et violente contre un bambin. À mon avis, une incarcération de trois mois suivie de deux ans de probation est une peine légère. Je souscris à la thèse de l’avocat du ministère public lorsque celui-ci dit, dans ses observations écrites, que, en réalité, lorsque l’on tient compte des faits et des circonstances de l’espèce, on peut dire que la peine proposée est trop légère. Il n’est pas surprenant que la juge du procès ait eu des réticences à suivre la recommandation conjointe.

Sa réticence à accepter la peine qui avait été recommandée conjointement a toutefois mis en branle un processus établi par le juge Moldaver dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook .

La juge du procès n’a pas engagé ce processus, ce qui constituait un vice de procédure qui a compromis l’équité du procès. [13] Dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook , le juge Moldaver a formulé à l’intention des juges de première instance des directives sur la manière d’aborder les recommandations conjointes qui soulèvent des préoccupations, afin de garantir que les recommandations conjointes seront considérées convenablement et que les accusés qui ont plaidé coupable seront traités équitablement.

Premièrement, les juges de première instance devraient « aborder la recommandation conjointe telle qu’elle leur est présentée »; ils devraient adopter cette démarche qu’ils envisagent de modifier la peine proposée ou d’y ajouter un nouvel élément, par exemple une ordonnance de probation (par. 51).

Deuxièmement, avant de modifier la peine proposée dans la recommandation conjointe, les juges de première instance devraient appliquer le critère de l’intérêt public (par. 52) : Selon le critère de l’intérêt public, un juge du procès ne devrait pas écarter une recommandation conjointe relative à la peine, à moins que la peine proposée soit susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice ou qu’elle soit par ailleurs contraire à l’intérêt public. […] [par. 32] [14] Troisièmement, les juges de première instance devraient se renseigner sur les circonstances qui ont amené les parties à présenter la recommandation conjointe, en tenant notamment compte de ce qui suit : […] les avantages obtenus par le ministère public ou toutes les concessions faites par l’accusé.

Plus les avantages obtenus par le ministère public sont grands, et plus l’accusé fait de concessions, plus il est probable que le juge du procès doive accepter la recommandation conjointe, même si celle-ci peut paraître trop clémente. […] [par. 53] [15] Si, après avoir entendu les considérations sous-tendant la recommandation conjointe, il n’est toujours pas satisfait, le juge du procès devrait faire part de ses préoccupations aux avocats et leur offrir la possibilité de présenter des observations additionnelles (par. 58).

Si, après avoir entendu les observations des avocats, il est toujours insatisfait de la recommandation conjointe, le juge du procès devrait permettre à l’accusé de retirer son plaidoyer de culpabilité (par. 59). Enfin, s’il décide d’écarter les recommandations conjointes après avoir épuisé les démarches décrites ci-dessus, le juge du procès devrait énoncer « des motifs clairs et convaincants » à l’appui de sa décision (par. 60). [16] Cela dit, il y a lieu d’apporter une précision : la question en appel n’est pas de savoir s’il y a eu un vice de procédure dans l’audience de détermination de la peine.

La question est plutôt de savoir si, selon la norme de contrôle indiquée, la juge du procès a commis une erreur de droit et si cette erreur a eu une incidence sur la peine infligée. Autrement dit, le fait pour un juge de première instance de ne pas suivre le cadre d’analyse énoncé dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook ne suffit pas en soi pour justifier l’intervention en appel. Il en faut davantage.

(1) La juge du procès a commis des erreurs de droit qui ont inévitablement eu une incidence sur la peine infligée [17] Il est évident que la juge du procès savait qu’elle ne pouvait rejeter la recommandation conjointe que si elleétait convaincue que celle-ci était contraire à l’intérêt public. Elle a conclu que c’était le cas, ce qui soulève, bien sûr, la questionsuivante : malgré les erreurs de procédure commises par la juge du procès, la peine devrait-elle être confirmée, étant donné que la jugedu procès à néanmoins conclu que la peine était contraire à l’intérêt public?

Plus précisément, son erreur a-t-elle eu une incidencequelconque sur la peine qui a finalement été infligée? [18] La manière dont la Cour suprême a traité l’analyse faite par le juge du procès dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook estinstructive à cet égard, puisqu’elle touche une situation comme celle dont nous sommes saisis : Le ministère public soutient que, peu importe le critère, il était loisible au juge du procès d’écarter la recommandation conjointe. Soit diten tout respect, je ne peux être d’accord.

Hormis le fait que le juge du procès n’a pas appliqué le critère approprié — il s’est seulementdemandé si la recommandation conjointe prévoyait une juste peine — il a omis de prendre en compte les avantages systémiquesimportants des recommandations conjointes, de même que la nécessité correspondante qu’elles soient raisonnablement certaines. En ce qui a trait à la peine de détention, il semble que le juge du procès ait traité la recommandation conjointe comme s’il s’agissaitd’une audience classique de détermination de la peine. En toute déférence, il a ainsi commis une erreur.

Les parties ont formulé unerecommandation claire et ferme quant à la peine appropriée. Il est important de souligner que le ministère public ne s’est pas désisté de larecommandation conjointe, mais a maintenu sa position selon laquelle il sollicitait une période de détention additionnelle de 18 mois,même après avoir été informé de l’erreur de calcul. À mon avis, le juge du procès n’avait aucune raison de substituer son opinion à l’entente examinée avec soin par les avocats.

La peine dedétention proposée, bien que légère, ne l’était pas au point de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice ou d’être contraire à l’intérêtpublic. Elle s’approchait de la fourchette de peines indiquée par le juge du procès, et, comme je l’ai mentionné, les recommandationsconjointes favorisent un fonctionnement en douceur du système de justice pénale. L’appelant a renoncé à son droit à un procès et à toutargument relatif à la légitime défense qu’il aurait pu invoquer.

En fin de compte, en dérogeant — de seulement six mois — à la peine dedétention recommandée, c’est tout juste si le juge ne l’a pas simplement remaniée. [par. 61 à 63] [C’est moi qui souligne.] [19] Dans Steeves c. R., 2010 NBCA 57, 360 R.N.-B. (2e) 88, le juge en chef Drapeau (tel était alors son titre) adiscuté de la norme pour rejeter une recommandation conjointe sur la peine : Au pays, et certainement au Nouveau-Brunswick, les tribunaux doivent accorder un poids considérable auxrecommandations conjointes sur la peine.

S’il est vrai que les tribunaux ne sont pas liés par l’accord auquel les parties arrivent au termede discussions en vue d’un règlement, y compris l’accord qui consisterait en un plaidoyer négocié et en une recommandation conjointesur la peine, il reste que l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire qui conduit au rejet de recommandations conjointes doit reposer sur des principes. Dans R. c. Guignard (M.) (2005), 282 R.N.-B. (2e) 346, [2005] A.N.-B. no 132 (QL), 2005 NBCA 35, la Cour a formulé lesobservations suivantes à ce sujet : Au paragraphe 23 de l’arrêt R. c.

LeBlanc (G.A.), notre Cour a reconnu que les recommandations conjointes sur la peine « fournissentune orientation précieuse et ont une importance considérable. » Les recommandations conjointes expriment les opinions des personnes àqui il incombe au premier chef de servir l’intérêt véritable de l’accusé et celui de la société dans son ensemble dans le cadre du processusde détermination de la peine. Il s’ensuit que, même si ces recommandations ne sont pas juridiquement contraignantes, les juges chargésde la détermination de la peine doivent les prendre sérieusement en compte et ne pas les écarter à la légère.

Nous estimons qu’une recommandation conjointe sur la peine devrait être suivie à moins qu’elle ne soit déraisonnable. À cet égard, noussouscrivons à l’opinion qu’a exprimée [le] juge d’appel Fish (tel était alors son titre), aux paragraphes 42, 43 et 51 de l’arrêt R. c.Douglas (2002), (QC CA), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 37 (C.A.Q.) : [TRADUCTION] Au Canada, les cours d’appel ont énoncé de différentes façons la norme qui permet de déterminer à quel moment le juge du procès estfondé à rejeter des observations conjointes sur la peine accompagnées d’un aveu de culpabilité négocié.

Quel que soit le langage employé, la norme se veut rigoureuse. Les cours d’appel ont dit à maintes et maintes reprises, et encore plussouvent ces dernières années, que le juge du procès ne doit pas rejeter la peine qui lui est conjointement proposée à moins que celle-ci nesoit « déraisonnable », « contraire à l’intérêt public », « pas appropriée » ou « susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice »[par. 17 et 18].

Cela dit, je suis d’avis d’adopter la formulation suivante, parce qu’elle met l’accent sur le caractère rigoureux de la norme que lestribunaux doivent appliquer dans les affaires, telle la présente : la sentence proposée ne doit être rejetée que si elle s’éloigne à ce pointdes sanctions admissibles que l’adopter serait susceptible de déconsidérer l’administration de la justice ou serait par ailleurs contraire àl’intérêt public.

Cette norme était proposée dans Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosureand Resolution Discussions, rapport produit sous la présidence de M. le juge G. Arthur Martin. Le juge d’appel Fish, aujourd’hui élevé àla Cour suprême du Canada, se reporte aux passages essentiels du rapport dans R. c.

Douglas, (QC CA), [2002] J.Q. no 418 (QL) : [TRADUCTION] La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a énoncé la norme applicable en des termes proposés dans Report of the Attorney General’s AdvisoryCommittee on Charge Screening, Disclosure and Resolution Discussions, rapport produit sous la présidence de M. le juge G. ArthurMartin (rapport Martin). Les objectifs généraux qui sous-tendent la démarche de la Cour et le choix de ses termes sont bien expliqués dans le rapport Martin.

Lespassages particulièrement pertinents du rapport sont reproduits ci-dessous : [TRADUCTION] Le Comité a [...] conclu que les discussions en vue d’un règlement sont souhaitables en soi, et sont d’une utilité pratique considérable àl’administration de la justice pénale en Ontario.

Le Comité reconnaît toutefois que les discussions en vue d’un règlement, encore quesouhaitables en soi, peuvent entraîner un certain mésusage ou se heurter à une certaine incompréhension de la part du grand public, enconséquence de quoi il a formulé une série de recommandations visant à éliminer tant les problèmes que l’impression de problèmesassociés aux discussions en vue d’un règlement menées sans restrictions [...] le Comité recommande que le juge chargé de ladétermination de la peine ne repousse les observations conjointes des parties que si la sentence proposée est susceptible de déconsidérerl’administration de la justice ou est par ailleurs contraire à l’intérêt public.

Le Comité constate que l’un des facteurs importants, parfois même le facteur le plus important, de la capacité des avocats de s’entendresur un règlement et de tirer de l’entente les avantages qu’elle amène, est le facteur de certitude. L’expérience a appris au Comité que lesaccusés renoncent beaucoup plus volontiers à leur droit à un procès si les suites de la renonciation sont certaines, qu’ils n’y renoncents’ils se trouvent face à la seule éventualité d’une issue ayant quelque ressemblance avec la sentence dont les avocats ont convenu.

Demême, l’entente dont les suites sont plutôt certaines qu’incertaines paraît préférable au substitut du procureur général, parce qu’il risquemoins de voir exclue la sentence dont il a conclu qu’elle apporte un règlement approprié à l’instance dans l’intérêt public.

Puisque la certitude des suites d’une proposition facilite les discussions en vue d’un règlement et la conclusion d’ententes, et que lesententes sur un règlement sont, du point de vue du Comité, utiles et équitables, il convient, de l’avis du Comité, de faire en sorte que lesdiscussions en vue d’un règlement aient le plus possible des suites certaines. Bien sûr, les suites de discussions en vue d’un règlementseraient parfaitement certaines si une règle interdisait au juge d’aller contre leur résultat.

Comme l’indique l’introduction du présentchapitre, d’autres ressorts ont choisi, à cet égard, de permettre la radiation du plaidoyer si le juge chargé de la détermination de la peinen’accueille pas [la recommandation conjointe]. Le droit n’est toutefois pas de cet ordre en Ontario et, de l’avis du Comité, ne devrait pasl’être non plus. Il est fondamental, dans notre système de justice, que la cour, et non les parties, ait le dernier mot.

Quoique la production [d’une recommandation conjointe] ne puisse dépouiller le juge qui préside la séance du pouvoir discrétionnairequi lui est reconnu en matière de détermination de la peine, il demeure approprié, de l’avis du Comité, que le juge tienne compte,[lorsqu’une recommandation conjointe lui est soumise], de l’intérêt que présente la certitude dans les discussions en vue d’un règlement.Il s’ensuit que, quand l’intérêt public ou le besoin de protéger la considération dont jouit l’administration de la justice n’exigent pas derepousser [la recommandation conjointe], le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine devrait, de l’avis du Comité, donner suite aubesoin de certitude à l’égard de règlements dont les parties ont convenu et accueillir [la recommandation conjointe] des avocats. [...] Le Comité estime que le dossier de la procédure de détermination de la peine ne doit pas être

sommaire, mais au contraire doit toujoursappuyer abondamment les observations présentées [...] Du fait même qu’il invite le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine àménager [à une recommandation conjointe] une place appropriée, le Comité impose aux avocats l’obligation corollaire de justifieramplement ce qu’ils avancent d’après les faits de l’espèce, présentés en séance publique. [...]

De l’avis du Comité, le juge chargé de la détermination de la peine n’aura pas commis d’erreur de principe pour avoir accueilli [une recommandation conjointe], ainsi que précédemment recommandé, pourvu qu’il soit arrivé de lui-même à la conclusion, fondée sur un dossier suffisamment étoffé, que la sentence proposée ne déconsidère pas l’administration de la justice et n’est pas par ailleurs contraire à l’intérêt public. Cette recommandation exprime, à la vérité, l’essentiel des obligations qui échoient au juge appelé à prononcer la peine.

Le Comité, par cette recommandation, s’est efforcé de définir le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge chargé de la détermination de la peine en termes suffisamment larges pour garantir que la sanction infligée soit juste en définitive, tout en donnant le plus possible aux parties l’assurance que la cour verra d’un œil favorable les règlements dont elles auront convenu.

Le Comité espère que, de cette façon, le système de justice et la société dans son ensemble pourront, dans toute la mesure du possible, tirer parti des avantages qu’apportent les discussions en vue d’un règlement [par. 44 à 45]. [par. 30 et 31] [Soulignement dans l’original.] [20] En outre, dans cette affaire, la juge chargée de déterminer la peine n’a pas accordé de poids au fait que les avocats plaidants sont réputés « [connaître] très bien la situation du contrevenant et les circonstances de l’infraction, ainsi que les forces et les faiblesses de leurs positions respectives » et, par conséquent, sont en mesure de produire des recommandations conjointes qui reflètent les intérêts à la fois du public et de l’accusé ( Anthony-Cook , par. 44 ). [21] Un examen du dossier montre que la juge du procès ne disposait pas de renseignements essentiels sur les circonstances sous-tendant la formulation de la recommandation conjointe et qu’elle n’en a pas demandé.

L’information pertinente était nécessaire pour bien effectuer l’analyse sur la détermination de la peine. [22] Comme la juge DeWitt-Van Oosten a récemment conclu dans R. c. Manca , 2019 BCCA 280 , [2019] B.C.J. No. 1386 (QL) , un juge chargé de déterminer la peine commet une erreur de principe lorsqu’il n’offre pas aux avocats la possibilité de présenter des observations additionnelles sur les motifs qui sous-tendent leur recommandation conjointe sur la peine dans une situation où il est réticent à accepter la recommandation conjointe (par. 34 et 35).

La conclusion de la juge DeWitt-Van Oosten sur ce point est fondée sur l’obligation énoncée dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook pour le juge du procès de suivre ce processus lorsqu’il conclut qu’il a de la difficulté à accepter la recommandation conjointe qui lui a été présentée ( Manca , par. 35 ). [23] Il appert du dossier que ni l’un ni l’autre des avocats n’a fourni l’information pertinente. Toutefois, l’information nécessaire aurait pu être présentée à la juge chargée de déterminer la peine si celle-ci avait fait part de ses préoccupations à l’égard de la recommandation conjointe.

La juge du procès avait l’obligation d’informer les parties de sa réticence à accepter la recommandation conjointe, afin de leur offrir la possibilité de répondre de façon appropriée. De plus, si le juge du procès n’est pas satisfait de la peine recommandée par les avocats, [TRADUCTION] « l’équité fondamentale exige que soit offerte aux avocats la possibilité de présenter des observations additionnelles en vue de tenter de répondre aux préoccupations du juge […] avant qu’il impose la peine » (voir R. c. G.W.C. , 2000 ABCA 333 , [2000] A.J. No. 1585 (QL) , par. 26 ).

Dans l’arrêt Anthony-Cook , le juge Moldaver a dit que « [l]e juge devrait faire part aux avocats de ses préoccupations, et les inviter à y répondre, en leur indiquant notamment la possibilité de permettre à l’accusé de retirer son plaidoyer de culpabilité, comme l’a fait le juge du procès en l’espèce » (par. 58). [24] Écrivant au nom de la Cour d’appel de la Colombie-Britannique, la juge Dickson a fait les observations suivantes dans R. c . Cheema , 2019 BCCA 268 , [2019] B.C.J.

No. 1345 (QL) , observations qui sont pertinentes en l’espèce : [TRADUCTION] À la lumière de ce qui précède, le juge à qui l’on présente une recommandation conjointe doit aborder la détermination de la peine de façon différente que s’il s’agissait d’une audience classique de détermination de la peine. Selon la méthode classique, le juge se concentre sur les circonstances de l’infraction et la situation du délinquant ainsi que sur les principes applicables de détermination de la peine.

Cependant, lorsqu’il évalue une recommandation conjointe, le juge doit tenir compte de facteurs qui sortent du cadre habituel des principes de détermination de la peine et ne devrait pas [TRADUCTION] « désosser » une recommandation conjointe en établissant la peine qui aurait été infligée à l’issue d’un procès et en comparant celle-ci à la peine proposée conjointement.

L’analyse devrait plutôt commencer par le fondement de la recommandation conjointe, notamment les avantages importants pour l’administration de la justice, et il faudrait se demander s’il y a autre chose que la durée de la peine qui met en cause l’intérêt public ou la considération dont jouit le système de justice : Anthony-Cook ,

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